Consciousness and the Limits of Social Conformity: A Theory of Ideology through the Works of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek by Bailes, JR
 
 
 
 
 
Consciousness and the Limits of Social Conformity: 
A Theory of Ideology through the Works of  
Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek 
 
 
Jonathan Richard Bailes 
 
UCL 
PhD European Studies  
2 
 
 
 
I, Jonathan Richard Bailes, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own.  Where 
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the 
thesis. 
 
Signature:      Date: 31
st
 March 2017  
3 
 
Abstract 
This thesis constructs a theory of ideology that outlines various ways individuals internalise 
conditions in advanced consumer capitalist societies.  It defines a concept of ideology and an 
approach to analysing ideological rationalisation, and identifies currently prevalent ideologies in 
terms of beliefs, levels of social awareness, and contradictions.  These aims are achieved via 
critical examination of existing ideology theories, in particular those of Herbert Marcuse, Fredric 
Jameson, and Slavoj Žižek.  Specifically, we analyse their dialectical and psychoanalytic 
conceptions of subjectivity, or approaches to ideology that emphasise both its necessity and 
partiality, and thus imply a certain inherent potential for transformation.  We also affirm their 
notions of society as an incomplete totality, whose consumerist pluralism is based around some 
repressed or excluded element, and the idea that ideology theory should identify with that element 
to gain a wider social perspective.  However, our ideology theory does not focus as fully as theirs 
on the unconscious, or ideology as a libidinal attachment to existing social relations that is 
identifiable through behaviour, rather than consciously articulated ideas.  While we accept a 
concept of libidinal attachment, we equally emphasise the role that consciously rationalised 
beliefs and values play in sustaining it by justifying behaviour.  We understand that conscious 
rationalisation is not merely a secondary effect of attachment, because it becomes a necessary 
support in all ideologies that can affect attachment itself if sufficiently challenged.  This notion 
enables us to consider the limits of specific ideologies, and their conditional relations to dominant 
power structures, that many ideology theories understate.  It also has repercussions for the 
radical political possibilities that Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek analyse, in that, while we accept 
many of the obstacles that face notions of political change in today’s consumer capitalist 
societies, our theory implies more direct ways in which alternative ideas can challenge dominant 
social relations by confronting contradictions in affirmative ideologies. 
Key words: ideology, rationalisation, subjectivity, consciousness, consumerism, radical politics, 
totality, domination, reification, fragmentation, Marcuse, Jameson, Žižek 
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In other matters no sensible person will behave so irresponsibly or rest content with such 
feeble grounds for his opinions and for the line he takes.  It is only in the highest and most 
sacred things that he allows himself to do so. 
Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion 
 
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; 
in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. 
Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks 
 
In other words, when the final economic crisis of capitalism develops, the fate of the 
revolution (and with it the fate of mankind) will depend on the ideological maturity of the 
proletariat, i.e. on its class consciousness. 
Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis constructs a theory of ideology that outlines various ways individuals understand and 
accept social conditions in advanced consumer capitalism.  It defines a concept of ideology and 
an approach to analysing ideological ‘rationalisation’,
1
 according to which different positions are 
described.  These aims are achieved via critical examination of existing ideology theories, in 
particular those of Herbert Marcuse, Fredric Jameson, and Slavoj Žižek, which incorporate 
dialectical conceptions of social relations, and identify various ideologies.  We adopt numerous 
core elements of these theories, but also explore common and specific issues they raise.  
Particularly, we shift ideology theory away from a focus on the unconscious and what we call 
‘negative’ ideology, or ideology based on a libidinal attachment to existing social relations that is 
identifiable through behaviour, rather than consciously articulated ideas.  This concept of ideology 
is negative in the sense that it assumes people do not need to believe in any guiding principles to 
justify their actions.  We accept a concept of libidinal attachment, but emphasise the role that 
conscious rationalisation plays in sustaining it, by showing how it remains dependent on 
assumptions, beliefs and values, or ‘positive’ ideological content that justifies behaviour.  This 
approach shows that conscious rationalisation is not merely a secondary effect of libidinal 
attachment, because it becomes a necessary support in all ideologies that can affect the 
attachment itself if sufficiently challenged.  With this notion, we are able to consider the limits of 
specific ideologies, and their conditional relations to dominant power structures, that many 
ideology theories understate.
2
 
                                                             
1 In our terms, rationalisation is the conscious aspect of ideology, or beliefs and justifications that support 
behaviour.  In many ways, the concept follows psychoanalytic definitions of rationalisation as a defence 
mechanism, which ‘offers logical and believable explanations for irrational behaviours that have been 
prompted by unconscious wishes’ (Anthony Bateman and Jeremy Holmes, Introduction to Psychoanalysis: 
Contemporary Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 92).  However, according to our 
understanding of ideology, rationalisation is not merely the way people justify specific instances of 
irrational behaviour, but how they justify a basic unconscious adherence to a subject position.  In this 
sense, rationalisation is a core component of subjectivity, which develops in accordance with the subject’s 
relationship to existing cultural norms and concepts of rationality. 
2 In this respect, our approach contrasts with those of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, and aspects of certain 
other major theories of ideology.  For example, it challenges Althusser’s stress on how subjects ‘“work by 
themselves” in the majority of cases’, once they have been ‘inserted into practices governed by rituals of 
the ISAs [Ideological State Apparatuses]’ (Louis Althusser, On ideology (London: Verso, 2008), p. 55).  Or, it 
questions Bourdieu’s understanding that ideological effects are mostly transmitted ‘through language, 
through the body, through attitudes towards things which are below the level of consciousness’ (Pierre 
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The thesis addresses a number of interconnected questions: What kinds of ‘affirmative’ 
ideologies are prevalent in advanced capitalist societies?
3
  What are their qualities, in terms of 
beliefs, social awareness, psychology, and contradictions?  What are the strengths and 
weaknesses in existing ideology theories for describing these ideologies?  How do these 
theoretical approaches affect consideration of political possibilities and practices? 
At this stage, it is important to understand what we mean by ‘ideology’.  In simple terms, it 
describes the ways people act and comprehend their actions according to their perception of 
cultural norms and societal functioning.  However, as our focus on Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek 
implies, we develop this concept in a certain theoretical direction, specifically one that revolves 
around Marxist dialectics and psychoanalysis.  The crucial aspect of these approaches is the way 
they place incompleteness and contradiction at the heart of both the social order and the psyche.  
In terms of dialectics, the important point is the tension between maintaining the social order and 
the contradictions and potentials for change that exist within it.  In this sense, ideology either 
justifies the existing order and represses contradictions (for example, by denying them, or 
explaining them away as more superficial problems), or it defines the contradictions as 
fundamental and imagines alternatives based on their resolution.  Meanwhile, in terms of 
psychoanalysis, we understand that consciousness presumes an unconscious attachment to 
language that necessarily integrates subjects into power relations, because any stability of 
meaning in language implies the dominance of certain ideas over others.  Thus, subjects already 
have an ideological affiliation based on their position in society and exposure to cultural 
narratives, which most likely conform to dominant notions of maintaining the existing social 
structure.  However, there remains a ‘drive’ in the psyche that also represents a dialectical 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, ‘Doxa and Common Life: An Interview’, in Mapping Ideology, pp. 265-277 (p. 
270)). 
3 Our concept of ‘affirmative’ ideology is defined in contrast to ‘oppositional’ ideology, and marks a 
distinction between behaviour and corresponding beliefs that  in general tend towards reinforcement of 
existing social relations, and behaviour and beliefs that tend towards rejection of existing social relations 
or agitation for large-scale social change.  Put this way, affirmative ideology does not only describe belief 
systems that view dominant ideas and structures as relatively just and reasonable, but also those that 
understand them as corrupt and unjust, but conform to them regardless (yet, as such, it also implies that 
different forms of affirmation involve different rationalisations, some of which may be less committed to 
existing conditions than others).  The term ‘affirmative’ in this sense draws on Marcuse’s concept of 
bourgeois ‘affirmative culture’, in which ‘even unhappiness’, or the acknowledgement that what exists is 
not ideal, still ‘becomes a means of subordination and acquiescence’ (Herbert Marcuse, ‘The Affirmative 
Character of Culture’, in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, trans. by Jeremy. J. Shapiro (London: Allen 
Lane, 1968), pp. 65-98 (p. 89)). 
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potential, in that it points to the contingency of attachment and lack of psychological fulfilment.  
The possibility that subjects may recognise this contingency, and with it the contingency of the 
social order, then haunts all affirmative ideologies.   
Our definition of ideology is thus one that focuses on its different ‘political effects’, or how 
ideologies reinforce or resist established institutions and ideas.  This approach itself implies a 
particular political stance, or a radical opposition to existing social relations based on ideas that 
realising certain obscured potentials could reduce suffering and deprivation.  As we see it, this 
perspective is not deficient for ideological analysis due to its partiality; rather, such partiality is 
necessary to gain a wider view of the current ideological composition.  It enables a theory that 
formulates different ideological positions in terms of their relationship to each other and some 
notion of an overall social structure.  Ideology theory of this type is thus intrinsically connected to 
concerns of political change, because it identifies and contests socially dominant assumptions, 
leading to considerations of their alternatives.  In this sense, ideology analysis becomes an 
important element in the ‘three tasks’ that comprise political change: ‘diagnosis and critique; 
formulating alternatives; and elaborating strategies of transformation’.
4
  Specifically, once we have 
identified the major problems in the existing system and possible replacements, the question of 
how such changes may occur is dependent on understanding ideologies and potential ways to 
challenge them. 
At the same time, the other main point about our concept of ideology is one that departs 
from the directions that Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek take, particularly their emphasis on the 
difficulties for widespread oppositional consciousness to develop within and affect current 
ideological conditions.  In our view, while their conclusions often realistically evaluate dominant 
power relations, and the sheer scope and adaptability of consumer capitalism, they also involve 
theoretical assumptions that present the ideological climate as more unified than is necessary.  
Broadly speaking, these issues surround concepts of reification and one-dimensionality in 
Marcuse, postmodern fragmentation in Jameson, and the primacy of enjoyment and unconscious 
attachment in Žižek.  In each case, we assert that the uniformity or ubiquity of these factors is 
overplayed, in a way that can make oppositional consciousness appear politically impotent.  As 
                                                             
4 Eric Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (London: Verso, 2010), p. 8. 
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such, the various ideologies that these theories identify are mostly not analysed in terms of 
contradictions in beliefs and values that can be challenged by such opposition. 
We develop our concept based on three proposals that mostly accord with Marcuse, Jameson 
and Žižek’s theories, and a fourth proposal that marks our shift in focus towards conscious 
rationalisation: 
 
1. Ideology is always present and always political 
2. Ideology relates to class division and struggle 
3. Ideology is produced by and produces social relations 
4. Ideology always relies on conscious, contestable beliefs 
 
These four proposals together constitute an approach to ideology that more equally balances its 
unconscious aspects, often emphasised in our source material, with the role of conscious 
rationalisation.  Thus, on one hand, ideology involves an unconscious attachment to the social, 
which is structured by the subject’s position in relation to existing ideas and institutions.  But, on 
the other hand, the attachment is consciously rationalised and vulnerable to certain contradictory 
experiences or alternative ideas, and such challenges may cause ideological shifts which could 
ultimately alter the subject’s position and restructure the form of attachment.  In other words, the 
existing dominant social structure facilitates numerous forms of affirmative rationalisation that 
then have different ‘tipping points’, or levels of tolerance for experience/knowledge of 
contradictions and exclusions, which may be exceeded.  The theoretical shift then has 
repercussions in terms of the way Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek imagine radical social change, in 
that it implies more direct ways in which alternative ideas can challenge ideologies that support 
current social relations. 
The first important point established by these proposals is that ideological analysis is itself 
affected by the ideology of the theorist.  That is, there is no ‘false consciousness’ that can be 
contrasted with some absolute truth or actual reality,
5
 even though ideologies can be more self-
                                                             
5 This idea is implied by Engels, in his comment that: ‘Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called 
thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness.  The real motives impelling him remain 
unknown to him’ (Freidrich Engels, ‘Letter from Engels to Franz Mehring’, Marxists.org, 14 July 1893 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1893/letters/93_07_14.htm> [accessed 10 August 2016] 
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reflexive by recognising themselves as ideologies.  This idea also implies that all people have an 
ideology, whether or not they are interested in social matters, primarily because their actions and 
beliefs either (tacitly) support the existing social order or reject it.  The possibility of rejection then 
splits the social itself, defining it as a particular formation that necessarily affirms certain values 
and disavows others.  We view this split along ‘class’ lines, in the sense that dominant capitalist 
logic implies certain forms of exclusion and disparity, and is especially influential over social 
behaviour.  From this insight, we consider that the plurality of ideological positions in consumer 
capitalist societies is an expression of a general structuring logic.  Thus, even if the cultural field 
appears to be fragmented and limitless, many ideologies internalise needs and desires that enact 
the requirements of systemic reproduction.  Even so, because social relations are not internalised 
in a uniform manner, they may also generate ideas that exceed this reproduction, and even 
influence the structure itself.  This point enables us to stress a ‘conditional’ relationship between 
ideologies and dominant influences, which relies on social institutions generating justificatory 
narratives, meeting expectations, and repressing subordinate ideas.  These conditions indicate 
beliefs and assumptions that can be identified and contested, and represent varying levels of 
commitment to the social order. 
This understanding allows us to split ideology into two levels, defined as a ‘baseline’ of 
affirmation or rejection, and ‘rationalisation’ of that basic attachment.  In our terms, both these 
levels are equally important, and comprise a circuitous or mutually constitutive relationship, in the 
sense that the baseline overdetermines rationalisation, and rationalisation influences the baseline.  
In this way, conscious experience and knowledge can conceivably alter subjects’ behaviour, 
because ‘interpellation’, or the subject’s basic recognition of itself as a subject through language, 
does not precede rationalisation in a linear cause and effect relationship.  It is then pertinent to 
identify different ideological positions in consumer capitalism to define the kinds of conditional 
beliefs they have, and the limits of their rationalisation.  We argue that, for the subjective and 
political potentials identified by Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek plausibly to exceed existing social 
relations in current conditions, the role of conscious rationalisation in ideology must be more fully 
considered.  For Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, the important point is that people often act in 
conformist ways despite being unable to justify them morally.  Therefore, challenging people’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
(para. 4 of 13)).  In our understanding, there is no alternative position in which consciousness can access 
the ‘real motives’. 
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beliefs has little effect on their actions, which are internalised at an unconscious level.  In Žižek’s 
Lacanian terms, conscious belief ‘disavows’ a deeper libidinal attachment, so ideological change 
instead requires subjects to recognise their ‘enjoyment’ of conformism for its own sake.  In our 
understanding, however, there remains a line of rationalisation connecting this disavowal to the 
attachment, because individuals must still explain why they do not act according to their beliefs.  
The root to uncovering the ultimate contingency of their actions is then still that of locating 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the assumptions behind this rationalisation. 
The remainder of this chapter explores our proposals and their theoretical significance in 
more detail.  It establishes the importance of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek to our concept of 
ideology, against other possible approaches, and the grounds of inquiry in the subsequent 
chapters.  The three main chapters — on Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek respectively — then 
investigate the work of each individual, and aim to reinforce central concepts of a dialectical 
approach to ideology; consider difficulties of expressing and developing oppositional ideology in 
consumer capitalist societies; identify a range of affirmative ideologies in these conditions, with 
their particular beliefs and assumptions; and explain how this ideological content is important in 
imagining solutions to some of the difficulties described.  The chapters are structured 
thematically, based on concepts that all three theorists consider, especially relating to the impact 
of mass commodification on subjectivity and political agency, as well as our emphasis on 
ideological rationalisation.  The repeated structure allows us to extract a social theory and 
ideology model from a critical analysis of Marcuse, then develop it through similar analyses of 
Jameson and Žižek.  However, each theory does not merely supersede its predecessor, and we 
show that aspects of Marcuse’s theory from the post-war mass consumerist boom and the cultural 
revolution of the 1960s remain pertinent, or enable us to reintroduce ideas that are less prominent 
in the later theories of Jameson and Žižek. 
 
1. Ideology is always present and always political 
The initial purpose of this statement is to explain that ideology is not only attributable to ruling 
ideas, or forces of social domination, as all thought cannot be both ideological and dominant.
6
  In 
our understanding, all thought emerges in language that is embedded within social power 
                                                             
6 Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2007), p. 2. 
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relations, so any particular viewpoint is implanted in networks of dominance and subordination.  
Thus, although not every action and thought is politically significant, any set of beliefs and 
behaviour is political in that it effectively either supports or disrupts the existing networks.  From 
this perspective, any viewpoint is ideological because it has a political effect, so there is no point 
outside ideology from which it can be analysed, or no consciousness that provides absolutely 
authoritative understanding of ideologies.  Also, because viewpoints contradict each other they 
cannot all be dominant, and some will have a more subordinate position in power relations.  
However, different viewpoints have different political and social repercussions, so those that view 
existing social relations in terms of what they repress or marginalise, and their potentials for 
transformation, can offer a ‘wider’ view than others.  In this respect, Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek 
all suggest that particular subordinate positions can reveal limits in more common positions that 
may otherwise be missed.  As an ideology itself, this notion already has its own positive ideas, 
but, in theorising the contingency of ideologies in general, should also have a level of self-
reflexivity. 
Ideology is thus understood in terms of a dialectic, in which ideologies, as partial views of 
the social order, are incomplete and imply a potential beyond themselves, within their own 
contradictions.  Recognising this constitutive incompleteness is then a way of enabling 
consideration of society beyond accepted norms.  Society itself is viewed as a ‘totality’ comprising 
its supportive ideologies, which is incomplete and contingent because certain notions of 
acceptable behaviour dominate within it, and therefore repress alternative notions.  That 
repression creates both material deprivation and effective prohibition on certain ideas and 
interpretations, which point to potentials beyond the totality.  The politics of such ideology theory 
then inevitably identifies with what is normally excluded, but this conception of totality also 
indicates that all understandings of ideology are political, because they either look beyond what 
exists, or universalise current social relations by not considering such potentials. 
Throughout the thesis, we affirm the main tenets of this dialectical approach, which are 
also central to the theories of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, and represent the primary common 
factor between their theories, and our own.  With Marcuse, it is manifested particularly in his 
contrast between ‘one-dimensionality’, which describes a kind of automatic absorption of 
dominant ideas, and ‘two-dimensional’ thinking, which perceives existing values as expressions of 
Introduction 
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particular and transcendable social forms.  As he puts it, the aim is that dialectical philosophy 
‘frees thought from its enslavement by the established universe of discourse and behaviour’, and 
‘projects its alternatives’.  He continues that, although this position remains ideological, its ‘effort 
may be truly therapeutic — to show reality as that which it really is, and to show that which this 
reality prevents from being’.
7
  The point here is not that reality as it ‘really is’ involves some 
positive truth which renders certain values absolute, but that it reveals the necessarily ideological 
nature of any view, which is ‘therapeutic’ because it indicates that current social contradictions are 
not essential or universal. 
This notion then reappears in Jameson’s consideration of History, and his method of 
textual analysis.  History, for Jameson, is what is absent when any particular set of dominant 
values appears universal and necessary, because it marks the contingency of that dominance 
and its repression of other values.  As such, History implies the continuation of struggle, because 
no values are eternal, and can therefore be replaced.  Yet, as a negative excess, History can only 
be recognised through its effects, or particular groups that embody the incompleteness of the 
existing totality.  It is not, for Jameson, that there is a correct interpretation of History, but that 
historicising highlights points of attempted ideological closure in other, less reflexive, 
interpretations and narratives.  Thus, it shows that, while there are only interpretations, ‘every 
individual interpretation must include an interpretation of its own existence, must show its own 
credentials and justify itself’.
8
  In this sense, Jameson’s Marxist method is ‘true’ not because it 
provides final answers but because it continuously contextualises interpretations (including 
Marxist ones), revealing their limits and repressed potentials. 
In Žižek’s theory, the dialectical relationship is embedded in the psychic structure itself, 
via Lacanian psychoanalytic categories.  In these terms, consciousness in language represents 
entry into ideology, because attachment to language requires stability of meaning.  In effect, 
because there is no absolute, external guarantee of meaning, subjects require a ‘fantasy’ 
structure that represses this lack and imagines such a guarantee.  Indeed, the aim of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is for subjects to recognise this lack, or the arbitrariness of meaning, and take 
responsibility for their own symbolic attachment.  The important point here for Žižek is not that 
such ideas imply a relativism in which all meaning is equally ‘false’, but how subjects react to the 
                                                             
7
 ODM, p. 199. 
8 Fredric Jameson, ‘Metacommentary’, in The Ideologies of Theory (London: Verso, 2008), pp. 5-19 (p. 7). 
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lack of meaning, which has real political consequences in regards to social exclusion.  For this 
reason, he explains ‘although ideology is already at work in everything we experience as “reality”, 
we must none the less maintain the tension that keeps the critique of ideology alive’.
9
 
The common feature in these theories is that they identify ideology as universally present 
but effectively split between ideological subjects who are ‘complicit in concealing the radical 
contingency of social relations’ and those who ‘are attentive to its constitutive character’.
10
  In this 
way, two-dimensional thinking, Marxist historicising, and confronting the lack in subjectivity all 
involve particular positions that are no less ideological than those they analyse.  It is important to 
mark a distinction here, for example, with Althusser’s contrast between ideology and science, in 
that, even though Althusser does not see science as absolute truth, he separates it from 
ideological thought in which ‘the practico-social function is more important than the theoretical 
function (function as knowledge)’.
11
  In Althusser’s terms, because Marxism is more self-reflexive 
it is less ideological, whereas for us, while some ideologies involve greater degrees of self-
awareness, and higher levels of knowledge, they still contain assumptions and contradictions.  
Althusser effectively uses the rational connotations of science to privilege his method against 
other forms of consciousness,
12
 whereas we focus on different political consequences (which is 
not to say that some truth claims do not withstand scrutiny better than others).  The result, as 
Porter explains of Žižek’s theory, is that, while ‘we can never be certain of the terms of our own 
ideological enslavement’, ‘we can maintain a critical position enabling us to point up and negate 
the limits of ideologies we encounter in the social field’.
13
  We therefore emphasise that political 
and moral assumptions are present in any critique of existing norms. 
The other point here is that dialectical theory assumes a critical position in regards to the 
established political field, because it denies the completeness of that field and indicates repressed 
potentials.  As such it implies that, when social theories lack this critical position, they tend to 
ignore such potentials and accept the dominant ideas they analyse.  Such theory may even 
                                                             
9 Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Spectre of Ideology’, in Mapping Ideology, ed. by Žižek (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 1-33 
(p. 17).  (Emphasis in quotes in original text unless otherwise indicated.) 
10 Jason Glynos and David Howarth, Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2007), p.14. 
11 Althusser, For Marx, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 1969), p. 231. 
12 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. by C. 
Gordon, trans. by C. Gordon and others (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1980), p. 85. 
13
 Robert Porter, ‘A World beyond Ideology? Strains in Slavoj Žižek’s Ideology Critique’, in Ideology after 
Poststructuralism, ed. by Siniša Malešević and Iain MacKenzie (London: Pluto, 2002), pp. 43-63 (p. 62). 
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repress the role of ideology altogether, by equating it to irrational fundamentalism, in opposition to 
rational thinking.  For example, according to Rawls, ‘ideologies, of whatever type, claim a 
monopoly of the knowledge of truth and justice for some particular race, or social class, or 
institutional group’,
14
 which violates the possibility of being a ‘competent judge’; and ‘a well-
ordered society does not require an ideology in order to achieve stability’
15
, because social 
institutions can be completely transparent.  This assumption that ideology applies to only certain 
people does not consider, for instance, how institutional transparency would still have both an 
ideological purpose and effect, or that measurements of competency and reason are intertwined 
with power relations.  For Rawls, ‘a reasonable man’ is someone who tries to take his own 
predilections into account,
16
 which appears similar to self-reflexive ideology.  But if those 
predilections are socially dominant, and society is not viewed in terms of the potential excess of 
its norms, they remain unrecognised, and ‘reasonable’ tends to mean aligned with established 
thinking.
17
  In particular, where Rawls views society as an agreement of mutual self-interest and 
material accumulation,
18
 he does not consider such assumptions as ideological or predilections. 
Furthermore, even theories that focus on ideology may not adequately account for the 
relations of dominance and subordination that structure their assumptions.  For example, various 
introductory texts to ‘political ideologies’ focus on the content of conscious political value systems, 
largely according to established categories within liberal democracies.
19
  As studies of ideology, 
these texts historicise and successfully contest certain established political terms, but do not 
analyse the totalising effect of the range of categorisations itself.  They often distance themselves 
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from a ‘Marxist’ approach to ideology, by characterising its method as one of simple materialist 
cause and effect,
20
 or of oppositions between illusion and reality or truth.
21
  Yet, in doing so, these 
arguments also jettison the structural considerations of Marxism from ideology theory, which help 
contextualise ideological meaning in concrete social circumstances.  As such, decisions about 
which beliefs qualify as political ideologies tend to follow certain assumptions, such as that 
cultural and identity issues are more ideology forming today than class or economic ones,
22
 and 
capitalism is not an ideology, because it ‘can involve notably different forms’.
23
  The question here 
from an oppositional perspective would be what ideologically makes cultural issues central to 
ideology in current social conditions.  That is, something appears to structure the field itself, and 
the fact that capitalism may have different forms should not disqualify it from consideration in that 
structuring ideological role.  These theories in fact touch on this idea, for example by describing 
liberalism as ‘a background theory or set of presuppositions and sentiments of a supposedly 
neutral and universal kind’.
24
  Here, it is not that everybody is politically liberal, but that liberal 
terms dominate the arena of what is considered acceptable and possible.  Even so, our approach 
to ideology takes this idea further, because it examines how dominant liberalism and capitalism 
overdetermine the categorisation and definition of ideologies, and considers the excess that they 
repress. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that society can be viewed as comprising various 
discourses intertwined with power relations, without according the repressed or subordinated 
element any special status.  Indeed, all discourses attempt to dominate by exercising power at 
different points throughout society, and, even the most self-reflexive positions impose positive 
assumptions.  Such ideas are represented by Foucault, who stresses the dispersal of power in 
‘local and unstable’ states,
25
 and that domination is not the reserve of the state.  However, we 
believe it should be emphasised that, while power is not possessed solely by a particular group, it 
is concentrated within certain dominating institutions, ideas and interests, most notably in ‘the 
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bureaucratic state and the organization of the social order by capital’.
26
  Foucault’s statement that 
‘all other forms of power relation must refer to’ the state, but only ‘because power relations have 
come more and more under state control’,
27
 does not fully explain how, in all societies, some 
overarching structure legitimises the norms that overdetermine local power relations.  Thus, while 
our concept of ideology is similar to Foucault’s notion of discourse in that it distances itself from 
false consciousness and absolute truth, it more specifically denotes the macro-political effects of 
certain discourses and their domination over others in particular circumstances.  In other words, 
such ideology theory shows that, although different discourses ‘might be epistemologically of 
equal worth’, their relative positions make ‘them structurally and ontologically very different and 
unequal’.
28
 
 
2. Ideology relates to class division and struggle 
Having constructed our approach to ideology around a split between domination and 
subordination, it is also important how that split is defined.  Here, we again draw on Marcuse, 
Jameson and Žižek in focusing on class division, and the idea that the existing mode of 
production that structures the totality tends towards economic disparity and exclusion.  This 
disparity is embodied in social groups that control resources, institutions and political ideas, and 
groups that lack such control, and the way that the existence of each is conditional on the 
existence of the other.  In terms of ideology, the point is not to reduce consciousness to an effect 
of material forces, although (as Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek all show) ideologies are in some 
way expressions of their mode of production.  That is, it should be understood that they are not 
merely determined by class identity, so that certain social positions correspond to specific beliefs, 
but are responses to a division which overdetermines them.  Emphasis on class struggle is thus 
an attempt to consider the relationship between ideology, politics, culture and economics, via a 
capitalist logic that cuts across social relations. 
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Marcuse’s work provides us with a basis for this position, by demonstrating how class 
frames a general background ideology.  He theorises a concept of social ‘needs’ that relate to 
realities and potentials of production, and historicises the Freudian ‘reality principle’ to suggest 
that repression of fulfilment could vary depending on social circumstances.  Specifically, the 
current reality principle continues to demand toil and deprivation, even though technological 
developments in capitalism could enable their reduction, and is therefore an ideological construct 
that represents particular class interests.  For Marcuse, the reality principle ‘applies to the brute 
fact of scarcity what actually is the consequence of a specific organization of scarcity, and of a 
specific existential attitude enforced by this organization’.
29
  The question is whether this 
organisation can be repurposed based on its potentials towards the needs of those who are most 
deprived or forced into exhausting, repetitive labour.  In some ways, Marcuse’s theory 
overreaches, because he argues that even psychic, instinctual repression can be transcended, 
rather than merely ‘surplus’ physical repression, but he at least shows how the material needs of 
the subordinated reveal the contingency of dominant social priorities.  Thus, when he later 
considers ‘cultural revolution’ in the US, he notes that it does not tackle such dominant principles, 
but demands individual freedoms that are often compatible with a consumerist permissiveness 
that actually reinforces the demand for continual labour, or recognises the misery of endless toil 
but offers no alternative.  
The idea of an overall material contradiction is also central to Jameson’s concept of 
postmodernism.  He shows that the shift to a politics of recognition and difference, in place of 
large scale economic concerns, relies on a particular mode of production (late capitalism) that 
continues to define its limits.  Thus, the range of pluralist antagonisms generally accepted within 
the political field is constituted on an exclusion, or by repressing the antagonism between the 
logic of the field itself and its excess.  As with History, for Jameson, ‘class’ does not denote 
concrete identities, but is the missing element represented by the relative positions of particular 
social groups.  In fact, Jameson explains, ‘capitalism’ itself is a representative concept that is 
‘either the result of scientific reduction […] or the mark of an imaginary and ideological vision’, but 
is not purely subjective because the laws of capital accumulation and profit really do ‘set absolute 
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barriers and limits to social changes’.
30
  Class is therefore a ‘relational’ concept, definable in 
instances where the interests of one group are effectively universalised in production relations, 
and another group is deprived as a result, until it successfully challenges that universality.  
Jameson also identifies class relations as those that cannot be made equal without erasing the 
categories themselves.  For example, the proletariat is subordinate to the bourgeoisie by 
definition, and overcoming this dominance would require a new mode of production. 
Žižek further clarifies how notions of class struggle restructure the range of recognised 
struggles in terms of an open potential beyond the existing social order.  That is, viewing society 
as a totality split by class demonstrates a contrast between accepting capitalism as the 
background to struggle, and opposing the background itself.  In this sense, political antagonisms 
either exclude considerations of alternative economic forms, and work on identity issues within 
capitalism, or they include such considerations, and reveal a need to combat deep contradictions 
in capitalism itself.  Furthermore, the idea that class struggle is less relevant today, because other 
antagonisms have become prevalent, merely indicates for Žižek how the constitutive exclusion of 
certain groups in society has been successfully repressed, indicating even greater dominance 
and subordination.  Class struggle then continues to identify this repressed element, and as such 
is ‘a unique mediating term which, while mooring politics in the economy […], simultaneously 
stands for the irreducible political moment in the very heart of the economic’.
31
  As with Marcuse 
and Jameson, Žižek does not refer to a specific social group, but to the inevitable ‘Real’ of 
exclusion in any social order, which is represented by subjects who effectively have no access to 
rights, opportunities and material goods. 
These emphases on class division need not imply that ideology is simply a reflection of 
economic relations, and Marcuse (to an extent), Jameson and Žižek generally avoid such 
reductionism.  Specifically, in our view, while the mode of production is central in social relations, 
ideologies are not necessarily direct internalisations of the demands of production and 
consumption.  Rather, they mediate these demands through beliefs, values and assumptions that 
may not even be explicitly economic, but inform how individuals conform and the limits of their 
conformity.  In this respect, we can contrast our position with, for example, The Dominant 
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Ideology Thesis of Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, in that, while we accept their point that there is 
no single ruling ideology which morally validates capitalism for the working classes,
32
 it is not 
simply that ‘subordinate classes are controlled by […] “the dull compulsion” of economic 
relationships, by the integrative effects of the division of labour, by the coercive nature of law and 
politics’.
33
  For Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, subordinates reproduce existing power relations due 
to their financial need to work, which enters them into relations of mutual dependency with other 
classes.  This theory then presents this ‘economic compulsion’ as an alternative to ideology, 
rather than one aspect of ideology theory.  Consequently, when, for example, they criticise 
Marcuse as a dominant ideology theorist, they miss that he considers how working-class 
identification with capitalism reflects both the economic situation and a variety of linguistic and 
cultural mechanisms.  Moreover, in their view, a lack of singular dominant values means there are 
no significant values, and they do not consider how a plurality of ideologies may support the 
whole.  As such, individuals accept existing relations ‘simply because they are there, or because 
they appear as a coercive external fact’, which does not entail ‘any set of beliefs, attitudes or 
“false consciousness”’.
34
  In our view, this approach makes politics merely an expression of 
material conditions, which leaves individuals with no meaningful ability to reflect on their desires, 
or the possibility and feasibility of doing something else.
35
 
Emphasising class struggle requires an ideological judgement, which defines a 
separation between ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ concerns.  Nevertheless, without marking the 
structuring role of a mode of production, it is difficult to formulate an opposition that exceeds a 
range of struggles ‘within’ the capitalist order.  An important point of reference here is Laclau and 
Mouffe, in that while our theory in many ways aligns with theirs, they reject privileging class 
antagonism.  They provide us with some of our basic assumptions, such as that all social forms 
are contingent, and that different logics are anchored in ‘Master Signifiers’ that attempt to 
universalise particular meaning, to maintain social stability and power relations.  Laclau also 
defines ideology as ‘the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity’, which 
implies that, since the social requires some stability of meaning, ‘the ideological must be seen as 
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constitutive of the social’.
36
  Their politics then consists of creating a ‘chain of equivalence’ to unite 
different struggles, including opposition to discrimination based on gender, race, and sexuality, 
and environmental and workers’ rights movements.  But, as such, the social division this chain 
represents is not necessarily anchored in the mode of production — these particular identities are 
‘contingent social logics’ that ‘acquire their meaning in precise conjunctural and relational 
contexts’, and ‘none of them has absolute validity’.
37
 
Our issue here is not with class antagonism as Laclau and Mouffe define it, as a conflict 
between particular groups over labour conditions, that represents (in Laclau’s words) ‘just one 
species of identity politics, […] which is becoming less and less important in the world in which we 
live’.
38
  That is, struggles over working conditions are not intrinsically radical, or able to unify 
social antagonism in general.  We also agree with their point that contradictions in the social order 
are not necessarily experienced as antagonisms, but depend on perceptions and articulations.  
As Laclau says, ‘Each social formation has its own forms of determination and relative autonomy, 
which are always instituted through a complex process of overdetermination and therefore cannot 
be established a priori.’
39
  In effect, antagonisms emerge when individuals identify certain needs 
that cannot be met without some shift in power relations.  However, the wider concept of class we 
consider (which also does not perceive particular groups as a priori representatives of social 
contradictions), marks the way that, retrospectively, certain antagonisms articulate contradictions 
that are more deeply constitutive of the existing social order.
40
  Specifically, class antagonism in 
this sense marks how capitalist labour as such creates relations of dominance and subordination 
throughout society that are then embodied in identities.
41
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This general concept of class antagonism then implies a different chain of equivalence 
between various struggles than is possible without it.  The inclusion of class in the chain is the 
difference between confronting intrinsic tendencies towards inequality in logics of commodification 
and capital accumulation, and confronting inequalities that are theoretically resolvable within 
capitalism.  In other words, it switches radical political aims from ‘recognition’ or ‘affirmative 
redistribution’ (compensation within the same structure), to ‘transformative redistribution’.
42
  In 
Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, we must seek an ‘equivalential articulation between anti-racism, anti-
sexism and anti-capitalism’, which ‘may be the condition for the consolidation of each one of 
these struggles’.
43
  Yet, if ‘anti-capitalism’ is articulated around a constitutive social split, as we 
suggest, it affects the goals of the whole series (which does not make the other elements in the 
chain less important), by making the mode of production itself an obstacle to overcoming social 
division.  This wider concept of class implies that it is not simply a matter of uniting a plurality of 
particular articulations, but that the very ‘particularisation’ of these issues is an expression of a 
dominant (liberal, capitalist) logic that stops a more general antagonism from forming. 
Without this concept of class, Laclau and Mouffe increasingly seem to accept that some 
form of capitalism remains the limit to political change.  Mouffe explains that ‘without calling for 
the sort of total overthrow of capitalism advocated by some Marxists, one can surely acknowledge 
that some form of anti-capitalist struggle cannot be eliminated from a radical politics’.
44
  
Meanwhile, Laclau states in a response to Žižek that he can agree with Žižek’s anti-capitalist 
stance if he means ‘the overcoming of the prevalent neoliberal economic model’ through greater 
state regulation and democratic control, to avoid ‘the worst effects of globalization’.
45
  In these 
statements, the term ‘anti-capitalism’ is used to describe opposition to aspects or forms of 
capitalism (neoliberalism, globalisation), rather than its core elements (such as wage labour).  
Laclau argues elsewhere that he is not resigned to capitalism, only that it is impossible to predict 
which antagonism might unify the chain of equivalence into a revolutionary universal, because 
any can potentially ‘involve radical change or global social transformation’.
46
  In contrast, the 
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important factor from our perspective is still whether this chain opposes capitalism as a mode of 
production, which requires certain unifying articulations rather than others. 
One problem with our concept of class is that, because it does not privilege a specific 
social identity, there is no obvious point around which class politics can develop.  As Laclau 
explains, class unity ‘should be conceived as a set of subject positions’, that are ‘systematically 
interlinked’, and ‘grounded on a core given by the location of the social agent in the relations of 
production’.
47
  If these subject positions and their location are replaced by abstract notions of 
needs and exclusion, any ‘proletariat’ is dispersed and fragmented.  As we shall see, Marcuse, 
Jameson and Žižek all recognise this problem, and it represents a major political challenge 
implied by their theories that we confront in each chapter.  For the moment, the significant point is 
that this political issue should not undermine the methodological approach to ideology in terms of 
class and a split totality.  That is, the alternative for ideology theory is to not consider the excess 
of capitalism itself, or other potential modes of production, and thus not analyse the deepest 
ideological assumptions it produces. 
 
3. Ideology is produced by and produces social relations 
It follows from our arguments so far that ideologies within a social order are influenced by that 
order in various ways, and that in consumer capitalist societies the dominant feature is the 
appearance that any singular structure has been replaced by a free plurality of identities and 
ideas.  However, there is a logic behind pluralism that limits its range, and any idea that a plurality 
has replaced ideology is ideological, because it disguises what is excluded from the totality.  An 
important aspect of our ideology theory is thus to consider how the social structure 
overdetermines ideological content, but we also consider how ideology may exceed this influence 
and even challenge the structure.  As such, we mediate between notions of autonomous subjects, 
who make clear, informed decisions about their interests, and ideas that ideology automatically 
reflects dominant structures.  Throughout the thesis, our position is that, despite powerful social 
pressures to conform, contradictory experience always carries a potential to cause doubts that 
may develop into oppositional ideologies. 
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Overall, Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek attempt to maintain a similar balance, by identifying 
certain critical faculties that resist affirmative ideological absorption, but are not always clear how 
such faculties survive, or what they may achieve.  For Marcuse, one-dimensional thinking is in 
many ways ingrained in institutional structures, such as how mass media repeat specific 
interpretations of words and exclude others, or how scientific and empirical methods reduce social 
issues to individual problems, by only conceiving what is, rather than what could be.  Also, 
material factors such as political stability and relatively high average living standards make 
conformity and stability seem more rational.  This vested interest is further increased by 
consumerism, with its promises of fulfilment that create new needs, and enable the individual ‘to 
continue his performance, which in turn perpetuates his labour and that of the others’.
48
  As such, 
many individuals appear ‘trained’ from the outset, simply by their position in society and the 
uniformity of meaning, and one-dimensionality can seem inescapable.  Nevertheless, Marcuse 
continually theorises potential catalysts that could reopen this closed thinking, such as possible 
‘autonomous’ spaces outside commodified production, where alternative cultural forms and 
politics may be produced, or potential contradictions in the mode of production itself, either due to 
technological development or because consumerism may raise expectations of fulfilment beyond 
that which it can accommodate. 
Jameson’s theory of postmodernism outlines similar forms of internalisation, and 
emphasises that social fragmentation, and the apparent dominance of styles and opinions, is itself 
the expression of a certain economic stability.  Even so, individuals really encounter fragmented, 
de-historicised images, interpreted according to different mediatised identities, with no indication 
of a social totality.  This fragmentation reflects globalised commodification, which disconnects 
consumers from processes of production, and divorces individual news stories from any wider 
context.  Furthermore, for Jameson, the postmodern psyche is also fragmented, in that individuals 
begin to compartmentalise contradictory experiences rather than rationalise them according to a 
narrative.  It can thus seem that, although Jameson claims postmodernism is ‘only’ a cultural 
dominant, most subjects are really incapable of recognising it as such.  As with Marcuse, he 
examines how certain cultural forms still imply political ideals, and also theorises a utopian politics 
that begins by focusing on particular details.  Yet, at this particular historical moment, he 
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understands that this and other concepts, such as ‘cognitive mapping’, merely reintroduce the 
possibility of thinking historically.  That is, Jameson concedes that a significant radical movement 
is not currently possible, but we can begin ‘a rattling of the bars and an intense spiritual 
concentration and preparation for another stage which has not yet arrived’.
49
 
In Žižek’s theory, the question of how late capitalism influences desire is accompanied by 
a more fundamental issue with subjectivity as such.  Specifically, the ‘fantasy’ which structures 
how subjects rationalise their attachment to the symbolic order is effectively secondary to basic 
ideological obedience.  Thus, all that really matters is the partial ‘enjoyment’ of unconscious 
attachment, regardless of how the fantasy justifies experienced contradictions.  This point means 
that, in consumer capitalism, social reproduction is more about participation in commodity 
exchange than any conscious beliefs.  Žižek also identifies a new social demand for subjects to 
continually find fulfilment through various pleasures, and to take responsibility for their choices.  
This demand is oppressive, as it removes all guarantees of meaning, leading subjects to 
desperately seek new authority figures, and creates a culture of blaming individuals for social 
problems.  To resist these psychic and social conditions, Žižek explains that subjects can confront 
the lack of reason for their symbolic attachment, which then implies various options beyond that 
prescribed by dominant relations.  The point is not that subjects ever escape the influence of 
cultural norms and material circumstances, but that recognising this lack engenders a different 
perspective on the existing totality. 
At certain points, these theories present current social conditions as overly totalising, in 
that the potentials for change seem impossible within the realities described.  As the next section 
shows, one of our main contentions is that a greater emphasis on the conscious element of 
ideology is necessary to locate these potentials.  At this point, the important factor is that these 
theories demonstrate the great scope and efficiency of dominance in late capitalism, while 
reiterating its fundamental lack of closure.  With their dialectical approach they cannot accept the 
existing totality as the limit of politics, either pessimistically, by resigning themselves to the 
impossibility of meaningful participation, or optimistically, by viewing the range of choices within 
consumer capitalist societies as meaningful.  Rather, they contextualise the particular order 
against its potentials and contradictions, showing that there are always power relations to resist.  
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As such, Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek also retain some concept of subjective agency that can 
potentially act beyond dominant social influences, and is not solely connected to material 
conditions. 
The importance of even these slight theoretical potentials can first be marked against 
theories that present the logic of the existing totality as effectively inescapable.  For example, 
Baudrillard’s theory of ‘simulation’ in ‘The Precession of Simulacra’ is in many ways comparable 
to (or influences) Jameson’s theory of postmodernism, but is more resigned to the logic it 
describes because it lacks an emphasis on dialectics.  Baudrillard contrasts the current 
‘simulation’ of a reality that no longer exists, and constitutes the effective real horizon, against 
‘dissimulation’, or deliberate masking of reality through false representation.
50
  Thus, there are no 
‘ideological’ struggles, and today’s scandals and conflicts only serve to hide that nothing is at 
stake.  He explains that, ‘all the holdups, airplane hijackings, etc. are now in some sense 
simulation holdups in that they are already inscribed in the decoding and orchestration rituals of 
the media, anticipated in their presentation and their possible consequences’.
51
  Conversely, we 
maintain that ideological analysis should reveal ideological limits even in ‘simulation’, because it 
serves existing power relations by repressing more meaningful struggle.  In fact, assumptions that 
there are only superficial mediatised codes, or that nothing is at stake politically, are ideological, 
in that they posit the omnipotence of the existing order.  Baudrillard claims that ‘the only weapon 
of power’ is ‘to persuade us of the reality of the social, of the gravity of the economy and the 
finalities of production’,
52
 but the fact that there is still a ‘power’ that needs a ‘weapon’ to maintain 
itself indicates a challengeable reality.  In effect, Baudrillard recognises capitalism as a particular 
system, but accepts the universality of this ‘hyperreal’ situation. 
The opposite problem to be avoided is that of exaggerating subjective autonomy, and in 
this respect the concept of simulation shows how the field of consumerist choices and identities is 
heavily depoliticised.  Here, we can contrast our position with the ‘reconstituted radical politics’ of 
Giddens, which valorises high ‘social reflexivity’ in today’s societies, because individuals have 
greater access to information and are used to making decisions.  For Giddens, although decisions 
are taken individually, such ‘life politics’ can have global impact because the market must react to 
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them.  He understands that social inequalities partially determine access to choices, and they are 
a ‘market-governed freedom’ that ‘becomes an enveloping framework of individual self-
expression’,
53
 but does not see these points as particularly limiting.  Rather, he emphasises how 
people of all social levels can make empowering, life-determining decisions, which bring 
happiness.
54
  However, the political impact from these choices is questionable, even if they force 
certain shifts in the market, because it is limited in scope and lacks direction.  There is no notion 
of solidarity behind these choices, and while they involve conscious evaluation, life politics do not 
congeal into a common cause, but ‘split into a multitude of individual and personal, strikingly 
similar but decidedly not complementary portmanteaus’.
55
  In fact, if this low-level consumerist 
politics is seen as valid participation, it may replace forms of political organisation.  As such, when 
Giddens recommends a general social development towards more ethical production, requiring 
intervention from states and big business,
56
 it is not clear why these organisations would take 
such steps, without concerted pressure from oppositional movements. 
The issue here is not simply that Giddens’ politics is not ‘radical’ enough, as even theories 
that look beyond the existing totality can struggle to achieve a convincing balance between 
subjective and structural factors.  For instance, Holloway’s ‘crack capitalism’ thesis is clearly ant i-
capitalist, but similarly exaggerates the impact of fairly minor political activities.  In it, any activity 
not shaped by capitalist production or consumption is politically meaningful, and helps create 
alternative, non-capitalist spaces, from ‘the car worker who goes to his allotment in the evening 
[...] to the young man who goes to the jungle to devote his life to organising armed struggle’.
57
  
Seen in this way, anti-capitalism has such a broad meaning it includes many acts that are already 
commonplace in capitalist societies without causing disruption.  Alternatively, theories that focus 
on explicit protest and resistance may assume too readily that they contain an underlying unifying 
logic.  For example, Hardt and Negri’s concept of ‘multitude’ emerges from the idea that, as 
production becomes more about information and communication, exploitative labour relations 
create a surplus of intelligence, experience, and desire that allow people to think beyond 
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competitiveness and individualism.  But, although Hardt and Negri recognise difficulties in 
challenging current power hierarchies, they focus too much on these transformative potentials, 
and not enough on how today’s production methods are also structurally reinforcing, and primarily 
remain relations of business and profit.  As such, it is not clear, as Hardt and Negri claim, that 
there is a ‘common web’ unifying the particular political struggles that emerge.
58
  They identify this 
general connection as a demand for global democracy, or control by the multitude itself, but in 
many cases are merely assuming protest movements have this subtext, and are fundamentally 
compatible.
59
  In this specific sense, Hardt and Negri resemble Giddens in that they also do not 
sufficiently analyse how dominant structures continue to affect various ideologies.  Part of our 
approach, in contrast, is to consider how even forms of protest may represent ideologies that 
maintain the existing social relations more than they disrupt them, where they lack explicit 
declaration of more radical goals. 
 
4. Ideology always relies on conscious, contestable beliefs  
At this point we emphasise the conscious aspect of ideology as a bridge between dominant social 
influences and repressed potentials, which differs from the positions of Marcuse, Jameson and 
Žižek to some extent.  Their theories tend to redefine ideology in consumer capitalist societies as 
something that no longer revolves around knowledge or contestable positive beliefs, and amplify 
the unconscious aspects of ideology so that behaviour and subject positions take priority.  For us, 
however, conscious motivations behind politically significant acts can still be identified, and are 
still a significant factor.  Thus, if people today are more aware that official values are corrupted 
and accept this situation cynically, or even if they follow norms without providing explicit reasons, 
some rationalisation or justification remains detectable.  Or, where behaviour appears to clash 
with conscious values, beliefs and assumptions are evident in the way the subject rationalises the 
discrepancy.  Moreover, in our view, although these conscious ideas may be considered the 
effect of unconscious attachment, or the way in which the subject represses the contingency of 
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attachment after the fact, we argue that they are also influential.  Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek 
emphasise how the unconscious directly internalises dominant expectations (especially in late 
capitalism), so the conscious ideological content that emerges as individuals justify these 
expectations appears less important.  Conversely, we see that, because content can change as 
individuals have experiences that contradict their beliefs, there may even be a point at which it 
becomes incompatible with the attachment and becomes susceptible to change.  
As we have seen, Marcuse’s notion of one-dimensionality presents an extreme form of 
ideological reification, which at times implies the total conditioning of consciousness.  Yet there is 
ambiguity in Marcuse’s work overall, in terms of whether one-dimensionality engenders 
affirmative beliefs, or conditions behaviour so that belief is irrelevant.  On the one hand, he 
explains that people are generally ignorant of social mechanisms, or accept them on moral 
grounds, and that such factors are necessary to maintain the social order.  On the other, he says 
that people recognise and accept social contradictions, either because there is material stability or 
because change seems impossible.  We understand that all these positions may be variations of 
(one-dimensional) ideology within the same society, and it is important to analyse them all in 
terms of their conditional rationalisations, rather than as forms of automatic submission into labour 
and consumer roles.  In fact, Marcuse also considers ideas such as how dominant media 
narratives unify internal political forces by justifying them against a ‘common enemy’.  If such 
narratives are really significant, it implies there are conscious ideological processes that are 
influenced by such information. 
In Jameson’s theory, the fragmentation of media imagery, and the psyche itself, blocks 
the formation of coherent narratives and rationalisations.  The market is accepted by default, 
becoming a background which detaches subjects from traditional belief systems, and provides 
forms of identity expression through consumerist media codes.  Jameson states that this total 
economic organisation dispels ‘the last remnant of the older autonomous subject or ego’, until 
what remains ‘is no longer able to distinguish between external suggestion and internal desire’, 
and is ‘wholly delivered over to objective manipulation’.
60
  But we can infer from Jameson’s theory 
that subjects are also still inclined to seek coherent meaning in the fragmented reality, and that 
even consumer attitudes revolve around numerous cultural beliefs and assumptions.  Moreover, 
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acceptance of the market involves various rationalisations of its role, many of which appear to 
view it as an overall structuring system.  We thus argue that Jameson’s idea of a utopian politics 
that may prepare the ground for consideration of alternatives rests on communicating with such 
rationalisations. 
With Žižek, it is quite clear that behaviour is far more representative of ideology than 
conscious belief, because it indicates subjects’ deeper obedience to their basic symbolic 
attachment.  For Žižek, ideology today is ‘fetishistic’, or ‘disavows’ this obedience by projecting it 
onto an external object, while consciously denying its own investment.  Individuals are able to 
articulate that they do not believe, for example, that excessive consumerism is deeply fulfilling, 
but continue to consume excessively anyway, unaware that it really does provide them with a 
certain libidinal enjoyment in which they are heavily invested.  Direct ideological criticism thus has 
little impact, and ‘we can no longer subject the ideological text to “symptomatic reading”, 
confronting it with its blank spots, with what it must repress’,
61
 because subjects already admit the 
contrast between their conscious values and behaviour.  In effect, Žižek understands that 
ideological positions may be fully aware of social contradictions and factually true, so what 
remains significant is their point of enunciation, or political repercussions.  However, we contend, 
the ‘realism’ of cynically aware forms of ideology should not be accepted at face value, and ‘fetish’ 
and ‘symptom’ are aspects of all ideology.  In particular, fetishistic disavowal still entails justifying 
the contrast between behaviour and values with reasons that contain beliefs and assumptions 
which can be contested as symptoms (such as that excessive consumption is necessary for 
economic stability, or that it is unavoidable).  Furthermore, different justifications may indicate 
varying levels of ideological certainty, behind similar behaviour. 
This understanding of ideology can thus be applied to various ideological positions, to 
outline a range of beliefs that justify participation in today’s capitalist societies.  These beliefs do 
not simply moralise dominant political systems, but always contain certain ethical judgements, 
which view some forms of behaviour as acceptable and some as unacceptable.  This notion 
opposes a common idea in ideology theory today, according to which dominant cynical 
ideologies, based on clear, realistic appraisals of the social situation, need no ethical 
rationalisation.  For example, Fisher argues that the purpose of ‘capitalist ideology’ is ‘to conceal 
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the fact that the operations of capital do not depend on any sort of subjectively assumed belief’.  
He continues that, ‘capitalism can proceed perfectly well […] without anyone making a case for 
it’.
62
  Meanwhile, Eagleton comments that, in ‘a society in which everybody was either a cynic or a 
masochist, […] there would be no need for ideology, in the sense of a set of discourses 
concealing or legitimating injustice’.
63
  In the first case, we can note that there are always 
institutions in capitalist societies justifying the market, as good or necessary, and political 
measures that support it, from wars to austerity measures, so we do not know how capitalism 
would proceed without them.  In the second case, to be a cynic or masochist — effectively the 
same thing from respective positions of privilege and deprivation — precisely requires finding 
ways to accept or deny the worst aspects of society, which is very much a matter of concealing or 
legitimating injustice.  If, as Eagleton continues, ‘cynics would feel no unease about inhabiting an 
exploitative social order’,
64
 we must still explain how they rationalise unease away.  At the same 
time, our aim is not to see ideology merely in terms of conscious ‘ruling class’ dominance and 
‘false consciousness’.  As Brown argues, we must escape ‘a model of objective interests on one 
side and ideological obfuscation and manipulation on the other’, because it ‘eschews the more 
troubling possibility of an abject, unemancipatory, and anti-egalitarian subjective orientation’.
65
  
But we are also interested in the contestable assumptions and knowledge deficits of this latter 
subjective orientation, beyond what Brown describes as the transformation of systemic 
contradictions into individual problems and the juxtaposition of consumer freedom and strong 
administrative forces. 
Such concepts of cynicism are also part of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek’s theories.  In 
Marcuse’s case it is less explicitly formulated, but implied in the idea that people are aware of, 
and accept, state brutality, as long as the economic situation remains stable.  However, the 
dominant media narratives Marcuse identifies suggest that, for some, moral concepts are still 
significant, or that outside these narratives people accept brutality by appealing to human nature, 
or their own powerlessness.  Jameson then connects cynicism to the ‘market ideology’ of the 
financial class, which valorises neoliberal economics not as just and equitable, but as preferable 
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to any planned economy.  Or, further down the social ladder, he sees cynicism as a resigned 
acceptance that simply participating in social expectations is the best way to stay afloat.  Again, 
we insist that these positions imply clear beliefs, such as in an essential human nature that 
corrupts all social planning, or that the current system is permanent or invincible.  For Žižek, 
finally, cynicism is the predominant ideology today, which comprehends how society functions 
and considers moral norms to be purely for the naïve.  In this view, the only thing cynics do not 
know is that their informed appraisal of social circumstances is ‘displaced’ and actually represent 
a deep conformism.  But we see that Žižek’s theory also introduces certain contestable 
assumptions into this high-level conscious awareness, such as the way that cynically demonising 
oppositional politics actually indicates a belief that radical change can only be to the detriment of 
society.
66
  Similar to Jameson’s concept of market ideology, this cynicism implies a fear of change 
based on deeply-held ideas about the limits of human progress.  For all three theorists, therefore, 
the notion that cynics fully accept the reality of social contradictions and how things work 
underplays the contestable assumptions behind these beliefs. 
Viewed in this way, we can counter cynicism not only in its ‘disavowals’, but also in its 
assumptions.  For example, Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason describes an ideological 
situation dominated by a general resigned cynicism, in which people are highly aware but see that 
such knowledge makes little difference to general corruption.  For Sloterdijk, this cynicism should 
not be opposed by moral or intellectual argument, but by ‘kynicism’, which also recognises the 
absurdity of society’s proclaimed values, and creates immediate subversive enjoyment in taking 
‘what is base, separated, and private out onto the street’.
67
  Kynicism is moral, in the sense that it 
resists any grand purpose or instrumental reason, and insists on a negative self-determination 
that lacks any foundational ideas or specific political motivation.
68
  We can identify a fetishistic 
disavowal here in that kynicism actually seems to involve little more than individualistic acting out, 
which, particularly in today’s permissive society, appears more as harmless escapist enjoyment.  
However, we can also identify the positive beliefs supporting this disavowal, such as that social 
rigidity is morally abhorrent, that it is possible to avoid taking a political stance, and that mockery 
and ridicule are powerful political tools.  It also assumes that the resigned cynicism of the majority 
                                                             
66 FT, p. 28. 
67 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. by Michael Eldred (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 105. 
68 Ibid., p. 293. 
Introduction 
37 
 
reflects a high level of social awareness against which political ideas are impotent, and as such 
does not consider whether there are limits to this resignation.
69
  These notions maintain the 
disparity between an apparently subversive mentality and less subversive behaviour, and can be 
argued against, for example by considering the greater potential impact of a more directed 
political movement. 
The most common cynical belief we encounter is one that justifies self-interest and self-
preservation according to an essential destructiveness in human nature, and the impossibility of 
progressive change.  Intellectually, this position is exemplified in Gray’s Straw Dogs, which 
justifiably challenges notions of inevitable progress (from liberal humanism to traditional Marxism), 
but then reduces all ideologies to such beliefs, which effectively places its own position outside 
ideology.  Gray’s argument relies on a concept of human nature which claims that humans 
function instinctively in ways that focus on immediate needs and ‘struggle to reckon profit and 
loss’, or in desperate times, ‘act to protect their offspring, to revenge themselves on enemies, or 
simply to give vent to their feelings’.
70
  As such, he believes that ideals of progress are as endless 
and pointless as the toils of Sisyphus, and explains that most humans throughout history have not 
believed in remaking the world ‘and a great many have had happy lives’.
71
  Yet, if we consider 
that individuals also act altruistically, motivated by global concerns, it is not clear that instinct 
always dominates consciousness.  We could also show that a great many people have not had 
happy lives, and that, even if progressive ideals are never fully realised, taking steps based on 
grand ideas can improve living conditions.  Ultimately, Gray’s assumptions justify a strongly 
conservative ideology that encourages people to accept their place in society, embracing 
spontaneous and instinctive action, rather than conceiving grand plans.  It is, as Critchley points 
out, the stance of a ‘passive nihilist’, who ‘simply focuses on himself and his particular pleasures’, 
and as the world explodes ‘closes his eyes and makes himself into an island’.
72
  It is also an 
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attempt to engage in debate to change people’s attitudes, and as such represents a positive set 
of political beliefs, despite the cynical  distance.
73
 
Following these arguments, a major implication of our theory in comparison to Marcuse, 
Jameson and Žižek is that it makes political change through a struggle of conscious ideas more 
plausible.  That is, if ideologies are not devoid of contestable assumptions, challenges to the 
coherence of conscious beliefs may influence attachments and behaviour, if they become 
sufficiently widespread.
74
  Dominant power cannot simply announce its domination, and the 
psyche cannot be fully compartmentalised, or accommodate any contradiction for the sake of 
enjoyment, without basic acceptance of the existing social order becoming strained.  Eagleton 
makes a similar point here, despite his negative concept of cynicism, because he sees that many 
other forms of ideology do not simply accept serious injustices, which means that people ‘must 
believe that these injustices are en route to being amended, or that they are counterbalanced by 
greater benefits, or that they are inevitable, or that they are not really injustices at all’.
75
  These 
beliefs are positive rationalisations (some of which could also relate to cynicism), which imply 
conditions on people’s acceptance of the status quo.  Conversely, while Marcuse, Jameson and 
Žižek conceptualise excess or utopian desires in ideology, suggesting abstract potentials for 
transcendence, because each also accepts that ideology (now) is a matter of unconscious 
programming, or that it can be de facto acceptance of dominance without content, this theoretical 
potential can seem empty.  Such conclusions can signify what Eagleton calls ‘bad’ utopianism, 
which offers ‘an alternative with scant foundation in the given social order’, as opposed to a ‘good’ 
utopianism, in which ‘a degraded present must be patiently scanned for those tendencies which 
[…] may be seen to point beyond it’.
76
  Thus, although Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek are politically 
committed, we assert that a concept of ideology which more fully considers the role of conscious 
belief is the necessary mediating factor to connect the unconscious obedience and potentials for 
change in their theories.  In our understanding, the challenges to dominant ideology they 
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describe, which emphasise reintroducing the negative into thought, or some sense of contingency 
and potential beyond what exists, only become effective through more direct confrontation of 
conscious ideological supports. 
 
Ideology as a Two-tiered Concept 
Our concept of ideology thus applies equal weight to subjects’ ‘baseline’ connection to the social 
order and their interpretation of that attachment, or appeals to certain values and ideas.  Also, the 
class split in the social defines whether the baseline attachment is ‘affirmative’ (generally 
supporting existing power relations) or ‘oppositional’ (generally opposing existing power relations).  
As such, ‘affirmative ideology’ describes a whole range of positions and conscious beliefs, whose 
only common trait is that they do not significantly challenge the status quo.  These positions are 
compatible at the systemic level but not necessarily in their content, and therefore comprise a 
structure of dominance that is both hugely powerful and internally contradictory.  Furthermore, 
these positions are not only effects of the social order, but its supports, and must be maintained 
for social relations to remain as they are.  For these reasons, ideological analysis should privilege 
neither the totality nor its elements, but accept their mutual influence, and that the contestable 
contents of the elements represent cracks in the supporting structure. 
Aspects of this ‘two-tiered’ concept of ideology are drawn from the work of Marcuse and 
Jameson, and especially Žižek’s use of Lacanian concepts, yet there are also important 
differences.  With Marcuse and Jameson, the concept of a split between acceptance or rejection 
of the existing order is present in the contrast between one-dimensional thought and two-
dimensional thought, or de-historicised fragments and historicised narrative.  That is, despite the 
apparent weakening of the psyche under consumer capitalist structures, there remains, as 
Jameson says, ‘an ensemble of human agents trained in specific ways and inventing original local 
tactics and practices according to the creativities of human freedom’.
77
  However, while they 
recognise different ways in which individuals comprehend social relations, they do not really 
consider the more productive role of affirmative rationalisation.  Thus, for Marcuse, although there 
are ‘countervailing powers’ in today’s society, ‘these forces cancel each other out in a higher 
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unification’, which seems to ‘promote rather than counteract the fateful integration’.
78
  In short, 
analysis of the conformism and systemic reinforcement in affirmative positions, overrides that of 
differences between them.  
Žižek goes a stage further in this respect, because the imaginary ‘fantasy’ is precisely a 
level of rationalisation in contrast to symbolic attachment.  In effect, the subject must attribute 
certain absolute justifications for its basic interpellation to an external source, to stabilise 
meaning, and the fantasy internalises certain social norms and adapts as necessary to maintain 
the attachment.  Despite this two-level structure, however, in this Symbolic-fantasy relationship 
the fantasy becomes merely a reaction to symbolic attachment, and peripheral to the core 
obedience.  Certainly, as Žižek says, fantasy cannot precede symbolic attachment, because 
subjects do not ‘merely fill in, occupy, a preordained place’, and ‘it is the very subjective act of 
recognition’ that makes it possible to posit an external meaning.
79
  Yet, entry into the Symbolic 
also implies attachment to a particular Master-Signifier that overdetermines the subject position, 
which means that the external authority posited cannot be purely subjective, and is already based 
on social influences.  While Žižek accepts this circuitous relationship, he still presents attachment 
as primary in ideology, in a way that renders positive ideas peripheral, and therefore focuses on 
change through an act that begins by negating the fantasy altogether.  Conversely, as we see it, if 
such ‘negation’ is to mean a political shift between acceptance and rejection, it presupposes a 
new, self-reflexive ideological position, that emerges in advance through positive experiences and 
ideas, and already overdetermines how the subject reacts to recognising the contingency of the 
fantasy.  As Laclau says, subjects are ‘never in the position of the absolute chooser who, faced 
with the contingency of all possible courses of action, would have no reason to choose’.
80
  As 
such, the baseline attachment that enables conscious rationalisation also depends on it, and 
contradictions encountered by the subject may alter the fantasy to the point it challenges the 
Master-Signifier itself. 
One implication of this theory is that subjectivity rests on a paradox, according to which a 
‘cause’ can be influenced by its own ‘effects’.  Essentially, it involves Althusser’s notion that 
subjective interpellation has ‘always-already’ occurred, so that subjects neither enter into symbolic 
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relations and then rationalise them, nor enter based on prior rationalisations, but are simply within 
the circuit.
81
  Or, as Althusser explains in terms of ‘principal’ and ‘secondary’ social contradictions, 
the structure and the plurality of meanings constitute each other: 
 
In plain terms this position implies […] that the principal is not the essence and the 
secondaries so many of its phenomena, so much so that the principal contradiction might 
practically exist without the secondary contradictions, or without some of them, or might 
exist before or after them.  On the contrary, it implies that the secondary contradictions 
are essential even to the existence of the principal contradiction, that they really 
constitute its condition of existence, just as the principal contradiction constitutes their 
condition of existence.
82
 
 
In our terms, each secondary contradiction reflects the principal, and relates to other secondary 
contradictions, which together form the essential supports for the principal.  There is mutual 
dependence between the ‘principal’ acceptance or rejection and its different ‘secondary’ 
manifestations or rationalisations.   
Furthermore, this mutual dependence is not fully self-contained, because various external 
influences may contribute to its content (ideological beliefs), and in pluralist societies in particular, 
the range of different rationalisations mean that various potential influences are constantly 
present.  Here, we consider the conflicting demands on subjects in consumer capitalism by 
synthesising Marcuse’s concepts of ‘performance principle’ and ‘repressive desublimation’, which 
describe a dual social expectation of productivity and consumerist leisure, with Jameson and 
Žižek’s focus on today’s fragmented and bewildering social pressures.  We thus show how a 
whole range of institutional demands function together according to logics of capitalist 
reproduction, but that these demands are also contradictory, and the way subjects prioritise 
particular demands over others causes tension.  That is, different subjects are interpellated 
according to specific constellations of influences, which dominate perception, but that perception 
is also susceptible to other influences.  As Therborn states in his concept of ‘qualification’, while 
‘those who have been subjected to a particular patterning of their capacities, to a particular 
discipline, qualify for the given roles and are capable of carrying them out’, ‘there is always an 
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inherent possibility that a contradiction may develop between the two’.
83
  When rationalisation is 
confronted by alternative rationalisations, it may be forced to articulate its assumptions, and even 
meet its own limits.  In that sense, following Butler, subjection is both ‘a power exerted on a 
subject’ and ‘a power assumed by the subject, an assumption that constitutes the instrument of 
that subject’s becoming’.
84
  The power relations that constitute subjects do not completely define 
their scope of action, as the subject assumes a power of its own in interpellation, to rationalise its 
subjection, and the power of rationalisation may work ‘against the power that made that 
assumption possible’.
85
 
With this understanding of ideology, identifying different rationalisations that support 
ideological attachments allows us to consider the particular limits of affirmation subjects may 
have.  To this end, we develop an ideology ‘map’, by analysing positions drawn from the works of 
Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek.  We examine various aspects of each ideology, such as the beliefs 
and justifications that underpin them, the level of ‘awareness’ or knowledge of social disparity they 
demonstrate, their main institutional influences (law, education, media), and the psychological 
conditions that may accompany them (such as guilt, fear, or even optimism).  These ideologies 
include a positive concept of cynicism, but also various other ways people internalise common 
propositions about the market, democracy, humanity, consumerist pleasures, and political 
alternatives, from versions of political liberalism and conservatism, to more ‘apolitical’ responses 
that may be equally significant in their social impact. 
 
Ideology and Political Change 
In each of the following three chapters, we examine how each of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek’s 
theories defines ideology in the situation of consumer capitalism, and the contents of the 
ideologies themselves.  Also, having established this base, we explore how our approach to 
ideology may alter the questions of political change that they consider, in particular how focusing 
on conscious aspects of ideology implies a more consequential battleground of ideas within the 
social.  In the final three sections of each chapter in particular — examining themes of 
‘commodification’, ‘agency’, and ‘political action’ — we both consider the powerful forces that 
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reproduce consumer capitalism, as described by Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, and shift the 
emphasis of their conclusions by highlighting the importance of contestable beliefs.  Thus, if the 
totality appears insurmountable, even given awareness of its contingency, it can be re-presented 
in terms of the specific mechanisms and conditions according to which its conscious supports are 
formed. 
In our first theme, Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek identify various ways in which 
commodification as such reduces scope for ideological resistance.  For example, mass 
commodification of information promotes certain ideas and marginalises others, or de-historicises 
oppositional politics, robbing them of their power.  In this way, popular oppositional politics seem 
impossible, since mass communications channels function according to market demands, and if 
more radical ideas use commodified channels to reach a mass audience, they both reproduce the 
established structure and force their message to fit dominant media codes.  Furthermore, 
symbolically rebellious acts lack impact in a permissive society that actively encourages and 
profits from subversion of taboo.  Aesthetic expressions of resistance are simply not shocking, or 
are represented in terms of a monetary value, and lose any revolutionary context.  As such, any 
contribution appears to be merely another form of participation in commodity relations, which 
adds to the circulation of information and the capitalist process.  In fact, the transformation of 
individual expression into consumerist identities and activities can make commodification seem 
fulfilling in itself. 
While these arguments are persuasive, we suggest limits and contradictions in 
commodity logic, by emphasising contrasts between ideological rationalisations.  For example, 
Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek all note that capitalism has become reliant on mass consumerism, 
and needs people to buy excessively, which relies on an ideological association between 
satisfaction, fulfilment and consumption.  Therefore, people do not simply invest in consumerist 
lifestyles without rationalising that investment, based on positive justifications.  Moreover, if there 
is a correlation between common beliefs and dominant media codes, it implies that mass media 
content is still influential.  It then follows that a greater quantity of radical content (which is not 
programmatically excluded by commodified mass media that obey market demand) could have an 
ideological and political impact.  To use Mandel’s example, the profitable business of publishing 
Marxist literature does not merely constitute ‘an “integration” of Marxism into the “world of 
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commodities”’, because ‘the bourgeois social order and the individual consumer by no means 
have a “value-free” or “neutral” attitude to the specific use-value of “Marxist literature”’.
86
  This 
content adds to the structure of capitalist communications, and promotes the idea of free 
democratic participation,
87
 but is also necessary if beliefs about participation and democracy are 
to change. 
Our second theme considers agency, or the extent to which Marcuse, Jameson and 
Žižek’s theories of subjectivity suggest potentials for psychological resistance against dominant 
codes.  In Marcuse’s case, the technologically rationalised system traps activity in logics of 
economic efficiency and productivity, and he argues that ‘subjective’ understanding that change is 
required has been separated from the ‘objective’ power of a unified work force, due to 
developments in production and consumption.  For Jameson, political goals are fragmented into 
codes that never relate themselves to their constitutive mode of production.  Rather, the complex 
global nature of the system makes it near impossible for individuals to identify their position, or 
locations of power, within it, leading to disempowerment and lack of direction.  Žižek, meanwhile, 
defines the potential of a subjective ‘act’ that rejects the laws of the existing order.  Here, the 
question that emerges is how this act is motivated or what makes subjects take such a decision, 
as well as how such acts may become politically powerful when revolutionary subjectivity is so 
fragmented.  In effect, the overriding concept that ultimately dominates all three theorists’ work in 
this area is the necessity of somehow reinvigorating a ‘class consciousness’. 
The extent to which Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek tend to present subjectivity as reified or 
fragmented by dominant forces and material circumstances makes it difficult to imagine how a 
conscious agency can contribute to such aims.  Marcuse in particular identifies the paradox that 
social relations must change to develop class consciousness, and that class consciousness is the 
prerequisite to force this change.  However, in our understanding, certain affirmative forms of 
consciousness are more committed to the existing order than others, so some positions suggest 
the possibility of gradually generating a more class focused interpretation, if contradictory 
arguments can achieve a high enough profile.  Jameson especially explores the possibility of 
invigorating utopian ideals in ideologies in general, which we believe hints at a potential to 
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develop alternative political goals (although we do not assume any intrinsically socialist element 
to this potential).  We also view oppositional agency as an ‘act’ in Žižek’s terms, in which subjects 
take responsibility for their own ‘decision’ to accept social relations.  But we emphasise that, if 
such acts are to be more than spontaneous and individual, they must emerge from challenges to 
belief via experience and knowledge that counter dominant assumptions.  Concepts such as the 
act, or the ability to comprehend utopian thinking, effectively presuppose a prior shift in 
consciousness, which often implies awaiting some kind of social crisis to invalidate current 
thinking.  In our view, while crisis is an important catalyst for widespread ideological change, the 
process of shifting consciousness begins beforehand, and the reaction to crisis is dependent on 
that preparatory work.  In other words, a mass act of taking responsibility for the future, or 
imagining radically progressive change, is the result of challenging conscious justifications for 
acceptance in the present.  
The final theme examines the kinds of political action that may be possible and effective 
today.  Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek all attempt to envisage conditions for oppositional 
movements to emerge, refusing to accept that the current circumstances are permanent or 
insurmountable, at least in the long term.  We consider the difficulties that any radical movement 
faces according to these theories, and attempt to extract their more ‘optimistic’ elements, as well 
as use our ideology theory to demonstrate how these may represent more concrete and ever-
present potentials.  With Marcuse, we focus on a shift in his perspective around the time of the 
1968 protest movements, which showed that oppositional ideas could emerge within the reified 
conditions he had defined.  Here he considers a ‘step by step’ approach to building radical 
politics, which involves gradual development of class consciousness and institutional change 
together, in a mutually reciprocal manner.  A similar idea then returns in Jameson’s theory of 
Utopia, which considers a need to combine far-reaching political goals with more accessible 
everyday politics.  That is, revolutionary or utopian aims may not be directly communicable, so 
must be mediated by balancing global ideas with more ‘local’ politics, with both sides essential to 
meaningful change.  Finally, with Žižek, we examine how political refusal, or withdrawal from 
political activity to create spaces for alternative thought, must also provide a positive political 
direction that questions capitalism and liberal democracy.  Against some of Žižek’s proposals, we 
emphasise that formal negation cannot precede positive content, but generally endorse his aim of 
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gradually developing fragmented opposition into a larger movement that considers various 
notions of radical change.  The common conclusion in all three chapters is thus this focus on 
gradual development, or a ‘spiral’ in which actions slowly change consciousness, which then 
slowly strengthen actions.
88
  But central to our argument throughout is that these proposals are 
only meaningful if positive ideological rationalisation has some form of productive power. 
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Chapter 2 
Herbert Marcuse 
I. Introduction 
Our analysis of Marcuse focuses on one-dimensionality, or the administrative conditioning of 
consciousness in post-war consumer capitalism, and the possibilities he considers for developing 
oppositional thinking within such circumstances.
1
  Many of the features Marcuse identifies in what 
he calls ‘advanced industrial society’ or ‘late industrial capitalism’ remain relevant today and are 
echoed in the theories of Jameson and Žižek, especially the psychological pressures of 
consumerism and productivity, which obscure alternative potentials.  Nevertheless, we argue 
against Marcuse’s suggestion that these dominant social demands are automatically absorbed by 
individuals, with rationalisation being little more than an effect of conformity.  Instead we explore 
how these demands are internalised based on specific beliefs and conditions.  Marcuse’s 
understanding affects consideration of social change, or his attempts to locate a minority ‘two-
dimensional’ or dialectical thought, and potentials for its expansion.  For the most part, in line with 
his concept of unconscious ideological internalisation, Marcuse explores possible crises that may 
appear due to intrinsic systemic contradictions, or ways to communicate that bypass 
consciousness.  For us, such possibilities still rely on challenges to ideological rationalisation to 
become plausible, and emphasis on such challenges implies further opportunities for political 
change.  Therefore, while aspects of Marcuse’s political theory begin to move in this direction, 
they must still be reframed in terms of conscious rationalisations. 
The first task is to examine the features of ‘one-dimensionality’, and some repressed 
potentials for transcendence Marcuse identifies, as well as possible catalysts for such change.  In 
effect, one-dimensionality refers to ideology that works through social practices and administrative 
systems to reinforce general acceptance of existing social relations, making the particular appear 
universal, and social change appear unnecessary or dangerous.  We accept the foundations of 
Marcuse’s analysis of consumer capitalist society here, and the split his theory creates between 
affirmative and oppositional ideology, but question whether this ‘total administration’ really renders 
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 To this end, the chapter mostly examines Marcuse’s later works, from the 1950s to the 1970s, especially 
EC (first published 1955), ODM (1964), EL (1969), and CRR (1972). 
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consciousness as impervious to two-dimensional thinking as he suggests.  Accordingly, Marcuse 
demonstrates a need for change, due to the way in which consumer capitalism artificially 
maintains levels of toil and scarcity, but his understanding of ideology indicates that direct political 
challenges are largely useless.  He thus considers various alternative catalysts for progressive 
change, from intrinsic tendencies in capitalism, science and human nature, to the unconscious 
influence of autonomous culture.  We argue that, while some of these potentials are convincing, 
their impact still relies on their recognition in mass consciousness, so any political change must 
also confront this conscious dimension. 
Our next aim is to show how ideological rationalisation remains important, and identify 
possible contents of rationalisations.  Marcuse stresses that individuals absorb institutional 
influences without contemplation, are unable to think outside dominant linguistic boundaries, or 
simply reproduce existing social relations through work and consumer behaviour.  In our 
understanding, external influences cannot simply be absorbed, because they make different 
demands on individuals, and different attitudes reveal varied justifications and levels of 
commitment to the social order.  Furthermore, the limits of language in mass media are not purely 
structural, but involve a conscious struggle to make certain narratives more influential than others.  
Media language thus includes a variety of affirmative interpretations that may highlight each 
other’s inconsistencies, and leave a minimal space for oppositional ideas.  We then identify 
specific ideological positions, by considering contrasting views Marcuse offers on the importance 
of knowledge to social reproduction.  While he suggests in some cases that ideological 
acceptance is merely a reflection of economic conditions, at times his descriptions also imply 
elements of conscious justification.  We expand this notion to demonstrate the importance of 
rationalisation and belief in all cases, and define their various forms. 
With these main ideas established, the question is how our understanding of ideology 
may shift the emphasis on Marcuse’s considerations of political change.  The first issue is that of 
how mass consumerism and commodification influence aims and expectations, and obstruct 
development of oppositional ideas.  In many ways, Marcuse pre-empts theories of postmodernism 
(such as those of Jameson and Žižek) by identifying how consumerism creates new concepts of 
fulfilment, through lifestyle choices and leisure activities, and incorporates previously subversive 
behaviour into mass entertainment.  We accept these ideas, but our point is also to demonstrate 
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that people still rationalise consumerism and its downsides (waste, pre-defined freedoms), in 
ways that are crucial to their attachment to it, and may be indirect and conditional.  Moreover, in 
regards to Marcuse’s emphasis on ‘autonomous’ art, as a cultural catalyst to oppositional politics, 
we understand that, because autonomous cultural zones are increasingly less influential in mass 
consumerism, it is necessary to consider how oppositional ideas may function within mass media 
spaces.  In particular, we argue, this potential rests less on the utopian form of high art and more 
on political content which challenges conscious ideological beliefs. 
For Marcuse, another problem remains that individuals throughout society are channelled 
into cellular administrative roles, disconnected from their wider effects.  Even leaders and elites, 
he claims, are not authors of the system so much as its functionaries.  In addition, it is difficult to 
perceive from which particular social identities a revolutionary sensibility might emerge, since, 
Marcuse shows, the different conditions for a revolutionary subject previously embodied in the 
industrial proletariat are now separated between classes.  In these conditions, it appears that the 
class consciousness of some middle-class intellectuals is the necessary catalyst to make 
connections between these groups.  In response to these points, we believe it is important that 
people still rationalise structural compulsions, as it makes their adherence conditional (and flawed 
because it relates to inconsistent institutional demands).  This rationalisation is then also crucial to 
the prospect of a class movement, since intellectual opposition can only be communicated 
effectively if there is a certain receptiveness in other groups, which implies that fragments of 
oppositional consciousness already exist within them. 
Finally, we see that Marcuse’s theory of ideology means that for the most part he cannot 
imagine a radical politics in terms of effective forms of action, and can only insist upon intrinsic 
social tendencies and contradictions, and a need to avoid defeatism.  Also, because his concept 
of one-dimensional thinking precludes more direct confrontations to affirmative ideologies, it is 
often not clear what action these observations entail.  An impasse emerges in which institutional 
change is the prerequisite for a change in consciousness, but the change in consciousness is 
needed for institutional change.  However, Marcuse alters his thinking with the protest movements 
of the late 1960s, to suggest the possibility of greater political engagement, because he sees an 
existing consciousness that may be further developed through gradual radical education and 
institutional reform.  As we perceive it, this initial emergence of such a consciousness reveals a 
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potential that was always within one-dimensional ideologies, and this politics of gradual 
development can theoretically begin in any social conditions.  We then analyse some of 
Marcuse’s strategies for developing change, with a focus on gradual development that must 
balance negation of dominant ideas with creating a positive alternative, and constitutional political 
action with extra-legal protests.  In our view, Marcuse’s emphasis on a politics of negation 
represents a commitment to mass self-determination, although it must also recognise its own 
specific assumptions, and may require support from established forms of political participation. 
Overall, our analysis affirms many of the difficulties of changing dominant forms of 
consciousness in consumer capitalism that Marcuse identifies.  Also, some of Marcuse’s 
contributions to ideology theory remain particularly important, including the framing of ‘true’ and 
‘false’ social needs, the social demand for both productivity and consumerist ‘desublimation’, and 
pluralist ‘repressive tolerance’ that allows intolerant views to thrive under a veil of neutrality.  In 
some cases, we defend his more contentious positions against criticisms, which tend to either 
accuse him of being too politically dogmatic, or, conversely, of withdrawing from political 
commitment.
2
  But at other points we agree with critics, particularly where they argue that the 
measures Marcuse suggests for political change often appear ineffective.
3
  For the most part, 
these measures become plausible when we accentuate the role of conscious rationalisation, 
against concepts such as ‘ego-weakness’, which supposedly makes individuals more susceptible 
to institutional demands.  We insist that it is unnecessary to focus so greatly on unconscious and 
external factors in envisaging change, and instead draw from Marcuse’s theory a range of 
ideological rationalisations with conscious limits that may gradually be contested.  In our view, 
such contestation can cause shifts in the unconscious acceptance of norms, by bringing 
contradictory assumptions to the surface that reveal its contingency.
4
  
                                                             
2 In the first case, instances include the idea that Marcuse’s notion of politicising science equates to top 
down political control (Feenberg); or that his opposition to repressive tolerance is a way of narrowing 
discussion (MacIntyre).  In the second case, we refer, for example, to arguments that Marcuse’s focus on 
art is a form of political withdrawal (Lukes, Reitz); or that the concept of counter education is purely 
negative and represents a retreat from actual political alternatives (Bernstein, Martineau). 
3 These points include: the way Marcuse privileges the socialising aspect of ‘biological’ instinct (Alford, 
Alway, Kellner), or some ideal state in historical recollection (Jay); his idea of progress based on a specific 
point of technological advancement (Alford, Feenberg); the value he places on heavily marginalised 
autonomous art (Bronner, Raulet, Kellner); his political focus on sudden revolution over gradual change 
(Bernstein, Geoghegan, Reitz); and the possibility of minority dictatorship (Lichtman). 
4
 To reiterate, this process is not a question of unveiling ‘false consciousness’ to reveal a positive reality, 
but of highlighting forms of partiality, omissions and inconsistencies, and their political effects. 
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II. Key Concepts 
i) One-Dimensionality 
Our first objective is to establish the social conditions Marcuse defines around the central concept 
of one-dimensionality, and show how this notion establishes an ideological split between 
conformism and opposition to existing social relations, but also overemphasises automatic or 
unconscious ideological absorption.  Marcuse identifies ways in which various material and 
cultural factors, from improvements in average living standards, to the reduction of language to a 
pragmatic or empirical common sense, create a new form of ideology that channels individuals 
into acceptance without explicit coercion.  He also explains how these changes obscure a 
continued alienation and lack of self-determination, and rely on global oppression and destruction, 
which one-dimensional consciousness fails to critically evaluate.  While we accept that such 
social changes have occurred, we question whether mass, one-dimensional consciousness is as 
impervious to opposition as Marcuse implies, and how minority two-dimensional thinking that 
considers potentials beyond the present reality manages to emerge in these conditions.  At this 
point, the aim is merely to identify a lack of conscious rationalisation in Marcuse’s ideology theory, 
and suggest that this lack problematizes concepts of political change.  
One-dimensional or identity thinking, for Marcuse, is not propaganda, but a certain logic in 
late industrial capitalism, which often stems from the ‘apolitical’, instrumental reduction of objects 
and concepts to singular notions by repeated association.  It leads to complete acceptance of 
what exists, as these particular interpretations are constantly affirmed throughout various aspects 
of everyday life, in a way that creates barriers to thought that ‘appear as the limits of Reason 
itself’.
5
  For example, Marcuse explains, a beautiful model advertising a cosmetic product is 
presented as beauty itself, implying that beauty requires and is that product.  Sufficient 
reinforcement of such ideas throughout advertising then obscures the fact that an abstract noun 
(beauty) has far more scope for meaning than an adjective (beautiful) used to describe certain 
objects.
6
  Marcuse also describes the issue as ‘operationalism’, or obsession with empiricism, 
which only considers problems within specific, local parameters, rather than as social questions.  
So, in the work place, a single employee’s complaint about low wages is analysed in terms of that 
individual’s current financial situation, not by considering the suitability of wages in general.  Or, 
                                                             
5
 ODM, p. 14. 
6 Ibid., p. 213. 
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mental health treatment aims at an individual’s ‘adjustive success’ in following social demands, 
not whether the demands are reasonable in themselves.
7
  In both cases, a particular solution may 
be found that alleviates the individual issue, but only by blocking consideration of wider social 
causes.  For Marcuse, such empiricist methodology is ideological, as it reinforces individualism 
and introduces ‘a false concreteness’ to reality that ‘assumes a political function’ by reaffirming 
the existing social order.
8
 
The point, therefore, is that various notions can come to appear universal through mere 
adherence to empirical data, because unrealised potentials are repressed by the analysis.  For 
Marcuse, ideas such as that social progress requires domination over nature, unpleasurable 
labour is a social necessity, or human experience is primarily one of oppression, obscure the 
historical dimension of scarcity, sacrifice and aggression.  He argues that such views are in part 
consequences of scientific rationality, which is no longer concerned with the enlightenment and 
‘freedom from fear which it once promised’, but with ‘denouncing the notion of an earthly 
paradise’,
9
 through  a ‘neutral’ authoritativeness that trivialises alternative thinking.  It is 
instrumentalism that views reality via measurements and categorisations, and aims at control, and 
as such can ideologically reduce nature and people to tools or obstacles relating to specific goals.  
Within late industrial capitalism, this logic reproduces the priority of increased ‘productivity’, whose 
destructive effects then become normalised, and are absolved from moral censure.  As such, 
despite revolving around knowledge and factual analysis, as opposed to mystic beliefs and moral 
absolutes, this ideology justifies acts that create waste, scarcity and conflict through an appeal to 
objective necessity.  In political terms, for Marcuse, it permits validation of virtually any act without 
guilt, to the extent, he claims, ‘one man can give the signal that liquidates hundreds and 
thousands of people, then declare himself free from all pangs of conscience’.
10
 
At the same time, an important aspect of ideological acceptance in this social formation is 
that it actually seems to enable upward mobility, and provides a relatively stable political system, 
against which there appears no immediate need to rebel.  In fact, since dominant concepts of 
individual and social success rely heavily on one-dimensional thinking, transcendent ideas even 
seem counterproductive.  As such, for Marcuse, the working class ceases to be antagonistic to 
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the system and instead becomes a consumer-producer with an interest in its maintenance.  This 
consumer dimension also compensates for sacrifices made to enhance productivity, both 
satisfying basic needs and providing sources of pleasure to fill leisure time.  Popular culture urges 
individuals to fill this time with entertainment, as opposed to critical reflection or political 
engagement, while offering promises of gratification that are never fully met and always demand 
more labour.  In a sense, this cycle of work-leisure is irrational, but it is rational for individuals to 
invest in it because not conforming is either inconceivable, or appears too risky.  Marcuse asks, if 
‘satisfying goods also include thoughts, feelings, aspirations, why should [people] wish to think, 
feel and imagine for themselves?’.
11
 
This one-dimensionality is massively dominant, for Marcuse, but still contrastable against 
a two-dimensional or dialectical thought.  Statements he makes that imply total reification, such as 
that today’s ‘culture is more ideological than its predecessor, inasmuch as today the ideology is in 
the process of production itself’,
12
 effectively exclude his own critical position, which represents a 
subordinate or socially-repressed minority consciousness within the same whole.  As such, as 
Kellner says, Marcuse is not ‘a theorist […] who completely rejects contradiction, conflict, revolt 
and alternative thought and action’.
13
  Rather, Marcuse is clear from his earlier work that there is 
always a general dialectical potential beyond what currently exists, or the ‘interpretation of that-
which-is in terms of that-which-is-not, confrontation of the given facts with that which they 
exclude’, and explains how acceptance of ‘that-which-is repels that-which-is-not and, in doing so, 
repels its own real possibilities’.
14
  The one-dimensional absorption of individuals into dominant 
social goals can therefore always generate exceptions.  Seen in this way, Marcuse’s concept of 
ideology marks a baseline split between affirmative ideologies that accept these goals, and 
oppositional ideologies that reject them. 
At the same time, this separation in itself does not explain how two-dimensional thinking 
emerges in the social circumstances, unless the unconscious ideological absorption of one-
dimensional thinking is not as total as Marcuse claims.  In fact, it may be that some of the features 
Marcuse identifies are not so specific to late industrial capitalism, but relate to all social forms.  As 
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13 Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984), p. 
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Laclau and Mouffe note, a particular (interpretation) becoming dominant and being elevated to the 
appearance of a universal is the central aspect of any hegemonic relation.
15
  Or, there may be 
potentials for critical development specific to this social form that Marcuse does not recognise.  As 
Habermas suggests, given the separation of communication from the specific ‘value orientations’ 
of more traditional (religious) societies, at least the formal possibility of critical thought should be 
greater today.
16
  Marcuse instead emphasises the distinct qualities of ideological subjugation in 
existing social relations, which seems to reinforce the concept of one-dimensionality but leave no 
space for the two-dimensional excess.  He acknowledges that dominant language is always one-
dimensional in a sense, because it primarily ‘expresses the given […] form of reality’, and adjusts 
individuals ‘to the given universe of discourse and behavior’.
17
  However, he feels that what is 
‘relatively new is the general acceptance of […] lies by public and private opinion’,
18
 or the way 
self-contradicting terms are automatically validated by experts and authority figures.  This 
reproduction of ideology through technical rationality then decreases critical capacity, but as such 
provides no clear reason why some people manage to resist the ‘lies’. 
Alternatively, since dialectical thinking indicates that people are capable of recognising 
contradictions, and ideological rationalisation still exists, we can consider whether those who 
accept contradictions also rationalise them, according to certain beliefs.  In fact, it seems there is 
no way for two-dimensional thinking to develop within these circumstances if, as Marcuse claims, 
the ‘people who speak and accept [dominant] language seem to be immune to everything — and 
susceptible to everything’.
19
  As Reitz says, where Marcuse sees such ‘an almost mechanical 
reflection of operational and functional material economic concerns in the ideological sphere’, it 
indicates ‘the integration of individual interests and a paralysis of criticism’.
20
  Therefore, we 
understand one-dimensionality as a combination of social logics and conscious justifications, 
which involves the possibility of ideological shifts due to conscious recognition of alternative 
possibilities.  For example, if people take seriously the idea that consumer goods provide 
                                                             
15 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. xiii. 
16 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Volume Two: The Critique of Functionalist 
Reason, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 180. 
17 Marcuse, ‘Beyond One-Dimensional Man’, in Towards a Critical Theory of Society: Collected Papers of 
Herbert Marcuse Volume Two, ed. by Kellner (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 107-120 (p. 118). 
18 ODM, p. 89. 
19 Marcuse, ‘Language and Technological Society’, Dissent, 8 (1961), 66-74 (p. 71). 
20
 Charles Reitz, Art, Alienation, and the Humanities: A Critical Engagement with Herbert Marcuse (Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press, 2000), p. 160. 
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fulfilment, that becomes a belief with certain limits; if they do not take it seriously, they are not 
really ‘susceptible to everything’, but have other reasons for accepting reified language.  Ideology 
in consumer capitalist societies may be especially complex, but it thus involves varied and subtle 
considerations of fulfilment, risk and inadequacy, which go beyond automatic absorption.  Since 
there is still a particular that becomes ‘universal’ and anchors justifications of social objectives, 
that particular can be identified and challenged. 
 
ii) True Needs 
In Marcuse’s terms, there is a repressed potential for qualitative social improvement, but the 
majority is incapable of thinking dialectically (or two-dimensionally) to perceive it.  That is, they are 
unable to perceive the intrinsic contradictions in the existing system, or contrast what is with an 
imaginary future based on resolving these contradictions.  For our purposes, it is important how 
Marcuse formulates this potential specifically, because it provides an oppositional narrative that 
can counter dominant thinking.  In particular, Marcuse centres on possibilities of reducing toil, 
deprivation and scarcity, against ideas that such sacrifices are necessary to repress ‘anti-social 
instincts’, or maintain the material standards of the existing order.  Here, we question Marcuse’s 
theory of instincts, because he does not clearly demonstrate that more socialising instincts can be 
liberated while controlling aggression and selfishness, but argue that the potentials he identifies in 
modern production suggest clear avenues for social improvement for the majority, and identify a 
class divide (between those who benefit most from current conditions, and those who do not).  
However, in Marcuse’s theory, the shift in consciousness required to recognise the need for social 
change can only emerge as an effect of tendencies within human nature and capitalist 
development, rather than conscious political interventions.  As such, the theories he develops to 
accentuate such tendencies reduce the role of active agency in social change.  In our view, 
conversely, the possibility of reducing repression is not purely dependent on particular conditions, 
as the needs Marcuse identifies can be part of a political message that counters dominant 
thinking. 
The split between what is and what could be, for Marcuse, can be seen in terms of true 
and false needs.  The latter are demands for excess productivity and consumerism that ensure 
dominance, self-repression and conformism, as opposed to critical self-determination.  The truth 
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is then simply that these demands are unnecessary, and specifically employed towards 
maintaining the dominance of particular forces in the existing order.  Marcuse explains that 
continuing deprivation, as well as repressive labour and environmental destruction, are only 
needed to maintain the established hierarchical dominance, not civilisation as such.  Thus, if in 
the past ‘the rationality of the repression organized in the capitalist mode of production was 
obvious’, it is now ‘losing its rationality’.
21
  In that sense, Marcuse explains, ‘The distinction 
between true and false consciousness, real and immediate interest still is meaningful.  But this 
distinction itself must be validated.’
22
  That is, true needs cannot be imposed, but are something 
individuals must comprehend by recognising their exploitation and the potentials it obscures. 
Marcuse also links these potentials to a critique of the Freudian theory of drives.  That is, 
where Freud sees that civilisation as such entails both physical and psychological repression (of 
the ‘pleasure principle’ into the ‘reality principle’ of delayed gratification and sacrifice), Marcuse 
sees this situation as historically conditioned, and based on a false assumption of inevitable 
scarcity in human society.  The consequent primary focus on increased productivity, which 
Marcuse calls the ‘performance principle’, that may have been necessary historically in most 
social formations, should therefore not be taken for granted.
23
  Marcuse notes how production and 
distribution methods have advanced to the point that they could make scarcity obsolete, and a 
non-repressive reality principle could emerge that revolved around ‘rational exercise in authority 
[...] derived from knowledge and confined to the administration of functions and arrangements 
necessary for the advancement of the whole’.
24
  The performance principle then embodies 
‘surplus-repression’, because it demands sacrifice beyond what civilisation requires. 
The conclusion Marcuse draws is that civilizational needs can even be compatible with 
certain ‘instincts’, which he draws from Freud’s notion of Eros.  According to Marcuse, the original 
nature of Eros is ascribed by Freud both an ‘amoral and asocial, even anti-moral and anti-social’ 
force of individual gratification, and a drive towards social bonds, or ‘an erotic impulse to 
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civilization’.
25
  This duality, for Marcuse, contradicts Freud’s insistence that civilisation must 
repress instinctual satisfaction, because social bonding in civilisation can also meet instinctual 
demands.  He states that Freud’s analysis of the relationship between instinct and work contains 
the insupportable assumptions ‘that free libidinal relations are essentially antagonistic to work 
relations, that energy has to be withdrawn from the former in order to institute the latter, that only 
the absence of full gratification sustains the societal organization of work’.
26
  Instead, Marcuse 
says, the bonding instinct could harmonise with civilisation to eliminate surplus-repression, 
reducing scarcity, struggle and domination and leading to ‘a non-repressive reality principle’ with 
qualitatively different work relations.  He argues that work can take the form of play if its ‘purpose’ 
is redirected towards gratification of (socialising) Eros.  Such work would be done simply because 
it suited ‘the free play of human abilities’, fulfilling needs through activities that would shape 
society according to self-determined desires.
27
  Marcuse calls this potential ‘non-repressive 
sublimation’, in contrast to the traditional repressive sublimation of performance, and the 
repressive desublimation of consumerism, which provides a narrow form of gratification that 
augments performance.  The point is not that non-repressive sublimation merely obeys the 
pleasure principle, but that it combines social instinct with conscious rationality.  As such, 
Marcuse does not expect it to create perfect social harmony, but a society in which ‘conflicts 
would themselves have libidinal value’, and ‘be permeated with the rationality of gratification’.
28
 
Marcuse’s attempts to establish potentials for an alternative society are more convincing 
when he focuses on material factors than on human nature and instinct.  On one hand, there is a 
clear logic that, since survival is easier in some locations and historical periods than others, if 
social toil and sacrifice is not reduced under more favourable circumstances, it is repurposed 
towards maintaining specific relations of domination.  On the other, in terms of Eros, scarcity and 
repression are not only matters of material resources, ideological maturity and technological 
development.  Rather, the duality in Eros signifies an internal contradiction that makes scarcity 
and repression inevitable, because it produces social and anti-social desires.  That is, even if 
civilisation could satisfy the social aspect of Eros, it would repress the individual side, which is 
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psychological scarcity.
29
  Marcuse in fact notes that ‘jealousy, unhappy love, and violence […] 
express the contradiction inherent in the libido between ubiquity and exclusiveness, between 
fulfillment in variation or change and fulfillment in constancy’.
30
  But effectively, as Alway puts it, 
he ‘recognizes the contradictory tendencies in Freud’s theory of sexuality but chooses to stress its 
social, as opposed to the individualistic, elements’.
31
  Non-repressive sublimation then depends 
on this privileging of one side of Eros over the other, or an understanding that satisfying one 
aspect is sufficiently fulfilling.  Yet, as Žižek’s Lacanian theory will show, it is more that 
necessarily partial gratification always leaves a surplus of dissatisfaction, regardless of which 
‘instinct’ it serves. 
This notion of fulfilment also contrasts with the idea of reducing surplus-repression 
relating to specific historical conditions.  Here, Marcuse acknowledges that some repression is 
inevitable, because ‘there can be no such thing as a total abolition of alienation’, which indicates 
‘the inexorable struggle of man with nature confronting the human subject and limiting its freedom 
no matter in what form of society’.
32
  But then, if the subject is always alienated, either not all 
activity can be socialising, or the content of certain labour remains ungratifying regardless of 
purpose.  As Alford explains, all work curtails freedom to some extent, simply because it 
represses instant gratification and ‘imposes objective demands upon individuals’.
33
  It thus seems 
that, while surplus-repression may be eradicated through social restructuring, Freud’s assumption 
stands that absence of full gratification is required to sustain the societal organisation of work.  It 
is then a question of the extent to which existing social conditions allow for eradication of scarcity 
and toil, and Marcuse does not provide specifics here, such as quantifying global productivity and 
automated labour.
34
  Rather, in one instance he explains that elimination of profitable waste is 
                                                             
29 In particular, the Oedipus complex represents scarcity of love, as desire for the mother is denied by the 
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sufficient for a universally high living standard that ‘does not mean return to healthy and robust 
poverty’,
35
 and elsewhere says that material and mental resources ‘are still so limited that there 
must be a vastly lower standard of living if social productivity were directed toward the universal 
gratification of individual needs’.
36
  In any case, the repurposing of work as play is only a partial 
potential. 
In our understanding, surplus-repression remains an important concept for considering 
change, if perceived as the form of exploitation in any social order.  Yet Marcuse is not always 
clear on this point, such as when he asks ‘whether a state of civilization can be reasonably 
envisaged in which human needs are fulfilled in such a manner and to such an extent that 
surplus-repression can be eliminated’.
37
  That is, it is always possible to envisage such a 
civilisation, or question social needs and the physical and psychological repression that 
reproduces them, because surplus-repression is by definition eliminable.  Marcuse explains that 
oppression in the past may have been necessary ‘to win the struggle against economic lack, to 
hasten the mobilization of the workforce and the domination of nature’.
38
  But that repression still 
involved a surplus where one group coerced another into labour and benefitted disproportionately 
from it, as ‘the distinct modes of scarcity that prevailed at different points in the history of 
civilization have neither been distributed collectively nor organized to respond to individual 
needs’.
39
  Elsewhere, Marcuse implies as much as he explains that terrible living conditions in the 
industrial revolution were no less irrational due to the comparatively low level of technical 
productivity, because ‘a reduction of toil and suffering […] was a real possibility’.
40
  Also, reducing 
scarcity is a matter of ideological ‘maturity’, for Marcuse, and the extent to which transcendent 
consciousness is suppressed.  Nevertheless, any notion of self-determination is a response to 
specific historical conditions, so self-determination is not a fixed value that requires a certain level 
of maturity to realise, but an evolving concept defined against particular forms of surplus-
repression. 
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The distinction between true and false social needs, and the notion of surplus-repression, 
thus reveal the grounds of class struggle around which an oppositional ideology may form.  
However, because Marcuse sees ideology in terms of automatic practices, he does not consider 
how questions of true needs may develop between systemic contradictions and their 
rationalisation, and he instead focuses on external or trans-historical influences on subjectivity.  
His theory of Eros equates to a universal concept of human nature, in which ‘prior to all ethical 
behaviour in accordance with specific social standards [...] morality is a “disposition” of the 
organism’.
41
  He tries to avoid essentialism by explaining that this ‘moral foundation’ and ‘biology’ 
are themselves historical, because ‘biological’ needs include cultural needs that ‘sink down’ to 
become second nature.  But, in that case, he cannot know that certain dispositions of the 
organism existed ‘prior to all ethical behaviour’.  Ultimately, the concept of socialising Eros 
appears to be an attempt to locate a basis for social change in the absence of any existing mass 
movement that can challenge capitalist relations,
42
 which leaves him only with ‘hope for the rebirth 
of rebellious subjectivity from a nature which is older than, and arises from below the level of, 
individuation and rationality’.
43
  Our response is to focus on the possibility of influencing one-
dimensional thinking through alternative forms of consciousness, using the evolving dialectical 
potential of true needs as a central argument.
44
 
 
iii) Realising Potentials 
In accordance with his theory of ideology, many of the means Marcuse considers for realising 
political change assume it is impossible to confront ideological consciousness.  However, we 
maintain that their plausibility still often relies on communication with one-dimensional thinking, 
which suggests we can also consider more direct forms of opposition.  Besides his concept of 
Eros and human nature, the progressive possibilities Marcuse identifies tend towards one of two 
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categories: either a marginal domain of ‘autonomous’ production whose cultural expressions may 
influence the unconscious, or internal contradictions and developments in the mode of production 
itself.  Here, we examine Marcuse’s theory of cultural memory, which invigorates a sense of loss 
in the subject, and that of scientific and technological rationality, whose logics render toil and 
scarcity increasingly redundant.  In our understanding, it seems that, in the case of cultural 
memory, only consciousness that already has some appreciation of potentials beyond what exists 
appear susceptible to unconscious forms.  While with science, regardless of the extent of 
development, the forces of dominance do not give way to potentials for repurposing until there is 
a mass conscious challenge to their authority. 
In a way that connects to his interpretation of Eros and historical struggle, Marcuse 
theorises that imagination and shared memory might motivate collective desires and reveal the 
falseness of existing social relations.  This process involves a historical view which shows that 
any society emerges from particular economic and political forces overcoming a prior system, 
indicating that any society can also be superseded.  For Marcuse, this view reveals the historical 
failure to transcend instinctual repression due to scarcity and immaturity, but also implies that, in 
all past revolutions, there was ‘a historical moment when the struggle against domination might 
have been victorious’,
45
 and that seed of possibility can inspire more developed and plausible 
attempts today.
46
  The question is then how subjects might ‘remember’ historical potentials when 
the current social formation militates against dialectical thinking.  Marcuse proposes a socio-
historical memory, incorporating Freud’s stages of psychological development and concept of 
archaic heritage, or phylogenetic cultural inheritance, to consider the stimulation of revolutionary 
consciousness through historical recollection.  He explains that we have an unconscious 
‘memory’ of past gratification which ‘generates the wish that the paradise be re-created on the 
basis of the achievements of civilization’, but the ‘truth value’ of this memory is restrained by the 
performance principle.  As such, the dissolution of the performance principle and surplus-
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repression should free ‘the forbidden images and impulses of childhood’, reacting against 
dominant reason and assuming ‘a progressive function’ through new critical standards.
47
 
The issue with this theory, as with Eros, is that it takes a historical potential and interprets 
it in terms of a pre-civilizational state.  Marcuse imagines a pre-existing condition of human 
gratification that can be ‘realised’ in certain conditions, which happens to be the current point of 
civilizational maturity.  In doing so, he conflates individual pre-Oedipal memory with an imaginary 
memory of pre-civilizational fulfilment, which ‘stresses the liberating potentialities of memory and 
recollection of pleasurable or euphoric experiences rather than the unpleasant or traumatic 
experiences stressed by Freud’.
48
  On one hand, the actual pre-Oedipal experience is not some 
idyllic paradise, but a state of internal conflict that itself denies gratification.  To put it in Žižek’s 
Lacanian terms, the sense of a ‘loss’ of pre-subjective completeness is the way subjects 
represent to themselves the intrinsic ‘lack’ of subjectivity itself, because it is always only partially 
fulfilling.  On the other hand, civilizational memory either recalls a purely imaginary state of 
harmony, or actual ambiguous potentials in human history, in which, as Bronner says, 
‘emancipatory moments of the past cannot simply reveal themselves since they will necessarily 
remain intertwined with historically regressive elements’.
49
  This latter sense then requires certain 
ideological criteria to distinguish between what is emancipatory in history, and what is not. 
Marcuse’s theory is then more plausible when he focuses on the successes and failures 
of history, rather than any pre-civilizational or pre-Oedipal ideal.  He later explains that 
‘recollection [...] is not remembrance of a Golden Past (which never existed)’, but a process of 
‘reassembling the bits and fragments which can be found in the distorted humanity and distorted 
nature’.
50
  In this case, ‘pre-civilizational’ memory becomes merely the truth that something is 
repressed in existing civilisation, which can only be perceived through historically constituted 
alternative desires and acts.  As Jay explains, Marcuse realises here that ‘what must be 
remembered are the actual historical experiences and desires of our ancestors, not some 
imagined prehistorical era of perfect bliss’.
51
  In that sense, it does not matter that emancipatory 
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moments intertwine with regression, because even terror and destruction demonstrate the 
difference between reality and potential.  This historicising memory recalls surplus-repression, 
freedoms gained and moments of loss, which may combine with utopian ideas to facilitate political 
imagination.
52
 
In taking this direction, however, the possibility of changing individuals’ perspectives 
appears to rely on challenging their conscious knowledge and conceptions of history.  In that 
sense, pre-civilizational memory makes more sense for Marcuse’s theory, because it aims to 
avoid such conclusions, and instead attempts to develop utopian ideals through unconscious 
effects.  That is, for Marcuse, historical memory can be provoked through means that both escape 
repression and communicate outside reified language.  He finds the solution in ‘phantasy’, which 
‘preserves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and 
individual memory, the tabooed images of freedom’.
53
  Under the performance principle, phantasy 
is deemed useless but is tolerated within a marginalised realm, where desires can be indulged 
without encroaching on productivity.  Marcuse emphasises that phantasy also represents an 
eternal reminder of the pleasure principle, or excess of the social order, which constantly nags at 
reality with what is repressed.  This nurturing of phantasy must then for Marcuse involve an 
autonomous cultural catalyst, because commodified culture is normalising in a way that excludes 
phantasy.  The problem here is that the utopian potential of autonomous art is simply 
unrecognisable to the one-dimensional thinking of the majority, even if they are exposed to it.  As 
such, it still appears that some conscious rationalisation within one-dimensional thinking is a pre-
requisite for art to have the effect Marcuse desires (we return to this point in Section IV). 
The other major potential for change Marcuse imagines involves developments in internal 
systemic logic, exemplified in his theory of science and technology.  As we have seen, for 
Marcuse, productivity as an end in itself based on manufactured demand means that society 
functions according to a range of unnecessary industries and labour.  He then argues that, under 
this logic, science and technology tend towards wasteful and destructive goals, when instead they 
could be mobilised towards reducing alienation.  Marcuse recognises that more advanced 
technology has historically led to greater destruction, but compares the current reality of 
technological use to its potential to be repurposed towards general human need.  He explains that 
                                                             
52
 Ibid., p. 41. 
53 EC, pp. 127-128. 
Herbert Marcuse 
65 
 
this potential is inherent in technological advancement, because when, in ‘established societies’, 
‘all socially necessary but individually repressive labour’ is mechanised, the ‘scientific rationality’ 
reaches a limit in its aims of quantitative progression.
54
  There is thus a point at which the only 
further advancement is change in the rationality itself, because productivity can only improve 
qualitatively.  Therefore, Marcuse states, ‘the completion of the technological reality would be not 
only the prerequisite, but also the rationale for transcending the technological reality’.
55
 
The value of Marcuse’s theory here is the implication that scientific rationality is not 
inherently destructive in its instrumentality, and is capable of transcendence.  The point is neither 
that it functions independently of control by particular groups and industries and contains a 
dominating rationality within itself,
56
 nor that it is simply subordinate to powerful interests in 
society which determine the aims of technological development, production and distribution.
57
  
Rather, although the operational logic of science is what ‘experiences, comprehends, and shapes 
the world in terms of calculable, predictable relationships among exactly identifiable units’, such 
science is also ‘a specific, socio-historical project’.
58
  Scientific rationality is ‘neutral’, but precisely 
in its neutrality, it cannot refuse collaboration with destructive forces, and ‘becomes susceptible 
and subject to the objectives which predominate in the society in which science develops’.
59
  Or, 
as Feenberg explains, ‘formally neutral’ scientific rationality is exploited by particular interests, 
and itself has an inherent bias, because its pure instrumentalism suits the technical aim of 
productivity, so Marcuse identifies ‘the intrinsic bias in technical reason itself insofar as it emerges 
from the conditions and requirements of class society in general’.
60
  As such, although productivity 
can be the primary aim of scientific rationality, it is not a universal feature of science.
61
  
Theoretically, if productivity for its own sake was replaced by alternative social goals, under a 
                                                             
54 ODM, p. 230. 
55 Ibid., p. 231. 
56 Claus Offe, ‘Technology and One-Dimensionality: A Version of the Technocracy Thesis?’, trans. by Anne-
Marie Feenberg, in Critical Theory and the Promise, pp. 215-224 (p. 216). 
57 Kellner, Herbert Marcuse, p. 266. 
58 ODM, p. 164. 
59 Marcuse, ‘Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture’, Daedalus, 94 (1965), 190-207 (pp. 202-203). 
60 Andrew Feenberg, ‘The Bias of Technology’, in Critical Theory and the Promise, pp. 225-256 (p. 242). 
61
 Andrew Feenberg, ‘The Critique of Technology: From Dystopia to Interaction’, in From New Left to Next 
Left, pp. 208-226 (p. 213). 
Consciousness and the Limits of Social Conformity 
66 
 
different rationality, science could adapt to new aims and practices.  As Marcuse states, ‘pure 
objectivity reveals itself as object for a subjectivity which provides the Telos, the ends’.
62
 
For Marcuse, therefore, since science tends towards certain politics in its neutrality, it 
should be explicitly politicised towards desirable aims.  Feenberg argues that this suggestion 
implies political control over science and a totalitarian turn, and that it should be ‘scientists’ own 
changing categories and perceptions in a radically new social environment’, that spontaneously 
change scientific purpose.
63
  Yet it seems to us, as Marcuse says, that if technical neutrality and 
operationalism cannot resist destructive efficiency, their liberation requires conscious redirection.  
Also, science cannot be removed from political contexts, so any attempt to avoid the politicisation 
of science would presume an ideological function that masks alternative potentialities.
64
  
Furthermore, Marcuse does not suggest direct political control over science, rather that science 
would find itself in ‘an essentially different experimental context’
65
 of meeting more self-
determined social demands, which presupposes a political shift that influences scientific 
perceptions.  The question then is whether, as Habermas argues, science is still an inherently 
instrumental approach to goals, so that Marcuse can only aim at political forms of technological 
revolution, in which ‘the structure of scientific technical progress would be conserved, and only 
the governing values would be changed’.
66
  If so, scientific potential would be the extent to which 
communicative reason could control instrumental rationality.  Even in these terms, there remains 
a potential to make science less destructive in different social conditions, but it is also possible 
that Habermas’ position presumes too much in this respect, and a science could emerge which 
considered waste and environmental destruction as part of its calculations.
67
  As Weber Nicholsen 
notes, Marcuse’s theory implies that ‘a different attitude toward nature in the broadest sense 
could result from as well as facilitate different subjective experiences, which could in turn suggest 
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different investigative methods and raise different questions for theorizing and for empirical 
examination’.
68
 
Despite this potential, our issue with the development of scientific rationality is that 
Marcuse ties it to a specific point of technological advancement, rather than conscious 
recognition.  To begin with, if some ‘completion’ point is the condition for science to transcend 
itself, it is inherently incapable of being repurposed up to that point.  As Alford explains, since 
scarcity signifies humanity’s incomplete dominance over nature, the ‘new science’ only emerges 
from ‘the complete subordination of nature to human purposes’, and Marcuse’s position ‘grants 
the aura of reconciliation with nature to what is actually projected to be humanity’s final victory 
over it’.
69
  As such, ‘completion of the technological rationality’ is incompatible with aims towards a 
‘more peaceful, joyful struggle with the inexorable resistance of society and nature’.
70
  Elsewhere, 
Marcuse qualifies his idea by describing ‘optimum conditions’ in which ‘the quantum of instinctual 
energy still to be diverted into necessary labor [...] would be so small that a large area of 
repressive constraints and modifications […] would collapse’.
71
  In this case, however, with no 
specific completion point, these tendencies never simply overcome the dominant use of science 
and technology because, as Marcuse tells us, elite interests falsely maintain current needs and 
obscure their irrationality.  Marcuse also states that the use of science and technology for 
dominative ends ‘becomes irrational when the success of these efforts opens new dimensions of 
human realization’,
72
 but in that sense science and technology always open new dimensions of 
human realisation, and could always be directed towards different goals.  The ‘optimum 
conditions’ are then not a point at which technological advancement changes social aims,
73
 but 
that at which a mass consciousness recognises potentials in whatever technology exists. 
In effect, because Marcuse does not treat conscious rationalisation as significant, the 
potential in scientific rationality is disconnected from consciousness.  Against this idea, we argue 
that there are ways in which the purpose of science can be questioned, and shifted ideologically, 
based on gradual challenges to dominant ideas.  As Feenberg suggests, a technological 
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revolution must ‘employ the existing scientific-technical rationality transitionally while awaiting a 
new cognitive dispensation’.
74
  He explains the possibility of ‘multiplying the contexts and 
technical systems that interact in any given application to take into account more and more of the 
essential features of the object’.
75
  For us, this idea suggests that it is important to focus on harms 
caused by existing scientific development and the politics it supports, as well as considering uses 
of technology that exceed its prescribed purpose.
76
  As with the question of true needs and the 
aim of remembering historical potentials, the possibilities of science and technology are a strong 
indication that we can imagine alternative social forms, but only to the extent that they can 
engage with consciousness, which means finding ways to communicate with one-dimensional 
ideologies.  
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III. Internalisation 
i) Ego Weakness 
Having established this need for an oppositional politics to directly challenge forms of affirmative 
consciousness, we must define the contents of such positions.  On one hand, Marcuse’s notion of 
one-dimensionality does not obviously lend itself to identifying different rationalisations, because 
he does not closely examine people’s beliefs, moral investments, and awareness of systemic 
contradictions.  Notions such as that of ‘ego weakness’, which we highlight here, in fact reinforce 
the idea that individuals simply absorb dominant social influences.  On the other, we can still draw 
certain potentials from which to develop our ideology theory from his work.  In particular, Marcuse 
adapts his ideas to the different historical conditions he experiences, or the changing quantity and 
quality of alternative thinking apparent in society, and these theoretical shifts effectively point to 
distinct forms of consciousness.  These variations, which we begin by examining in terms of 
different attitudes to employment, can then be seen as ideological beliefs with conditional 
rationalisations, with which it may be possible to engage.  In interpreting Marcuse’s theory in this 
way, these rationalisations contrast with the strict one-dimensionality defined by ego weakness, 
and suggest that people relate to social demands with varying degrees of commitment. 
Marcuse explains that today’s apparatus of production and consumption undermines the 
centrality of the family, and that despite the liberation associated with escaping rigid patriarchy, 
this process weakens individual autonomy because the ego does not properly develop.  In the 
past, for Marcuse, the authority of the family in an individual’s life meant a struggle for identity, 
particularly against the father, and a clear private sphere.  Conflict with parents strengthened the 
ego against external influences, but now individuals cannot resist homogenised social 
imperatives.
77
  As such, outside sources, such as ‘gangs, radio and television set the pattern for 
conformity and rebellion’, and failure to adhere to pressure from peers and mass media makes 
social success problematic.
78
  The point here is thus not that ‘Marcuse believed that the decline of 
the family was weakening the link between individuals and the performance principle’.
79
  Rather, 
the father ‘yields [his] function to younger father figures outside the family, […] who all represent 
                                                             
77 Marcuse, ‘The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man’, in Five Lectures, pp. 44-61 (p. 50). 
78 EC, p. 88. 
79
 Vincent Geoghegan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse (London: Pluto Press, 1981), 
p. 59. 
Consciousness and the Limits of Social Conformity 
70 
 
the reality principle far better and far more effectively than the father did’.
80
  The weakened ego is 
more directly influenced by the performance principle, through various institutional demands. 
The important implications, from our perspective, are that if this ego weakness is a 
generalised condition, it completely undercuts conscious ideological rationalisation.  It represents 
a mass psychology lacking internal conflict, which means, as Marcuse says, ‘the interactions 
between ego, superego, and id congeal into automatic reactions’ until consciousness is ‘reduced 
to the task of regulating the coordination of the individual with the whole’.
81
  This notion is not 
compatible with our theory of ideology, which implies a certain ego that only follows dominant 
social influences because it has justifications for doing so.  These justifications are also influenced 
by social conditions, but because individuals effectively take ownership of them, they function as 
the conditions of their behaviour.  To demonstrate this point, we can identify signs that individuals 
consciously process social demands in a way that is significant to their conformist actions, and we 
infer these signs from Marcuse’s work. 
One example of note is the contrasting attitudes to labour Marcuse describes in different 
texts.  In ODM, he explains how workers have integrated their own interests with those of their 
employers, caring about the fortunes of the company, or even the economy as a whole, and 
investing in the idea of working harder to maintain overall growth.
82
  Later, in CRR, he 
emphasises instead that indifference is rife among workers, explaining that it matters very little if 
the work force are committed, because ‘a whole sector of the economy (agriculture) and a large 
sector of industry depend on government subsidies, [so] bankruptcy is no longer a threat’.
83
  
Around the same time he also identifies ‘a general disintegration of worker morale’ and that ‘the 
overall breakdown of confidence in the priorities and hierarchies set by capitalism is apparent’.
84
  
Rather than taking an interest in the success of the business or economy as a direct reason for 
productivity, workers are interested purely in earning their living, and productivity is an indirect 
result. 
The important point here is that, while in both these cases individuals reproduce relations 
of dominance and the performance principle, and do not obviously contemplate alternative 
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potentials, their rationalisations are different.  The first example represents a moral justification of 
productivity, labour and sacrifice as a social good, and suggests that economic growth relies on 
such commitment.  In the second example, the performance principle is reduced to a basic 
exchange — labour for money — with no real belief in productivity as an end.  The first group’s 
commitment is also for personal gain, in that they may work harder simply because it is the most 
profitable course of action, but the motivation is not constant between both groups.  For example, 
it can be asked why one group believes in more aspirational needs, while the other is satisfied 
with less.  Or, the less committed perspective could indicate possibilities such as that individuals 
feel they have little choice but to follow social demands, because alternative options appear to be 
lacking, or too risky to realise. 
We can also assume that these varied forms of conscious rationalisation exist 
simultaneously, rather than separately relating to specific economic circumstances.  That is, some 
people continue to believe in the morality of productivity even when the economy is weaker, while 
some never did, and as such all individuals encounter contrasting ideas that may force them to 
consider their justifications.  In Marcuse’s concept of ego weakness, to the extent such 
justification exists it is superfluous, as it merely coordinates the automatic absorption of social 
goals that functions at a deeper level.  Yet this idea suggests that the various external influences 
on the individual are uniform to begin with.  Conversely, we contend that because these 
influences include not only gangs, radio and television, but also employers, economists and the 
state (among others), there is always some inconsistency of demands which means individuals 
must prioritise certain goals over others.  Thus, the dominant social expectations of productivity 
and consumerism are justified through different conditions, which can be contradicted by 
alternative knowledge and experience.  In particular, the way that certain rationalisations seem to 
internalise social demands more indirectly, as in the second example of workers attitudes, 
suggests that their connection to these goals is less strong, and ego weakness is less total and 
less homogenous than Marcuse claims. 
The implication of this point is that affirmative behaviour, such as labour, may represent a 
loose connection to affirmative belief in some instances, and does not clearly indicate that social 
demands have been absorbed.  For example, some work within capitalist relations may already 
fulfil Marcuse’s definition of ‘play’, in that it is fulfilling and helps social bonding.  Marcuse says 
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that pleasure taken from alienated labour ‘has nothing to do with primary instinctual 
gratification’,
85
 but such a statement seems to undermine aspects of various forms of work, 
including his own.  As Hyman asks, ‘Are we to understand his oeuvre as a manifestation of 
repressive sublimation?’  Or, if not, ‘How is it, then, that non-repressive sublimation can exist 
under the rule of the reality principle?’
86
  Effectively, Marcuse’s work was wage labour facilitated 
by authoritative institutions that also caused friction in the system, suggesting that the way 
individuals approach their labour is not a matter of ego-free conformism.  This notion may then 
also be relevant to other forms of work that simultaneously contribute to systemic reproduction 
and undermine identity thinking.  At one point, Marcuse even sees some modern forms of 
productivity as potentials in themselves, in that they ‘transform the work process into a technical 
process in which the human agent of production plays increasingly the role of a supervisor, 
inventor and experimentor’.  In such cases, ‘the work process itself […] becomes, in its rationality, 
subject to the free play of the mind’.
87
  In short, participation and absorption in the process of 
production does not sufficiently explain affirmative ideology, and we can consider the limits of the 
different beliefs involved, and the levels of commitment they represent. 
 
ii) Language and Media 
If people have conditional rationalisations of social aims, it seems that maintaining the social 
order relies partly on how convincingly dominant narratives make sense of existing conditions.  
However, in Marcuse’s terms, it is more that the propagation of such narratives through mass 
media completely defines the limits of thought, and individuals do not care about their actual 
content.  Against this idea, we argue that aspects of Marcuse’s work also indicate various 
conscious justifications of social conditions, in particular economic disparity, and that narrative 
content remains relevant.  On one hand, even where people recognise partiality and 
inconsistency in media coverage, it suggests a conscious processing of these ideas and a form of 
rationalisation.  On the other, the existence of different narratives suggests a variety of 
vocabularies, which cannot be entirely compatible with each other or allow concepts to be 
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reduced to singular interpretations.  It is then a question of how certain narratives become 
dominant in commodified media, which we maintain is not merely a matter of media forms, but 
one of conscious propaganda and struggle over media language that suggests its content is an 
important part of social reproduction. 
For Marcuse, the way particular representations assume universal status in mass 
communications today is a result of its capitalist structure.  He explains that there are no formal 
blocks on content, as advanced industrial society is not actually fascist,
88
 but the pluralist 
framework subsumes different ideas under dominant interpretations, creating an illusion of 
freedom.  In this way, contrast between ideas is cancelled out in their ‘higher unification’, which 
promotes pluralist integration.
89
  As with scientific rationality, the logic of neutrality puts minority 
ideas at a disadvantage, so although any oppositional group is formally ‘free to deliberate and 
discuss, to speak and to assemble’, it is ‘left harmless and helpless in the face of the 
overwhelming majority, which militates against qualitative social change’.
90
  Against dominant 
ideas, non-conformist thought either seems incomprehensible or is compromised as it is 
interpreted and evaluated according to a reduced ‘public language’.
91
  Opposing ideas are 
incorporated into that which they oppose (a demand for peace is countered by the idea that the 
war aims to create peace), and tolerance is merely this incorporation. 
Furthermore, Marcuse claims, there is a political bias inherent to the forms of mass 
media.  In particular, an emotional distance is reinforced through the formatting and 
presentational style of programmes and publications, which undercuts the gravity of certain 
events.  On one hand, newspapers break information into small pieces, meaning ‘vital information’ 
is ‘interspersed between extraneous material, irrelevant items, [or relegated] to an obscure 
place’,
92
 while advertisements are juxtaposed against horrific news, or interrupt serious 
broadcasts.  On the other, a simple consistency of tone, such as a news reader ‘neutrally’ 
announcing torture and murder in the same manner as stock market fluctuations or the weather, 
drains any anger or accusatory context from the former.  In this way, Marcuse explains, even 
state brutality is no longer praised as heroic, but reduced ‘to the level of natural events and 
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contingencies of daily life’.
93
  The idea of balance then appears absurd, because it effectively 
tolerates support for destruction by granting it the same validity as its criticism.  The way to 
counter such repressive tolerance, therefore, would be through politicisation that takes a more 
emotional stance and maintains connective links between individual ‘stories’. 
Marcuse’s observations suggest deep systemic restrictions of form and content in media 
language, and extreme consequences.  He explains that, ‘the total mobilization of all media for 
the defense of the established reality has coordinated the means of expression to the point where 
communication of transcending contents becomes technically impossible’.
94
  In this way, the 
terms available to the majority actually cannot express dissatisfaction with the social order as 
such, and people cannot avoid speaking ‘the language of their masters, benefactors, advertisers’, 
which ‘merges with what they really think and see and feel’.
95
  Marcuse is aware that concepts are 
never fully reduced to a single meaning, and that reification remains an illusion which obscures 
actual social contradictions.  He also continues to note the existence of two-dimensional thinking, 
especially in the realm of philosophy, in which concepts still in some way ‘transcend their 
particular realizations as something that is to be surpassed, overcome’.
96
  Yet, he says, even 
though ‘ordinary language still is haunted by the big words of higher culture’, and concepts such 
as rights and democracy, in commercialised consumption and production people ‘speak a 
different language, and for the time being they seem to have the last word’.
97
  As such, when 
individuals enter mass media zones, their words are robbed of all depth. 
Conversely, other points Marcuse makes render these observations less clear, and even 
suggest that people consciously articulate different ideas and interpretations.  For example, he 
states, ‘It seems unwarranted to assume that the recipients [of dominant language] believe, or are 
made to believe, what they are being told.’  Instead, ‘people don’t believe it, or don’t care, and yet 
act accordingly’.
98
  For us, this lack of belief requires some alternative notion of what is true, and 
the ability to contrast the falseness of a narrative against this notion.  If people do not believe 
dominant narratives, they believe something else.  Furthermore, ‘not believing’ and ‘not caring’ 
are different reactions, even if the behavioural outcome may be similar, because there are 
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different conscious rationalisations in tuning out, trivialising, or cynically justifying contradictions.  
It therefore seems that affirmative language does not always capture public imagination, and that 
ideological acceptance still involves people analysing and judging terms and their meanings. 
Moreover, structural and tonal neutrality do not fully explain how certain political 
narratives gain ascendancy, and in fact Marcuse describes a particular media discourse that 
accentuates the idea of a ‘common enemy’ to unify different opinions ‘inside’ society against 
those ‘outside’ (although this outside element is effectively the marginalised and exploited part 
within society overall).  Here, an outside threat, such as international communism, allows political 
parties to converge on policy, leading to a politics that sees any opposition, regardless of aim, as 
an enemy because it jeopardises this unity.  As Marcuse says, ‘it is not so much Communism, a 
highly complex and “abstract” social system’ that is threatening; rather, the idea of communism 
invokes a general hostility, as needs arise, and the concept of the enemy ‘can assimilate many 
familiar hated impersonations, such as pinks, intellectuals, beards, foreigners, Jews’.
99
  In our 
theory, to the extent this narrative represents the ‘public language’, it indicates an important 
conscious justification of social disparity, for those who believe it.  Also, it does not emerge from 
tonal neutrality, so much as from a passionate, moralistic emphasis on fear, hatred and revenge.  
Marcuse even notes how a full range of discourses is rarely tolerated in the media, and states that 
in ‘the administered language […] a specific vocabulary of hate, resentment, and defamation is 
reserved for opposition to the aggressive policies and for the enemy’.
100
  He explains, for 
example, how the word ‘violence’ is used selectively to describe anti-establishment protests, 
rather than police or army actions, which ‘is a typical example of political linguistics, utilized as a 
weapon by the established society’.
101
  These points then suggest that the enemy narrative is not 
merely the result of information losing its context in media formatting, but conscious, 
propagandistic manipulation of language and emotion to suit certain interests. 
The common enemy narrative is thus a particular (dominant) part of media discourse that 
is really believed in some cases, but not in others, and therefore not fully unifying.  On one hand, 
it is a view that suits populist right-wing positions that seek to blame foreigners and marginalised 
groups for social problems.  It also supports ideas that the current society is a place of tolerance 
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and ‘cultural superiority’ that assimilates differences, by depicting the non-consumerist world as a 
completely separate realm in which intolerance reigns.
102
  Yet, both of these positions fail to 
recognise the way this interior integration and the ‘backwardness’ of the other are connected, 
through relations of exploitation.  On the other hand, some affirmative rationalisations may 
recognise such connections, and their justifications for supporting the existing order then require 
different media narratives.  As such, mass communications structures service various ideologies 
that may contrast at all but the baseline level, and if their ‘higher unification’ strengthens the 
appearance of pluralist freedom, the concepts in any interpretation remain particular because they 
contrast with others.  Furthermore, since media structures are formally open, even though certain 
discourses are barely represented, the boundaries of permissibility are not solidly defined.  It is 
not always obvious what language is oppositional, and dominant one-dimensional discourses do 
not necessarily have the tools to incorporate or dismiss all dissent. 
 
iii) Awareness 
With these notions of media narratives and justifications for everyday social participation, we have 
already begun to identify certain beliefs and contradictions.  Our aim is now to identify other forms 
of rationalisation and connect them to ideological positions, including those that supposedly 
demonstrate unconscious or automatic acceptance.  Marcuse’s work provides us with various 
possibilities in this respect, in that, even though he sometimes says that it simply does not matter 
what people believe, at other points he suggests that positive ideas or moral investments are 
necessary to sustain society.  We interpret these theoretical shifts as indications that different 
people accept the social order in different ways, and argue that conscious rationalisation is crucial 
in all cases, including those in which belief appears insignificant.  The higher unity (social 
affirmation) between positions indicates that most people still do not engage with human 
potentials or critically evaluate social structures, but the differences between rationalisations 
suggest specific limits, reliant on images of society that reflect particular levels of awareness.  
Specifically, the ways people justify disparity relate to the information they receive and its 
plausibility in regards to their own experiences.  In analysing these justifications, we take the first 
step towards identifying central points in our ideology map. 
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The different ways Marcuse approaches conscious awareness, or people’s knowledge of 
social corruption and exploitation, and the importance of that knowledge, provide us with a range 
of contrasting notions about ideological function and content.  First, in EC, he states that ‘the 
individual does not really know what is going on’, due to the ‘the overpowering machine of 
education and entertainment’, and that, ‘since knowledge of the whole truth is hardly conducive to 
happiness, such general anaesthesia makes individuals happy’.
103
  Here, a more traditional 
ideological mystification and ignorance seems to hold society together.  Later, in EL, Marcuse 
also points to the need for moral investment in the system, explaining that technocratic 
administration still ‘demands to a considerable extent, belief in one’s beliefs [...]; belief in the 
operative value of society’s values’.
104
  Between and after these texts, however, such ideas are 
lost.  For example, Marcuse suggests that people are aware of destructive social tendencies, but 
they ‘are not comprehended as long as they appear merely as more or less inevitable by-products 
[...] of growth and progress’.
105
  He also says that it ‘is not that [people] are not aware of what is 
going on, […] but that, being aware and informed, they do not and cannot respond and react’.
106
  
In these cases, oppression and suffering are recognised, but seem necessary, natural, or 
insurmountable.  Elsewhere, Marcuse goes even further, stating that society has translated 
ideology ‘into the reality of its political institutions, suburban homes, nuclear plants, supermarkets, 
drug-stores and psychiatric offices.’  Therefore, ‘the ideas of reason, equality, happiness, 
personality etc. have obtained their value in practicable social relations’.
107
  In CRR he then 
describes a situation of counterrevolution, in which ‘the power structure is no longer “sublimated” 
in the style of a liberalistic culture, no longer even hypocritical [...], but brutal, throwing off all 
pretensions of truth and justice’.
108
  At these points, affirmation appears conditional only on 
material satisfaction, regardless of how it is achieved, so belief and awareness are irrelevant. 
These quotes thus represent a range of ideas in Marcuse’s work, from a social order that 
thrives on ignorance in the general public or needs to maintain moral support for social norms, to 
one which functions despite knowledge of its destructive side.  In fact, these fluctuations make it 
unclear what ideology actually is, for Marcuse, or how it is reproduced, as some of his arguments 
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appear to rely on the dominance of particular beliefs, while others are purely reflections of social 
conditions.
109
  In the latter cases, ideology is effectively located outside of consciousness, in the 
‘real abstraction’ of commodity exchanges.
110
  Here, as long as exchange relations continue to 
function, in terms of enabling fulfilment of material needs, ideology is reproduced through 
behaviour, regardless of the conscious investment Marcuse alludes to elsewhere.  In our terms, 
then, Marcuse switches between considering the ideological baseline and its rationalisations 
without recognising this distinction, as opposed to our approach of identifying ideology as an 
interconnected circuit of unconscious acceptance and conscious justification.  However, if we take 
the ideas that Marcuse expresses as a whole, and combine them, he effectively considers 
ideology through a range of influences, from economics, to political power and doctrine, to 
psychology.  It is not then that his theory of ideology ‘credits a psychic factor with causal power far 
greater than that of economic, social or political factors’,
111
 or that it ‘is too much given to 
subjective and irrational influences to be relied on’.
112
  Some of his statements even indicate the 
exact opposite, in that they effectively reduce affirmation to economic conditions.  In these cases, 
our aim is to also identify the psychological factors, or combine the implications of Marcuse’s 
different positions towards an ideology theory that considers material circumstances and the 
beliefs that emerge within them. 
The first question here is how material factors influence ‘low awareness’ rationalisations, 
or ideologies which explicitly understand the existing social organisation as morally right or 
potentially fulfilling.  As in Marcuse’s consideration that workers may invest in the success of their 
companies and the economy, some individuals may perceive productivity, hard work and even 
consumerism as good in themselves, in terms of providing opportunities and maintaining social 
prosperity.  This moral position represses knowledge of the downsides of increased capitalist 
productivity, such as excessive waste and social disparity.  Alternatively, as Marcuse explains, 
individuals may internalise consumerist goals as needs, to the point ‘they find their soul in their 
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automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment’.
113
  In this case, the demands of 
consumerism are prioritised over those of productivity, but the result is still investment in the cycle 
of labour and leisure.  This ideology is apparently apathetic to politics and wider social goals, but 
indirectly supports the existing order, because it contributes to reproducing the economy and 
does not consider alternatives or unrealised potentials outside consumerism.  It involves belief 
that it is acceptable to focus on the pleasure, enthusiasm and comfort of consuming, and that 
such endeavours are harmless and not connected to major social problems. 
Second, we can consider how moral justification and lacks in knowledge are still part of 
positions that appear to recognise and accept corruption of official values, or are motivated by 
self-interest.  Certain narratives, such as the common enemy and the backwardness of 
foreigners, or even the misfortune of natural disasters, may justify ‘the way things are’ as a force 
outside control, based on reasonable knowledge of world politics and events.  Yet such narratives 
function by precluding fuller awareness of connections between external events and advanced 
industrial countries (such as how powerful capitalist governments support oppressive ruling 
classes in ‘backward’ countries, or how the resulting lack of development exacerbates the impact 
of natural disasters).  Alternatively, if such connections are recognised, they may be deemed 
inevitable according to pessimistic concepts of human nature.  Marcuse mentions that a common 
objection to the idea of a revolution in values is ‘that this goal is incompatible with the nature of 
man’, which ‘testifies to the degree to which this objection has succumbed to a conformist 
ideology’.
114
  Or, more knowledgeable individuals may not confront imperialism and systemic 
oppression because it appears so overwhelmingly powerful.  In that sense, government and mass 
media narratives remain useful to reinforce this idea of insurmountable dominance, or simply to 
provide forms of escapism.  But even in these latter cases, awareness deficiency remains, in that 
individuals either fail to historicise their concepts of human nature, or do not consider the 
possibility of systemic weaknesses. 
There are hints of this last position in Marcuse’s theory itself, precisely because he 
focuses on the ‘higher unification’ of ideologies, rather than differences between them.  As such, 
his mode of thinking groups affirmative ideologies into a single unmovable block, which effectively 
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testifies to the all-encompassing nature of the economic and political system.  Thus, where he 
says that the brutality of the outside must be ‘taken for granted or forgotten or repressed or 
unknown’,
115
 to allow individuals to internalise the social order, he does not consider how ‘taken 
for granted’ ‘forgotten/repressed’ and ‘unknown’ imply different limits of rationalisation.  In our 
view, these notions suggest that some individuals use universal concepts to justify social 
contradictions, while others try to deny their relevance, or fail to notice them altogether, and each 
of these positions involves conditional beliefs.  In that sense, the strength of ideological plurality is 
also its weakness, because the system cannot reproduce itself according to a single authoritative 
ideology but must rely on varied rationalisations with internal frictions, whose contingent beliefs 
can be exposed. 
Based on the rationalisations we have drawn from Marcuse’s work, we can propose five 
preliminary positions for a ‘map’ of affirmative ideological internalisation.  They each suggest, but 
are not limited to, particular awareness levels, as well as compatibility with certain social identities 
or political beliefs rather than others.  Also, each implies a different possibility of negation, 
although they are not entirely discrete categories.  The positions are: (1) moralistic internalisation 
of productivity (apologist); (2) internalisation of fulfilment through consumerism (hedonist); (3) 
internalisation of consumer freedoms, and separation between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (pluralist); (4) 
internalisation of social demands for personal gain, using pessimistic concepts of human nature 
(cynic); (5) internalisation of disempowerment due to systemic omnipotence (defeatist).  It should 
also be apparent that these positions are not ideologies in the sense of explicit political beliefs.  
Among them, the apologist and pluralist are closest to traditional political ideologies (conservative 
and liberal, respectively), but are not exact fits, and are outnumbered by more apparently 
pragmatic or ‘apolitical’ positions. 
The existence of this range of conscious positions does not stop them being one-
dimensional, in the sense that they are affirmative and do not imagine potentials to radically 
change the social formation.  Yet their co-existence both strengthens the system and creates 
points of contradiction and contestability from which such potentials can be imagined.  In 
particular, most of these positions justify the performance principle indirectly, rather than through 
its demand for sacrifice and toil, which means that performance is reliant on the beliefs behind 
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these contingent factors.  For example, most hedonists still need wage labour to afford consumer 
pleasures, but it is the promise of fulfilment, not productivity, that is its driving force.  As such 
there is a certain repressed potential in hedonism, which Marcuse in fact notes where he 
distinguishes between its affirmative and negative forms.  Affirmative hedonism is individualistic, 
accepts the goals of happiness prescribed by society, and does not distinguish ‘between true and 
false enjoyment’,
116
 while negative or radical hedonism recognises that labour and happiness are 
incompatible, and that consumerist opportunity is stratified by class disparity.  In this latter sense, 
hedonism is a generalised belief in realising happiness, and has always ‘been right precisely in its 
falsehood insofar as it has preserved the demand for happiness against every idealization of 
unhappiness’.
117
  Affirmative hedonism then also contains that potential, if the link between 
fulfilment and consumerism is not maintained, because it is primarily a commitment to happiness 
rather than capitalist productivity.  In this way, certain conditions are then applicable to all the 
positions we have identified, if the beliefs that attach them to the existing system can be 
challenged. 
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IV. The Commodity Form 
i) Consumerism 
Our understanding of ideology as it contrasts with Marcuse’s has various repercussions for 
envisaging how oppositional ideology may increase its presence in consumer capitalist societies.  
We thus apply this understanding to some of the difficulties Marcuse identifies for political change 
in existing social conditions, to show that more direct challenges to consciousness may be more 
fruitful than certain aspects of his theory of ideology suggest.  In this section, we expand on 
themes introduced in the previous section regarding mass media, which suggest that the very 
structures of commodification generate conformist desires and repress alternatives.  Our initial 
point of focus here is consumerism, which, as already noted, is the main social demand alongside 
productivity in late industrial capitalism, around which higher ideological unification revolves.  
Marcuse shows that individuals absorb consumerist goals due to actual benefits they confer 
(convenience, pleasure) and their pseudo-utopian promises, all of which obscure the toil and 
destruction required to maintain them.  He also notes that, because individuals become 
dependent on these benefits, the system is contingent on its ability to continually create new, 
enticing goods that promise increasingly greater fulfilment.  However, in Marcuse’s terms, the 
effects of a systemic failure to supply the demand it has created may be disastrous, as consumer 
needs have become so deeply ingrained.  From our perspective, it is more a question of seeing 
that people are attached to consumerism in various ways and to various degrees, and identifying 
how their expectations are connected to these beliefs. 
According to Marcuse, consumerism is a part of capitalist total administration which 
represses potential by creating apparent needs that demand mindless continuation of dominant 
forms of production.  It offers pre-packaged, temporary pleasures as rewards for obeying the 
performance principle, whose promises of satisfaction fix individuals in the cycle of exploitation, 
and direct practical rationality away from alternative forms.  For Marcuse, these consumer 
demands become biological, in his historical sense, and he explains that the ‘consumer economy 
and the politics of corporate capitalism have created a second nature of man which ties him 
libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form’.
118
  It is not the goods themselves that are 
repressive, but their existence as commodities within the existing order.  In fact, because 
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everything, including politicians, is promoted and sold as a commodity in markets dominated by 
major corporations, ‘the “inherent” quality of the merchandise ceases to be a decisive factor in its 
marketability’.
119
  Desirability and participation become paramount, and individuals knowingly 
make decisions based on the images and rhetoric connected to products. 
Furthermore, for Marcuse, since consumerism partially fulfils the needs it creates, it 
genuinely grants a sense of inclusion and appears as a rational social goal.  In this sense, 
modern life can seem compatible with instinctual desires for libidinal gratification, which ‘makes 
the very notion of alienation questionable’.
120
  Yet, Marcuse explains, this fulfilment is ‘repressive 
desublimation’ that permits only a particular sexual gratification that actually contracts the libido.  
It is also still constrained by the performance principle, that is, it is not that ‘the “reality principle” 
[…] is daily compelled to retreat, self-limit, and compromise in the face of renewed assaults by the 
“pleasure principle”’;
121
 rather, the reality principle now involves a regulated allowance of 
pleasure.  This satisfaction replaces consideration of alternative forms of fulfilment, such as may 
come from reducing toil and waste, or increasing connections of solidarity between people.  As 
Marcuse says, ‘innumerable gadgets [...] divert [people’s] attention from the real issue — which is 
the awareness that they could both work less and determine their own needs and satisfactions’.
122
  
As such, people are still alienated from certain drives and potentials by consumerism, but do not 
experience this alienation, because they instead experience specific pleasures and a higher 
standard of living compared to any visible alternative.  Class antagonism is then repressed (not 
erased), because ‘the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment 
are shared by the underlying population’.
123
 
In this basic form, Marcuse’s theory suggests mass acceptance of consumer goals based 
on economic realities and libidinal promises, as opposed to any ideological rationalisations.  
However, Marcuse also makes observations that imply more conscious involvement or that 
people internalise consumer demands differently and conditionally.  First, actual belief in the 
libidinal fulfilment of consumerism relates particularly to Marcuse’s concept of ‘hedonism’ 
mentioned previously.  Specifically, it suggests a position of lower awareness that must maintain 
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belief that individual happiness is an acceptable life goal, and that consumerist gratification is the 
best way to realise it.  Any other rationalisations then seem to require additional or alternative 
beliefs.  For example, Marcuse explains that the partial gratification granted by repressive 
desublimation also causes aggression that requires an outlet.  Thus, ‘merchandise […] is made 
into objects of the libido; and the national Enemy […] is distorted and inflated to such an extent 
that he can activate and satisfy aggressiveness’.
124
  Here, ideological affirmation involves a 
combination of consumerist fulfilment and propaganda, which resembles our ‘pluralist’ position.  
At other points, Marcuse even claims that ‘the fetishism of the commodity world is wearing thin: 
people see the power structure behind the alleged technocracy and its blessings’,
125
 as well as 
that the higher living standard relies on ‘misery, frustration, and resentment’, and that the waste, 
inhuman working conditions, and ‘constant slaughter’ required to maintain it ‘is too obvious to be 
effectively repressed’.
126
  These comments, from around 1972, indicate a higher awareness of 
contradictions in capitalism and consumerist living during economic crisis.  Yet, despite the 
inefficiency and waste, the system reproduces itself regardless (through state subsidies, military 
expansion and ‘counterrevolutionary’ oppression of opposition).  Here, for Marcuse, the values of 
efficient performance in work are gone, sometimes leading to protests as jobs are lost and wages 
decline, but not to a radical movement.  In this sense, while the economic structures that 
manipulate social relations become visible, the concepts of value and the commodity form itself 
remain largely unquestioned.  If commodity fetishism is ‘wearing thin’, it is not worn out altogether 
for the majority, as they continue to participate in exchange relations.
127
  The result is affirmative 
ideology that understands the downsides of consumerism, but finds ways to justify them.  This 
ideology may take the form of a ‘cynical’ acceptance that continues to affirm the status quo 
because any change risks making things worse (for the cynic), or a ‘defeatist’ rationality in which 
people may even block the contradictions of consumerism from consciousness by consuming, 
because they feel powerless in the global system and apparent dead end of history.  But, at the 
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same time, it seems that as awareness of capitalist contradictions increases in times of crisis, 
people start to think about political change more.  Therefore, as the notion of counterrevolution 
implies, it requires a greater effort of propaganda to repress alternatives and defend even these 
cynical and defeatist narratives from a revolutionary consciousness.  In this sense, even value-
based exchange relations could be threatened, if the majority became aware that the commodity 
form itself is at the heart of the crisis. 
Despite introducing these different possible forms of ideology, Marcuse does not suggest 
that conscious rationalisation can affect investment in consumerist demands.  Again, any 
potentials for change in his theory come from intrinsic material contradictions in the consumerist 
system.  On one hand, these ideas demonstrate the dependency of the social order on certain 
structural and ideological elements.  Marcuse explains that the economy depends on consumers 
investing in manufactured needs, which makes promises and expectations continuously rise, and 
that, while greater demand should increase production, systemic fluctuations and automation 
cause cutbacks and job losses, which decrease purchasing power.
128
  He thus argues that 
disparity between wages and demand could foster ‘transcending needs which cannot be satisfied 
without abolishing the capitalist mode of production’.
129
  On the other hand, his own theory of 
ideological absorption appears to undercut such possibilities, if ‘mutilated experience’, ‘false 
consciousness’ and ‘false needs’ are second nature, because failure to satisfy manufactured 
demand may provoke aggression at targets that ‘seem to be different, and to represent an 
alternative’.
130
  In effect, the danger is that repressive desublimation may escape performance 
principle control, and that, ‘precisely through the spread of [the] commodity form, the repressive 
social morality which sustains the system is being weakened’.
131
  As such, a lack of satisfaction 
through consumerism may lead to aggression that can only be repressed by authoritarian means. 
In our terms, it is possible instead to interpret the material potentials in various ways, 
according to which the scenario Marcuse describes is only one prospect among many, based on 
the most extreme and direct investment in consumer goals.  In other words, it does not consider 
that many people may internalise consumerism less directly, through justifications such as 
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escapism, freedom, necessity, or moral good.  In Marcuse’s perspective, repressive 
desublimation equates to mere acceptance of immediate gratification, and he therefore does not 
imagine that one-dimensional consciousness could develop in different ways in reaction to crisis 
and economic shifts, or even to information that connects mass production to deprivation, 
freedom of choice to oppression, and individualism to social fragmentation.  For example, the 
beginnings of such rationalisations are visible in concepts of consumer ethics which have 
developed in recent times (mainly after Marcuse’s work), and indicate that pleasure and material 
satisfaction are not people’s sole concerns.  Although this ethics is still often reduced to 
operational individual consumer responsibility, such as the ‘choice’ of eco-friendly or organic 
brands, or may act as a way to assuage guilt, it shows that people in some sense consider the 
downsides of consumerism.  Thus, while this understanding is usually not politicised, and does 
not question the apparently objective properties of value (and in fact reproduces exchange and 
value relations as a form of consumer behaviour), it indicates moral expectations that may be 
expanded further into a more general critique.  In particular, it may be possible to redirect the 
notion of ethical consumerism away from choice towards reduction, by introducing ideas about 
the overall excess of production and the waste it entails.  Then, since consumerist capitalism 
relies on people’s investment in excess consumption (and the associated waste and violence) to 
maintain growth, it is to an extent vulnerable to these ideological pressures.  Ultimately, a mass 
opposition to consumerism may only develop fully in a time of major economic crisis, but to do so 
it requires a political movement to begin beforehand, and gradually grow into a significant force. 
 
ii) Art 
The other major question surrounding commodification is the extent to which oppositional ideas 
can find space within forms of commodified mass communication, and whether their message 
retains any power in such conditions.  This question arises because if we accept that consumer 
capitalism seeks to commodify all areas of social life, then any counter-ideology would need to 
work within these processes, to intervene in the existing system.  As we have seen, for Marcuse it 
is important to seek autonomous cultural expression, which retains radical or two-dimensional 
sentiment precisely by avoiding mainstream channels.  He further argues that this autonomous 
expression cannot simply attempt to shock in a way that actually functions in line with consumer 
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permissiveness, but must maintain an intellectualised form that invigorates alternative thinking.  
We contend that Marcuse’s theory of art demonstrates a strong political aim, but it seems that 
commitment to autonomy and more abstract communication cannot expand beyond an already-
established intellectual sphere.  It is therefore necessary to imagine ways in which commodified 
media may be used to convey more radical messages, which becomes more plausible when we 
consider the possibility of challenging conscious beliefs.  Specifically, it suggests that not only the 
utopian forms of art but also the political content of culture is significant, and that such content 
can retain some power even when commodified. 
Marcuse emphasises the need for cultural autonomy because oppositional cultural forms 
produced or communicated within mainstream spaces become commodities themselves, and 
reproduce the whole.  He explains that high bourgeois art has revolutionary value in that it 
militates against the assimilation of social norms, because its ‘transcendence of immediate reality 
shatters the reified objectivity of established social relations and opens a new dimension of 
experience’.
132
  Such transcendence negates the appearance of a closed totality, because its 
estranging form (rather than overt political content) goes beyond language to an ‘aesthetic 
dimension’ that renders everything contingent, into a world in which there is ‘no more conformity 
and no more rebellion — only sorrow and joy’.
133
  But the power of this art depends on its 
existence outside the realm of profit, so it can contradict society from without, even though, 
historically, such an autonomous position has been enabled by social inequality and minority 
privilege.
134
  Conversely, for Marcuse, when they are commodified, even the highest works of 
culture are normalised, reduced to the realities of advertising and exchange value.  Such works 
lose power by being marketed as classics, and strengthen the image of permissive consumer 
pluralism.  Thus, Marcuse states, although ‘the words, tone, colours, shapes of the perennial 
works remain the same, […] that which they expressed is losing its truth, its validity’ because they 
no longer stand ‘shockingly apart from and against the established reality’.
135
  In short, the sense 
of estrangement is gone. 
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There are still cases in which Marcuse does concede that art’s utopian value survives 
commodification in some way.  For example, he states that even bourgeois works were ‘created 
as commodities for sale on the market’, which ‘by itself does not change their substance, their 
truth’.
136
  He also says that bourgeois estranging works remain ‘authentic’ as they indict ‘the 
totality of a society which draws everything, even the estranging works, into its purview’, and adds 
that economic structures ‘determine the use value (and with it the exchange value) of the works 
but not what they are and what they say’.
137
  Here, however, Marcuse also explains that the 
messages and ideas that such works provide cannot become popular, because popularity by 
definition means appealing to mass tastes formed by anti-intellectual culture, or using dominant 
language that cannot create a sense of estrangement.  As such, even if the power of art is 
retained when it is commodified, it is only to the extent it remains a niche interest. 
Meanwhile, for autonomous culture to have an estranging effect, it is equally important for 
Marcuse that it has an intellectual dimension, to avoid becoming harmlessly incorporated into 
consumerist pluralism.  In this respect, he criticises ‘cultural revolution’ as a form of mindless 
acting out, and explains that it ‘diverts mental and physical energy from […] the political arena’, 
because it ‘transfigures economic and social into cultural conditions’.
138
  Its hip, anti-conservative 
expressions mimic an anti-intellectualism, overt sexualisation, and onus on individual liberty within 
the current system, that accord with consumer culture.  Its shock tactics based around offence 
and obscenity no longer separate it from various forms of mass entertainment, and therefore it 
only really opposes the traditional elite — including high art — and is mostly absorbed with 
approval or indifference.  Even when it is more critical, Marcuse argues, it is more a way of 
expressing frustrations that reveals the misery of life but not its potential transcendence, and thus 
represents performance of catharsis or ‘group therapy’, bringing temporary relief before restoring 
normal relations.
139
  Overall, this anti-art autonomous culture is weaker politically than high art 
itself.  That is, it is also only tolerated within the realm of phantasy, yet lacks the potential of art to 
transcend these circumstances, because ‘the gap which separates Art from reality […] can be 
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reduced’, only if ‘reality itself tends towards Art as reality’s own Form’.
140
  Without these 
revolutionary tendencies, anti-art remains an inconsequential appendage of the dominant order. 
At the same time, Marcuse is not entirely dismissive of these cultural expressions, 
because they also indicate alternative sensibilities.  In fact, because the movement is cultural and 
creative it seeks new forms and language that may cause dissonance in dominant concepts.  
Hence, Marcuse says, whilst it explicitly calls for private liberation, it contains seeds of social 
liberation, or qualitatively different needs.  In EL, he states that ‘satire, irony, and laughing 
provocation become a necessary dimension of the new politics’, and that ‘the cynical defiance of 
the fool’ is a means of ‘demasking the deeds of the serious ones who govern the whole’.
141
  He 
also highlights forms of slang and linguistic deformation emerging from marginalised peoples, 
which suggest estrangement and a differentiated consciousness and identity.  However, he still 
argues that the potential of such culture is dependent on it avoiding incorporation into mass 
consumerism by becoming intellectualised, or ‘subjecting the new sensibility (the private, 
individual liberation) to the rigorous discipline of the mind’.
142
  Marcuse does not then see the 
‘cynical defiance of the fool’ as a replacement for politics, and is not, as Lukes says, ‘asking one 
to oppose undesirable reality by retreating into the world of the fool’, which cannot combat 
powerful forces, and ‘only makes their position of dominance more secure’.
143
  Rather, Marcuse 
explains with his concept of the fool that when opposition lacks mass support, ‘concentrated 
power can afford to tolerate (perhaps even defend) radical dissent’, so such ‘opposition is […] 
sucked into the very world which it opposes’.
144
  Elsewhere, he also says that if resistance only 
satirises or mocks the establishment, ‘the fun falls flat, becomes silly in any terms because it 
testifies to political impotence’.
145
  The fool simply represents an alternative sensibility that may, at 
best, help inspire political organisation. 
We can thus agree with Marcuse’s aim in this aesthetic turn, which is to reinvigorate 
oppositional politics rather than escape from it, as critics such as Reitz and Lukes suggest.  Reitz 
explains that Marcuse postpones ‘an end to the cultural alienation of the artist and intellectual 
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“until the millennium which will never be”’, and since this ‘paradox is taken to express permanent 
opposition, rather than real (historically surmountable) contradiction, it is not dialectical at all’.
146
  
But Marcuse actually says that, ‘since the tension between idea and reality, between the universal 
and the particular, is likely to persist until the millennium which will never be, art must remain 
alienation’.
147
  That is, ‘authentic’ art reveals a beauty that is not realised in any social reality, or 
the necessary excess of totality as such, and a constant potential for change.  In this sense, art 
and the critical intellectual are always alienated from existing social norms, by definition, and that 
alienation makes them dialectical.  For Lukes, meanwhile, Marcuse’s ‘inward’ turn is problematic 
because art’s negative potential does not necessarily lead to progressive politics.  Therefore, he 
concludes, ‘affirmative art […] must remain until a safer environment is created for the 
“aestheticization of politics”’, ‘because the visions of authentic art cannot be trusted’.
148
  He adds 
that any ‘integration of politics and aesthetics […] will owe its chance to “politicians”’ who ‘retained 
an obligation to instrumental interests’.
149
  Yet, for Marcuse, aesthetic negation equates to non-
repressive sublimation, which already implies a politics of increased socialisation.  It is not then 
purely negating, and does not require the response Lukes recommends, which effectively implies 
a more oppressive version of the status quo, that somehow enforces the affirmative role of art. 
The problem in Marcuse’s theory, we argue, is rather that autonomous and estranging art 
seems unable to escape its dominant designation as harmless fantasy, separate from serious 
concerns.  Its marginal or distant position reinforces its own externality, and limits its potential to 
act on affirmative ideology.  It is thus unclear how the utopian potentials of art or subcultures can 
be heard from their autonomous zones, or how such zones may expand.  Indeed, Marcuse 
explains that consumer demand ‘expresses the lawful and even organized effort to reject the 
Other in his own right, to prevent autonomy even in a small, reserved sphere of existence’.
150
  But 
if the spread of commodification reduces autonomy, it can only become less significant, until the 
already distant potential of estranging art vanishes almost entirely.  As such, by emphasising 
autonomy, Marcuse retains oppositional culture in an easily segregated and shrinking ‘special 
reservation’.  As Bronner says, if ‘art estranges itself from society and its reality principle, it also 
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alienates itself from the very possibility of a discourse to determine its emancipatory potential’.
151
  
Furthermore, Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensional consciousness implies that any 
intellectualised culture would simply be ignored by the majority, because ‘society has been 
closing the mental and physical space in which this culture could be understood in its cognitive 
substance’.
152
  He even demonstrates that intellectual considerations of art can be ‘affirmative’, 
where art’s alternative realm is perceived as a temporary reprieve from the inevitable suffering of 
reality, rather than an indication of actual potential.
153
  It is not then surprising when he states that, 
‘in the present, the subject to which authentic art appeals is socially anonymous’.
154
  In that case, 
however, the only political value of art is to show the openness of alternatives to those radicals 
who have already decided an alternative is required, so Marcuse ‘succeeds in establishing the 
unique nature of the aesthetic only at the cost of renouncing its basis and effectiveness in 
reality’.
155
 
From this perspective, any political potential in oppositional culture appears to rest on its 
ability to resist total determination by market forces while also escaping its autonomous 
enclosure, to communicate in a way that takes it beyond ‘an attuned sensibility’ or ‘a higher truth 
available only to the happy few’.
156
  In other words, culture must somehow bring its negating 
qualities to the commodified sphere, despite the major obstacles such a move entails.  As we 
have seen, Marcuse suggests that utopian elements in art are not completely destroyed in 
commodification, although it is counterproductive to make them appeal to a mass audience, by 
translating them into everyday terms.  He also considers that even one-dimensional prescriptions 
of attitudes and habits, and promises of consumer fulfilment, may contain a certain utopian 
element of their own.  For example, he explains, when the human body is used in advertising, ‘the 
plastic beauty may not be the real thing, but they stimulate aesthetic-sensuous needs which, in 
their development, must become incompatible with the body as instrument of alienated labor’.
157
  
The idealised images appeal directly to the senses, stimulating aspirations that the advertised 
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products actually fail to satisfy.  The outcome may still be frustration, or even an obsessive focus 
on the object, and, unlike high art, these desires do not inspire the limitlessness of creativity and 
imagination.  But the implication is the capability of reified consciousness to do more than simply 
absorb explicit consumerist messages. 
From this starting point, we can take these possibilities further.  In particular, Marcuse’s 
suggestion that what cultural works ‘say’ is not fully determined by their position in commodified 
production, is still only concerned with the estrangement of form, rather than the possible impact 
of alternative political content.  As Kellner says, in focusing on form, ‘Marcuse seems to 
underemphasize […] conservative-ideological elements in high culture’ and ‘underestimates the 
political potentiality of art which is part of a process of cultural revolution’.
158
  That is, he assumes 
that even in high art that has reactionary political content the estranging form is more potent,
159
 
and that more familiar cultural forms that express progressive ideas are effectively nullified.  
Against this idea, we can consider that it is not only (deliberate or unintentional) formal 
estrangements that can communicate against the grain, but also content, because ideology is not 
only a matter of unconscious absorption.  Specifically, not only sensual imagery, but also spoken 
and written language, can invigorate alternative thinking, if oppositional ideas can increase their 
presence in commodified media to the extent they disrupt beliefs that cement affirmative 
rationalisations. 
The issue that remains to be addressed is that such content cannot become popular 
without being diluted, because it must be translated into everyday terms.  However, rather than 
insist on autonomy, it appears more worthwhile to try and gradually increase radical ideas in 
commodified media, by challenging conscious narratives.  As Geoghegan argues, Marcuse 
‘underestimated the power of works of art not simply despite but even because of their mass 
diffusion’.
160
  That is, even if only the minority of an audience receives a transcendental or 
progressive political message from commodified culture, that diffusion is politically useful.  
Commodified media is still manufactured according to sales potentials, and for the most part 
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remains familiar and de-intellectualised,
161
 but there are no hard rules governing creative 
expression or interpretation.  Marcuse says that any chance of change in consciousness ‘is fatally 
reduced by the fact that the leftist minority does not possess the large funds required for equal 
access to the mass media’.
162
   This point suggests that the problem for radical ideas is primarily 
one of access and presence, which means that such ideas could have an impact if they could 
slowly become more prominent.  In fact, Marcuse continues here that ‘without the continuous 
effort of persuasion, of reducing, one by one, the hostile majority, the prospects of the opposition 
would be still darker than they are’.
163
  These words, which embody Marcuse’s optimism in the 
late 1960s, imply an accumulative value in continual criticism of existing relations.  For us, they 
should be understood in terms of the possibility of challenging conscious rationalisations, due to 
individuals’ need for narratives that explain social conditions.  
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V. Agency 
i) Administration and Responsibility 
For an oppositional politics to potentially make a difference to the social order, it must be 
established that existing institutions function in part because people invest in them ideologically, 
and that this investment may be challenged.  Yet, as Marcuse explains it, people throughout 
society are effectively given responsibilities according to their jobs, based on narrow or 
operational demands, which they then simply perform in a daily routine.  Even leaders are 
effectively administrators whose task is to maintain social and economic stability, and are 
expected to fulfil the duties of the role regardless of any detrimental effects.  Our point here is 
that, no matter how natural or routine such administrative behaviour appears, rationalisation 
means that limits exist in the relationship between practices and justifications, and consciousness 
may shift from affirmative behaviour to refusal.  We therefore examine how certain rationalisations 
deny systemic contradictions, with notions of personal responsibility that attribute social problems 
to personal failures, obscuring that the demands of performance are contradictory in themselves.  
As such, challenging these ideas by focusing on structural issues, while also relating them to 
everyday problems, offers a way of developing oppositional consciousness.  Without such a 
focus, the operational processes Marcuse describes can appear so ingrained that even the 
radical minority may be seen to merely fulfil a certain function within existing social relations. 
Marcuse describes various ways in which late industrial capitalism largely functions by 
itself, based on individual goals.  The operationalism of administrative society effectively 
represses all global ideas, whether those of revolution, or calculated plans of exploitation by a 
ruling class.  Instead, each person has a specific administrative role to fulfil, so that even the elite 
is not a group that propagates a superior culture or morality, but a number of individuals who 
oversee and promote productivity.  As Marcuse puts it, the standardisation of production and 
consumption ‘are not a conspiracy, […] centralized in any agency or group of agencies’ but 
‘diffused throughout the society’, from local community and peer groups, to media, corporations, 
and government.
164
  Processes are compartmentalised by operational rationality, and the people 
who make decisions, ‘if they are identifiable at all, do so not as these individuals but as 
“representatives” of the Nation, the Corporation, the University’, and are often unaware of the 
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‘institutions, influences, interests embodied in organizations’.
165
  Society functions according to 
the combined result of many singular technical judgements, which follow demands for maximum 
efficiency and productivity. 
In this structure, Marcuse also explains that people no longer view authorities as leader 
figures, in the Freudian sense, in which either a person or an idea, such as nationalism, is 
essential to organise civilisation and control aggression (a symbolic representation of the ‘primal 
father’).  That is, because individuals no longer live in thrall to a particular ethos enforced by a 
specific power, leaders are akin to functionaries, valued as competent supervisors of productivity, 
and people identify with them to the extent they ‘still deliver the goods’.
166
  In fact, Marcuse 
claims, as the populace in advanced industrial society grows more aggressive, it actually wants 
leaders to execute the systemic violence that sustains false needs, and pressures governments 
into destructive acts beyond those deemed necessary for performance.
167
  More generally, 
leaders and elites must conform to the same instrumentalist measures of fitting in, or ‘adjustive 
success’, as everyone else.  One-dimensional thinking makes individuals responsible for their 
success or failure in their administrative roles, according to dominant social demands, or for 
seeking the expert advice that enables them to improve.  As such, when leaders fail, it is likewise 
due to their personal inadequacy to maintain dominant structures. 
These concepts of operational demands and systemic administration suggest that ethical 
reasons for doing jobs are generally unimportant.  Individuals do not behave in accordance with 
their administrative roles due to moral or political pressures.  Rather, ‘Duty, work, and discipline 
[…] serve as ends in themselves, no longer dependent on rational justification in terms of their 
actual necessity.’
168
  As Marcuse puts it, if there is any wider justification of the technical 
rationality that directs conformist behaviour, it is merely that ends and means ‘are determined by 
the requirements of maintaining, enlarging, and protecting the apparatus’.
169
  However, we 
maintain that individuals must also justify the existing apparatus and their participation in these 
ends and means.  Even the simplest of reasons such as ‘just doing my job’ without questioning 
how it affects others (with all its parallels to ‘only following orders’), are supported by ethical 
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assumptions that allow individuals to prioritise their employment over other concerns, and are not 
merely a matter of executing objective processes.  It is also not clear that leader figures are only 
treated as efficient administrators, given the way they are presented as fulfilling consumer 
choices.  As Marcuse says, ‘In its emphasis on the sensuous “image”, on the “sex appeal” of the 
political leader, the American system has mastered […] the depth dimension of satisfactory 
submission beneath the political dimension.’
170
  As such, there is still a libidinal investment in the 
image of the leader, and some aspirational ideal, or desire that goes beyond maintaining the 
stability of the existing course. 
We may also consider that the operational demands of jobs are not always consistent, 
and therefore administrators have to consciously decide how to prioritise certain tasks over 
others.  Especially in socially influential spheres such as politics or finance, choices must be 
made that are not clearly decidable purely on questions of efficiency and profit (for example, short 
term gains may counteract long term growth).  Therefore, the interests of the leaders and elites 
themselves may still affect social development, or redefine the meaning of dominant social goals, 
whether in ways that attempt to ensure elite privilege, or according to other beliefs.  It is then the 
case that both operational imperatives direct the behaviour of individuals, and that the interests 
and beliefs of individuals direct the demands of the system.  In other words, there is an excess of 
rationalisation over operationalism that makes it possible for individuals to execute demands in 
different ways, and it may even be that certain rationalisations can lead to refusal, or decisions 
that go beyond operational expectations.  
At the same time, the neutral logics of instrumentalism and operationalism effectively 
contain their own ideological justifications, in the sense that they enable individuals to deflect from 
inconsistent systemic demands by blaming human error and corruption for problems that arise.  
These rationalisations are then susceptible to analysis precisely because of this blind spot around 
such inconsistencies.  For example, in the economic crisis of 2007-2008, it is possible to identify 
two main narratives.  The first depicted the global crisis as a kind of natural disaster that just 
happened, which is a form of defeatism that accepts the universality of the system and the 
impossibility of controlling its fluctuations, while the second focused on individuals, particularly the 
actions of greedy bankers or incompetent economists.  As Žižek explains, this blaming narrative 
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was often genuine, as opposed to a cynical attempt to redirect blame away from the system, and 
it was ‘truly surprising […] how easily the idea was accepted that its happening was an 
unpredictable surprise which hit the markets out of the blue’, and that ‘those who promised 
continuous growth did not really understand what was going on’.
171
  But where people really 
accept ineptitude or dishonesty as the main cause, they miss how operational rationality itself 
allowed agents to destabilise the financial system for their personal gain.
172
  That is, whether this 
narrative is constructed from a moralistic defence of the system (in which capitalism and 
liberalism do still function as leader substitutes, albeit corrupted by incompetency and 
selfishness), or a cynical interpretation (the bankers’ behaviour only becomes undesirable when it 
threatens economic growth), it does not consider that the crisis happened largely because the 
demands of the performance principle itself are contradictory, and any options the bankers had 
within their limited purview were flawed in some respect.  In other words, the system is inherently 
problematic in the sense that the greater efficiency of profitmaking it requires gradually 
undermines its own stability.  Therefore, these affirmative ideologies must rationalise the effects 
of this contradiction according to some more superficial cause, through contestable beliefs and 
assumptions that obscure the deeper issue. 
Moreover, if Marcuse places too much emphasis on structural causation, these ideologies 
effectively do the opposite and exaggerate individual agency.  As such, even cynical affirmation 
does not simply accept existing relations, but actively tries to enforce them, under the belief that 
any oppositional idea could really corrupt the stability of the market.  In this sense, both apologists 
and cynics are conscious agents of maintaining the social order, committed to ensuring that any 
complaints against the status quo merely aim at minor improvements in efficiency.  In contrast, 
Marcuse shows us that the systemic organisation of individuals is the problem, and revolutionary 
consciousness is a matter of adjusting the focus of politics to the overall exploitative demands of 
capitalist production.  Yet, with Marcuse’s understanding of ideology, it seems that only systemic 
failure can create change, because people otherwise continue to execute operational demands 
without contemplation.  As he says, the material basis of ‘a rupture with the continuum of 
domination and exploitation’ is ‘in the aggravating economic stresses of the global system of 
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corporate capitalism’, which include inflation, crises, intensified competition, waste and 
destruction.
173
  In our view, although such conditions are ultimately necessary for major social 
change, they do not so much cause oppositional thinking to emerge as amplify whatever forms of 
oppositional ideology have already been developed.  If a radical political direction is to be taken at 
the point of crisis, it depends on the potential in the present for individuals to begin to consciously 
accept notions of more systemic contradictions underlying social problems.  Marcuse is aware 
that any revolutionary transition involves not only technological advancement and internal 
contradictions, but also ‘the growth of the political organization of the laboring classes’, who must 
act ‘as a class-conscious force’.
174
  As such, it must be possible for an oppositional politics to 
construct a discourse that mediates between individual responsibility and systemic contradictions, 
and can communicate with conscious agents who are capable of evolving rationalisations. 
 
ii) Revolutionary Classes 
The question of how to develop such a discourse is also a matter of identifying where in society 
oppositional thinking already exists, and where it is most likely to emerge.  It is to a great extent a 
question of class consciousness, but, Marcuse explains, there is no longer an industrial working 
class that represents a revolutionary subject, and the elements of such a subject (central role in 
production, consciousness, material need) are now split between classes.  It thus appears 
necessary to create an inter-class movement, which appears difficult because of this clear 
separation of factors, and where Marcuse attempts to locate common ground between groups it is 
unconvincing (for example, the middle-class need for change lacks the immediacy as that of the 
marginalised underclass).  While we use Marcuse’s class categories as a guideline, then, it 
becomes important to find potentials for class consciousness in small sections of each class, and 
even in the exploited classes outside consumer capitalist societies, based on the possibility of 
confronting affirmative rationalisations.  That is, since there is no potential for any particular 
subordinate class to take power, any possibility of radical change involves establishing a cross-
class political movement which recognises and opposes systemic class disparity as the core 
social problem. 
                                                             
173
 Marcuse, ‘Beyond One-Dimensional Man’, p. 114. 
174 Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 19. 
Herbert Marcuse 
99 
 
At various points, Marcuse tries to identify a class-based subject of revolution that could 
recognise its alienation and unify in a struggle for progressive change.  Traditionally, this 
revolutionary class would be the mass of overworked, undernourished labourers within the 
centres of power, whose material existence could lead to its self-awareness as a class with 
universal interests.  However, this class has become ideologically conservative — integrated into 
a society that satisfies its immediate needs, and unable to develop consciousness of its 
alienation.  Therefore, while the working class remains for Marcuse ‘the objective factor’ of 
revolution, because it represents a critical mass of people within production, even despite the 
reduction of industry in advanced capitalist countries, it lacks both the ‘subjective factor’ of 
political consciousness and the experience of vital, material need for change.  The ‘subjective 
factor’ instead currently only exists among a minority of ‘nonconformist young intelligentsia’, or 
individuals emerging from inside the system, who gain a universal view because they have 
greater access to education.  Vital need, meanwhile, is found in ‘the ghetto population’ and ‘the 
“underprivileged” sections of the laboring classes in backward capitalist countries’.
175
  Such 
groups exist in late industrial capitalism because it still relies on poverty-wage labour and creates 
an increasing excess of non-labourers.  Marcuse describes such people as ‘the exploited and 
persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable’.  Because of 
their rejection by the system, they have an immediate need for better living standards, and ‘thus 
their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not’.
176
 
The clear problem here is that none of these revolutionary factors (power, consciousness, 
need) currently coincide in a single subject.  Only a major working-class movement has the power 
to challenge the status quo, but without material deprivation or revolutionary consciousness, could 
only make demands within the existing order.  But, without this power, the middle-class 
intelligentsia cannot replace the working class as revolutionary subject, despite its radical 
demands.  Marcuse states that the working class is ‘the only class which, by virtue of its function 
in the productive process, is capable of arresting this process, and of redirecting it’.
177
  The 
intelligentsia thus provides a ‘preparatory function’, that is, ‘it is not and cannot be a revolutionary 
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class, but it can become the catalyst’.
178
  It can only demonstrate that alternatives are possible 
and non-conformism is an option, to inspire a larger force.  Marcuse points to the 1960s student 
movement as an example, in that it made connections with labour movements, and through total 
refusal brought ‘to the fore the new historical Subject of change, responding to the new objective 
conditions, with qualitatively different needs and aspirations’.
179
  It is also has a certain power to 
resist the authorities, because they cannot react too violently to an intellectual or student class 
that is supposed to be a central component of society’s future,
180
 or the next generation of 
administrators.  But as such it remains distinct from the unemployed underclass, which is 
operationally expendable because of its lack of role in the production process, and therefore 
subject to violence, imprisonment and further ghettoisation.   
Marcuse thus sees that an oppositional politics based on class struggle cannot merely 
focus on a particular group, and must aim at connecting potentials in each class into a larger 
movement.  The difficulty is how to make such connections, if there is a lack of oppositional 
consciousness outside the intellectual class.  For Marcuse, ‘the forces of emancipation cannot be 
identified with any social class which, by virtue of its material condition, is free from false 
consciousness.’  But, he adds, ‘they are hopelessly dispersed throughout the society’.
181
  In our 
understanding, the point to make here is that, while the separation of revolutionary factors 
Marcuse identifies provides a useful outline of the social situation, there may be greater fluidity 
between classes than this description allows.  That is, the revolutionary elements within each 
class may be more ambiguous than he suggests, which appears to reduce their power, but the 
potential for class consciousness is more evenly distributed throughout the social spectrum, which 
implies greater opportunity for interconnection. 
In the first case, it is not clear that the characteristics Marcuse associates with each class 
represent clear potentials to be connected.  For example, the very privilege of middle-class 
intellectuals may also dilute their commitment and reintegrate them into the establishment in the 
medium term.  As such, it is not as Marcuse says that students are as invested as the underclass 
in terms of ‘the depth of the Refusal’, which ‘makes them reject the rules of the game that is 
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rigged against them’.
182
  In short, the rules are not rigged against students and intellectuals to the 
same degree, and the access to information and education that defines the intelligentsia splits it 
between conformism and rejection.  In that sense, the intelligentsia is either not a class, or is a 
class with two mutually exclusive interests, one of which is maintaining its privileged position.  At 
the same time, the vital needs of the underclass are also not necessarily revolutionary, because 
in some cases they may be met operationally within the existing system.  Since late industrial 
capitalism can adapt to include (or exclude) different identity groups, and formally allows social 
mobility, the needs of individual underclass members remain ambiguous.  Marcuse explains of 
working-class interests that they ‘do not crave a new order but a larger share in the prevailing 
one’, and that ‘their uniformity is in the competitive self-interest they all manifest’.
183
  Yet this 
interest could also apply for elements of the underclass, to the extent that individualistic desires to 
belong, or come inside, may be realistic in some sense. 
Similarly, even the power of the working class is uncertain, because the concept does not 
define a clear group with a specific potential.  Marcuse recognises that the working class has 
expanded to include white-collar professionals and technicians, taking it beyond purely physical 
production.  He explains that a revolutionary working class now will be one ‘in which the blue 
collar labor will only be a minority, a class which will include large strata of middle classes, and in 
which intellectual work will play an increasing role’.
184
  In that case, however, the working class is 
not defined by its type of labour, level of wealth, or even education, but purely by being employed.  
It is not a class, as Alway says, in terms of a group with a ‘unity of interests and experiences that 
once at least theoretically resulted from sharing the same position within the production 
process’.
185
  It is not distinct from elements of the intelligentsia, and their ‘subjective factor’, or 
even from administrative elites.  As Marcuse states, ‘the managers are thoroughly tied up with the 
vested interests, and as performers of necessary productive functions they do not constitute a 
separate “class” at all’.
186
  With this expanded definition of the working class, Marcuse then shifts 
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‘the basis of revolutionary agency from the economic to the political sphere’.
187
  The ‘objective 
factor’ of revolution becomes not a class, but a general majority. 
These points appear to fragment revolutionary potentials further, as even the particular 
characteristics of each class become less clear.  However, in our view, the loss of discrete 
distinctions may also make it easier to envisage connections between groups in each class that 
could form an oppositional political movement.  Such a movement would still be a class politics in 
the sense that it would organise to eradicate the relationships of domination and subordination 
inherent to the capitalist mode of production.  This idea highlights the need to understand the 
different forms of rationalisation within each class, including those that may already have certain 
oppositional tendencies.  In effect, the dispersal of oppositional thinking is not completely 
‘hopeless’, but a way in which political ideas may span class boundaries.  The situation, as it 
stands, is surely that individuals within each class group are mostly affirmative in their thinking — 
even the majority of the educated class are resigned, in their awareness, to the existing situation.  
Nevertheless, the affirmative ideologies in these groups are susceptible (to varying extents) to 
contradictory ideas and experiences, which may affect beliefs and assumptions.  In these terms, 
the class consciousness of the educated can only be a catalyst if there are forms of affirmative 
consciousness that are susceptible to it, having in some sense already articulated their 
deprivation or lack of fulfilment.  Kellner in fact criticises Marcuse for associating revolutionary 
consciousness only with the intelligentsia, and designating it as the driving force, because ‘it is a 
mistake to ascribe to any class or group a privileged role as conveyor of revolutionary 
consciousness, force or leadership’.
188
  For us, Marcuse recognises that this consciousness is 
only the necessary beginning of a collaborative movement, but he must also recognise the 
potentials in different rationalisations in all classes, which are developed by, and can develop, 
radical consciousness. 
A final point to consider here is that an interclass movement cannot be internal to a single 
nation in late industrial capitalism, but must connect with external movements that resist the 
negative effects of domination.  In this respect, Marcuse analysed the anti-colonialist movements 
of his time, and in particular identified their connective potential due to their more traditional 
working-class sensibility.  As he explains, for such movements, the proletariat was still ‘the human 
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basis of the social process of production’, and provided ‘the popular support for the national 
liberation fronts’.
189
  He also saw that external resistance in general could affect imperialist 
expansion, by reducing the flow of wealth to the centres of capitalism, leading to disarray and 
dissatisfaction within.  In CRR, he notes how the US, as representative of capitalism, increasingly 
enforces its power abroad through militaristic means, ‘where indigenous ruling groups are not 
doing the job of liquidating popular liberation movements, […] because the system is no longer 
capable of reproducing itself by virtue of its own economic mechanisms’.
190
  As such, anti-war 
sentiment grows, causing protests which are countered through curtailment of freedoms, and 
more aggressive propaganda.  All these measures create further economic strain, and even 
overstretch of power, which undermines official ideological goals and the supply of consumer 
comforts. 
Marcuse effectively describes two separate issues in these processes.  On one hand, he 
shows how economic disruption can be caused by any sufficiently large resistance, and on the 
other, that only certain forms can connect with oppositional politics in late industrial capitalist 
countries.  Marcuse does not make this distinction, perhaps because he saw grounds for 
solidarity with the anti-colonial liberation movements he analysed.  But, as Geoghegan says, he 
therefore did not really consider generally what ‘could possibly unite the disparate elements of the 
Great Refusal in political activity’, nor ‘precisely how these forces were to be co-ordinated both 
prior to and during a revolutionary upsurge’.
191
  That is, to form significant opposition, the local 
and global outside cannot merely share an adversary, or simply be disruptive.  Also, it is not clear 
how, in Marcuse’s terms, resistance movements from ‘developing’ nations could embody a 
transcendent revolutionary consciousness, given his claim that only late industrial society enables 
civilizational maturity.  As Offe puts it, with such thinking it would be contradictory to identify ‘the 
starting points for a “post-technical” culture and society [...] precisely in those Third World 
countries that have been spared the process of industrialization’.
192
  Marcuse is clear that neo-
colonialist resistance must find ‘support in the “affluent society”’ itself’,
193
 and is not merely a 
means to help overstretch established powers.  Yet, for there to be support, local and global 
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movements must connect ideologically, over an inclusive form of class consciousness.  It is a 
question of combining the political needs of different marginalised groups where aims overlap, 
which assumes a certain ideological flexibility. 
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VI. Political Action 
i) Motivating Change 
With this concept of a conscious agency in all ideology, and the possibility of using mass 
communications for oppositional messages, it remains necessary to theorise the practical details 
of a radical politics, especially in terms of how it can expand oppositional consciousness.  
Marcuse demonstrates a commitment to envisaging political approaches that may realise 
dialectical potentials in existing historical conditions.  But, without a theoretical focus on conscious 
ideological rationalisation, he often considers potentials for a sudden revolutionary upheaval, or a 
major shift in production or consciousness that does not appear to be on the horizon.  In line with 
such ideas, he recommends a form of withdrawal into intellectual preparation, which tends to 
reduce political change to formal necessity, without effective content.  However, there is a 
contrast in this area of Marcuse’s work in the more optimistic politics he develops around the time 
of the 1968 protests in the US and parts of Europe.  This contrast hints at an approach to 
revolutionary politics that accepts a gradual and reciprocal shifting of sensibilities and structures, 
and escapes the impasse he reaches elsewhere.  It also allows Marcuse to formulate a concept 
of ‘negative education’, which suggests that dialectical thinking can have an impact on existing 
subversive potentials.  We argue that our theory of ideology can function in line with this 
approach, at least to the extent it is explicitly reinterpreted as the possibility of challenging 
conscious aspects of affirmative ideologies. 
For Marcuse, revolutionary politics is necessary because it is possible, in that people are 
actually deprived and potentially need not be, and first requires that people believe in that 
possibility.  Marcuse follows Bloch’s concept of concrete Utopia,
194
 stressing that the notion of 
utopian possibilities defines a conceivable reality based on technological advances that ‘deprives 
“utopia” of its traditional unreal content’, so that ‘what is denounced as “utopian” is no longer that 
which has “no place” [...] but rather that which is blocked from coming about by the power of the 
established societies’.
195
  The pejorative meaning of Utopia — that qualitative social improvement 
is unreachable, and any alternative is regressive — is maintained only by affirmative ideology.  
Failure to resist these dominant ideas, and imagine utopian potentials, then only strengthens the 
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current reality over possible alternatives.  According to Marcuse, a specific programme of 
resistance is required that is ‘free of all illusion but also of all defeatism, for through its mere 
existence defeatism betrays the possibility of freedom to the status quo’.
196
  He also says that, 
even if no road to success is visible, leaving only a politically impotent refusal of conformist 
behaviour, it is better than ‘defeatism and quietism’, and ‘even if we see no transformation, we 
must fight on’.
197
 
The importance to oppositional politics of refusing to accept the limits of existing reality is 
clear, but the question then is what it actually means to ‘fight on’ in particularly difficult 
circumstances.  Marcuse recommends a ‘great refusal’ and isolation from forms of political 
participation such as the anti-intellectual cultural revolution, to avoid co-option back into 
affirmative thinking.  At one point, he justifies withdrawal as a tactic, claiming that although it ‘may 
indeed lead to an “ivory tower”’, it ‘may also […] lead to something that the Establishment is 
increasingly incapable of tolerating, namely, independent thinking and feeling’.
198
  He adds that, 
‘Where radical mass action is absent, and the Left is incomparably weaker, its actions must be 
self-limiting.’
199
  The problem is that this ‘ivory tower’ of alternative thought is similar in status to 
marginalised autonomous art, and as tolerable to the performance principle as the designated 
zone of phantasy.  It is not that political refusal is problematic as such (as we will see, Žižek’s 
concept of refusal is more a rejection of binary political choices to create space for alternative 
thought and action), but that, put in terms of self-isolation, it further reduces the limited profile of 
resistance, and therefore loses any momentum.  As Reitz says, it seems ‘that the dialectics of 
nature, society, and thought [become] an academic rather than a transformative practice’.
200
  
Also, if utopian belief is merely an abstract hope without a plausible means for development, it 
may seem less relevant or desirable.
201
 
At such moments, Marcuse effectively cedes the possibility of connecting existing 
sentiments of dissatisfaction together into the beginnings of a movement.  This approach may 
then discourage and undermine ongoing efforts rather than engage with them, as Marcuse does 
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not consider that demand for total revolution must grow slowly as more minor concerns 
accumulate and communicate in similar terms.  In fact, with Marcuse’s concept of ideology, it 
does not seem possible to gradually alter people’s consciousness, so some monumental social 
shift is required.  Instead, it seems that certain conditions make revolutionary change possible, 
and until those conditions arrive people can only prepare for them, by withdrawing to theory.  As 
such, any attempt to act beforehand will fall short of revolutionary aims, and Marcuse’s call may 
create a ‘growing sense of total impotence’.
202
  As Geoghegan puts it, in the face of such 
transcendent demand, ‘the selling of newspapers and participation in industrial action, for 
example, will seem pathetically inadequate’.
203
  Marcuse notes the problems of withdrawal when it 
comes to withdrawing from theory, explaining how New Left countercultures ‘destroyed 
themselves when they forfeited their political impetus in favor of withdrawal into […] abstract anti-
authoritarianism and a contempt for theory as a directive for praxis’.
204
  But he does not recognise 
the issues in the reverse situation, in which theory must also communicate with existing forms of 
practice. 
Marcuse alters his position in his work of the late 1960s (notably EL), in which, not long 
after his thesis on one-dimensional man, many people demonstrated in various political and 
cultural movements that they were capable of thinking and acting beyond dominant expectations.  
Here, Marcuse identifies forms of progressive activism and ideas of a light, pretty and playful 
society with an emphasis on freedom, imagination and alternative sensibility.  He explains that if 
such demands could grow until they could not be ignored, they may trigger a wider change in 
consciousness leading to further demands that connect the aesthetic dimension of imagination 
and concrete politics.  In this case, he says, ‘the needs and faculties of freedom [...] emerge only 
in the collective practice of creating an environment: level by level, step by step’.
205
  The focus is 
on making political connections between existing groups (where they already show signs of 
alternative sensibilities), and organic development. 
This politics of gradual, reciprocal development is more pertinent to our theory of 
ideology, in that it suggests the possibility of gradually changing consciousness based on 
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oppositional political activities.  Elsewhere, Marcuse tends to stress the paradox that institutions 
and consciousness both need to change first, because dominant institutions stop consciousness 
from developing, and the lack of alternative consciousness stops institutional change.  The step 
by step approach appears to tackle both sides of the equation at once, to make gradual advances 
in all areas.  For Marcuse, this potential relates to specific circumstances, or social conditions in 
which oppositional sentiment had already emerged, and could develop into a political movement.  
Conversely, we view it as a general possibility that contrasts with notions of automatic ideological 
absorption.  In this sense, it can be seen as a way of maintaining the commitment to radical 
politics that Marcuse demands in a more concrete form, avoiding the danger of viewing such 
possibilities nostalgically, as a product of a specific time that is no longer relevant.
206
  In particular, 
it may be asked how this new sensibility emerged to begin with, in the sense that it must have 
developed from one-dimensional thinking, and the implication is that the potential for it was 
already, and is thus always, present.  It then becomes a question of working with this potential, 
and (as Jameson shows) of balancing transcendental ideas with everyday language.  Seen in this 
way, this step by step politics can be repurposed towards a theory in which conscious limits can 
always be contradicted, even if development is slow.  At one point, Marcuse says that, ‘unless the 
recognition of what is being done and what is being prevented subverts the consciousness and 
the behavior of man, not even a catastrophe will bring about the change’.
207
  In such a statement, 
our concept of ideology focuses on this ‘unless’, or the vague implication that a combination of 
awareness and imagination could have an impact on social acceptance. 
Meanwhile, in terms of the practicalities of gradually developing a movement, Marcuse 
envisions a need for intellectual leadership around ‘utopian possibilities’, as opposed to 
disorganised or ‘spontaneous’ uprising.  That is, if instinctive personal desires and excesses of 
affirmative thought are to actually shift towards revolutionary sensibilities, they require direction by 
two-dimensional thinking that highlights real potentials for an alternative social order.  Marcuse 
frames this organisation as a kind of education, but one which is negative in the sense that it 
reveals the contingency of existing relations and the inherent possibility of imagining new ones.  
This ‘counter-education’ can then be distinguished from the reifying doctrines of educational 
institutions that ‘serve to enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse and 
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behavior’.
208
  The aim is that, from this negative teaching, ‘The distinction between rational and 
irrational authority, between repression and surplus-repression, can be made and verified by the 
individuals themselves.’
209
   
In many ways, this education is precisely the kind of dialectical approach necessary to 
challenge the beliefs of conscious rationalisations.  Marcuse’s focus on negation makes it an 
attempt to disrupt assumptions not merely to replace them with other absolute ideas, but to 
invigorate various desires and notions of self-determination.  We therefore insist that such 
negation represents a relatively open form of engagement that cannot simply be understood, as 
some critics believe, as a retreat from politics.  For example, according to Reitz, Marcuse 
‘reduces social and educational philosophy to aesthetic philosophy’,
210
 and it is necessary ‘to 
compensate for critical theory’s aestheticist deficits through renewed inquiry into class structure 
and material social forces’.
211
  Yet, for Marcuse, negative education aims to generate political 
alternatives by revealing potentials in existing social relations or possible reversals of actual social 
problems.  As such, it involves criticism of mass media discourses, promotion of normally 
suppressed information, distrust of politicians, and organising protest and refusal.
212
  Marcuse is 
then not, as Martineau suggests, ‘taking refuge in revolutionarism’,
213
 or only interested in 
subversion, or disruption, rather than actually taking power.  While Marcuse claims that we must 
negate the current order without knowing in advance exactly what would replace it, the point is 
that ‘the question as to which are “real” needs must be answered by the individuals themselves’, 
but only when they can fully consider alternatives, because otherwise ‘their answer to this 
question cannot be taken as their own’.
214
  The goal is thus to create a more organic opposition, 
which must first disrupt one-dimensional institutions so that it can develop further, but is not purely 
destructive because its goals and values ‘must be visible already in our actions’.
215
  In other 
words, the new sensibility that would govern is expressed in the methods used to create an 
alternative social formation.  There is thus no concept of liberation without political goals here, 
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which avoids ‘the hard questions of how institutions and practices [...] are to embody Reason, 
Freedom and Happiness’.
216
 Rather, Marcuse makes such questions a collective responsibility.
217
 
The issue with the concept of negative education, in our view, is that it does not clearly 
acknowledge its own ‘positive’ role, or that revealing social potentials inevitably means suggesting 
certain content for alternatives, so it may dictate the desires of those it educates.  In this sense, it 
may be necessary to emphasise a more reciprocal relationship between educator and student 
than Marcuse tends to allow.  It is not quite, as Kellner says, that Marcuse is an intellectual elitist, 
whose idea of educator conforms to ‘the traditional concept of the intellectual defined as someone 
who possesses special knowledge by virtue of their education, high level of culture and cognitive 
talents’,
218
 which means their insights should be followed.  Marcuse does not respect education 
and intellectualism as such, as he recognises it often has affirmative bias, and is clear that radical 
educators could come from all classes.
219
  But, the point stands, as Balbus also claims, that 
Marcuse effectively sees students as ‘sensuous social actors’ and educators as ‘rational social 
theorists’, which overlooks the alternative ideas students must already have to be receptive to (re-
)education.
220
  As such, educators have positive ideas about the kinds of ‘real needs’ that should 
emerge from critical thinking, which unavoidably intertwine with their approaches to negative 
education, and may go unrecognised and be unconsciously forced onto the student.  By the same 
token, teachers may not consider that some needs expressed by students are also already ‘real’, 
as they define when students are sufficiently liberated from dominant thinking that their ideas 
become ‘their own’ and can be taken seriously.  We thus suggest that, rather than the one-
directional implications of ‘education’, there could be a ‘conversation’ between teacher and 
student,  That is, it seems important that teachers properly consider students’ desires from the 
start, to recognise and develop their own assumptions about political change.  It is not strictly that 
teachers provide a form which students then fill with content, but one in which certain content is 
implied by the form itself and must adapt to the new content.  If negation in consumer capitalism 
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ultimately focuses on class disparity and the mode of production, the range of social problems 
experienced by students may expand teachers’ understanding of the manifestations of disparity 
and the kinds of solutions they require. 
 
ii) Points of Contestation 
With these ideas of how a movement may develop structurally, we can also envisage the different 
forms of political participation that may contribute.  Again, in this respect, there is a split in 
Marcuse’s work between a focus on sudden revolutionary change, and a commitment to longer 
term accumulative processes.  In the first case, Marcuse struggles to identify likely causes for 
change, and although we understand that the difficulties he identifies for oppositional politics 
cannot be ignored, it is his particular approach that restricts him to suggestions for change that 
appear merely hopeful.  For example, his brief consideration of minority ‘dictatorship’ to break the 
deadlock of affirmative consciousness and institutions ultimately does not appear plausible.  We 
therefore turn to parts of Marcuse’s work in which he considers forms of political participation that 
are more in tune with a gradual development of oppositional ideology.  Here, while it is never a 
case of simply working within established political structures, there is a certain possibility that a 
combination of internal and external strategies may have a mutually reinforcing effect.  In fact, it 
may be less likely that a radical movement is violently crushed by the state, if such activism has 
already established sympathetic connections within major political and cultural organisations.  
Yet, as ever, these prospects rest on a concept of conditional ideological consciousness, rather 
than automatic ideological absorption. 
Marcuse’s work shows us that the difficulty for any genuinely disruptive oppositional 
politics (regardless of the approach to ideology), is how it can survive the inevitable ideological 
and legal backlash against it.  Marcuse argues that such a politics must exceed the bounds of 
established political participation, if it is to represent any kind of transformed sensibility.  That is, 
for the most part he sees that political parties cannot be transformed from within, and that 
everyday political activities such as voting, writing to politicians and joining officially sanctioned 
protests only testify ‘to the existence of democratic liberties which, in reality, have changed their 
content and lost their effectiveness’.
221
  Thus, it is necessary to employ unauthorised measures to 
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create effective protest, which mean that ‘confrontations with state power, with institutionalized 
violence, seem inevitable — unless opposition becomes a harmless ritual, a pacifier of 
conscience, and a star witness for the rights and freedoms available under the status quo’.
222
  In 
these terms, opposition cannot concern itself with keeping resistance legal, because part of what 
it resists is the established law, but if mass consciousness does not recognise the right to illegal 
resistance through civil disobedience, the state retains widespread support.  Radical protest 
movements must somehow reverse the understanding that systemic violence reflects the general 
interest, while oppositional disruption reflects particular interest. 
A major problem in reaching this goal is that a minority movement cannot control the 
terms of its own representation in commodified media.  As such, many forms of affirmative 
ideology may still welcome a legal violent response by the establishment, particularly those that 
prioritise performance, stability and enjoyment, or lash out against opposition because it makes 
them feel guilty.  Then, once there is a more brutal counterattack, a minority movement would 
have difficulty organising at all.  Marcuse warns that ‘once fascism is installed, it may well destroy 
any revolutionary potential for an indefinite time’.
223
  This not unrealistic fear appears to lead 
radical opposition into a dead end, since it seems that any protest that is not a ‘harmless ritual’ 
provokes disproportionate response that quickly suppresses it.  Even the non-defeatist must 
accept that any radical political strategy is a gamble with slim chance of success.  However, 
Marcuse explains, ‘All militant opposition takes the risk of increasing repression.  This has never 
been a reason to stop the opposition.  Otherwise, all progress would be impossible.’
224
  He adds 
that what might be called ‘adventurism, romanticism, imagination […] is an element necessary to 
all revolution’.
225
  Nevertheless, if this attitude of defiance is necessary for any revolution, on its 
own it is not a solution to the difficulties Marcuse identifies. 
In much of his work, Marcuse is unable to move beyond this point, and the reason for this 
impasse, in our understanding, is only partly because these difficulties are so severe, and also 
partly because he does not consider the possibility of causing gradual shifts in conscious 
ideological rationalisations.  Instead, he returns to the paradox that both social structures and 
one-dimensional mass consciousness cannot change without change in the other, and explains 
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that, ‘In order for the mechanisms to be abolished, there must first be a need to abolish them.  
That is the circle in which we are placed, and I do not know how to get out of it.’
226
  In these 
conditions, because Marcuse cannot see how ‘the emergence of these new needs can be 
conceived at all as a radical development out of existing ones’ he asks whether, ‘in order to set 
free these needs, a dictatorship appears necessary’.
227
  With such total indoctrination, it seems 
only a systemic failure or enforced revolution can make people question their needs.  This move 
may be justified, for Marcuse, because as long as some people are denied rights, they cannot 
gain them through official democratic channels, and their need ‘presupposes the withdrawal of 
civil rights from those who prevent their exercise’.
228
  In that sense, dictatorship is the expansion 
of rights to those currently excluded, opposing the ‘repressive tolerance’ of existing society, 
whose formal neutrality in a situation of inequality ‘protects the already established machinery of 
discrimination’.
229
  It is a realisation that a more substantial tolerance requires intolerance, or a 
decision about what to tolerate, because no society can tolerate both transcendent and repressive 
ideas. 
Despite the aims behind this concept of dictatorship, it is ultimately not a plausible means 
of escape from the paradox of change.  In terms of content, even though the point is not, as 
MacIntyre suggests, that ‘to foreclose on tolerance is precisely to cut oneself off from [...] criticism 
and refutation’,
230
 Marcuse still again effectively privileges the educator’s ideas over the student’s, 
with a minority defining the bounds of tolerance.  Marcuse suggests that the distinction ‘between 
progress and regression can be made rationally on empirical grounds’, based on ‘the real 
possibilities of human freedom [...] relative to the attained stage of civilization’.
231
  For example, he 
says elsewhere, tolerance of Hitler by the Weimar Republic led to the Second World War and the 
Holocaust, and ‘the definition of this movement as not deserving democratic tolerance is more 
than a personal value judgment’.
232
  But not all judgements about tolerance are confronted with 
such outwardly aggressive ideologies, and in many cases the particular interests of those judging 
tolerance would be more prevalent.  Also, in practical terms, there are simply no means for a 
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dictatorship of the minority to impose itself in the social conditions Marcuse describes.  As 
Lichtman asks, ‘How can any such minority make a revolution?  If it were possible, wouldn’t it be 
unnecessary; if necessary, impossible?’
233
  Marcuse later recognises that ‘the systematic 
withdrawal of tolerance toward regressive and repressive opinions and movements could only be 
envisaged as results of large scale pressure’, which would ‘presuppose that which is still to be 
accomplished’.
234
  He also says that smaller scale movements could only prepare the ground, and 
subsequently that, despite its theoretical justification, ‘the alternative to the established semi-
democratic process is not a dictatorship or elite, no matter how intellectual and intelligent, but the 
struggle for a real democracy’.
235
  That is, the imposition of a new politics still requires a popular 
will, and is then not dictatorship but a different form of democracy. 
If we are to take this concept of ‘real democracy’ seriously, it implies breaking the 
impasse in a different way, which does not attempt to force sudden major changes in either 
institutions or consciousness, and can somehow confront the ideological and legal difficulties that 
any oppositional movement faces.  Such potentials appear realistic, we assert, only to the extent 
that the gap between one-dimensional and two-dimensional thinking can be bridged by 
confronting and developing conscious ideological beliefs.  In fact, Marcuse proposes some 
possible justifications for non-legal protest that may convince people of its legitimacy.  First, he 
explains there is ‘a universal higher law’ that ‘goes beyond the self-defined right and privilege of a 
particular group.’  As such, oppositional movements can ‘appeal to humanity’s right to peace, to 
humanity’s right to abolish exploitation and oppression’, which are ‘demonstrable as universal 
rights’.
236
  Or, another alternative is ‘to assert that actually we are the ones who are defending 
existing positive laws’, that is, if ‘we defend civil liberties, we are in fact defending the laws of the 
Establishment’.
237
  Here, protest consciously breaks laws to protect the values those laws were 
meant to uphold.  The first of these suggestions is problematic, since even the most brutal 
resistance groups could theoretically invoke a ‘higher law’ to justify their actions, so there is no 
reason why a particular claim to represent universal interests should be treated seriously.  The 
second idea of defending positive law by breaking it represents a more dialectical development of 
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alternative ideas, based on contradictions between official values and lived experience.  However, 
as Marcuse, says, it is pitted against established forms of positive law, which we understand 
indicates that its effectiveness depends on the possibility of causing conscious dissonance in 
individuals by appealing to strong beliefs and values that condition their affirmation of the social 
order. 
Marcuse also suggests courses of action that may contribute towards a more gradually 
developing political movement, which begins from an oppositional minority, and implies the need 
for different forms of political participation and communication to increase numbers.  For example, 
at points in his later work he considers political participation through official channels, which may 
make minor institutional changes first.  He explains that, for socialism to become possible, it first 
requires ‘a radical transformation of bourgeois democracy […] within the framework of 
monopolistic state capitalism’.  Therefore, even if opposition can manage nothing but ‘the smallest 
and most discredited means of protest: demonstrations, pickets, even [writing] letters’, they count 
because ‘the larger the number, the quantity, the more difficult to disregard this kind of protest’.
238
  
He also recommends a ‘long march through the institutions’, which involves working within the 
system to learn the techniques of education, media, and economics while retaining resistant 
consciousness,
239
 and states that actions usually condemned ‘as reformist, economistic, 
bourgeois-liberal politics can have a positive importance’, because ‘late capitalism boasts a 
diminished tolerance threshold’.
240
  Marcuse does not clarify why at these specific points the 
tolerance of late capitalism is diminished, or letters and protests around particular issues are more 
effective.  But, taken more generally, we can consider that such strategies may temper some of 
the problems that more radical protest confronts, by granting it more legitimacy, and reducing 
ideological support for state violence. 
To summarise our argument, when Marcuse considers political change from the 
perspective of ideology as automatic, unconscious absorption, it exacerbates the already major 
problems of how an oppositional politics may emerge in current material realities.  It is when we 
introduce the possibility of viewing ideology not only in terms of its baseline unification, but also 
through its various rationalisations, and consider the aspects of Marcuse’s work that are 
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compatible with this theory, that the development of oppositional politics becomes more plausible.  
In particular, it seems necessary to combine numerous legal and illegal means, based on a 
narrative that, initially, attempts to demonstrate the system’s radical incompatibility with its 
professed values.  For example, dominant notions of work which demand that individuals have 
jobs and pay taxes, or that promote concepts of meritocracy and social mobility, can be 
contrasted with a reality in which there is not sufficient work for all and social advancement is very 
difficult for the majority.  The important point here is to present this critique as a systemic issue 
(which draws on Marcuse’s arguments about automation and the increasing irrationality of 
alienated labour), or a contradiction whose resolution implies dramatic change to the system 
itself.  This approach may challenge mass consciousness by exposing beliefs to alternative, 
historicised information and ideas, even using commodified channels that cannot fully eradicate 
its message, attempting to slowly reach higher levels of saturation.  Such a multi-faceted, gradual 
concept of change does not rely on any single moment of success or failure, but is a continual 
project based on ever present potentials.  
Herbert Marcuse 
117 
 
VII. Conclusion 
In many ways, Marcuse’s theory of consumer capitalism remains highly relevant, and various 
threads that we have examined continue into the work of Jameson and Žižek.  In particular, he 
identifies a combination of pressures on individuals in the form of the performance principle and 
repressive desublimation, or productivity and consumer pleasure, and highlights how both these 
aspects are crucial to the background of expectation in late industrial capitalism, with performance 
remaining the dominant factor.  He reveals the contingency of these demands and transcendent 
potentials through a concept of needs, not by prescribing specific alternatives, but by encouraging 
radical imagination based on material possibilities.  For our purposes, one of the most important 
elements of his approach is his critique of neutrality in its various forms, which demonstrates the 
need for conscious politicisation to avoid a particular politics that hides behind objective or open 
processes.  Through this understanding, it is apparent that many forms of ideology in consumer 
capitalism are not explicitly political, or appear as formal freedoms or scientific logics, but as such 
lead to ‘repressive tolerance’ and justifications of waste and destruction. 
The main issue we have identified with this theory is the way in which, for Marcuse, these 
forms of technical rationality are absorbed into consciousness as a ‘second nature’.  This reified 
one-dimensionality and concepts such as ego weakness effectively create an unbridgeable gap 
between ideological affirmation and opposition, with each unable to communicate with the other.  
In some cases, Marcuse even reduces one-dimensional ideology to a reflex of economic 
conditions and consumer satisfaction, and it becomes difficult to understand how two-dimensional 
thinking emerges, or could ever expand.  These difficulties often lead Marcuse to an impasse in 
which neither consciousness nor the system can change without the other changing first, and he 
therefore generally considers change in ways that ground potentials outside consciousness, from 
human nature and aesthetics to intrinsic tendencies in economics and technological 
advancement.  The problem then is that, although some of these ideas appear plausible, they 
remain abstract potentials with no clear basis for active development according to the concept of 
ideology Marcuse provides.   
At the same time, despite the dominance of this thinking in Marcuse’s theory, there are 
elements that indicate a different approach to political change.  To begin with, Marcuse also 
mentions more explicit political interests and psychological reactions that may contribute to 
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affirmative ideology, and may be developed to form part of a theory of ideological rationalisations 
(especially when we consider that dominant social demands may be contradictory and require 
conscious prioritisation).  In short, these ideas imply that the performance principle is not 
absorbed directly in many cases, but according to beliefs that represent partial or indirect 
commitment.  From here, we can then imagine an oppositional politics that expands gradually by 
confronting these rationalisations.  Marcuse suggests a similar approach when he sees that 
alternative sensibilities are already emerging, through a concept of negation which, we believe, is 
essential to create a politics based on sensibilities of openness and self-determination.  It must, 
however, remain a reciprocal development between leaders and students, and communicate in 
ways that challenge affirmative ideologies.  Understood in this way, we can envisage tactics of 
persuasion and co-operation with parts of all class groups, balancing narratives of systemic and 
individual responsibility, and using both established and alternative communications channels. 
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Chapter 3 
Fredric Jameson 
I. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Jameson’s concept of postmodernism as a ‘cultural logic’ corresponding 
to ‘late capitalism’ and his attempts to reinvigorate the historical, dialectical perspective repressed 
by that logic.
1
  As Jameson describes it, while postmodernism does not fully erase the historical 
dimension from culture, for many it is impossible to imagine anything beyond what exists, 
because representation and perception is fragmented and depthless.  Consequently, various 
ways in which he considers re-politicising commodified culture aim not at creating an oppositional 
movement in the present, but at demonstrating the continued existence of dialectical thought, in 
the hope that it will be more widely recognisable in some unforeseeable future.  Overall, we affirm 
Jameson’s dialectical view of postmodernism as a particular ‘totality’ within history, and his aim of 
maintaining tensions between synchronic and diachronic perspectives to reinvigorate a sense of 
the temporal.  However, Jameson’s concept of ideology in postmodernism is one in which beliefs, 
forms of rationalisation, and awareness are irrelevant, because ‘conscious ideologies and political 
opinions’ have ‘ceased to be functional in perpetuating and reproducing the system’.
2
  Against this 
idea, we argue that the various political identities in postmodern society remain functioning 
ideologies in some sense.  As such, aspects of Jameson’s theory, such as his consideration of 
Utopia, appear more able to conceive the potential for gradual political change in the present.  In 
effect, our approach to postmodernism considers the subordinate elements of consciousness 
throughout, whereas Jameson recognises these but does not sufficiently factor them into his 
analysis of political potentials. 
The first section of this chapter examines Jameson’s use of periodisation to analyse 
current social norms, or identify synchronic totalities situated within a diachronic series of modes 
of production, culminating in postmodernism and late capitalism.  In many ways, Jameson’s 
theory of postmodernism continues from Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality, describing 
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how objects are reduced to immediate meanings, but with more ‘fragmentation’ and even less 
space for autonomous expression.  Jameson emphasises the system behind the apparent 
randomness of cultural production, or the dominant logic that obscures alternative potentials.  As 
with Marcuse, this understanding effectively splits the social according to affirmative and 
oppositional (dialectical) consciousness.  However, because the unique characteristic of 
postmodern logic is that it flattens all historical representation into mere style or image, there 
appears to be no way for subordinate logics to communicate.  The repercussions of this point are 
expanded upon as we examine Jameson’s concepts of History and Utopia, which aim at 
reinstating the ‘temporal’ dimension to flattened images, by contextualising the present in terms of 
the past, or potential alternatives.  These notions demonstrate ways of revealing the contingency 
of the social order and imagining social change, and are thus central to developing oppositional 
thinking.  Nonetheless, we contend, they appear effective only to the extent that radical ideas can 
communicate with affirmative ideological narratives, which in Jameson’s theory no longer exist in 
a meaningful form. 
Following these arguments, our aim is to show how narrative, belief and rationalisation 
are important aspects of consciousness in late capitalism.  For Jameson, disconnected and 
superficial imagery replace conscious ideology, as if the fragmented presentation of discourse 
within the media is reflected in the psyche itself.  Conversely, we maintain that media 
representations still appeal to people’s particular values, and that recipients always attempt to 
construct coherent narratives around their experience which can exceed prescribed ideas and 
even influence the system in return.  From this idea, we define particular affirmative ideologies 
(with which oppositional politics must interact) from various aspects of Jameson’s work.  These 
ideologies can generally be seen as ways that people react to the market as the background 
reality of the late capitalist totality, or how they respond to the cultural expectations of postmodern 
difference and pluralism.  For Jameson, such positions are more de-historicised images that 
merely reproduce consumer participation, or forms of cynicism that (tacitly) accept the existing 
order without illusion.  For us, on the contrary, late capitalism relies on the conscious justifications 
in these positions, which often represent indirect or conditional forms of commitment. 
The issue is then how oppositional forms of ideology that can challenge these affirmative 
forms may develop.  First, we turn to the state of generalised commodification and superficial 
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image culture that Jameson defines.  We examine the dichotomy he establishes between 
modernism and postmodernism to highlight the dominant features of the present, and how the 
ubiquity of commodified cultural production makes the expression and reception of oppositional 
political ideas problematic.  While we understand the importance of mass commodification in 
these respects, we consider whether ‘modernist’ processes are still part of postmodernism to a 
degree that is obscured by Jameson’s defining them in contrast to each other.  As such, it is 
unclear that the forms and content of postmodern culture are necessarily ‘depthless’, and instead 
they may contain utopian or political ideas in a similar way to modern art, even if substantially 
obscured by their distribution as commodities.  From this point, through our understanding that 
ideologies tend to exceed de-politicised media representations, we suggest ways in which people 
might receive these ideas, or otherwise develop oppositional political thinking even through 
commodity culture. 
The implication of our theory is thus that subjectivity in postmodernism is more than a 
collection of depthless identities, and involves an active consciousness.  Jameson explains that 
such agency exists, and subjectivity should not be reduced to systemic factors, but his focus on 
structure and mediatised images of social groups means that he rarely considers the potential of 
such agency.  This problem is also present in his concept of ‘cognitive mapping’, which suggests 
a way of reintroducing the temporal dimension to ‘spatialized’ postmodern logic.  From our 
perspective, cognitive mapping is important for social change if we understand affirmative 
ideologies as active sets of beliefs that attempt to produce coherent narratives of the system, in 
that it reinterprets them in terms of class consciousness.  Without this notion of functioning 
ideology, as in Jameson’s theory, the potential for historical thinking is reduced to its recognition 
by a marginal element in society, and there is no (present) way for such recognition to escape 
depthless representation and develop dialectically. 
It is still possible to draw some political potentials from Jameson’s theory, although he 
pays less attention to actual political efforts than either Marcuse or Žižek.  On one hand, the style 
and cultural focus of Jameson’s work has certain advantages, such as unifying intellectual fields 
that may otherwise be separated, or allowing him to use a writing style that evokes dialectical 
openness.  These factors point to the value of cultural critique, but in our view also suggest a 
greater need to balance it with political ideas to make it more widely accessible.  On the other 
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hand, there are some instances where Jameson does consider politics, and the implications of 
this relatively minor aspect of his work may be expanded into our overall theory.  Specifically, 
Jameson describes how ‘new social movements’ represent ideologies that exceed consumerist 
logic and represent a kind of agency, but the particularised nature of these movements make it 
difficult to imagine how they could connect into a class consciousness.  We argue that this agency 
is a general feature of ideology, and revolves around social contradictions common to the 
experience of many ideologies, which provide a basis for connection. 
As with our analysis of Marcuse’s work, we attempt to show, by applying our theory of 
ideology to notions such as historicising, utopian politics, commodified media and fragmented 
perception, that Jameson’s theories already imply potential for an oppositional political movement.  
As such, we support Jameson’s commitment to a Marxist dialectics and his concepts of History 
and Utopia as ways of revealing political possibilities against dominant representations of the 
present.
3
  However, at the same time, we concur with criticisms that highlight Jameson’s over-
emphasis of dominant aspects of the totality.
4
  The point to emphasise is both that there are still 
‘functioning’ ideologies which rationalise the capitalist system in different ways, according to their 
own beliefs and contradictions, and that these ideologies indicate that culture is not merely 
experienced in fragments, so a general capacity to produce and receive historically situated 
concepts remains.  Our aim is then to shift the balance in Jameson’s work slightly from the logic 
of the system to its supports, or the way in which ideas and knowledge remain crucial to its 
survival. 
                                                             
3 In particular, we argue against notions such as that Jameson’s totalising reduces the scope of political 
thought or claims to represent a historical referent (LaCapra, Roberts); that his focus on Marxism implies 
the exclusion of other progressive discourses (Best); or that Jameson’s call for temporal politics ignores 
spatial politics (Homer, Massey). 
4 For example, we generally affirm ideas that Jameson’s concept of totality closes off space for 
oppositional ideas to emerge (Best and Kellner, Homer); that he focuses too exclusively on higher level 
dominant trends, such as fragmented cultural form, rather than specific phenomena (Eagleton, Said); that 
he is overly selective and generalising with the texts he analyses (Callinicos, Homer, Nicholls); and 
therefore that he does not fully consider forms of politics that may already exist in postmodern culture 
(Burnham, Hutcheon, Spivak). 
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II. Key Concepts 
i) Postmodernism 
We begin by examining Jameson’s definition of postmodernism according to his theory of 
periodisation and totalising.  Jameson identifies the current ‘postmodern’ cultural logic and ‘late 
capitalism’ (a term borrowed from Mandel to describe the phase of capitalism that succeeds its 
monopoly or imperial form) as a homogenising global totality that erases historical experience and 
absorbs other cultural logics and autonomous space.  For Jameson, this logic is a cultural 
dominant, in the sense that it also contains remnants of previous and anticipatory cultures, and 
any ‘totality’ includes its own contradictions.  This concept of totality therefore considers what is 
excluded from it, or the contingent assumptions that support it.  However, in our understanding, 
Jameson’s definition of postmodernism as a particular period within a series of historically 
developing modes of production is overly totalising, in that it appears to leave no space outside it, 
and the remnants of other cultures are powerless to escape absorption into its logic.  As with 
Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality, oppositional forces are present, but it is not clear how 
they emerge in the conditions Jameson describes, and the dialectical movement of history 
appears (temporarily) frozen.  We thus emphasise that analysis of postmodernism should include 
its limitations, gaps and contradictions within definitions of the dominant logic. 
Postmodernism, for Jameson, is a cultural logic relating to a particular phase of capitalism 
that is distinct from modernism in various ways.  He identifies its ‘constitutive features’ as ‘a new 
depthlessness’, based in ‘a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum’, plus ‘a 
consequent weakening of historicity’, and ‘a whole new type of emotional ground tone [...] which 
can best be grasped by a return to older theories of the sublime’, and relates all these notions to 
‘a whole new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new economic world system’.
5
  In 
effect, a de-historicising culture of the image turns experience into a string of disconnected 
present moments, which reflects a hugely complex economic system that separates objects from 
their conditions of production, and eradicates traditional ways of life to a previously unimaginable 
extent.  Jameson thus explains that postmodernism is a ‘spatial’ logic, in which temporal 
experience is reduced to manufactured consumerist cycles, such as the seasons of sport or 
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fashion, which ‘simulate formerly natural rhythms for commercial convenience’.
6
  Outside these 
cycles, the present is merely updated through mass media with disembodied ‘events’ that fade 
away as the next occurs.  In this sense, everything becomes ‘cultural’, so even politics is 
disconnected from history, and, as with Marcuse, artistic expression loses its connection with the 
sublime, becoming mere exchange value and sensual experience.  Postmodern culture creates 
spectacle and ‘intensities’ of feeling, whose absence of context causes a ‘waning of effect’, so 
images do not evoke emotion or social and existential anxieties, and the autonomous modern 
subject fragments into superficial group identities. 
All these features Jameson defines correspond to a particular economic structure, with 
the expansion of the spatial reflecting the geographical expansion of capitalism.  As he puts it, 
postmodernism is ‘the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American 
military and economic domination throughout the world’, and ‘the underside of culture is b lood, 
torture, death and terror’.
7
  The image of cultural and aesthetic freedom, and the everyday 
practices, social norms and mental habits associated with it, are all part of this domination, and 
represent a paradox in postmodernism ‘between an unparalleled rate of change on all the levels 
of social life and an unparalleled standardization of everything — feelings along with consumer 
goods, language along with built space’.
8
  Nothing produced in this system is really new, in the 
sense of changing the system itself, but simply a mass of consumer styles that emerge from its 
stability.  Jameson contrasts his approach with ‘postmodern theory’ that effectively accepts 
postmodernism as non-systematic production of difference, because he sees that a theoretical 
focus on language and arbitrariness of meaning ‘is closely linked with the emergence of these 
phenomena as relatively autonomous and opaque objects in their own right in the new distribution 
mechanisms of industrial capitalism’.
9
  That is, it is a feature of late capitalist logic to not view itself 
as a system at all, which obscures that even ‘a system that constitutively produces differences 
remains a system’, and need not resemble the object it produces.
10
 
In many ways, Jameson’s view of postmodern culture reflects an advanced form of the 
social and economic conditions identified by Marcuse.  Mass consumption, planned 
                                                             
6 Jameson, ‘The Antimonies of Postmodernity’, in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 
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obsolescence, visual technologies, global communications, and general standardisation of life, 
are epiphenomena of a broader change — a redistributed prosperity in centres of capitalism 
afforded by global expansion.  In these terms, the system becomes increasingly complex and 
creates an ever deeper disconnect between local lived experience and globally outsourced 
exploitation and oppression.  As Jameson explains, experience started to become locally 
authentic but false overall during imperialist times, as the total system escaped individual 
understanding,
11
 but today multiple levels of abstraction between production and consumption 
make the system a sublime, whose partial unveiling through criticism still does not provide real 
comprehension.  Jameson in fact identifies within Marcuse’s work the central point that ‘the 
consumer’s society […] has lost the experience of the negative in all its forms’, and that without 
that contrast, a ‘genuinely human existence’ is impossible.
12
  But, like Marcuse, Jameson also still 
views late capitalism in terms of class division, so while a certain cultural democratisation in 
postmodernism ‘dismantles many of the barriers to cultural consumption that seemed implicit in 
modernism’, marginalised groups still exist that ‘repudiate the very concept of a postmodernism 
as the universalizing cover story for what is essentially a much narrower class-cultural 
operation’.
13
  Postmodern notions of cultural democracy, and power politics based on identity 
recognition, repress questions of wealth distribution and ownership of production that refuse to 
disappear, given the realities of economic deprivation. 
Jameson’s concept of postmodernism reveals clear differences in the culture of today’s 
dominant capitalist societies (and even globally in some respects)
14
 compared to their earlier 
forms.  The array of fragmented, image-focused styles appears to reflect important social shifts, 
such as globalised manufacturing, mass consumerism, identity politics and new media 
technologies, which go beyond mere stylistic shifts within art.
15
  It is not necessarily the case that 
postmodernism is so different that it represents ‘a whole new economic world system’, but such 
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(London: Verso, 1998), pp. 122-123. 
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rhetoric is not meant to be taken literally, and Jameson is more attempting to define the present 
as a synchronic totality, so that cultural dominants are clearly perceived.  He explains that 
defining the current cultural paradigm in contrast to a past paradigm requires an ‘inaugural 
narrative act that grounds the perception and interpretation of the events to be narrated.’  He also 
claims to ‘have pretended to believe that the postmodern is as unusual as it thinks it is’,
16
 so that it 
can be viewed as a distinct historical moment.  Thus, there is no sudden and clean break 
between modernism and postmodernism, as various causal factors at different historical points 
(mass consumerism and television in the 1950s, a psychological shift in the 1960s) contribute to 
the present situation.
17
  As Jameson says, all social formations contain ‘several modes of 
production all at once, including vestiges and survivals of older modes of production [...] as well 
as anticipatory tendencies’.
18
  It is therefore necessary to ‘respect both the methodological 
imperative implicit in the concept of totality or totalization, and the quite different attention of a 
“symptomal” analysis to discontinuities, rifts, actions at distance, within a merely apparently 
unified cultural text’.
19
  In that sense, the qualities of postmodernism have developed from an 
anticipatory position, and retain other subordinate cultural logics.   
The concept of totalising is useful to our understanding of a social split, in the sense that 
it aims to analyse society as a particular system to identify its points of exclusion and intolerance.  
In Jameson’s sense, it connects different social levels, such as economics, culture and politics, by 
assuming a ‘semi-autonomy’ between them, which accepts a certain analytical value in 
considering them separately, but also the mutual influence between them.  For Jameson, this 
interconnected view is not ‘purely symbolic’, since the levels cannot be separate in any absolute 
sense,
20
 but it remains an abstraction, which is ‘as false as it is true’,
21
 because there is no actual 
specific form of connection either.
22
  As such, totalising promotes a particular interpretation of 
                                                             
16 PM, p. xiii. 
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social conditions over others, but it does not then mean that it may undermine an alliance politics, 
because ‘the quest for totalization functions to regenerate structures of domination’.
23
  First, 
Jameson distinguishes totalising from totalitarian absolutes, or any effort to annul the gap 
between subject and object.  He explains it never involves a ‘privileged bird’s-eye view of the 
whole’, and his project ‘implies exactly the opposite and takes as its premise the impossibility for 
individual and biological human subjects to conceive of such a position, let alone to adopt or 
achieve it’.
24
  Second, some form of dominating assumption is inevitable in any social theory, 
even if it takes an ‘anti-totality’ view, because it must still exclude certain forms of politics to create 
an alliance or shared vision.  The question for a totalising theory is then how it represents the 
whole, and for Jameson the aim of showing capitalism as a totality is ‘to demonstrate that it 
cannot be reformed, and that its repairs […] necessarily end up strengthening and enlarging it’.
25
  
An alliance politics could then be built on such ideas. 
From our perspective, the issue with Jameson’s theory of postmodernism is rather that, 
despite his insistence that it is as a kind of ideal theory, or a cultural dominant with various 
‘symptomal’ rifts and discontinuities, he often focuses purely on its dominant qualities over its 
contingency and thereby limits the scope for imagining deep political change.  He explains that, 
while not all cultural production is postmodern, ‘The postmodern is […] the force field in which 
very different kinds of cultural impulses [...] must make their way.’
26
  It then seems that, although 
all historical dominants create such a ‘force field’, the postmodern version is one that can engulf 
all subordinate culture in its de-historicising logic, and has, as Marcuse feared, annihilated the 
autonomous sphere.  The globalisation of capitalism also means there is no geographical outside, 
and thus no existing alternative social form.  Jameson states that today’s capitalism ‘eliminates 
the enclaves of precapitalist organization it had hitherto tolerated and exploited’, leading to ‘a new 
and historically original penetration and colonization of Nature and the Unconscious’.
27
  The 
commodity form has expanded to the point that even the natural environment is considered in 
terms of its exchange value, and these relations of value are reproduced unconsciously through 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Postmodern Return, With a Vengeance, of Subjectivity’, in Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, pp. 228-248 
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everyday behaviour,  The ‘force field’ is the capitalist mode of production, represented by 
commodification that is more deeply and widely embedded in social relations than ever before. It 
appears that dominant culture colonises the physical and psychological areas from which non-
dominated expression could emerge, and the ‘vestiges’ and ‘anticipatory tendencies’ are 
interpreted according to its logic.
28
  These statements then seem to be more than mere rhetorical 
devices that establish the particular dominant features of the totality, and form the basis of 
Jameson’s approaches to political change. 
In our understanding, the point is that even to the extent oppositional ideas are either 
repressed or incorporated by the commodity form, they retain content that may affect how people 
understand commodification and the social problems it engenders.  In Jameson’s terms, 
conversely, the diachronic, uneven movement of history itself has reached a point (for the 
foreseeable future) at which it reabsorbs its own contradictions.  If, in general, a dominant cultural 
logic must represent itself as universal to maintain dominance, it seems that the postmodern logic 
rooted in globalised commodification, really defuses oppositional thinking and becomes universal 
by default.  It is true, as Jameson says, that the lack of any existing major alternatives to late 
capitalism means that it is theoretically problematic to provide any ‘solution’ to its dominance, 
since then ‘the statement of the problem will seem to have failed, by underestimating the 
problem’.
29
  Indeed, overstating the conditions of postmodernism may have important political 
effects, in that without it very little ‘historical understanding’ finds a way into critical analysis.
30
  But 
it should still be possible to historicise even the conditions of late capitalism without depicting 
them as so fully colonising, and without needing to claim that some oppositional force is ready to 
replace them, according to the dialectical concept of totality.
31
  Jameson warns that it is 
problematic to propose a closed system, because it creates a ‘winner loses’ logic, in which the 
successful theorist finds there is no purpose left for critical negation.
32
  Yet, because he presents 
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a ‘too totalizing’ dominance,
33
 his analysis effectively succumbs to this logic, rendering 
inconceivable any space that postmodern logic fails to absorb, or any conscious means for 
instigating a subsequent dialectical step.
34
  The caveats about synchronic periodisation that 
Jameson introduces are not integral to the bulk of his analysis, so he often does not fully consider 
the obstacles and limits to the phenomena he identifies.  In contrast, we perceive that if a radical 
political opposition is to become plausible, cultural dominants should be assessed throughout in 
terms of how they negatively affect postmodern dominance and the conditions of its acceptance. 
 
ii) History and Narrative 
Re-contextualising the present in relation to history, or as part of a narrative which views society 
in terms of fluctuation, contingency and latent potentials, is then a major part of Jameson’s 
project.  For Jameson, the point is not that this perspective reveals some absolute form of history, 
but that it is a specific interpretation that allows us to question existing norms, by showing them as 
dominant particulars and revealing subordinate potentials beyond them.  We agree with Jameson 
here that the ‘truth’, in effect, is the constant possibility of historicising, and that the particular 
narrative he employs is valuable because it reveals experiences of deprivation and oppression.  
The problem is how this historicising can be useful in postmodernism, if mass culture flattens out 
all narrative into disconnected images, and, for Jameson, it is a case of deciphering how narrative 
may be reintroduced at all in these conditions.  But if we consider his theories of textual analysis, 
which involve reading different levels of political unconscious in ideological expression, we can 
understand that culture still functions through explanatory narratives and a continuing struggle 
between different beliefs, each with limitations that a commitment to historicising helps expose. 
Jameson’s concept of Marxist historicising is a specific aim not simply to construct a chain 
of empirical events, but to form a narrative of ‘the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom 
from a realm of Necessity’.
35
  In these terms, the concept of Necessity has parallels with scarcity 
in Marcuse’s theory, in its widest sense as the cultural, psychological, and technological limits on 
humanity at any historical point.  These limits prevent Freedom, but Freedom itself is a response 
to Necessity, or a desire for transcendence articulated based on experienced limits.  History is 
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then not an objective reality, but that which structures people’s understanding of the past and their 
future potentials, based on the endless contrast between what is and what could be.  As Jameson 
puts it, ‘history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise’, but ‘an absent cause, […] 
inaccessible to us except in textual form’.
36
  It can only ever be represented, and in a way that is 
dependent on the particular concepts and expressions available to a society.
37
  
The aim is then to analyse texts to gain insight into the historical limits and desires behind 
their ideological expressions.  It is not a matter of explaining what texts mean, but of 
‘metacommentary’, or identifying in an interpretation ‘a particular narrative trait, or seme, as a 
function of its social, historical, or political context’.
38
  Different interpretations are not wrong, for 
Jameson, but always contain ideological assumptions that they do not fully recognise, and which 
can be revealed.  As such, he says, a Marxist method of historicising that avoids final meaning is 
‘the absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation’,
39
 and exists within other methods as a 
repressed reality of their relationship to ‘collective struggle’.  It shows the ‘political unconscious’ 
behind all expression, which can be read at three different levels — those ‘of the political 
(immediate historic events), of the social (class and class consciousness), and of the economic 
(the mode of production)’.
40
  As Jameson explains it, the first level involves reading the text as a 
symbolic act which confronts a political issue without being able to consciously express it, or ‘the 
rewriting or restructuration of a prior historical or ideological subtext’,
41
 that retrospectively 
becomes observable as an ‘absent cause’.  At the second level, a wider collective or class 
discourse is expressed in the text, which is viewed as a single ideological utterance, or 
‘ideologeme’, in a larger dialogic range of voices, perceivable through its oppositional 
relationships.
42
  In the final level, the dynamics of several modes of production are identified 
within the text, and ‘make up what can be termed the ideology of form, that is, the determinate 
contradiction of the specific messages emitted by the various sign systems which coexist in a 
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given artistic process as well as in its general social formation’.
43
  Here, the text is contextualised 
as an expression of a moment within an overall history of changing and overlapping master 
narratives, not merely within the context of a single social order. 
Jameson’s method is important for imagining radical political potentials because it 
understands ideology within relationships of dominance and subordination that are contingent and 
temporary, and therefore questions the Necessity that maintains such dominance.  In our view, it 
is also possible for this method to be the horizon of interpretation while representing a form of 
interpretation itself, or ‘always situation-specific and singular’,
44
 rather than some metaphysical 
principle.  On the surface, as Boer explains, it may seem difficult to maintain these ideas together, 
because either Jameson ‘allows that Marxism must jostle for position in the theoretical 
marketplace’, or ‘he asserts the superiority of Marxism’, which suggests ‘there is less room to be 
open to the possibilities of other methods’.
45
  But the point, as Boer concludes, is that if a range of 
possible interpretations is viewed as a plurality of equal positions (or even choices), Marxist 
dialectics can always then analyse the historical conditions of that plurality.  As such, narrative is 
always ideological representation, and Marxism is another master code, but one that can always 
de-finalise any particular interpretation.
46
 
Furthermore, it is not only this ability to historicise that is important in Jameson’s method, 
but the particular narrative of history it constructs.  That is, the concept of History as Freedom 
versus Necessity appears evident at a basic level (as the clash of natural/social limits and 
natural/social desires), but also represents a specific aim to conceive social struggles and desires 
in a way that exposes contradictions in the present through actual forms of marginalisation, 
deprivation and oppression.  In this sense, for Jameson, ‘History as ground and untranscendable 
horizon needs no particular theoretical justification’, because ‘its alienating necessities will not 
forget us, however much we might prefer to ignore them’.
47
  It remains the case that, because 
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Necessity and Freedom are only meaningful in their (ideological) representation, Marxism 
inevitably highlights certain types of Freedom and Necessity over others.
48
  Yet, Jameson 
recognises both that the narrative of class struggle is an idealised abstraction through which he 
chooses to construct a dialectical history, because interpretation must contextualise its object 
within ‘a social field dominated by some central contradiction’,
49
 and that this choice is not purely 
subjective, because categories such as class and wage labour are ‘symptoms’ of social reality.
50
 
The difference between this method and other narratives is then in the extent it reveals 
potentials for political Freedom from particular existing forms of Necessity.  It is not, as Best 
claims, that Jameson’s focus is reductive, because it cannot be decided in advance that ‘Marxism 
assigns the ultimate place of other discourses’, and it may be ‘that a feminist or psychoanalytic 
reading of a text is more appropriate and more powerful in some cases’.
51
  Jameson’s Marxism 
does not replace these readings, so that we must choose the most appropriate to each situation.  
Rather, it relates them to class struggle in a way that resists a narrower contextualisation (such as 
within identity politics), and retains the human factor of social organisation.
52
  This narrative is 
restrictive in the sense that its contextualisation precludes other overall contexts, but any 
approach, including one that attempts to critique the limits of narrative in general, has the same 
result.  For example, Spivak notes that postmodern art can historicise the past, rather than 
effacing it, as Jameson claims, because its appropriation and juxtaposition of past styles ‘can be 
read as a questioning of the identification of continuist narratives of history with History as such’, 
or a reminder that History is not ‘a transcendental signifier for the weight of authority (or the 
authoritative explanation)’, and ‘has no literal referent’.
53
  What is intrinsic to Jameson’s method, 
however, is not only that it already avoids presenting class struggle as a literal referent of history, 
but also that it asks why we should view history in this way.  In other words, it accepts that its 
attempt to disrupt theoretical hierarchies is a means towards a specific end, and implies that any 
similar approach must also have a purpose.  More specifically, it shows that such theories must 
effectively choose between a narrative that focuses on deep structural causes of social disparity, 
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a narrative that focuses on inequalities within established structures, and a kind of anti-narrative 
that merely emphasises the falsity of all ideological positions, but therefore tacitly affirms the 
system by ignoring its disparities.
54
  None of these approaches are right or wrong, but they have 
different political effects, and the context of class struggle functions as a rallying point for more 
radical change.  As Jameson says, we should not conclude that ‘since it is unrepresentable, 
capitalism is ineffable and a kind of mystery beyond language or thought; but rather that one must 
redouble one’s efforts to express the inexpressible in this respect’.
55
 
One area of contention in Jameson’s theory of historicising is the way he contrasts his 
structural analysis against moral judgement, which distances it from subjective belief.  He 
explains, for example, how Marx saw that ‘collective forms’ of political change ‘are not merely 
desirable (or ethical), not even possible, but also and above all inevitable, provided we 
understand the bringing to emergence of that inevitability as a collective human task and 
project’.
56
  But if a concept such as Freedom versus Necessity suggests the existing social order 
is tested against historical potentials and our ability to realise them, rather than moral standards, 
Jameson demonstrates ethical suppositions in the will to see these potentials come to fruition.  
His idea that History is ‘a text-to-be-(re)-constructed’, and there is ‘an obligation to do so’,
57
 can 
only imply a moral obligation, which assumes that a collective project is right.  As Eagleton 
argues, Jameson’s analysis includes morally judgemental language, which he uses to explain 
why he ‘should object to poverty or unemployment, or […] why he finds the utopian impulse so 
precious’.
58
  Ultimately, there is no absolute reason why we should seek to deliberately further the 
cause of Freedom over Necessity.  In fact, as with Eros, aspects of Freedom may even work 
against civilizational ties, and Jameson avoids these aspects precisely by defining Freedom 
according to certain values.  It is still important to criticise the moralising of particular symptoms of 
capitalism, rather than the system itself, but structural analysis does not indicate a lack of moral 
judgement.  Thus, where Jameson explains that ‘violence pornography’ in action films ‘is not to be 
seen as a form of immorality at all but rather as a structural effect of the temporality of our 
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socioeconomic system’,
59
 it is not clear how a purely structural analysis could turn that mere 
observation into a critique of capitalism.  
To a great extent, Jameson’s theory of historicising is then central to our theoretical 
assumptions, but the question remains how it can function in postmodernism.  In Jameson’s 
terms, historical representation becomes doubly problematic in postmodern culture, in that not 
only is History an absent cause, but its representation in narrative is fragmented into individual 
images, and this postmodern logic has penetrated the general unconscious.  It is already 
necessary, as Jameson explains, to represent the global society allegorically, which ‘happens 
when you know you cannot represent something but you also cannot not do it’.
60
  Yet, as with art 
in Marcuse’s theory, such allegory is effectively a code that only the un-colonised might 
recognise, and is beyond the understanding of the masses.  For a historicising approach to be 
widely effective, therefore, it seems that it must be able to communicate with elements of 
narrative that remain in the colonised unconscious.  In this sense, the concept of political 
unconscious that Jameson introduces prior to his postmodern theory suggests that all texts are 
narrative, ideological resolutions to unconscious social issues, so it should also be possible to 
read postmodern texts in terms of the specific beliefs and rationalisations with which they interpret 
the social situation.  Although Jameson may recognise this possibility, his analysis of postmodern 
texts focuses on their repression of history, rather than detecting narratives in apparent 
fragmentation to be contrasted with notions of class struggle.
61
 
The different levels of political unconscious that Jameson defines are useful in this 
respect, if we emphasise the mediation between them, as different aspects of ideology.  As in PU, 
all levels are detectable in any given text or ideology, but our aim is to focus on the mutual 
influence between them, whereas Jameson tends to treat the three levels separately.
62
  In 
particular, for Jameson, the third level of modes of production and the general contingency of 
ideology takes precedence, rather than specific ideological resolutions.  However, we can 
compare the first level, which produces ‘aesthetic or narrative form’ to create ‘imaginary or formal 
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“solutions” to unresolvable social contradictions’,
63
 to individual rationalisations of social 
experience.  At this level, specific beliefs and justifications may be analysed, to understand more 
fully how they affirm or reject existing class relations.  As such, the first level contributes to class 
struggle through the rationalisation of social contradictions, just as the historical development of 
class struggle overdetermines the narratives themselves.  In effect, multiple ideologies pull the 
dominant logic in different directions, and act as its supports, while the logic influences the nature 
of those supports.  In terms of postmodernism, ‘depthlessness’ is then itself an ideological 
resolution, which obscures how ideologies continually mediate between the levels of political 
unconscious, and reconcile global ideas with individual experience through narratives. 
 
iii) Utopia 
As Jameson’s theory of History considers dialectical temporality in terms of the past, its 
counterpart is the future of political struggle as understood through the concept of Utopia.  Or, as 
historicising points to the contingency of the present, Utopia implies the impossibility of social 
stasis by actually imagining alternative futures.  The central issue Jameson identifies is that of 
how to communicate the utopian notion of a radically different future in terms of everyday political 
ideas.  Ostensibly, the problem here is again that of invigorating two-dimensional thought through 
one-dimensional language, but Jameson confronts the challenge more directly than Marcuse.  He 
sees the tension between the two sides as the necessary condition to develop utopian thought, by 
introducing comprehensible political concepts that, if thought through, enable critical reflection on 
existing social relations.  This approach supports the possibility of gradual ideological change, as 
it suggests a level of openness to new concepts even in affirmative ideologies.  However, it is not 
clear, as Jameson argues, that this potential indicates a ‘utopian impulse’ which privileges 
socialist collective politics.  Instead, we emphasise that there is only a clash of utopian visions, 
represented by different ideologies, and that alternative thought must be directed towards specific 
political ends.  We also note that the development of utopian alternatives Jameson suggests 
implies a level of ideological rationalisation that is not present in his theories of postmodernism. 
The concept of Utopia as Jameson presents it is a way of reinvigorating thought about 
alternative social formations that is otherwise largely discredited.  Jameson explains that ‘Utopian 
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form is itself a representational meditation on radical difference, radical otherness, and on the 
systemic nature of the social totality’,
64
 which effectively imagines Freedom from the perceived 
Necessities of that totality.  As with History, it views the present as contingent, but from the 
perspective of an alternative future, based on existing potentials and the social changes required.  
Utopia is ‘another word for the socialist project’,
65
 for Jameson, which, similar to Marcuse, 
demonstrates repressed structural tendencies, and counters pejorative definitions that either 
stress the impossibility of qualitative change or its empty idealism.  Jameson in fact sees that 
Utopia should be especially central to political considerations when social alternatives do not 
seem viable (such as late capitalism), because trying to imagine something beyond what exists 
sparks the re-evaluation of current limits.  Focusing on Utopia does not mean ‘the outlines of a 
new and effective practical politics […] will at once become visible; but only that we wi ll never 
come to one without it’.
66
 
It is then a question of identifying utopian ideals and understanding where they are 
located.  Jameson distinguishes between discrete utopian political programmes and an underlying 
utopian impulse in cultural expression.  The first represents an explicit politics that attempts to 
correct a particular wrong seen as the root problem in a social order, according to a certain 
project.  The second is an ever-present abstract ideal or proto-political desire in the psyche, 
whose lack of fulfilment is compensated for by particular ideological goals, such as liberal reform, 
market fundamentalism, or consumer pleasure.
67
  Psychologically, Jameson explains, this 
impulse may represent some felt lack of collectivity or deep-rooted longing to become a ‘people’, 
even though such a collective has no real historical precedent,
68
 which dissipates if not revitalised 
by utopian thinking.  The problem with trying to connect these two forms into a radical politics is 
that the abstract ideal can only be developed by ideas that exceed existing political activities and 
social norms, while a political project must ultimately communicate with a population through 
these norms.  There is an incompatibility between Utopia and any actual politics, and Jameson 
explains that although Utopia ‘inevitably arouses political passions’, it seems ‘to avoid or to 
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abolish the political altogether’.
69
  Thus, utopian politics must be subjected to current social 
concepts, which reduce its radical dimension, else it remains an unknown transcendence that 
appears to cancel humanity itself, and can ‘reawaken all the most classical fears of Utopia as 
such’.
70
 
The important point here, for Jameson, is not that this paradox is terminal for utopian 
politics, but that it signifies a dialectical tension which represents the mechanism of utopian 
possibility.  The solution is precisely to accept this tension, and walk a line between the radically 
different and ordinary communication.  Then, in attempting to represent the utopian impulse 
symbolically or allegorically, imagining how this symbolisation is possible can slowly alter the 
limits of representation.  As Jameson explains, debates around the issue of utopian 
representation itself may ‘find themselves drawn inside the Utopian text, thereby becoming 
occasions for further Utopian productivity’.
71
  In short, defining and communicating the impossible 
produces conditions of possibility and gratification.
72
  Thus if, for Marcuse, the obstacle for utopian 
art is that it must somehow remain autonomous and become less marginal, for Jameson, the 
antagonism between marginalisation and established politics is the engine of utopian thinking.  
There is even a common ground of understanding between the apparently contradictory poles, 
since individual wish-fulfilment is based on social influences, including deeply internalised taboos 
that affect imaginative constructs.
73
  In other words, the autonomous utopian wish is shaped by 
society, and can never represent a total break from what exists. 
Jameson also describes the tension in utopian politics through the concepts of 
‘Imagination’ — an overall utopian vision and commitment to change — and ‘Fancy’ — the micro 
processes and details of change — which alternately take precedence depending on social 
conditions.  So, historically, for Jameson, industrial capitalism simplified the task of Imagination 
because the only alternative option was to abolish the single mode of production, but 
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subsequently capitalism and socialism dominated Imagination to the point that only the practical 
politics and details (Fancy) remained.  At this point, Jameson explains, the utopian impulse wanes 
and ‘the function of Imagination slowly atrophies for want of use’, leaving us ‘in the helpless 
position of passive accomplices and impotent handwringers’.
74
  However, if it seems that late 
capitalism offers the worst of both worlds, with the single, global system leaving no space for 
Imagination, and Fancy being incorporated into individual ‘life-style’ fantasies, the utopian impulse 
can be reborn, according to Jameson, because there are no other political potentials.  That is, 
when political change seems near, utopian imagination and speculation give way to concrete 
programmes, whereas in de-politicised conditions, radical politics is separated from daily 
experience and ‘allows us to take hitherto unimaginable mental liberties with structures whose 
actual modification or abolition scarcely seem on the cards’.
75
 
More specifically, Jameson believes it may be possible to reinvigorate Imagination by fully 
considering forms of Fancy.  The idea is that thinking through a notion such as the abolition of 
money ‘unexpectedly foregrounds all kinds of new individual, social and ontological relationships’, 
and revives something of the utopian impulse.
76
  There is no specific vision of an alternative future 
here, but questioning such an important social element at least makes people imagine the 
possibility of alternatives.  In this sense, Jameson says, ‘Utopian is no longer the invention and 
defense of a specific floorplan, but rather the story of all the arguments about how Utopia should 
be constructed in the first place.’
77
  The result is a gradual development that effectively avoids 
Marcuse’s impasse between changes in social structures and consciousness, because the 
mention of the ideal ‘returns upon our present to play a diagnostic and a critical-substantive 
role’.
78
  In this sense, the paradox between the conditions needed for the break and the break 
needed to create those conditions is, for Jameson, ‘a rhetorical and political strength’, because it 
is the attempt to think what a social break would look like, rather than what would come after, that 
enables change.
79
 
Jameson’s utopian theory thus suggests that a conversation between utopian political 
notions and everyday politics can begin even in late capitalism.  It imagines changes that could be 
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made to an apparently insurmountable system, and, by thinking through such changes, identifies 
the obstacles that block them.  In terms of our ideology theory, it represents a clear approach to 
communications between affirmative and oppositional thinking, through specific ideas that are 
comprehensible in everyday language, but may lead to imaginative social critique.  However, it is 
less clear why these considerations should necessarily invigorate a utopian impulse, rather than 
potentially instigate different forms of ideological change.  Jameson notes that, with any particular 
utopian project, ‘No matter how comprehensive and trans-class or post-ideological the inventory 
of reality’s flaws and defects, the imagined resolution necessarily remains wedded to this or that 
ideological perspective.’
80
  But as such, any ‘impulse’ to transcend existing social relations is not 
intrinsically utopian in the sense of desiring a classless collective, only where it is understood as 
such through specific ideologies.  There is then no obvious distinction between a utopian political 
project and a sublimated utopian impulse, because there are only different interpretations of an 
ideal society, each with their own political goals and ideas of a harmonious collective.  Jameson 
explains that any future Utopia must have some association with socialism, in terms of ‘the values 
of social and economic equality and the universal right to food, lodging, medicine, education and 
work’, and provides ‘proof’ that these socialist goals are necessary to Utopia, in that ‘even neo-
conservative fundamentalisms of the day continue to promise eventual satisfaction in all these 
areas’.
81
  In contrast, we would argue here that such ideologies show how universal provision is 
not only a socialist ideal, and, for some, utopian visions can remain committed to capitalism. 
In this sense, any project which aims at major political change is ‘utopian’ in its striving for 
a social ideal that currently does not exist, and no particular ideals are more utopian than others.  
It is then not a question of reinvigorating a utopian impulse (or, in Marcuse’s terms, the socialising 
side of Eros) so much as inspiring and redirecting political ideals according to certain values that 
demand radical change.  Thus, even fascist ideologies with ideals based on segregation and 
exclusion are utopian in their own way, and it is not, as Jameson understands, that ‘the 
destructive passions’ of extreme right movements simply ‘spring from rage and bitter 
disappointment at the failures of Utopian aspirations’.
82
  Jameson effectively places a particular 
notion of utopian aspiration prior to ideology, so, even if it is meant allegorically, it allows him to 
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define a ‘true’ expression of utopian impulse from a ‘false’ one.  But, as Homer puts it, there is no 
absolute distinction between compensatory and anticipatory ideal projections, and if ‘Jameson 
may interpret a racist rally as compensatory, […] the racists themselves would see it as being 
anticipatory’.
83
  As such, the possibility of reinvigorating Imagination through Fancy in a way that 
leads to socialist radical alternatives depends on considering forms of Fancy that not only reveal 
the notion of alternatives, but already imply socialist solutions.  The utopian impulse is better 
viewed as a pure ‘lack’ (in Žižek’s Lacanian terms) that is always filled by some ideological 
object,
84
 but which can be re-determined if subjects take responsibility for it. 
Finally, the idea of a utopian politics developing through Fancy seems to contrast with the 
extent of de-politicisation suggested in Jameson’s theory of postmodernism.  For example, 
Jameson explains that consumer culture taps into ‘powerful sources of collective fantasy’, and 
‘not only provides itself with an energy power but also puts itself in a position to manipulate and to 
control such energies as well’.
85
  In this case, it is not a specific political ideal that stands in for the 
degraded utopian impulse, but consumer desire itself, and the potential for developing utopian 
thinking then begins from this weak abstract impulse, preparing for a time in which politics 
becomes possible again.  For us, however, it is only feasible that particular questions about 
abolishing money, full employment and so on can be comprehensively considered and spark 
bigger political ideas if they communicate with different forms of conscious rationalisation.  Either 
it is a way of challenging existing beliefs by confronting them with their own limits, as well as 
developing an alternative from various perspectives, or it cannot expand beyond an intellectual 
minority.  As such, it relies on the presence of ideological justifications even in consumerist 
attitudes, which are then not entirely depthless.  In short, it is less a case of injecting a question 
into a political vacuum to connect with a lost impulse, and more of entering it into a field consisting 
of numerous political positions. 
In a more recent essay, ‘An American Utopia’, Jameson appears to grant a more 
significant role to this kind of conscious challenge, but the issue remains.  He explains that ‘it 
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would be incumbent on our otherwise impotent social-democratic parties to “talk socialism”’, to 
(re)introduce concepts such as nationalising industry, state control of energy sources, taxation of 
corporate wealth, economic redistribution, and free education and healthcare.
86
  For Jameson, 
political parties in the current system ‘can never accomplish any of these things, but they can talk 
about them, they can make them thinkable and conceivable once again’.
87
  Actually realising 
major change requires instead the establishment of ‘dual power’, in which a collective and 
classless social space exists alongside, and gradually erodes, the state.  Jameson identifies the 
army as the possible location of this alternative, through a mass draft that effectively creates 
socialised healthcare and education, and forces people to work according to collective demands.  
The question then is how this monumental shift in the role of the army might occur.  Žižek tells us 
that, when ‘Jameson was asked how he imagines the eventual implementation of his utopia of 
universal militarization, he evoked an emergency state caused by a large ecological 
catastrophe’.
88
  While we understand the importance of crisis for major change, it is not clear here 
why, even after the catastrophe, the existing government would demand this specific change.  In 
fact, for there to be sufficient political impetus to introduce the military draft, socialist ideals must 
have already become prominent, which implies a significant socialist movement had formed 
before the catastrophe.  Jameson’s utopian theory, however, is split too neatly between potential 
changes in consciousness in the present that are unable to construct an oppositional poli tics, and 
a future catastrophe that brings this politics into being.  For us, this gap is impossible to bridge 
without considering the ways in which changes in consciousness begin to cause a political shift in 
the present.  As Dean puts it, ‘Jameson’s military model of collectivity directs us away from the 
dual power with actual political potential: crowds and party.’
89
  Or, in our terms, dual power grows 
organically from conscious challenges to dominant ideas and subsequent shifts in behaviour that 
reject consumerist fulfilment.  Some kind of social crisis is undoubtedly necessary for an 
oppositional politics to fully flourish, but the utopian project is reliant on tangible political gains 
being made beforehand. 
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III. Internalisation 
i) Perception and Fragmentation 
As we understand it, ideology does not function in Jameson’s theory of postmodernism in a way 
that might enable his concepts of History and Utopia to be politically effective.  It is thus 
necessary to examine more closely how our theory of ideology differs from the postmodern 
ideology Jameson defines, in a way that suggests potentials for political engagement that is not 
purely preparatory (it not only gradually challenges how people think, but also what they think).  
The idea of reintroducing historical and utopian thinking is then a matter of identifying the 
conditions and beliefs of different ideological positions.  To this end, we first show how Jameson 
highlights the fragmentation of experience, through a form of perception that identifies with 
postmodern codes without conditions of acceptance, and by ‘compartmentalising’ them so that 
contradictions remain unnoticed.  Yet, according to other parts of Jameson’s theory some form of 
connecting narrative seems inescapable, and this idea should apply to the reception of 
fragmented culture, which then requires ordering beliefs and values.  These forms of ideological 
rationalisation are then part of the psychic internalisation of the socio-economic system, and part 
of late capitalist production itself, in the sense that it requires their support for its legitimation. 
Jameson’s concept of the psyche in late capitalism is again based on a contrast between 
modernism and postmodernism.  He identifies a ‘shift in the dynamics of cultural pathology’ from 
the modernist monadic subject to today’s situation, ‘in which the alienation of the subject is 
displaced by the latter’s fragmentation’.
90
  As with Marcuse’s technological rationality, ‘psychic 
fragmentation’ is a development that corresponds with systematic quantification and 
instrumentalism in capitalism.  Historically, it follows the notion of autonomous individualism, as 
production increasingly becomes a series of micro tasks within an unseen larger process, rather 
than the self-contained activity of an individual.  For Jameson, the point is not necessarily that 
there really was an ‘autonomous’ modern subject, but that even the perception of autonomy 
encouraged critical thinking and reinforced the image of unique subjective experience.  At the 
same time, even if fragmentation is only a matter of perception, because no unified self is 
apparent, individual feeling and transcendence are harder to comprehend. 
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This psychic fragmentation appears to present an effective non-subject for whom 
signifiers lose any concrete relationship and experience is immediately meaningful, or a 
‘schizophrenic’, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology.
91
  Jameson explains that conceiving the 
schizophrenic or ‘psychic subject who “perceives” by way of difference and differentiation alone’, 
is only ‘the construction of an ideal’ (by Deleuze and Guattari), as an ethical and political task.
92
  
That is, there is no total fragmentation, and the postmodern reduction to the present is a ‘historical 
tendency’ that is ‘unrealizable’, since ‘human beings cannot revert to the immediacy of the animal 
kingdom’.
93
  However, the way Jameson uses concepts such as depthlessness defines a political 
reality that resembles this schizophrenic ideal.  For example, he explains that a narrative fragment 
in the past would be meaningless without its overall context, but can now emit ‘a complete 
narrative message in its own right’, based on a ‘newly acquired capacity to soak up content and to 
project it in a kind of instant reflex’.
94
  Or, he describes psychic compartmentalisation, in which 
‘the separation of subsystems and topics in various unrelated parts of the mind’,
95
 keep apart 
contradictory discourses, which are activated in specific contexts.  In this psyche, attention span 
decreases, and history and narrative become alien — any notion of the present coming into being 
is repressed, to the point that classic texts simply appear boring or irrelevant.
96
  Perception is so 
fragmented and purely sensual, for Jameson, that individuals may become temporarily unable to 
distinguish between art and life.  He explains how ‘urban squalor’ can become ‘a delight to the 
eyes when expressed in commodification’, meaning ‘the alienation of daily life in the city can now 
be experienced in the form of a strange new hallucinatory exhilaration’.
97
  If social disparity can be 
perceived purely as aesthetic variation, even suffering can seem excitingly new, and there is no 
historical context against which to contrast such understanding. 
Jameson’s definition of the postmodernism psyche thus often goes further than observing 
that cultural difference and ephemerality are a major part of today’s society, or that fragmentation 
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is connected to structures of production and consumption in late capitalism.  It appears that, 
although depth and alternative meaning are not eradicated by the fragmentation of imagery and 
the psyche, they are so heavily repressed and dominated that they become completely 
inaccessible.  Jameson then explains that, while cultural modernism corresponds to semi-
autonomy of language and the possibility of utopian negation, in postmodern texts ‘reification 
penetrates the sign itself and disjoins the signifier from the signified’, leaving a ‘pure and random 
play of signifiers’.
98
  Against this idea, it can be asked whether media language and imagery really 
is so totally fragmented, and whether the postmodern psyche really absorbs fragments with no 
connecting narrative.  Similar to Marcuse, Jameson notes how media forms such as newspapers 
present stories as equivalent but discrete units, so ‘two events activate altogether different and 
unrelated mental zones of reference and associative fields’,
99
 and any connections or common 
root causes are obscured.  Furthermore, he states, ideologies are transformed in the media ‘into 
images of themselves and caricatures in which identifiable slogans substitute for traditional 
beliefs’.
100
  Yet, as we see it, there is no obvious way to distinguish between cynical sloganeering 
and traditional belief, and, because publications maintain specific political positions, the choice of 
stories falls within an overall logic.  Although the different stories in a newspaper are not all 
perfectly in tune ideologically, ‘they depend on, and also in some ways express, unities of thought 
and consciousness’, and it is not simply that mass media ‘have created an autonomous realm of 
“hyperreality” where the sign or image is everything’.
101
   
Similarly, from the receiver’s perspective, while individuals may now be accustomed to 
quickly switching their attention between different content, they do not necessarily 
compartmentalise it without some unifying logic.  In fact, at points in his theory Jameson alludes 
to a basic psychological need to understand experience through patterns and narrative forms.  
For example, he considers how people always try to make narrative connections when reading 
literary fiction, even with complex plots, because they get a sense of relief from coherence.  For 
Jameson, plots have become less coherent as societies have become more differentiated.  Thus, 
the pre-modern novel of plot, drawing on well-worn proverbs and social conventions, is 
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superseded by the modernist psychological novel with its individual viewpoints,
102
 and then by 
postmodern forms which have no plot, unity of action and character, or even subjective 
coherence.  However, Jameson claims that, rather than simply reflect this incoherence, ‘the mind 
blows its fuses, and its abstract, pattern-making functions reappear underground’, because 
unconscious reason ‘is unable to cease making those intricate cross-references and 
interconnections that the surface of the work seems to deny’.
103
  Elsewhere he says that the basic 
categories of narrative ‘are fundamental tropes or forms by which we understand human events 
and realities’.
104
  It therefore follows that the psyche retains this need for coherence, or continues 
to demand some ordering ideology.  As such, even though ‘it becomes increasingly difficult to 
construct a narrative which does justice to [...] the situation of individuals in ever more 
horrendously complex social matrices’,
105
 the psyche cannot simply accept fragmented difference, 
or a lack of interpretation, and the appearance of these latter obscure narrative structures. 
This understanding suggests a tension between fragmented media logics and ideologies, 
but Jameson’s analysis of postmodernism still assumes a lack of psychic narrative connections.  
In particular, he focuses on the forms of cultural objects to comprehend the cultural logic, but as 
such pays little attention to elements such as ‘the subjective, empirical and psychological’,
106
 and 
does not fully examine how fragmented media representation is structured and received 
according to conscious ideological processes.  In this sense, the postmodern psyche resembles 
Marcuse’s extreme formulations of ego weakness, so that images are received and immediately 
generate an identity-appropriate response.  In analysing Marcuse, Jameson even reiterates ‘the 
collapse of the family, the disappearance of the authoritarian father’, according to which ‘the 
Oedipus complex and the superego themselves are greatly weakened’.
107
  But, if the subject’s 
perception is fragmented to the extent of having no sense of self, then it is not clear what there is 
to emancipate any longer, or why it would be worthwhile.
108
 
Furthermore, in Marcuse’s theory the superego is not necessarily weakened so much as 
transferred to new authority figures, because the performance principle and repressive 
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desublimation imply a certain direction behind fragmentation.  Seen in this way, it is not only that 
fragmentation is produced by a system, but that certain ideological forces within the system 
maintain the illusion of fragmentation.  It is then not merely that most mass media productions 
‘distract their readers and viewers from any genuine thinking about the nature of their own lives 
and the relationship of the latter to the socioeconomic system’.
109
  Jameson points to something 
more like repressive desublimation when he describes mass cultural manipulation as ‘repression 
and wish-fulfillment together’, as a mechanism which ‘strategically arouses fantasy content within 
careful symbolic containment structures’, and gratifies ‘desires only to the degree to which they 
can be momentarily stilled’.
110
  Here, manipulation is neither empty distraction nor false 
consciousness, but a way of indulging fantasies within the confines of the system, even creating 
an image of social harmony.  But in that case, the way individuals perceive their social and 
individual goals, and how those perceptions are maintained ideologically, remain important.  It is 
necessary to analyse how the economic structure is supported culturally, through ‘competing 
ideological and practical narratives and objects that bring economic life into view’.
111
  This idea 
moves us away from Jameson’s notion that fragmentation confronts us like a huge panel of TV 
screens, and that to transcend it would be to ‘do the impossible, namely, to see all the screens at 
once, in their radical and random difference’, to the point that ‘the vivid perception of radical 
difference is in and of itself a new mode of grasping what used to be called relationship’.
112
  We 
would contend instead that relationship is what allows the psyche to accept these screens as 
reality, so it is still possible to question that relationship to reveal the power source behind the 
screens. 
 
ii) Market Ideology 
To demonstrate the role of different narratives in the social order, we must further identify the 
kinds of ideologies that justify and contribute to its reproduction.  Jameson tends to present 
postmodern ideology as an acceptance of economic conditions that does not require positive 
beliefs in specific values.  He explains that the two dominant ideologies today are those of the 
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market and of consumption, the first of which involves a cynical reason ‘that knows and accepts 
everything about itself’, and the second of which assures society through practices rather than 
beliefs.
113
  Jameson also cites Adorno on numerous occasions with the idea that today ‘the 
commodity is its own ideology’, and that ‘consumption and consumerism […] themselves are 
enough to reproduce and legitimate the system, no matter what “ideology” you happen to be 
committed to’.
114
  On one hand, understanding society’s economic demands defines a common 
baseline of acceptance for affirmative ideologies, which we can connect to our notion of a 
background ideology, towards which different rationalisations must relate.  On the other, 
Jameson’s concept of a neoliberal ‘market ideology’, and other ways in which he conceives 
acceptance, also indicate a variety of ideological positions, and these positions all rely on 
functioning ideological beliefs and assumptions. 
Market ideology, for Jameson, involves an acceptance of dominant neoliberalism and a 
need to maintain the economic apparatus.  He associates this position with elites who understand 
market functioning, and who affirm the market as it is, without illusion that it actually creates 
growth and choice, or that market freedom creates personal freedom.  Rather, these people 
recognise the reality of oligopolies of multinational companies, inconsequential consumer choices, 
and limited personal opportunity.  As Jameson says, ‘in the view of many neoliberals, not only do 
we not yet have a free market, but what we have in its place’ is ‘absolutely inimical to the real free 
market and its establishment’.
115
  He contrasts this position with liberal ‘political philosophy’ that 
disconnects analysis of social problems and the choice of solutions from the structuring 
mechanism of the market.  This deliberation assumes the market is a legitimate and preferable 
form of social ordering, even though it understands that the current form of the market contradicts 
liberal values.  But, as such, it does not analyse the intrinsic contradictions of the market or its 
role in shaping the political options under consideration, whereas market ideology sees these 
contradictions and accepts them. 
At the same time, Jameson claims that market ideology still depends on certain 
metaphysical concepts, especially that of a universal human nature.  That is, it naturalises human 
behaviour that focuses on economic efficiency and productivity, or calculating rationality aimed at 
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maximising value.  For Jameson, the problem here is not merely viewing human behaviour in 
terms of rational calculation, but that comparison between this behaviour and business enterprise 
becomes prescriptive, as rationality is associated with maintaining current economic productivity.  
It also does not account for a postmodern culture in which consumerism itself becomes an object 
of consumption,
116
 since market ideology understands human behaviour as productive, and 
cannot rationalise consumption for its own sake.  The focus of market ideology is then on 
opposition to planned economies, based on belief that humans always fail when trying to control 
societies, so that the market is essential as ‘interpersonal mechanism’ to ‘substitute for human 
hubris and planning and replace human decisions altogether’.
117
  For Jameson, this view is 
connected to the historical failure of planned economies, particularly the Soviet Union, and 
constitutes ‘cynical reason’ in which ‘profound disillusionment with political praxis’ has led to a 
popular ‘rhetoric of market abnegation and the surrender of human freedom’.
118
 
This cynical reason, as Jameson describes it through neoliberal market ideology, 
resembles the cynicism defined in the previous chapter in its allusion to a pessimistic, absolute 
concept of human nature.  However, there appear to be conflicting beliefs here, if neoliberals are 
both sincerely against economic planning and fully aware that the market is heavily controlled 
according to elite interests.  Market ideology presumably recognises, as Jameson says 
elsewhere, that multinational corporations effectively ensure the economy develops only in 
particular ways, and that private business in a sense becomes ‘a visible “subject of history” and a 
visible actor on the world stage’.
119
  As such, there may be a deeper cynicism at work that 
supports the market simply because it is dominant and provides relatively stable conditions (for 
the elite).  For this cynical individual, the problems of human nature imply that all societies are 
corrupted by greed and individualism, so it is better to maintain whatever situation provides the 
individual with a privileged position.  Such a perspective even absolves these cynics of 
responsibility for their actions, and encourages them to indulge their individual desires.
120
  The 
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fear is less of social degradation, as in Jameson’s cynical realism, and more of personal 
misfortune. 
Elsewhere, Jameson defines a cynical reason that appears more individualistic in this 
sense, but relates to people lower down the economic scale, who perceive only the system’s 
‘permanence’.  This cynicism is an ‘empty ideology that accompanies the practices of profit and 
money making, and that has (and needs) no content to disguise itself’.  Rather, it ‘exists in the 
pure present, without the requirement of some great ideological project for the future’.
121
  It is a 
position that recalls the ‘dull economic compulsion’ of Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, according to 
which people simply act in ways that help them make money and survive within the system.  In 
PM, Jameson also explains how individuals must now function in less stable and secure 
economic conditions, in which market fluctuations mean the ‘entire system is  [...] subject to 
reshuffling without warning’,
122
 especially if it is questioned.  This concept implies strong tones of 
what we have previously called defeatism, which we can redefine in Jameson’s terms as a form of 
cynical acceptance, but still distinct from the cynical opportunism connected with neoliberalism.  
This position also particularly embodies Jameson’s observation that ‘it seems to be easier for us 
today to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of 
late capitalism’,
 
and ‘perhaps that is due to some weakness in our imaginations’.
123
  In effect, 
capitalism is experienced simply as an omnipotent power that may lead to an unstoppable 
destruction.  Defeatism thus reveals an inability ‘to conceive how “delinking” from the world 
economy could possibly be a feasible political and economic project’.
124
  We can add that this 
inability, along with commitments to short term survival and making money, are still based on 
certain beliefs about the market system, and a pessimistic view of political organisation. 
It thus already seems that Jameson’s theory points to different forms of (cynical) market 
acceptance that have clear beliefs, and in our view it is possible to identify more.  For example, he 
mentions an essentialist notion of human nature that is more celebratory than pessimistic, in that 
it promotes toil, productivity and competitiveness as goods in themselves, ideally suited to 
capitalism.  He describes a market rhetoric according to which the destructive (Erotic) excesses of 
these elements combine with the elements themselves leading to ‘a conception of the sinfulness 
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and aggressivity of human nature that can alone be balanced and tamed by an equally natural 
propensity of human beings to do business and to make money’.
125
  This statement contrasts with 
Jameson’s notion of cynicism, we believe, because the cynic is pessimistic and resigned to the 
flaws of capitalism, whereas this commitment to capitalist productivity as manifestation of a 
universal truth either shades into traditional liberalism, by connecting the instrumental rationality in 
human behaviour to that of capitalism, or into a neo-conservatism that defends individualistic 
nature both against economic planning and the excesses of the market itself, based on a strong 
moral (religious) doctrine.
126
 
Also, based on aspects of Jameson’s theory, it seems that some people actually believe 
the rhetoric of market freedom and opportunity, or consumerist fulfilment.  For example, Jameson 
describes the deregulation and privatisation drives of Reagan and Thatcher as ‘utopias of 
immense investments and increases in production to come’, and states that because ‘it has 
become customary to identify political freedom with market freedom, the motivations behind 
ideology no longer seem to need an elaborate machinery of decoding’.
127
  Yet, the celebration of 
small government, lower taxes and open markets still represents itself as a general social good, 
and may be accepted on those grounds.  Therefore, if the neoliberal sees free market rhetoric as 
a noble lie, the neoconservative believes that lower taxes improve individual opportunity, and 
even for those who experience diminished opportunities as government services shrink, it may be 
understood as a short term sacrifice, or worthwhile due to the consumer pleasures granted by the 
expanding market.  Jameson explains that such pleasures are ‘the ideological fantasy 
consequences available for ideological consumers who buy into the market theory, of which they 
are not themselves a part’.
128
  In that sense, the free market becomes an ideal for hedonistic 
consumption, rather than production or entrepreneurialism.
129
 
Interpreted in this way, neoliberal ‘market ideology’ is one form of acceptance among 
many, none of which are clearly dominant, and most of the five ideological positions we have 
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already identified are represented or even developed further by Jameson’s observations.  In 
particular, the moral apologist position splits between liberalism and neo-conservatism, oriented in 
different traditions, and defeatism can be seen as a form of cynicism.  For Jameson, however, the 
different responses he identifies are less aspects of specific ideological positions, and more 
symptoms of the lack of meaningful beliefs.  That is, either the practices of consumer choice 
reproduce the system, so that ideologies are politically irrelevant images and media codes, or 
elite justifications of free market economics are transparent about their self-interested aims, to the 
point that ‘the unmasking of [ideological] rationalizations, the primordial gesture of debunking and 
of exposure, no longer seems necessary’.
130
  Yet, in the first case, while political identities are 
often successfully reduced to commodity choices, people’s beliefs are not necessarily limited by 
these images, and the images themselves do not explain why people make specific choices, or 
what hopes they invest in them.  In the second case, cynical reason still involves the promotion of 
mystifying and manipulative narratives which obscure its intentions, and Jameson makes various 
statements that point to such a conclusion.  For example, he says that ‘cynical reason is a 
positivism with a mission, with a politics or even a metaphysics’, and involves ‘a whole program 
for justifying this view of things’.
131
  More specifically, it works to systematically redirect anti-
institutional energies ‘against fantasies of “big government” and “bureaucracy”’,
132
 and this 
‘repression of the concept of society and the social system has a vital part to play in perpetuating 
its domination’.
133
  These comments describe a cynicism that attempts to manipulate 
consciousness based on a belief that it matters what people think about the system, and it is 
therefore not clear that society can function without such rhetoric.  As Cevasco maintains, for 
example, it has been one of ‘the ideological victories of the Right’ to implant ‘the word 
“irrevocability” in contemporary discourse’, implying that ‘it is impossible to have a better world’ 
than that provided by the globalised market, to an extent that has ‘repressed critical knowledge of 
the actual functioning of the system’.
134
  In such manoeuvres, we can perceive deeply embedded 
assumptions in cynical reason itself, regarding human nature and the need to maintain existing 
power structures, which show that it does not ‘know and accept everything about itself’. 
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In ‘Ideological Analysis: A Handbook’, Jameson suggests a more multi-layered approach 
to ideology which hints at the previous analysis of the political unconscious.  He explains that it is 
useful ‘to measure the analytic or diagnostic value of various competing conceptions of 
ideology’,
135
 which include levels of the individual mind, group consciousness, and the system, 
and it is only at this third level that the ideological is located in the organisation and practices of 
daily life.
136
  The implication here is that all of these forms of analysis are advantageous for 
understanding how ideology functions, and Jameson recognises that viewing ideology in terms of 
practices alone can ‘elide the conceptual and social dimensions of ideology altogether’, and 
remove its connection to ‘the historical function of ideology in class struggle’.
137
  What we must 
then do, however, is apply this approach to Jameson’s theory of postmodernism, to show that the 
individual and group levels of ideology remain significant, and that the various ideas he 
associates with market acceptance represent beliefs within different examples of those 
ideologies.  
 
iii) Awareness and Culture 
If acceptance of the market is the baseline of affirmative ideology, we can already see that its 
rationalisations are not only economic, but also revolve around various cultural factors, from 
religious moralising to consumerist notions of happiness.  It is then apparent that affirming the 
mode of production requires conscious investment in certain cultural norms, which allows us to 
develop our ideological positions further.  Jameson’s analyses of postmodern culture and different 
responses to the expectations it creates provide a useful framework for this discussion, and 
indicate numerous ways in which people relate to the whole.  For our purposes, however, these 
responses are not merely mediatised images or simulacra, as Jameson suggests, but functioning 
ideologies that people follow based on conditional beliefs and justifications, which are indirectly 
connected to the general aims of consumer capitalism. 
One important position that did not arise in discussing reactions to the market is that of 
pluralism, partly because it denies the notion of capitalism as system.  More than any other 
position, it is a celebration of postmodern fragmentation, and of difference and lack of system as 
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good in themselves, in terms of the freedom of choice they promote.  This denial of systemic 
logics, for Jameson, makes pluralist politics ‘at best a refusal to go about the principal critical 
business of our time, which is to forge a kind of methodological synthesis from the multiplicity of 
critical codes’, and at worst a ‘veiled assault on the nonpluralistic (read, “totalitarian”) critical 
systems — Marxism, for example’.
138
  Pluralism constructs a binary opposition between 
heterogeneity and homogeneity, or unfettered cultural difference and totalitarian conformity, and 
assumes that qualitative comparison of difference is intrinsically oppressive.  As such, Jameson 
explains, its purpose is ‘to forestall that systematic articulation and totalization of interpretive 
results which can only lead to embarrassing questions about the relationship between them and 
in particular the place of history’.
139
  Nothing would undermine pluralism more than identifying it as 
the expression of a specific totality, so it must maintain the illusion of a non-system.  It therefore 
does not consider that pluralist difference is structured by the market, according to which certain 
identities dominate over others.  Anti-authoritarian pluralism thus submits to the increasingly 
hegemonic and homogenous authority of exchange value, which determines the conditions of 
cultural inclusion. 
For Jameson, there is also an inconsistency with anti-essentialist pluralism in that its 
proponents can also accept essentialist ideas, such as that of universal human nature.
140
  He 
reads this contradiction in terms of psychological compartmentalisation, in which ‘we postmodern 
people are capable of entertaining both these attitudes […] simultaneously, with no sense of their 
incongruity, let alone their logical incompatibility’.
141
  Conversely, it appears to us that pluralist 
attitudes are only compatible with certain essentialisms, and not others, which is less a matter of 
compartmentalising and more an indication that pluralism itself involves specific beliefs.  In 
particular, pluralism can function alongside other ideologies to the extent they promote production 
of cultural difference (and therefore the system).  Thus, if it should firmly reject traditional 
liberalism and cynical neoliberalism, for their respective essentialist concepts of enlightenment 
values or human nature, it also supports the liberal notion of autonomous, rational agents, as 
opposed to systemic overdetermination, and neoliberalism’s resistance to collective politics and 
economic planning.  Furthermore, the pluralist concept of an external ‘common enemy’, or 
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homogeneous alternative, shares with neoliberalism the need to maintain the present against an 
undesirable other.  In this respect, the economic supports for pluralism become more visible, as 
well as the cultural supports for neoliberal economics. 
Other ideological positions may affirm pluralist difference less directly, or vary in how they 
interpret postmodern concepts of identity recognition and freedom of choice.  Hedonism is 
perhaps the only other fully celebratory response, and merely requires a continued supply of 
commodified pleasures and belief in the association between pleasure and consumerism to invest 
in difference.  With other positions, even those that invest in consumer behaviour, the relationship 
is more complex.  For example, we have already mentioned how cynical resignation or defeatism 
may accept consumerist pleasures as escapism, and this idea also emerges in Jameson’s work, 
although not specifically tied to this position.  Jameson describes consumption as a bonus, and its 
excesses ‘a way of talking yourself into it and making […] a genuine pleasure and jouissance out 
of necessity, turning resignation into excitement’.
142
  In our terms, this statement suggests that 
defeatism may lead to genuine enjoyment of consumerism, but that it is more aware of the 
destructive conditions that produce the choices on offer.  As such, it indicates a pessimistic 
inversion of the celebratory pluralist ‘end of history’ (the point at which capitalism has become a 
single dominant),
143
 into an experience of involuntary political stasis, or a dead end of history that 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy due to this escapist behaviour. 
In PM, Jameson also describes a straightforward rejection of fragmentation and anti-
essentialism, based on a psychological inability to handle subjective indeterminacy and relativism.  
He explains that the expectation pluralist culture places on the individual to constantly recognise 
new identity groups may put great strain on the sense of consciousness or self.  As individuals 
recognise others in their difference, they panic and ‘are led to anticipate the imminent collapse of 
all [their] inward conceptual defense mechanisms, and in particular the rationalizations of privilege 
and the well-nigh natural formations [...] of narcissism and self-love’.
144
  This idea resembles the 
Freudian concept in which a social demand to love the neighbour, even the stranger, conflicts 
with love for the core family,
145
 yet here the individual fears that recognising everyone comes at 
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the expense of the ego itself, or any sense of its own uniqueness.  This ‘terror of anonymity’, for 
Jameson, can lead to ‘a self-deception that does not want to know and tries to sink ever deeper 
into a willful involuntarity, a directed distraction’.
146
  Put this way, this response also appears to be 
a kind of defeatism, but one which refuses even to imagine the system behind the dominant 
demand.  It fears self-examination, in the belief there may be nothing to examine, and instead 
focuses on immediate needs and achievements.
147
 
The inability to accept cultural relativism may also lead to more hostile opposition, or a 
moral resistance to difference.  In the ‘Ideology’ chapter of PM, Jameson describes a range of 
‘moral’ intellectual approaches to postmodernism, through all the possible combinations of anti- or 
pro- modernism and postmodernism, that judge these periods rather than consider them 
dialectically.  In particular, we are interested here in the two variations of pro-modernism, anti-
postmodernism which embody this more moralistic rejection, and correspond with 
neoconservative and liberal ideologies.  First, Jameson identifies a position that contrasts ‘the 
moral responsibility of the “masterpieces” and monuments of classical modernism with the 
fundamental irresponsibility and superficiality of […] postmodernism’,
148
 and that recommends 
aesthetic responsibility and defence of traditional values, against a ‘social breakdown’ associated 
with 1960s counter culture.  Second, he describes a position that views postmodernism as 
politically reactionary, and a distraction from the modernist project based on Enlightenment 
values.  For Jameson, both these ‘traditional’ positions emerge within postmodernism itself.  
Thus, liberalism is an ideology that wants to reclaim ‘ethics’ from postmodern relativism, as if the 
latter was an appeal to ‘anything goes’ hedonism and violence,
149
 but represents mere hand-
wringing without any positive alternative, due to its ‘belief that the “system” is not really total [...], 
that we can ameliorate it, reorganize it, and regulate it in such a way that it becomes tolerable’.
150
  
Meanwhile, neoconservative ‘fundamentalist’ positions reaffirm some traditional absolute that has 
been supposedly marginalised by pluralism, but have ‘a simulated relationship to the past’.  For 
example, Jameson says, fundamentalist Christianity involves ‘the denial of any fundamental 
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social or cultural difference between postmodern subjects of late capitalism and the Middle-
Eastern subjects of the early Roman Empire’.
151
  Such fundamentalism is part of de-historicised 
postmodern culture, as one of many discourses, even though it opposes heterogeneity and 
espouses an explicit ‘truth’. 
Jameson’s work thus allows us to identify a range of reactions to postmodern cultural 
pluralism.  However, where he considers positions such as liberalism and fundamentalism, it is 
only as simulacra of an imaginary past that merely add to pluralist choices, rather than as 
ideologies whose beliefs may affect social reproduction.  He states, for instance, that liberalism 
has little political relevance anymore, because generally modern realities such as 
‘counterinsurgency warfare and neocolonialism’ are understood ‘as deeper and more ominous 
structural necessities of the American system’.
152
  In fact, we can assume that Jameson would 
view all of the ideologies we have identified as these images or caricatures of themselves, merely 
creating an appearance of political meaning.  In contrast, we understand that there is something 
too complete or enclosed about viewing ideologies in this way, in that they lack consideration of 
belief and awareness that help explain why people take particular positions, and the limits of their 
adherence.  For example, religious and nationalist fundamentalisms may centre on de-historicised 
postmodern images and involve real political beliefs, in the sense that they rely on the ability to 
maintain certain truth claims, and their reaction against pluralist culture can create (local) 
obstacles for capitalist reproduction.  It is therefore important to register the tension within such 
positions, and the conditions of their compatibility with the system. 
From this perspective, there is no qualitative distinction between cynical self-awareness 
and the images of traditional beliefs, as their support for the status quo is equally based on 
particular assumptions.  Ideologies that accept the status quo in all its pluralist and individualist 
volatility are maintained according to beliefs about human nature, the status of capitalism, and the 
potential for alternatives.  Neoliberal cynical reason contains metaphysical assumptions, and 
defeatist cynicism tacitly supports the market by asserting its absolute power.  These positions do 
not only understand how the social system functions; they also include particular ideas that justify 
that system (as necessary, inevitable or irreplaceable), structured by the capitalist mode of 
production.  Such ideas do not constitute a lack of belief, in contrast to traditional ideologies, but 
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themselves contain beliefs that can also be challenged,  Furthermore, although the mediatised 
images in postmodern mass media are especially widespread and sophisticated, the use of de-
historicised representations to legitimise beliefs is not new, and does not necessarily mean that 
beliefs are identical to their media images, or that consumer choices have ‘replaced the resolute 
taking of a stand and the full-throated endorsement of a political opinion’.
153
  Thus, all the 
ideological positions that form our map at this point (liberal moralism, neoconservative moralism, 
hedonism, pluralism, neoliberal cynicism, defeatist cynicism) are ideologies that mediate between 
individual and society, and continue to develop and fluctuate inside and outside the media. 
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IV. The Commodity Form 
i) Postmodernism vs. Modernism 
Understanding the postmodern psyche in terms of different ideological rationalisations allows us 
to imagine development of ‘utopian’ thinking through communication with their limits, conditions 
and ideals.  We must then consider how this communication can happen, or what channels it can 
use, and how it may resist dominant media narratives.  In this respect, Jameson’s contrast 
between modernism and postmodernism returns us to the question of cultural autonomy versus 
commodification, and the difficulties of producing and disseminating oppositional ideas without 
losing the radicalness of their form or content.  Our argument is that, the way Jameson defines 
postmodernism in terms of this contrast effectively excludes ‘modernist’ features from his analysis 
of the present, even though he recognises there is no clear split between periods.  When 
Jameson links modernism to modernisation, for example, he does not fully consider the ongoing 
processes of modernisation in many countries, which suggests that they remain in a modernist 
state of change.  As we see it, this continued unevenness between and within societies indicates 
a constant antagonism and politicisation that is not fully lost in the commodification of expression, 
and is not a dwindling ‘remnant’ of modernism, but an intrinsic aspect of postmodernism itself. 
Jameson’s description of the shift from modernism to postmodernism recalls the issues 
Marcuse identified around commodification of cultural production.  That is, postmodernism 
creates more widespread literacy and access to information, and a sense of democratisation, but 
at the same time signifies a loss of autonomy, which made utopian thinking possible despite its 
reliance on social disparity.  The result is that postmodernism provides greater opportunity for 
cultural expression to a larger number of people, yet at the cost of its power, making further 
democratisation more difficult to imagine.  Commodification erodes the divide between ‘high’ and 
‘low’ culture, bringing more artistic credibility to the latter, but turns both into depthless images 
that merely appeal to different groups, which represses any negating and critical value.
154
  High 
culture is reduced to particular contexts (such as classical music in advertising), so that any 
‘complete and continuous discourse has become an indistinguishable blur intermittently 
illuminated by vulgar theme songs, motifs that have crystallized into objects and tokens, like 
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clichés in speech’.
155
  Classic works are rewritten via new discourses and identity groups, so 
‘historical monuments, now all cleaned up, become glittering simulacra of the past, and not its 
survival’.
156
 
As Jameson sees it, the last really political art was made in the 1960s, where counter 
cultural innovations were protests, following modernist experimentation.  Here, he explains, the 
idea of the ‘end of art’ was a reaction to the perceived complicity of institutions, including those of 
high art and academia, in the dominant political structures of the time.  The postmodern 
equivalent, the ‘end of history’, is its de-politicisation, or an attempt to subvert a cultural dominant 
that fails because the dominant now accepts previously subversive modernist styles.  For 
example, Jameson says, as modernist styles of architecture are absorbed into the system and 
‘become stamped with [...] bureaucratic connotation’, their supersession by other styles ‘radically 
produces some feeling of “relief”, even though what replaces it is neither Utopia nor 
democracy’.
157
  Since experimentation is now the norm, the power to shock by negating 
established boundaries has been lost, and the main difference between modern and postmodern 
art is not form or content, but historical situation.  In a post-modern world, new styles and 
interpretations are welcomed by industries that constantly try to renew desire, so rather than 
oppose market rationalisation, postmodern culture seems to ‘at least share a resonant affirmation, 
when not an outright celebration, of the market as such’.
158
 
Modernism also represents, for Jameson, a period of social modernisation, in which 
alternative realities coexisted, and there was a state of flux.  He explains that modern artists and 
philosophers ‘still lived in two distinct worlds simultaneously’, moving between the rural past and 
urban modernity, and their ‘sensitivity to deep time […] then registers this comparatist perception 
of the two socioeconomic temporalities’.
159
  Conversely, in postmodernism, ‘Everything is now 
organized and planned; nature has been triumphantly blotted out, along with peasants, petit-
bourgeois commerce, handicraft, feudal aristocracies and imperial bureaucracies.’
160
  These 
elements remain merely as simulacra, as postmodernism is modernisation completed, with no 
visible past or development towards a different future.  This change is exemplified in Jameson’s 
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distinction between modernist parody, in which stylistic imitation reveals the contradictions in a 
linguistic norm, creating a satirical effect, and postmodern pastiche, for which there is no linguistic 
norm, only private group codes, and thus no possibility of putting styles into relief.  
Representations of history in commodified culture become nostalgic attempts to relive the past, 
which merely create a depthless image that illustrates the postmodern perception of the past in 
the de-historicised present.  Thus, according to Jameson, if there is any sense of ‘realism’ left in 
representation, it can only derive from ‘slowly becoming aware of a new and original historical 
situation in which we are condemned to seek History by way of our own pop images and 
simulacra of that history’.
161
 
The synchronic method of defining contrasting periods (modernist change and 
postmodernist stasis) that Jameson employs is effective in illustrating the social impact of 
expanded commodification.  Yet, despite caveats about uneven development, Jameson treats the 
distinct definition of postmodernism as more than an idealised analytical category, because he 
does not pay sufficient attention to ‘modernist’ processes that remain intrinsic to postmodern 
logic.  For example, modernisation exceeds its correlation with cultural modernism, especially as 
many regions are far less modernised than the USA, and are even kept from modernising in many 
ways precisely due to uneven investment and development engendered by global capitalism.
162
  
Jameson says that the level of commodification is not the same everywhere, but ‘the tendency 
toward global commodification is far more visible and imaginable than it was in the modern 
period’.
163
  He also states that the struggle in third world cultures connected to first world cultural 
imperialism is ‘a reflexion of the economic situation of such areas in their penetration by various 
stages of capital, or as it is sometimes euphemistically termed, of modernization’.
164
  But as such, 
the particular media technology that engenders de-historicised imagery is far from global, and 
very few places are postmodern in terms of experiencing a lack of contrast between old and new, 
so that modernisation, and its sense of temporality, should remain dominant.  At another point, 
Jameson says that incomplete commodification in certain parts of the world is what enables us to 
understand what completeness looks like.
165
  If so, it suggests that we still experience contrast 
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that need not only be an image, and can envisage what is at stake in the struggles involved.  
Jameson’s insistence on postmodern stasis shifts focus from considering how dominant 
narratives represent contrast, to the impossibility of its representation. 
Similarly, when Jameson identifies hints of political meaning in postmodern culture he 
tends not to develop their implications further, and continues to emphasise their fragmentation 
and depthlessness.  For example, he states that music ‘remains a fundamental class marker’, and 
that ‘highbrow and lowbrow, or elite and mass, musical tastes’ still arouse passions, because 
music ‘includes history in a more thoroughgoing and irrevocable fashion’ that ‘can scarcely be 
woven out of the memory’.
166
  Yet he does not then consider that other cultural forms have such 
class markers, which might indicate limits of cultural democratisation.  Burnham suggests, for 
instance, that poetry as ‘an elite art form’ lacks economic (commodity) prestige and has ‘no 
popular equivalent’, which means that ‘interest in poetry immediately marks the aesthete off from 
the masses’.
167
  Even if we add that types of ‘street poetry’ contrast this elite, they are also heavily 
class marked.  It can then be extrapolated from Burnham’s point that other cultural forms retain 
class markers to greater or lesser extents.  However, Jameson generally accentuates the lack of 
markers, such as by comparing postmodern society to Blade Runner with its ‘interfusion of 
crowds of people among a high technological bazaar […], all of it sealed into an inside without an 
outside’, which becomes ‘the unmappable system of late capitalism itself’.
168
  This analogy 
supresses continued experiences of disparity and segregation, or the difficulties of upward social 
mobility, and does not account for the way such experiences may exceed the branding of 
commodified cultural codes.  Jameson asks whether in de-historicised postmodernism ‘some 
deeper memory of history still faintly stirs’, or if nostalgia denotes ‘the incompleteness of the 
postmodern process, the survival within it of remnants of the past’.
169
  For us, this memory is 
implicit in the definition of postmodernism, and should be treated as part of the ideologies that 
support the cultural dominant. 
In our understanding, while postmodernism involves a greater quantity and scope of de-
politicised culture than previous eras, a disconnect between cultural images and history is nothing 
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new, and different, even oppositional, interpretations still exceed the dominant logic.  It is not, as 
Jameson states, that what characterises postmodern culture ‘is the supersession of everything 
outside of commercial culture’, to the extent that the ‘image is the commodity’, and ‘it is vain to 
expect a negation of the logic of commodity production from it’.
170
  Rather, as Hutcheon argues, 
although postmodern culture lacks autonomy and has to work within the commodified field, it may 
also recognise its commodity status and exploit ‘its “insider” position in order to begin a 
subversion from within’.
171
  In this sense, postmodernism is ‘the name given to cultural practices 
which acknowledge their inevitable implication in capitalism, without relinquishing the power or will 
to intervene critically in it’.
172
  From our perspective, the point here is simply that culture which 
contributes to the system by being a commodity, can also criticise its own role in the system as 
well as various dominant ideologies.  As Hutcheon says, it also implies that parody remains 
possible, not merely blank or nostalgic co-option of other styles, and ‘signals how present 
representations come from past ones and what ideological consequences derive from both 
continuity and difference’.
173
  It highlights particular connotations of styles by placing them against 
others to reveal that all representation is political, and does not then reflect Jameson’s contrast 
between a simpler past and the fragmented present (which is itself nostalgic, for Hutcheon). 
At the same time, while Hutcheon’s position demonstrates that politics is communicable 
within commodified culture, her notion of critical postmodern culture still lacks the ‘modern’ quality 
of a negation that points towards some alternative potential reality, or mediates with utopian 
political projects.
174
  As such, this valorisation of criticism itself leads less to a political catalyst 
than a kind of self-depoliticising loop that feeds back into postmodern logic.  In other words, 
because this postmodern art depends on commodification, it can offer no alternative, and 
becomes a tacit form of affirmation.  Hutcheon states that postmodern artists ‘know that their 
interrogations of culture themselves form an ideology’,
175
 but suggests that this art avoids the 
answers and totalising replies Jameson seeks, ‘which postmodernism cannot and will not offer’.
176
  
Yet trying to avoid ‘totalising’ becomes a totalising logic in itself, because there is no way to take a 
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specific position against what exists, or against a ‘norm’ of discourse.  Thus, while we argue 
against Jameson’s idea that no ideological norms remain, and agree with Hutcheon that serious 
parody remains possible, it is still, as Jameson suggests, that parody becomes pastiche without 
consistent ‘totalising’ political direction. 
The question that emerges from this point is how to identify the norms to parody, and 
according to what political aims.  From Jameson’s definition of postmodernism, it seems that the 
lack of any norm is the issue, but he also identifies how that lack is structured by late capitalism.  
We can then conclude that the appearance of the lack of structuring, and concepts of mutually 
tolerant difference that obscure the market logic behind them, are the norm.  Therefore, if 
pastiche is the play of styles inside the bounds of market acceptance and pluralist tolerance, 
parody focuses on what the market excludes or does not tolerate, so it is the supposed 
disappearance of history and class struggle (which Jameson effectively identifies as the norms of 
postmodernism), that keep parody possible.  If, as Hutcheon says, postmodern culture can 
criticise the whole from within, it is then also possible that a more directed political criticism can 
function within commodified spaces, based around opposition to these norms of disparity and 
exclusion.  It is not only critique of capitalism and the commodification of art that is possible, but 
also its contrast against potential alternative social forms that target the contradictions of the 
commodity form as such.  This criticism constitutes a specific political aim, which focuses on the 
marginalisation of elements within the existing system as symptoms of class struggle.  Indeed, if 
Jameson’s utopian project of reintroducing radical alternatives to politics is to be effective, it 
seems crucial to us that its message retains some power even within commodified cultural fields.    
 
ii) Politics and Postmodern Art 
This possibility of radical political content within postmodern culture rests on a consciousness that 
attempts to create political art even while considering the demands of the market, and a 
consciousness that can receive political messages despite their distribution through commodified 
mass media.  Here, we theorise the continued presence of the first of these forms, with the 
contention that the form and content of postmodern art is not depthless in itself, but, as with 
classic modern texts, de-contextualised to a degree by its commodification.  Thus, although 
commodity logic influences artistic production, an expression of political depth remains possible 
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that is often suppressed by Jameson’s choice of cultural objects for analysis.  This depth is then 
as much part of postmodern cultural expression as flexibility of meaning, rather than a side-effect 
of the dominant logic that occurs in spite itself.  As such, while presentation of culture as 
commodity promotes superficial and ephemeral interpretations, it does not repress politically 
meaningful ideas within culture to the point they become inaccessible. 
At times, Jameson identifies certain forms of art that could fit Hutcheon’s definition of self-
reflexive and socially critical postmodern culture, but he mostly perceives them as rare hints of a 
degraded utopian unconscious, rather than political intent.  For example, in certain fictional 
dystopian futures and post-apocalyptic societies, he identifies a consumerist proto-utopian vision, 
in the way survivors of such catastrophes are left free to consume without limitations.  The 
apocalypse thus ‘includes both catastrophe and fulfillment’, or ‘Utopia and the extinction of the 
human race all at once’.
177
  Or, he describes how magical realism and fantasy history novels 
effectively blur the lines between real historical accounts and fiction, reinvigorating the possibility 
of imagination and offering a relationship to praxis missing from more literal representations.  That 
is, if historical study has become socially impotent, these novels’ ‘inventiveness endorses a 
creative freedom with respect to events it cannot control’ and agency ‘steps out of the historical 
record itself into the process of devising it’.
178
  At one point, he also describes a more explicitly 
utopian sentiment in a particular collaborative art installation, which conveys a demand to 
contemplate the relationship in its composition of objects, and the cooperative agency behind it 
that contrasts with the modern work of the individual.  In this way, the installation ‘does not 
compute within the paradigm and does not seem to have been theoretically foreseen by it’.
179
  For 
Jameson, this particular text represents a politics of resistance through postmodernism itself, 
rather than a remnant of modernism, at least to the extent it is interpreted as such.  He even adds 
here that, ‘one finds everywhere today — not least among artists and writers — something like an 
unacknowledged “party of Utopia”’.
180
  It may not be widely recognised, and therefore inspire an 
oppositional political programme, but represents an underground movement within postmodern 
art. 
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If this ‘party of Utopia’ is everywhere, however, Jameson rarely perceives it in his 
treatment of postmodern art, because he mostly considers only the superficiality of its forms.  For 
example, in comparing Van Gogh’s modernist Peasant Shoes and Warhol’s postmodern Diamond 
Dust Shoes, Jameson explains that while Van Gogh’s piece contains utopian colour that 
transforms the landscape of peasant life, in Warhol’s piece, the colour is replaced by the 
monochrome form of the photographic negative, so its flat, disembodied items exist in space but 
not time, and the image ‘does not really speak to us at all’.
181
  However, in our interpretation, the 
use of the photographic negative may also point beyond existing reality — it both ‘negates’ its 
depicted (consumer) object, and represents something to be ‘developed’ — and therefore 
indicates a ‘utopian’ element in a different way to Van Gogh’s piece.
182
  Furthermore, other 
statements Jameson makes imply that it is not the form itself or any lack of critical intent behind it 
that is at issue, but the context in which works such as Warhol’s are often embedded.  He 
explains that, while Warhol’s works (in general) are ‘obviously representations of commodity or 
consumer fetishism [they] do not seem to function as critical or political statements’.
183
  But in this 
respect, the appearance of a lack of critical function also applies to Van Gogh’s work in the 
postmodern context.  As Jameson says, if Van Gogh’s ‘copiously reproduced image is not to sink 
to the level of sheer decoration, it requires us to reconstruct some initial situation out of which the 
finished work emerges’.
184
  It then seems that we could also reconstruct such a situation for 
Warhol, rather than focusing on its depthless style, and there is a certain relationship of identity 
through such a hermeneutic reading.
185
 
In this and other comparisons, it is unclear whether the lack of postmodern political art is 
purely due to its presentation as a commodity, or whether its commodified production leads to 
forms that intrinsically have less depth than modernist forms.  In his analysis, Jameson often 
implies the latter, but also tends to select examples that best fit such an interpretation,
186
 or forces 
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‘into a single mould a diversity of cultural phenomena which do not obviously belong together’.
187
  
Thus, Jameson contrasts the literally depthless visual style of Diamond Dust Shoes with Peasant 
Shoes to show how it exemplifies postmodernism, whereas he considers the untitled installation 
mentioned previously as an exception.  In this way, for Jameson, where forms of modernist depth 
are detectable in postmodern art, they are accidental, inevitable ‘failures’ of depthless expression 
‘that inscribe the particular postmodern project back into its context’,
188
 rather than critical aspects 
of cultural expressions showing through despite their commodification.  For example, he explains 
that video art as a form blocks final interpretations, and connections made between the 
fragmented images are ‘provisional’, and ‘subject to change without notice’, so contextualisation is 
quickly rewritten.
189
  He then says that sometimes a single theme can dominate long enough to 
become an overall interpretation, but then ‘whatever a good […] videotext might be, it will be bad 
or flawed whenever such interpretation proves possible’.
190
  Yet it is only Jameson’s definition of 
postmodernism and video art that makes such meaning a flaw or ‘bad’ excess, and not simply 
part of the medium and its aims.
191
 
At the same time, Jameson also explains that the examples of postmodern art he 
examines are not meant to exemplify the features of postmodernism.  Rather, the point of 
postmodernism is that there are no ‘works’ with clear meanings to be interpreted, only ‘texts’ that 
deny interpretation, so viewing texts as representations of postmodernism means failing to 
appreciate their textuality.
192
  For this reason, Jameson emphasises the relationship over the 
individual, so that ‘the cultural production process […] is the object of study and no longer the 
individual masterpiece’, which ‘shifts our methodological practice […] from individual textual 
analysis to […] mode-of-production analysis’.
193
  In our view, however, Jameson does use 
particular texts to illustrate the characteristics of postmodernism, which is only problematic 
because he emphasises certain characteristics over others.  In fact, individual analysis is 
necessary to construct a theory of ‘cultural  logic’ relating to a mode of production, if it does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Postmodernism, p. 212; and Peter Nicholls, ‘Divergences: Modernism, Postmodernism, Jameson and 
Lyotard’, Critical Quarterly, 33 (1991), 1-18 (p. 3). 
187 Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 131. 
188 PM, p. xvi. 
189 Ibid., p. 87. 
190 Ibid., p. 92. 
191 Homer, Marxism, Hermeneutics, pp. 115. 
192
 PM, p. xvii. 
193 Jameson, ‘Symptoms of Theory or Symptoms for Theory?’, Critical Inquiry 30 (2004), 403-408 (p. 408). 
Consciousness and the Limits of Social Conformity 
168 
 
simply accept randomness and difference as a (lack of) logic.  Texts must be treated as ‘works’ to 
understand the particular social conditions and ideological ties that influence postmodern forms, 
and this process does not imply some ‘modernist’ failure of textuality, because it shows that the 
logic of difference itself emerges from a certain range of political ideals.  The appearance of 
depthlessness or immediate, shifting meanings is then to a great extent the result of commodified 
context, which does not indicate a lack of depth or more durable meaning in form itself. 
It remains that case that postmodern art is doubly depoliticised to a degree, because it is 
not only received as a commodity but produced as one, within an ideological climate in which 
utopian social alternatives are rarely considered.  However, such a notion does not exhaust the 
political possibilities in cultural production, or the way ideological beliefs can exceed commodified 
media presentation and even express themselves through it.  In this respect, Jameson’s theory 
often does not consider the ‘political unconscious’ of postmodern works other than as an 
expression of late capitalist cultural fragmentation.  His goal is ‘to reawaken […] some sense of 
the ineradicable drive towards collectivity that can be detected, no matter how faintly and feebly, 
in the most degraded works of mass culture’,
194
 and he explains that criticism which highlights the 
lack of meaning in a form may better reveal the dominant logic than seeking meaning within texts 
themselves.
195
  But in focusing only on the lack of fixed meaning, we may miss expressions of 
political ideas and concepts in various media.  It is then a question of examining postmodern 
culture for beliefs or utopian ideals that are not as faint or degraded as Jameson suggests, 
through ideological analysis, and considering how these sentiments might further expand given 
the restraints of commodification. 
 
iii) Consumer Culture 
If it remains possible to express depth of meaning in conditions of commodification, it is also 
necessary to consider how that depth and any utopian ideas may be received.  Here, we argue 
that, despite the commodification process, various people can experience an excess of meaning 
in media codes and images, and interpret cultural objects in non-prescribed ways, so that a space 
remains within commodified culture for alternative political ideas to develop.  In Jameson’s 
portrayal of the situation, the relationship between culture and economics is ‘dedifferentiated’, so 
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that culture is now economic right down to its core, and many apparent oppositional positions are 
reduced to consumer choices.  While we agree with this idea to an extent, it is our contention that 
people do not merely understand the culture they consume purely in accordance with consumer 
identity images, or that their disconnection from the conditions of mass production stops them 
perceiving exploitation.  
According to Jameson, economic and cultural logics have effectively colonised each 
other.  As he puts it, ‘the market has become […] fully as much a commodity as any of the items it 
includes within itself’, while ‘postmodernism is the consumption of sheer commodification as a 
process’.
196
  Mass media are then platforms for distributing commodities, while the market is 
glamorised through the lifestyles of celebrity entrepreneurs.  Free trade agreements and 
organisations even ensure the global dominance of US popular culture, undermining national 
protectionist policies from agriculture to film industries, and connecting mass culture, economic 
aims and political policy.
197
  Meanwhile, the economic forces that drive consumer culture are 
fetishised, whether in the enjoyment of shopping, celebration of films based on their budgets, or 
focus on forms of media technology rather than available content.  Commodification, Jameson 
explains, has exploded throughout the whole of the social ‘to the point at which everything in our 
social life — from economic value and state power to practices and to the very structure of the 
psyche itself — can be said to have become “cultural” in some original and yet untheorized 
sense’.
198
   
Under these conditions, it seems that political opposition and cultural subversion cannot 
gain critical distance due to the explosion of culture into all social spheres.  Opposition is 
distributed through mass media images completely intertwined with consumerist values, so the 
message becomes inseparable from its presentation, imbedded between advertisements or even 
in news organs that are largely publicity machines.  This distribution also validates the sense of 
freedom that consumer choice allows, in that it appears to welcome all kinds of views into the field 
of consumer fulfilment, with new identity groups accepted by the market to create something for 
everyone.  Almost any belief or taste is represented by an appropriate form of consuming, 
including niche cultures that are defined against the mainstream.  As Jameson says, for example, 
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highbrow French film is part of the international film market alongside the dominant Hollywood 
against which it defines itself, and therefore strengthens inclusive pluralism.
199
  Even so, it is not 
that anything can become a consumer option, as certain ideas exceed the ideological limits of 
pluralism, and some cultural groups lack the means to consume.  But such people are either 
near-invisible in the marketised media or vilified according to ‘enemy’ narratives that portray 
outsiders as anti-pluralist fundamentalists, or their victims. 
The economics of culture also help to render the conditions of its production more 
opaque.  Jameson states that, for all the complexities of consumerism, the effacement of the 
object’s production is ‘the indispensable precondition on which all the rest can be constructed’.
200
  
In other words, because western consumers only experience the final object of consumption, 
disconnected from the history of its production, they ‘inhabit a dream world of artificial stimuli and 
televised experience’, in which ‘the fundamental questions of being and of the meaning of life 
[seem] utterly remote and pointless’.
201
  In previous forms of capitalism, Jameson explains, the 
bourgeois was similarly detached from production, but the worker could perceive ‘the finished 
product as little more than a moment in the process of production itself’ and understand the world 
in terms of interrelated processes.
202
  Today, conversely, few consumers have this perspective, 
and escapist resignation means that enjoying consumer goods may further repress knowledge of 
their origin.  Also, the complexity of the system makes it difficult even for those who are interested 
to comprehend the multifaceted processes of production, or connections between consumerism 
and global poverty.  There is a certain rationality in disconnecting and ‘forgetting’ how objects are 
produced. 
When the situation is described in this way, there does not seem to be much potential for 
consciousness to develop in the processes of consumerism beyond the absorption of de-
historicised products according to particular identity requirements.  As with Marcuse, Jameson 
mentions some intrinsic tendencies in the system itself that may produce strain.  On one hand, he 
notes that difficulties may arise with maintaining mass purchasing power, but adds that such an 
issue will only become significant when relatively high employment cannot be maintained.
203
  On 
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the other, he acknowledges a more immediate pressure in manufacturing libidinal investment in 
consumerism, since the latter must create actual pleasure, rather than being a mere commodity 
‘fix’ that satisfies addiction.  Here, Jameson states that, despite the promotion of consumer goods 
as needs, deep down the individual is ‘naggingly aware’ that is not the case.
204
  This idea is 
similar to Marcuse’s that consumer pleasures provide partial fulfilment, so individuals experience 
other desires, and must be continually convinced that these desires can also be met by consumer 
choices. 
We argue that it is possible to expand this concept of nagging awareness further, to 
suggest ways in which individuals still develop ideas from consumer culture that exceed the de-
historicised products and identities presented.  First, people’s beliefs do not necessarily match the 
media identity image with which they are associated, particularly because they do not share its 
superficiality.  For example, as Jameson says, an interest in independent or arthouse cinema may 
be a way of rejecting the vapidity and reactionary politics of mainstream culture that itself 
becomes merely another commodified choice.  However, it does not mean that opposition to the 
dominant strain is exhausted by making this choice, or that it replaces more substantive political 
ideas, and in fact the culture chosen may also develop these ideas.  That is, because the range of 
available identities presented in the media includes radical positions, not merely styles branded 
as rebellious, the messages of these positions remain intact in some sense even in their 
commodified diffusion.  Despite the relatively small presence of these positions compared to 
others, due to the demands of the market, they still transmit alternative ideas.  In other words, it is 
not only that individuals may become ‘naggingly aware’ that their consumption is not completely 
fulfilling, but also that what they consume contains ideas that may develop their consciousness 
towards a critique of consumerism itself.  Culture that is critical of dominant ideas, and even 
politicised in a way that suggests radical alternatives, is still more likely to cause individuals to 
subsequently reduce their consumerism as a political act than is mainstream ‘conformist’ culture. 
Second, nagging awareness may also relate back to the production conditions of 
consumer goods, or that the lack of fulfilment is in part due to a certain guilt that creeps into 
postmodern living.  In this respect, issues surrounding methods of manufacture and the 
providence of goods have become more prominent in recent times, in brands such as ‘Fair trade’ 
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and laws aimed at holding multinationals to certain labour standards, which indicate that 
consumerism has not been delinked from production in people’s minds.  It thus seems less that 
‘the materiality of the object itself is summoned to veil the human relationship and to give it the 
appearance of a relation between things’.
205
  For the most part, these changes are not radical, in 
that multinationals can still find loopholes in laws through subcontracting, and Fair trade remains 
an individual ethical choice within consumerism.  As Jameson says, consumerism ‘individualizes 
and atomizes’, and ethical consumerism blocks consideration of collective responses to social 
issues.
206
  But such developments do not occur without significant public understanding of and 
concern towards production processes, and may not fully placate those concerns.  As such, 
ideological values are not repressed by the reduction of identities to consumer choices, or by the 
reified appearance of consumer goods, and some trace of economic processes and political 
concepts remains within consumer culture.  Thus, although Fair Trade does not yet move beyond 
the concept of value, it potentially represents a first step towards recognition that exchange-value 
is not an immutable property.  It shows that people still recognise the human relationships in 
production and consumption, and oppose exploitation in these relations.  From this position, it 
seems more likely that radical ideas can penetrate, and relate the concept of exploitation to the 
commodity form itself, rather than the situation Jameson describes in which the relations of 
production are effaced by the fully de-historicised consumer product.  We cannot then focus only 
on how commodity relations create obstacles, because doing so ‘links the economical to the 
experiential only at the cost of displacing the political’.
207
  Although the majority of products are 
superficial, it remains possible both to produce politically charged commodified culture, and for 
that politics to be received, helping to develop oppositional ideologies and challenging affirmative 
ones. 
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V. Agency 
i) Subjectivity and Group Identity 
This final point about the way people receive and develop ideas that exceed production or 
reception of mediatised images, along with ideas such as the psychic reliance on narrative 
patterns, suggest a kind of active subject in postmodernism that does not merely reflect the 
dominant logic.  In our attempt to demonstrate potentials for enlarging oppositional sensibilities in 
fragmented social conditions, we thus aim to build on this concept further, to understand how 
people may retain a capacity for ideological change.  Jameson’s definition of postmodernism 
tends to assign such qualities to modernism, whose concept of a monadic, autonomous subject 
has been superseded by subject-positions.  Yet he also claims there is agency in the present, or 
choices that are structured by social conditions without being reducible to them, and argues that 
neither the system nor agency should take analytical precedence, because it means either the 
system appears ‘so total that it is overpowering, and […] the individuals caught up in it have little 
power to do anything’, or ‘agents and actors appear who are somehow stronger than the most 
inhuman system’.
208
  Such statements provide important supports for our theory of ideology, but 
we argue that overall Jameson does give precedence to systemic analysis, and mainly considers 
individuals as adherents to pluralist group identities. 
For the most part, the postmodern subject in Jameson’s theory is (or functions as) more a 
composition of mediatised ‘subject-positions’.  These unstable identity markers and their 
communicative codes are not viewed as ideologies by Jameson, but ‘a kind of storehouse of older 
ideological fragments that can be appealed to now and then for a digression or an acceptable 
justification for some necessary move in narrative strategy’.
209
  Thus, he claims, even in 
fundamentalist positions, ‘dogmatic insistence on things is not a characteristic of belief, but [...] of 
the way the group enforces its cohesion and its membership and excludes the nonmembers’.
210
  
In such statements, codes and subject-positions reduce meaning to arguments and styles that 
individuals can call upon as fragments to maintain their support for the system, regardless of 
coherence.  If individuals believe anything it is only that they must maintain their identities, and if 
there is any agency involved it is only that of selecting the codes to follow.  It does not appear that 
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the reasons for selection and commitment to codes are important, or that people may not be fully 
satisfied by the codes themselves. 
The process Jameson describes then causes individuals to disavow cultural antagonisms, 
by reducing these to variations of opinion and style under concepts of pluralist difference.  The 
repression of history in these subject-positions means they lack conception of their origins, and 
are sociological categories with certain characteristics, not political class desires.  For Jameson, 
group identities represent a form of ‘liberal tolerance’, which is the ‘result of social homogenization 
and standardization and the obliteration of genuine social difference in the first place’.
211
  He 
explains that there has been ‘a transformation of the Other and of otherness, in which 
paradoxically the recognition of the Other entails the waning or disappearance of otherness, and 
in which a politics of difference becomes a politics of identity’.
212
  This postmodern Other of 
alternative identity contrasts the historical antagonism with the Other as alien culture, in which an 
observer recognises another culture as the opposite of what is known, but then comes to 
recognise its knowledge as cultural through the Other’s impression of it.
213
  The mutually 
exclusive practices or antagonisms between cultures are what define them as cultures in the first 
place, and postmodern pluralism is then a false resolution of this cultural antagonism, which 
reduces substantial differences under a singular dominant, but remains antagonistic to cultures 
that retain their sense of history and otherness.  The dominant cultural politics is thus not a 
universal collectiveness, because it eradicates difference in a way that continues to represent one 
group’s domination over (or isolation from) others.  It represents a sublimation of the original 
‘ethnic’ antagonism, for Jameson, but contrasts with the alternative sublimation into class 
struggle, which ‘has as its aim and outcome not the triumph of one class over another but the 
abolition of the very category of class’.
214
 
The way Jameson understands postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism, 
and pluralism as a continuation of social hierarchies, means that subject-positions are still 
structured by social inequalities.  As such, it is possible to detect certain limits in the free play of 
arguments and opinions, and compatibility issues between codes.  As Jameson explains, subject-
positions are ‘interpellated roles’ that emerge from existing social groups, and a specific 
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constellation of subject-positions can only function if it reflects ‘some more concrete truce or 
alliance between the various real social groups thereby entailed’.
215
  In other words, de-politicised 
identities remain irreconcilable in some sense, even when they become mere difference of 
opinion or culture that lack any notion of their historical emergence as antagonistic opposites (for 
example, the way racial markers such as black and white are embedded with notions of 
superiority and inferiority).  We believe that this point also indicates a certain depth of belief in 
subject-positions, based on narrative limitations that go beyond compartmentalisation and 
contradictory arguments that lack binding justifications.  For instance, if some individuals are able 
to hold a belief in environmental responsibility alongside a lifestyle of excessive consumerism, 
others cannot, and the difference between the two is not intrinsic to the codes or social positions 
of the individuals, but in the way this combination is encountered through different values and 
awareness levels.  There is also a sense here of the antagonistic relationship between ideologies, 
despite their pluralist existence, which shows they are not experienced as merely different. 
In Jameson’s theory of subject-positions and postmodern identity formation, it thus 
generally appears that the scope for subjective agency is severely limited.  Nevertheless, he 
maintains that his aim is not to discount agency, and that he emphasises structural influences 
also to counterbalance a more individual focus.  That is, although we can examine postmodern 
culture through the conscious aims of artists, audiences, and institutions, we must also 
understand the synchronic and diachronic cultural influences on those entities.  Jameson 
reiterates that people make history but not in circumstances of their choosing, and his focus on 
modes of production does not override that various agents can create different forms of political 
tactics.  He also notes that the idea of collective consciousness, or even class consciousness, is 
problematic if it simply views individual consciousness as a reflection of group dynamics and 
structures, because it cannot consider any new conceptual categories that emerge from it.  But, at 
the same time, understanding class dynamics is still essential, for Jameson, to theorise the 
relationships between individuals, so what is required ‘is a whole new logic of collective dynamics, 
with categories that escape the taint of some mere application of terms drawn from individual 
experience’.
216
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When speaking in these terms, Jameson appears to espouse the kind of dialectical 
mediation between the system and individual for which we have argued.  However, it is still the 
case that, in establishing a systemic focus, the conclusions of Jameson’s theory do not sufficiently 
consider aspects of individual consciousness.  As such, the forms of active, functioning ideology 
that we have identified as an important part of the postmodern situation, and necessary for 
conceiving political change, remain absent from his theory of subject-positions.  For the most part, 
Jameson explores only the shift from modernist autonomous subjects to postmodern fragmented 
subject-positions, rather than any existing excess of oppositional ideologies or their potential 
development.  Thus, where he introduces ‘a third term’ of subjectivity besides autonomy and 
fragmentation, he describes it as ‘the non-centered subject that is a part of an organic group or 
collective’,
217
 or ‘the subject at the other end of historical time, in a social order that has put 
behind it class organization, commodity production and the market, alienated labor, and the 
implacable determinism of a historical logic beyond the control of humanity’.
218
  In other words, it 
is a subject yet to come, which leaves the question of what kind of agency is required in the 
present to nurture this form.  For us, a class consciousness that can challenge the dominant 
individualist perspective can only expand due to both the critical distance of a minority and the 
possibility of gradually influencing the conscious beliefs of the majority.  Therefore, it is necessary 
to consider how the consciousness of different individuals within identity groups can be 
challenged, by interrogating the beliefs people use to justify conformist behaviour, which structure 
and support apparently fragmented subject-positions. 
 
ii) Cognitive Mapping 
In our understanding, agency thus emerges from the social narratives that all individuals have, 
based on experience, knowledge and interests, and the possibility of changes in behaviour 
relating to those contributing factors.  A dialectical concept of totalising then reveals each 
narrative to be a contingent acceptance of the system, which allows us to question whether the 
system should be accepted at all.  The problem is how to introduce this concept of totality to 
(fragmented) mass consciousness, with the intent of encouraging a greater oppositional agency.  
One of Jameson’s important contributions here is the concept of ‘cognitive mapping’, or an 
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attempt to somehow envisage the social as a totality in history, against postmodern logic.  As we 
understand it, cognitive mapping demonstrates a plausible way of promoting class consciousness 
to individuals and groups throughout society, by revealing connections between political events 
and social conditions.  However, Jameson emphasises that, while some repressed temporal 
dimension remains in postmodernism, people are incapable of perceiving it, unless something 
changes their forms of perception first, which suggests cognitive mapping would currently be 
ineffective in inspiring a new politics.  Against this point, we argue that the potential for temporal 
understanding and shifts towards oppositional agency is already present in ideological forms, as it 
is not the lack of narrative that is the issue, but the particular narratives people follow, which may 
be susceptible to change. 
Jameson defines cognitive mapping as an effectively ‘modernist’ method that ‘retains an 
impossible concept of totality’.
219
  It emerges from the idea that postmodern society is too complex 
for individuals to get a firm ideological footing and understand their position within it, so they must 
somehow locate their positions in an overall structure, to shatter the image of disconnected 
fragments.  The scope of the system and partial view of any particular individual means that 
cognitive mapping requires a collective rather than individual perspective, and Jameson equates it 
to the development of class consciousness, albeit of a type that has not previously been 
encountered.  In effect, it is impossible to know what form it can take, for Jameson, because the 
complexity of the global system and its de-historicising culture make mapping difficult to conceive.  
For example, a class view of society is rendered problematic in that, although certain individuals 
are responsible for economic strategies, there is no clear ruling class that forcefully assimilates 
the masses to its own language or cultural norms.  As with Marcuse’s understanding that upper 
management is another administrative role in the technical rationality, Jameson says that ‘what’s 
systemic about it is not due to anybody’s agency’, and norms are imposed on the elite as much as 
anyone else.
220
  Thus, although there remains a social divide, in the sense that only a few have 
the knowledge and social position to actually affect the economy, and generally do not ‘tolerate 
any questions about why it should be like that, or even worth knowing in the first place’,
221
 the elite 
is not easily viewed as a class because it is internally fragmented throughout various interests in 
                                                             
219 PM, p. 409. 
220
 Jameson, Jameson on Jameson, p. 114. 
221 PM, p. 352. 
Consciousness and the Limits of Social Conformity 
178 
 
the production process.
222
  Considering such difficulties, Jameson states that the aim of cognitive 
mapping is not so much to actually represent the system, but ‘to see whether by systematizing 
something that is resolutely unsystematic, and historicizing something that is resolutely 
ahistorical, one couldn’t outflank it and force a historical way at least of thinking about that’.
223
 
Cognitive mapping is then a matter of narrative, rather than a literal mapping of a physical 
space, or an attempt to bring the temporal back into the spatial, to imagine some kind of politics in 
postmodernism.  As we perceive it, the important point here is not that Jameson somehow 
privileges the temporal over the spatial, but that spatial relations should be also viewed 
historically.  This idea contrasts Homer’s argument that Jameson’s focus on the narrative aspect 
of politics abstracts too much from everyday spatial experience or potential spatial politics, and 
misses that today’s more globalised politics and economics are significantly spatial.  For example, 
he says, trade agreements such as NAFTA mean that ‘North America is now free to export grain 
to Mexico, potentially destroying the local economies, yet the citizens of California can erect 
barriers to keep Mexican migrants out’.
224
  In our view, on the contrary, spatial politics is precisely 
what disconnects issues surrounding the Mexican economy and Mexican migration to California 
from NAFTA, and renders them as separate concerns.  It is the ‘defragmenting’ influence of 
temporality that reconnects these ever expanding spaces.  The other danger, as Massey 
explains, is that a singular concept of the temporal (which Massey connects to Jameson’s 
modernist fear of postmodern disorder) may be applied too rigidly, creating a ‘Grand Narrative’ 
that ignores the spatial diversity required for a wide-ranging political movement.
225
  In this case, 
Jameson appears to be aware of the problem, when he describes ‘the unresolvable […] dilemma 
of the transfer of curved space to flat charts’, so ‘there can be no true maps’, only ‘scientific 
progress, or better still, a dialectical advance, in the various historical moments of mapmaking’.
226
  
In other words, rather than some final ‘grand narrative’ into which all particular phenomena must 
fit, the processes of mapping develop with knowledge, and, in this case, spatial politics brings 
necessary diversity to the temporal formulation.   
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The problem with cognitive mapping as Jameson presents it is then not the concept of 
reintroducing temporality, but a paradox (not dissimilar to Marcuse’s political impasse) that the 
very thing it is supposed to address — postmodern de-historicisation — renders it ineffective.  In 
other words, there seems to be no way for cognitive mapping to develop in the social conditions 
Jameson defines, and as such there is something ‘insufficiently dialectical’ about his approach.
227
  
On one hand, the temporal is still in some sense detectable in the spatialized postmodernism, for 
Jameson, as the categories of time and space are ultimately inseparable, and even the idealised 
notion of the schizophrenic ‘marks the impossible effort to imagine something like a pure 
experience of the spatial present’.
228
  On this basis, cognitive mapping represents ‘most clearly 
Jameson’s refusal to accept the apparent closures and ahistoricity of the postmodern that he 
outlines elsewhere’.
229
  On the other hand, Jameson cannot envisage any dialectical relationship 
between cognitive mapping and spatial politics in the present.  Thus, its potential ‘may well be 
dependent on some prior political opening, which its task would then be to enlarge culturally’, but 
until then, ‘if we cannot imagine the productions of such an aesthetic, there may […] be 
something positive in the attempt to keep alive the possibility of imagining such a thing’.
230
  In the 
present, the mapping process finds itself spatialized again, into a mere image, and Jameson 
points to ‘the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great global multinational and 
decentered communicational network’.
231
  In this view, insisting that the temporal is ineradicable in 
present conditions seems superfluous, as it is also completely inaccessible (bar some vague 
hope for a future change in sensibility), and it remains ‘precisely space’s ability to absolutely 
repress temporality that is the issue’.
232
  The temporal is less a marginalised element still 
somehow identifiable within postmodernism, and more a missing dimension that modernist 
cognitive mapping cannot locate. 
At certain points, Jameson identifies degraded forms of ideological mapping in 
postmodern culture that imply a sublimated need, but does not consider these as narratives with 
potential to appreciate temporal concepts.  For example, he explains, technological development 
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may be seen as the focal point of alienation and end of Nature, which effectively stands in for 
capitalism itself.  Here, modern technology ‘seems to offer some privileged representational 
shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our minds and 
imaginations to grasp’.
233
  Or, paranoia and conspiracy fiction may be seen as an attempt to 
totalise, and Jameson states that, even if ‘nothing is gained by having been persuaded of the 
definitive verisimilitude of this or that conspiratorial hypothesis’, at least ‘in the intent to 
hypothesize […] lies the beginning of wisdom’.
234
  Conspiracy theories do no connect explanatory 
narratives to the background of social and economic institutions, but such perception at least 
achieves a kind of ‘closure-effect’, which resembles how cognitive mapping triangulates, ‘rather 
than perceiving or representing, a totality’.
235
  According to our aims, it is then necessary to 
expand on these attempts at imagining a coherent logic to social functioning, to show that they 
are part of postmodern ideologies in general, which are not then closed to temporal 
considerations.  
In our terms, cognitive mapping is therefore a way to develop class consciousness from 
ideologies in postmodernism, by redefining their narratives through a systemic perspective.  As 
such, it contrasts Jameson’s idea that ‘the production of functioning and living ideologies’ may be 
‘not possible at all’ in certain historical moments, and that ‘this would seem to be our situation in 
the current crisis’.
236
  That is, rather than aim at reintroducing the concept of historical totality to 
people who can no longer comprehend their individual experience in terms of some consistent 
meaning, it challenges the range of narratives and meanings, or ‘living ideologies’ that already 
explain the current situation.  Jameson says that ‘ideology, as such, attempts to span or 
coordinate, to map, by means of conscious and unconscious representations’.
237
  We would argue 
that this concept of ideology remains in postmodernism, as a necessity for social functioning,
238
 
and represents the capacity to make connections between social phenomena.  Analysing, 
combining and contrasting these positions according to a dialectical notion of totality is then a 
possibility that can begin in the present, and may also help us recognise which ideological 
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elements are emergent and which are residual against the dominant cultural logic as part of a 
wider focus for cognitive mapping.
239
  As Harvey puts it, through the renewal of historical 
materialism we can ‘launch a counter-attack of narrative against the image, of ethics against 
aesthetics, of a project of Becoming rather than Being, and to search for unity within difference’, 
without denying the power of the postmodern logic.
240
  In this sense, as with Jameson’s utopian 
theory, cognitive mapping can mediate between totalising class consciousness and existing 
politics to inspire alternative thinking.  A form of agency then becomes clearer in postmodernism 
in the active battle between ideological beliefs and power structures. 
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VI. Political Action 
i) Politics and Cultural Criticism 
Jameson’s focus on preparing the ground for future developments when defining cognitive 
mapping and utopian thinking, and his general approach to postmodernism, suggest a lack of any 
existing oppositional politics that can avoid incorporation into consumer culture.  As such, he 
devotes less of his work to examining political strategies than either Marcuse or Žižek, and 
concentrates more on the cultural conditions that repress oppositional thinking, and forms of 
cultural expression that somehow keep such thinking alive.  The question then is what political 
effect Jameson’s particular disciplinary can have, to the extent that it concentrates on aesthetic 
form and style.  Here, we examine some critical analyses of Jameson’s work that consider this 
issue from various perspectives, and which overall suggest that Jameson’s approach creates a 
kind of indirect reflection on political possibilities, but in a way that marginalises it from politics 
itself.  The important point, we contend, is that mediation between theory and practice, which 
Jameson reiterates as necessary for social change, requires a more even balance of cultural and 
political theorising. 
For some theorists, Jameson’s continuous examination of cultural forms, and even his 
own writing style, have important political effects.  Irr and Buchanan, for example, explain how the 
wide range of his cultural analyses and emphasis on historicising rather than judging is inclusive, 
because he draws out and combines different qualities from a huge variety of texts, and moves 
between different aesthetic fields, thus reaching new audiences.
241
  Therefore, if there is a 
tendency towards separation of disciplines in academia, and a lack of conversation between 
them,
242
 Jameson contributes to reversing that trend, by linking literature, architecture, film studies 
and so on.  For Helmling, meanwhile, there are dialectical qualities within the aesthetic form of 
Jameson’s writing, which act as an antidote to familiarity and closure, and work together with the 
content to reveal the contingency of conventions.  In this view, the form creates a certain ambition 
and energy, which appeals to ‘a minority audience that hungers to see the challenges of its own 
time written about in relevantly challenging ways’.
243
  There is a depth of reward and satisfaction 
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in understanding Jameson’s texts than cannot be gained from more ‘accessible’ texts, which also 
implies a greater comprehension of the existing totality. 
More critical views of Jameson’s work point to a lack of explicit political engagement, or 
suggest that his totalising and historicising approach excludes existing politics.  For example, 
Eagleton explains that ‘what appears wrong with the world’, in Jameson’s work, ‘is not so much 
this or that phenomenon but the fact that we cannot see all these phenomena together and see 
them whole’.
244
  As such, totalising becomes a hermeneutics which explains the world but does 
not try to change it.  Jameson in fact still emphasises the unity of theory and practice, in the sense 
that ‘discovering the truth and elaborating it is inseparable from action, from changing ourselves 
and the society from which our illusions sprang’.
245
  Yet, for Eagleton, it is not enough for such a 
unity that Jameson simply discovers and elaborates aspects of the social reality.  Similarly, 
Homer accuses Jameson of an all-or-nothing logic in regards to mapping the totality, and 
considers that, while we cannot merely deal with disconnected, reformist micro-politics, it is 
debilitating ‘to be faced with the task of conceiving of a completely new form of global politics’.
246
  
This criticism effectively aligns cognitive mapping with Marcuse’s demand to withdraw politically to 
prepare for social conditions more conducive to change, or disconnect from existing political 
practices until the (impossible) task of formulating the whole is complete.  Said also questions 
whether there is a need to distinguish between everyday politics and more global theory at all, 
and criticises Jameson for paying little attention to the former, or how the two connect (in PU).  
For Said, Jameson’s distinction and emphasis on totality advocates ‘a strong hermeneutic 
globalism which will have the effect of subsuming the local in the synchronic’.
247
  In all these 
examples, the description of the totality appears to override the influence of specific parts within it, 
and the task of mapping postpones consideration of political action in the present. 
From our perspective, there are important points to consider in both sides of these 
arguments.  First, Jameson’s work demonstrates the kind of alternative and unifying thinking 
necessary to consider political alternatives.  The lack of resolution in the form of his writing 
maintains dialectical tension in contrasts such as that between synchronic and diachronic, and 
even within postmodernism.  Even though, at the level of content, Jameson emphasises the 
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dominating logic over its particulars (as Said says), his style suggests this lack of completeness 
and closure.  Furthermore, Jameson provides a particularly far-reaching analysis of cultural 
commodification, without which any radical politics would be less well-equipped to deal with this 
major influence in late capitalism.  In that sense, it is important that someone focuses mainly on 
culture, rather than directly on politics, and Jameson’s historicising and non-judgemental method 
is a useful alternative to more final interpretations.  Also, in postmodernism, it may be necessary 
to approach politics via culture, because fields such as politics and economics are mostly one-
dimensional considerations of existing relations, to reintroduce more transcendent forms of 
thought.  Ultimately, although social problems are political or economic in some deeper sense, 
any resistance must find a way to exceed cultural incorporation, and Jameson’s work represents 
a commitment to such issues. 
Conversely, there is also validity in the criticisms of Jameson’s approach regarding the 
need to fully understand the totality, or know exactly where we stand in relation to the 
mechanisms of a global system, before political resistance can be effective.  The idea of unifying 
theory and practice appears to involve concentrating fully on theory in the hope that some new 
form of practice develops from it, rather than combining theory with existing practices, which are 
understood as commodified and disconnected images.  But, as Osborne argues, ‘if we take 
seriously the reference to social classes […] then this retreat becomes unnecessary, and not only 
“negative” theory but some kind of more “positive” form of dialectical theorizing should be 
possible’.
248
  For us, the issue with Jameson here is not that he sees a need to fully theorise a 
global politics prior to political action (as Homer suggests), because he recognises the inevitable 
failure of cognitive mapping to envisage a system fully, and aims rather at reinvigorating 
dialectical thinking through the exercise itself.  However, even the attempted mapping must 
develop in conversation with living, politically engaged ideologies from the start, even if they are 
not transcendent,
249
 without reducing them to images and expressions of the dominant logic.  In 
that sense, mapping the totality is not a theoretical exercise that can inspire a form of practice; it 
is a practical involvement with fragmented political groups to understand the uneven and partially 
antagonistic relationships between the whole and its parts. 
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The dialectical tensions in Jameson’s work also create their own tension in terms of its 
political value, reflecting the conflict Jameson identifies in his theory of Utopia between radical 
ideals and recognised politics.  That is, formulating a strong, focused contribution to cultural and 
aesthetic theory inevitably means losing some connection to the specific social problems that 
people encounter.  Or, a challenging writing style that helps us understand that the system is 
incredibly complex, and points to dialectical potentials, is insufficient to connect with non-
intellectuals, or even academics from more empirical fields.
250
  In this respect, a focus on 
aesthetics and its commodification seems to be a particularly postmodern choice in itself, which 
reflects an emphasis on culture within society that obscures the politics of continuing struggles 
(even though Jameson’s point is to re-politicise the whole according to its historical context).  As 
Eagleton puts it, ‘The question of appropriation has to do with politics, not with culture; it is a 
question of who is winning at any particular time.’
251
  According to this idea, art and culture are not 
fields which gain or lose the power to create political change, so much as reflections of political 
dominance and resistance, whose particular content indicates possible directions for political 
change.  Our point here is not that Jameson should ‘change sides’ and merely address political 
matters, rather that his work does not mediate enough between opposition to the whole and 
political realities, as his theory of Utopia recommends.  In our understanding, this kind of 
mediation is what enables us to envisage the development of a political movement beginning in 
the present, attempting to connect existing forms of resistance together through more radical 
notions of change.  
 
ii) Groups and Classes 
Despite this general tendency in Jameson’s work to suggest an absence of meaningful political 
activity in late capitalism, there are times when he considers the potential of existing forms of 
resistance, such as ‘new social movements’.  At these points, for Jameson, although singular 
identity-based movements are not class struggle (or replacements for class struggle) it seems 
that they represent more than simply media codes.  The problem is how these movements might 
expand into more universal opposition, or include more economic notions of change.  Jameson 
highlights various difficulties in connecting different issues, and with local movements attempting 
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to increase their scope.  These ideas raise valid points that must be considered in any attempt to 
link together forms of political resistance, but we also see a potential common ground for 
opposition within them, in that social disparity and deprivation are still part of everyday existence.  
In short, because these material realities remain visible in our societies, the ways people of all 
classes justify or accept them may be challenged by historicising and utopian narratives.  From 
this perspective, it is possible to envisage a political movement developing from meaningful 
ideological struggles that continue in late capitalist societies. 
For Jameson, ‘new social movements’ and single-issue identity politics are representative 
of the dominant paradigm of subject-positions and pluralism, which sees antagonisms as 
questions of tolerance, rather than contradictions central to the social logic.  As such, these 
movements do not emerge instead of class struggle, but are signs of the latter’s repression by the 
postmodern logic, and are expressions of capitalist differentiation.  However, Jameson claims, 
these movements also exceed the prescribed values of consumerism, and are therefore politically 
meaningful even though they fall short of being new agents of history emerging as a real 
antithesis.  They represent neither determinism nor voluntarism, but political activity that results 
from and retrospectively confirms objective circumstances, as well as a free individual choice to 
act or not in the face of  historical Necessity.  Here, Jameson recognises ‘the simultaneous 
possibility of active political commitment along with disabused systemic realism and 
contemplation, and not some sterile choice between those two things’.
252
  In these terms, there is 
a conscious decision-making process to resist aspects of the social order, which implies 
openness to change, even if it is formulated within the dominant logic.   
The task for a class-based politics is then to connect the notions of change within these 
movements through utopian ideas, which, as Jameson shows, faces major difficulties.  To begin 
with, a combination of strategies is required that adapts to the realities of the present while 
holding the structure of capital in mind,
253
 but no specific political group can represent a 
revolutionary subject of history, and even uniting around common interests with temporary 
overlaps does not confront underlying systemic contradictions.  Thus, for Jameson, such 
movements must somehow make the economic central to their aims, to enable a politics that can 
attend ‘to the ideological resistance to the concept of totality, and to that epistemological razor of 
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postmodern nominalism which shears away such apparent abstractions as the economic system 
and the social totality themselves’.
254
  However, Jameson does not seek a purely economic focus, 
and if an economic demand is necessary because political domination and democratic 
programmes can be incorporated back into the capitalist state, he explains that it ‘must always be 
in some sense a figure for a more total revolutionary transformation, unless it is to fall back into 
economism’.
255
  He therefore sees that different forms of political or cultural antagonism can be 
compatible with economic critique, and it is not a question of one taking priority over the other, but 
of the aims of cultural change being sufficiently radical to include liberation from economic 
exploitation.
256
 
The issue remains that group politics appear to have fundamental incompatibilities with 
the economic focus of class politics.  For example, Jameson explains, new social movements are 
more prone to incorporation than class struggles — turned into media images, stripped of their 
history — and even the more marginalised remain part of the plurality of groups and cannot fulfil a 
‘structural role’.
257
  Conversely, while concepts of class structure help systemic understanding, 
they lack immediate appeal and relevance, as they define individuals according to abstractions 
outside experience, such as production processes.  It is then easier to identify with groups 
because they are more locally relevant, and predicated on visible institutions.  Jameson also 
questions whether the apparently puritanical revolutionary Left demands to think, recognise 
exploitation, and accommodate myriad political desires, can remain relevant when so dramatically 
opposed to consumer enjoyment, and thus whether it is possible to combine ideas of revolution 
and pleasure.  In this sense, he says, a notion such as sexual liberation is problematic, especially 
regarding ‘working-class’ attitudes to gender and sexuality, or ‘the programmed habits of 
subalternity, obedience, and the like, which cultural revolution seeks to dissolve’.
258
  In effect, the 
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sexual revolutionary may appear to many as a patronising middle-class outsider, trying to impose 
unwanted connections.  Or, Jameson argues, the male view of sexual politics and feminism is an 
existential issue, compared to the female view of feminist group struggle, so male defence of 
sexual liberation may even facilitate sexual exploitation.  Furthermore, if it is possible to promote 
aims of realising a deeper libidinal pleasure, or pure feeling unmediated by language, these aims 
are likely to appear frivolous, or insufficiently political.  Yet, Jameson states, integration between 
pleasure and radical change is not unfeasible, if it can connect cultural liberations to a wider 
politics, or maintain ‘a dual focus, in which the local issue is meaningful and desirable in and of 
itself, but is also at one and the same time taken as the figure for Utopia in general’.
259
 
There is also still the issue of commodification, and mass media that reduce politically 
charged language to identity-specific codes.  Jameson describes how the League of Black 
Revolutionary Workers in Detroit in the 1960s, after a number of city wide political successes, had 
a problem of representation when the movement tried to expand its cause and area of operations.  
According to Jameson, they found it difficult to explain the local issue in a way that resonated with 
other particular situations, and, in the process of networking, the leaders became media figures, 
which caused the original base to crumble.  When the movement became a media image — a 
book, a film, a story — it was separated from its social connections.  The use of commodified 
space as a communication channel robbed the message of its political content, and the end of the 
movement simply revealed ‘some ultimate dialectical barrier or invisible limit’ of the system in 
relief against it.
260
  In fact, for Jameson, the limits of political practice beyond local causes in 
postmodernism seem to be these moments of rendering the system visible, which implies any 
attempt to construct a deeper politics from new social movements will be diffused by mass media 
communication. 
In Jameson’s terms, therefore, despite the hints of agency in existing political movements, 
they either remain local campaigns that do not disrupt pluralist narratives, or are reduced to 
images if they try to communicate more widely.  There is then effectively only the hope that, if we 
attempt to make narrative connections, the concept of narrative connection itself may be slowly 
revived.  However, in our view of ideology, the excesses of consciousness over depthless media 
representation are more general, and already reveal narratives of social contradiction that may 
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connect with more radical conceptions.  In many cases, as Jameson notes, people’s material 
realities include experience of deprivation alongside the celebration of difference and tolerance, 
which therefore must be rationalised.  Yet, as such, acceptance of these conditions is not fully 
explained by postmodern depthlessness, or poverty as an aesthetic quality.  Jameson tells us that 
the ‘visibility and continuity of the class model, from the daily experience in the home and on the 
street all the way up to total mobilization itself, […] is no longer available today’.
261
  But, while it is 
undeniable that the globalisation of class relations makes it difficult to envisage or organise class 
politics, the situation is not invisible so much as rationalised, whether through liberal 
representations of helpless victims, cynical fear of change, or the hidden intolerance of pluralism 
that views outsiders as dropouts, parasites and totalitarians.  Any political aims thus enter this 
ideological arena, and must make a mark within it. 
It remains the case that class consciousness is marginal, since connecting local problems 
to systemic structures requires an understanding of history and global capital that affirmative 
ideologies obscure.  As we have seen with Marcuse, a class politics can no longer look towards a 
particular class that manifests economic contradictions to rise up and take control.  Rather, class 
politics entails a process in which the inequalities of the existing system are gradually better 
understood by individuals and groups within each class, leading to an oppositional movement.  
Moreover, the important point in terms of producing radical alternatives is that this movement 
focuses on the way social disparity is intrinsic to contradictions in capitalism, but can be overcome 
if the mode of production itself is transformed.  Jameson’s theories of History and Utopia offer 
viable approaches to developing a collective political movement, in the sense that they can define 
empowerment and freedom in ways that are both locally and generally meaningful, by mediating 
between various political dynamics and notions of class.  However, the important point as we 
perceive it is that such a method may have an impact within the current cultural logic, not only in 
some unforeseeable alternative future.  Jameson’s theory of Utopia comes closest to this idea, 
and even resembles Marcuse’s step by step approach in that it does not seem to ‘rest on the 
debilitating prospect of representing an unrepresentable totality, but rather on the articulation of a 
formal tension between local difference and global totality’.
262
  There are even moments (in his 
later work) at which Jameson considers actual political issues, in ways that appear to override 
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questions of how politics is possible.  For example, he makes specific recommendations, such as 
to defend the welfare state against the onslaught of market rhetoric, while also naming the system 
and its alternative.
263
  He also explains how current left-leaning governments offer potentials, 
despite feelings of powerlessness, and the long term failures of many oppositional movements, in 
that ‘Left electoral victories are neither hollow social-democratic exercises nor occasions in which 
power passes hands definitively’, but ‘signals for the gradual unfolding of democratic demands’, or 
‘increasingly radical claims on a sympathetic government’ that will ‘be radicalized in its turn, 
unless it sells out to the appeal for order’.
264
  We maintain that this effort to establish radical 
claims describes precisely a battle between active ideologies, with something at stake beyond the 
media images and codes. 
                                                             
263
 VOD, p. 382. 
264 Ibid., p. 391. 
Fredric Jameson 
191 
 
VII. Conclusion 
In our understanding, Jameson’s descriptions of postmodern or globalised capitalist society are 
largely plausible, in terms of the dominance of commodity logic over life in many parts of the 
world.  As such, there is no obvious progressive alternative to a US-centred late capitalism that 
incorporates many ideas into its form of pluralism, and condemns the remainder to 
marginalisation.  To counter this dominance, Jameson shows that it is essential to understand late 
capitalism as a system, or the present culmination of continuing historical developments, which 
allow us to view its gaps and contradictions.  Thus, even though he does not fully acknowledge 
the moral assumptions in his concepts of History and totalising, their view of the present remains 
politically important.  As with that of Marcuse, Jameson’s work remains committed to revealing the 
gap between reality and its potential, in a way that effectively divides ideology between affirmative 
and oppositional forms of consciousness, and removes us from the immediacy of the present. 
Our main issue with Jameson’s work is that, in defining the postmodern logic as one that 
even colonises the unconsciousness (the very excess of experienced reality), ideological 
rationalisation becomes less apparent, if not absent or superfluous.  The ‘modernist’ dialectic that 
can hold any dominant cultural logic in tension with its subordinate features is rendered ineffective 
by commodified forms of representation, and it appears that it cannot overcome this barrier.  In 
our view, Jameson’s method is prone to a form of totalising that does not sufficiently account for 
the excesses of the dominant logic when considering political potentials.  The point is then that 
‘modernist’ methods can still identify limits to postmodernism, because dialectics and functioning 
ideologies inevitably remain part of it.  The notion that postmodernism assimilates consciousness 
to media codes without rationalisation, or reproduces itself regardless of what people think, based 
on the global presence of capitalism and the scope of commodification, is still only an appearance 
that obscures its own ideological supports.  It is then not so much that a new concept of politics is 
required that cannot yet be envisaged, but that the task is still one of identifying ideologies, and 
understanding their limits or conditions of affirmation, and deeper ideals that may connect with 
more radical projects.  The tendencies and dominance of commodified postmodern culture make 
such a difficult task even harder, but seeing these ideological positions as different totalising 
narratives allows us to better understand the whole, and some possible conditions for its 
transcendence. 
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Within Jameson’s work, various concepts suggest the possibility of developing an 
oppositional politics in current circumstances through gradual, dialectical development.  In 
particular, his notion of Utopia provides a theoretical basis for gradually forming such a 
movement, in the way it mediates between different discourses, even if we understand the 
‘utopian impulse’ as a general negative excess of subjectivity.  However, with his understanding 
of ideology as cynical reason or reproduction of the system through practices, this potential 
remains an exercise in maintaining a marginalised concept of dialectical thinking in the hope that 
some future consciousness may perceive its value, rather than communication with living 
ideologies.  Throughout this chapter we have therefore tried to demonstrate that such ideologies 
exist, and exceed fragmented perception, commodified images, and identity politics, so that this 
approach to Utopia, and ideas such as cognitive mapping, may be seen as more politically 
powerful tools. 
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Chapter 4 
Slavoj Žižek 
I. Introduction 
Our analysis of Žižek examines how he structures ideology through Lacanian categories of the 
subject, and the implications of that approach.
1
  Through these categories, Žižek’s theory goes 
beyond those of Marcuse and Jameson in that it not only splits ideology between affirmative and 
oppositional positions, centred on class struggle, but also distinguishes between unconscious 
ideological attachment and a conscious ‘fantasy’ that allows the subject to justify that attachment 
(in our terms, a form of rationalisation).  The way consciousness functions to block recognition of 
the ‘irrationality’ of attachment is then a central concern in Žižek’s work, more so than we have 
seen with Marcuse and Jameson.  Moreover, it delineates a dialectic within subjectivity itself that, 
as we see it, suggests an intrinsic potential for ideological change.  However, Žižek’s theory does 
not endow rationalisation with the level of influence required for such potential, and defines it 
more as a way of justifying ideological attachment at all costs.  In other words, the conscious 
aspect of ideology is subservient to unconscious belief or obedience, for Žižek, against our 
understanding that rationalisation can be forced to adapt to contrary ideas in a way that affects 
core attachment.  Žižek’s own concept of ideological change focuses more on negation, or 
revealing to subjects the contingency of their attachments.  Here, while we accept that radically 
progressive ideological change requires subjects to recognise the contingency of what they have 
taken for reality, we stress that this realisation must still occur through challenges to conscious 
beliefs, so negation involves expanding the presence of specific oppositional ideologies. 
We begin by introducing the main Lacanian terms that Žižek uses to define ideology and 
subjectivity.  First, the central categories of Imaginary, Symbolic and Real provide the tools to 
define a subject that is constitutively attached to the social through language, but in a way that is 
necessarily ‘incomplete’ because there is no external reason for that attachment, causing the 
subject to imagine reasons retrospectively through consciousness.  This terminology also enables 
                                                             
1 In this case, our literary focus is spread quite evenly between Žižek’s major works in English from 1989 to 
the present, most notably: SOI (first published 1989), FTKN (first published 1991), TS (first published 1999), 
PV (2006) and IDLC (2008).  
Slavoj Žižek 
195 
 
us to split symbolic attachment according to our concepts of ideological ‘affirmation’ and 
‘opposition’, so we can draw from it our two-tiered notion of ideology.  We then examine the 
complexity of the subject’s relationship to ideological attachment through the concepts of drive, 
desire, fantasy and superego.  According to these terms, the possibilities of transcendence 
implied by the lack of ideological closure are effectively blocked by an endless circuit that revolves 
around obedience to attachment.  Therefore, for Žižek, ideological change is a matter of 
‘traversing the fantasy’, or subjects recognising that there is no external reason for their symbolic 
attachment.  In contrast, we suggest that contradictory experience and knowledge may affect the 
ideological fantasy to the point it shifts symbolic attachment.  In other words, there is some limit 
point at which the fantasy can no longer find a way to justify the subject’s particular symbolic 
attachment, and the only remaining possibility is to change behaviour itself.  Furthermore, in 
terms of traversing the fantasy, we argue that Žižek does not sufficiently emphasise how specific 
oppositional ideological beliefs and values are necessary in advance to cause negation, and thus 
already influence how the subject reacts to recognising the lack in subjectivity.  To identify with 
the fantasy and the ‘irrationality’ of the attachment, the subject must go through an ideological 
shift based on challenges to its assumptions and beliefs. 
To reinforce our arguments, we analyse how Žižek prioritises the unconscious over the 
conscious in his treatment of ideologies.  In Žižek’s theory, the central feature of ideology (today) 
is that it is ‘fetishistic’, or uses conscious justifications to ‘displace’ underlying beliefs.  He 
contrasts this form against ‘symptomal’ concepts of ideology, which highlight false beliefs or lack 
of awareness.  For Žižek, subjects behave in ways that contradict their conscious values, and 
rationalise this discrepancy by transferring belief elsewhere, but the behaviour itself is what 
indicates their (unconscious) ideological attachment.  Consequently, ideology critique seems 
ineffective because people already know that their behaviour is contradictory in some sense.  
Against this point, we insist that the ways in which discrepancies are justified still involves 
assumptions and beliefs that can be analysed and challenged, and therefore even the most 
cynical fetishism is susceptible to a ‘symptomal’ ideology critique.  That is, while we agree with 
Žižek that beliefs are not false in some absolute sense, because all notions of reality are 
ideological, the fetish does not simply displace conscious belief, as it justifies displacement 
through other beliefs.  With this idea, it is then possible to examine various ideologies described 
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by Žižek, both in the way they relate to the positions we have outlined in previous chapters, and 
the particular beliefs and assumptions they contain. 
In the remaining sections, we explore how Žižek theorises potentials for ideological 
change in line with a radical politics in consumerist neoliberal capitalism.  While many of the 
strategies and obstacles he identifies are pertinent to this endeavour, we reconsider them in 
terms of the reciprocal connection between ideological levels, and the need for a negation that 
emerges from particular ideals.  To begin with, Žižek identifies various ways in which capitalism 
itself obstructs and diffuses radical politics.  He explains that the commodity form represents a 
fetish in practice which reproduces capitalism through behaviour; that consumerism creates a 
general demand to enjoy which replaces any specific authority figure; and that cultural protest and 
opposition are inadequate because, in becoming commodified, they lack a sufficiently radical 
political critique.  From our perspective, the focus on fetishistic behaviour can obscure how 
different ideological rationalisations commit to commodity fetishism to different extents.  Also, we 
contend, there is still a general authoritative principle in society to which ideologies are 
connected.  The different attachments to capitalism may then be contested by oppositional ideas, 
and we maintain that such ideas can even survive within commodified cultural channels, because 
radical messages exceed depoliticised forms of presentation. 
In terms of radical political agency, our main point of interest is in Žižek’s treatment of the 
Lacanian ‘act’, or a point at which a subject does something unsanctioned within the existing 
symbolic horizon, and causes a shift in what is deemed possible.  In this way, the act indicates a 
certain potential for self-determination, in which the subject obliterates its previous perspective 
and adopts a new one.  Our focus here is on what motivates a subject to act in a way that may 
lead to radical political change.  Specifically, we see that if an act is to be more than spontaneous 
voluntarism, it has to have been already rationalised according to a symbolically articulated idea, 
which implies that conscious experience has already caused an ideological shift.  In our view, 
Žižek does not fully confront the repercussion that the new symbolic order reflects the causes of 
the act, so that the outcome results from its specific form.  We then connect this idea of radical 
agency to Žižek’s emphasis on class struggle, in which he constructs a theory of universal social 
antagonism based around ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ elements in society.  For us, any act which 
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negates the current order to inspire such principles must be formulated in these class terms in 
advance. 
In considering the form and content of a politics which attempts to eradicate existing 
forms of exclusion, Žižek’s approach also focuses on negative refusals that may open up 
understanding of alternative possibilities.  In this sense, we argue, his resistance to democracy 
works as a way of marking the distinction between politics within the current symbolic horizon and 
a class politics of the excluded, but the question remains how to develop this latter.  Here, Žižek 
views non-participation, at least in widely recognised forms of activism, as especially productive.  
We assert that, while there is a certain power in refusal, it is necessary to define more clearly 
ways in which it may be combined with recognised forms of political participation for maximum 
effect, especially if radical politics is to bridge a gap between everyday thinking and transcendent 
ideals.  This form of mediation is more evident in Žižek’s vision of ‘the Party’ as an organising 
force for radical change, in that he emphasises cooperation between radical leadership and a 
wider political movement.  As with Marcuse’s concept of education, we reiterate that the Party 
already implies a certain political direction, rather than the more fully negative role of revealing 
contingency that Žižek suggests.  Even so, it functions as a form of mediation between everyday 
politics and radical ideals, and the ideological direction it represents may be essential to 
challenging conscious affirmative beliefs. 
These considerations of political negation and rejection connect back to Žižek’s concept 
of ideology, as they imply that affirmative ideologies attach themselves to capitalism regardless of 
conscious experience.  Our aim is to stress the role of particular ideological direction in facilitating 
negation and the possibility that affirmative ideologies are still susceptible to change precisely 
through challenges to their beliefs.  In terms of the type of radical political challenge desired, 
these aims coincide with Žižek’s, and we generally defend him from accusations that his politics is 
overly narrow and exclusive, or lacks specific goals.
2
  Nevertheless, we understand some 
criticisms in this respect, especially against Žižek’s implications that a more indeterminate form of 
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negation is the first step to realising social change.
3
  Indeed, this issue of the balance between 
negation and oppositional ideological content returns throughout, as we understand that certain 
radical ideologies and movements are the condition for rendering affirmative ideologies contingent 
in a way that points towards class consciousness.  
                                                             
3 The arguments here include that: Žižek’s concept of a pre-symbolic subject suggests the possibility of 
ideological negation prior to re-entering the symbolic (Boucher, Johnston); the act never simply negates 
but is already politicised or implies alternative content (Grigg, Marchart, Stavrakakis); Žižek’s approach to 
political refusal may initially be more destructive than constructive (Dean); it is not always clear how the 
leader and the Party function without being dogmatic (Sharpe and Boucher). 
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II. Key Concepts 
i) Symbolic, Real and Imaginary 
Žižek’s use of Lacanian theory in many ways provides a structure for our concept of ideology, in 
the way that the main elements of the psyche — Imaginary, Symbolic and Real — create a 
central dialectical relationship within subjectivity.  As previously mentioned, notions such as 
repressed erotic instinct (Marcuse) or utopian impulse (Jameson) become, in Žižek’s terms, an 
indeterminable ‘lack’ in the subject, or simply the excess of interpellation into symbolic life 
(linguistic consciousness).  The constitutive gap formed by this Real remainder of any particular 
Symbolic order then implies that ideology is always present and always contingent, because 
symbolic representation cannot be identical to its object.  Furthermore, the connection between 
the Symbolic and the Imaginary establishes our two different levels of ideological attachment, in 
the sense that entry into the Symbolic links the subject to the social order, and the Imaginary 
‘fantasy’ structures rationalisations of that connection.  We also maintain that Žižek’s notion of 
capitalism as ‘symbolic Real’ (which resembles absent History in Jameson’s theory) effectively 
represents the split between affirmative and oppositional ideologies. 
The relationship between the Symbolic and the Real is one of the most important in 
Žižek’s theory.  The Symbolic is the horizon of linguistic representation, within which all 
consciousness functions, and therefore forms the boundaries of experienced reality.  It is the 
structure which enables explanation, or the ‘Other Scene external to the thought whereby the 
form of the thought is already articulated in advance’,
4
 and the stability of our reality thus relies on 
stability of meaning within the Symbolic.  The Real is the remainder of symbolisation, or that 
which resists symbolisation absolutely.  It is not an actual reality beyond the Symbolic, but the 
unnameable negative excess of representation itself, which emerges as an effect of language.  In 
short, whatever meaning the Symbolic provides, the Real is that which points to its contingency, 
but can only be embodied in contradictions in the symbolic reality.  There is then only symbolic 
reality and the negative gap between symbolic representation and its object, so ideology is not an 
escape from reality into mystification, but the creation of reality to escape absence of meaning.  
More specifically, the Symbolic needs ideology to hide its lack (of totality), or to suture the 
symbolic field with a ‘Master-Signifier’ that acts as a guarantor of meaning.  This Master-Signifier 
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is ultimately tautological (follow God’s word because it is God’s word), and ideology is structured 
around it, to keep the subject from confronting its emptiness.  In this way, the purpose of 
ideological analysis is ‘to detect, behind the dazzling splendour of the element which holds it 
together [...] this self-referential, tautological, performative operation’.
5
 
The particular forms of ideology that obscure the lack are part of the Imaginary, which is 
also within the realm of the signifier, but more specific to the individual ego.  With imaginary 
identification the subject creates the ideal image of itself (ideal ego), as opposed to symbolic 
identification, in which the subject views itself from the perspective of an (imagined) authority 
figure (ego ideal).  However, symbolic identification overdetermines the Imaginary, so the ideal 
ego falls under the gaze of the Symbolic, and is structured through the ego ideal.  Žižek explains 
that ‘the subject must identify himself with the imaginary other’, that is, imagine his identity as that 
of an external perception, and this ‘imaginary self-experience is for the subject the way to 
misrecognize his radical dependence on [...] the symbolic order as his decentred cause’.
6
  
Subjects then formulate an imaginary ‘fantasy’ that structures their experience of reality and 
enables them to rationalise their position in the social order.  The subject’s entry into symbolic 
meaning must be anchored in some external reason, to avoid confronting the contingency of the 
Symbolic.  Thus, the fantasy fills in the imaginary desire of the Other, so that the subject ‘is 
loaded with a symbolic mandate’, and ‘given a place in the intersubjective network of symbolic 
relations’.
7
 
From these basic definitions, ideology can be seen as both necessary and incomplete, 
because there is no objective reality, and representation is always unequal to its object.  These 
concepts also indicate two levels of ideology, which comprise an initial base attachment to the 
Symbolic and the fantasy structure which retroactively provides a reason for that attachment.  The 
Real, meanwhile, signifies a certain instability in all ideology, or a limit of the Symbolic that the 
fantasy must repress.  For our purposes, the other question here is whether these concepts can 
register a difference between ‘affirmative’ and ‘oppositional’ symbolic attachments, as it seem that 
subjects must already have accepted or rejected the social order prior to any rationalisations.  In 
this sense it appears important to view the Symbolic both as an overall limit of representation, 
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contrasted only by negativity, and according to the horizons of specific fantasies or subject 
positions, which relate in different ways to the Master-Signifier. 
The first significant point here is that Žižek recognises certain ‘empty’ or shared Master-
Signifiers which act as central points in the (affirmative) ideological field.  These signifiers suture 
the Symbolic at a higher level than individual ego ideals, and make ideological struggle a matter 
of attempting to ‘fill’ the empty Master-Signifiers with specific meanings.
8
  For example, the empty 
Master-Signifier ‘democracy’ is central to many ideologies in late capitalist societies, but each 
accords it a particular content, and the symbolic order overall includes these competing claims to 
authority.  Žižek thus distinguishes between the symbolic order and the ego ideal, or between the 
Symbolic as horizon of common language, and ego ideals as different sets of values within it.
9
  He 
explains that ‘the ego ideal is symbolic, the point of my symbolic identification, the point in the big 
Other from which I observe (and judge) myself’.
10
  It is not that the ego ideal is the symbolic order, 
but it is of the symbolic order, and the point of identification within it. 
If this distinction points to a variety of ‘affirmative’ ideologies, we can assume there are 
also ‘oppositional’ ideologies that resist the authority of the empty Master-Signifier, yet still 
operate within the Symbolic.  For example, some ideologies may not see ‘democracy’ as a 
Master-Signifier, but remain ideologies, and indicate that democracy is ‘only’ a dominant idea, and 
non-democracy remains symbolically representable.  In such ideologies, a sense of the Real is 
encountered, although they are not real in a completely negative sense, and what Žižek calls the 
‘symbolic Real’ becomes significant.  Žižek pairs all the terms in the Lacanian trinity in their 
different permutations to create six different positions (real Real, symbolic Real, imaginary Real, 
symbolic Symbolic, imaginary Symbolic and imaginary Imaginary).  In this schema, both 
imaginary Real and symbolic Real describe points at which subjects confront the limits of 
symbolisation, as opposed to the real Real of absolute negativity.  The imaginary Real is the thing 
that annoys us in the Other that we can never identify, while the symbolic Real is a field of 
symbolisation beyond the ego ideal, which can be identified in some sense, but not included in 
any symbolic position, such as meaningless scientific formulae in quantum physics, where 
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concepts are identified that affect reality but do not seem to fit within it.
11
  Most importantly, 
Žižek’s other common example of the symbolic Real is capitalism itself, which, he explains, 
‘remains the same in all possible symbolization’, and exists beyond the multitude of cultures as 
the ‘neutral meaningless underlying structure’.
12
  This point effectively splits the Symbolic around 
capitalism as an absent Master-Signifier, which defines a point of differentiation between 
affirmative and negative ideologies. 
This association between capitalism and the Real can thus be integrated into our concept 
of ideology, although the exact definition of the relationship requires further clarification 
(especially since Žižek does not always specify that capitalism is the symbolic Real, rather than 
the Real as such).  First, it may seem that placing capitalism into the Real implies it cannot be 
theorised positively.  For example, Sharpe asks how Žižek can make this equivalence in the 
name of ‘critique of capitalism’, when, ‘logically, it can only mean the collapse into one-
dimensionality’,
13
 where capitalism becomes an effective background that cannot be 
outmanoeuvred.  Alternatively, rather than raising capitalism to the absolute, the opposite issue is 
that the Real is lowered to the level of the particular.  Butler, for example, argues that either the 
Real is some ahistorical principle, or it indicates specific needs for immanent critique that require 
no general term.  She states that the Real as ahistorical principle misses specific ‘failures and 
discontinuities produced by social relations that invariably exceed the signifier and whose 
exclusions are necessary for the stabilization of the signifier’.
14
  But then, if capitalism is the Real, 
‘the absences that structure discourse, […] are defined in relation to the discourse itself’, not ‘in 
every instance from an ahistorical “bar”’.
15
  In the first case, however, although Žižek sees that 
capitalism has a universality, because it does not relate to a particular civilisation, it is not ‘the 
entire empirical reality of capitalism’ that is real, but ‘the underlying matrix of its functioning’.
16
  
That is, capitalism goes beyond any single culture or language, and cannot be fully symbolised, 
but cuts across cultures, rather than structuring everything in them, and non-capitalist 
symbolisations remain possible.  In the second case, capitalism is an example of the impossibility 
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12 Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
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of a symbolic order without a lack, for Žižek, but that impossibility is only inferred from particular 
antagonisms, so does not precede them.  As Žižek states, ‘the political struggle for hegemony 
[…], and the “non-historical” bar or impossibility are thus strictly correlative’.
17
  Every particular 
struggle is sustained by the impossibility of non-antagonistic totality, and capitalism describes an 
especially expansive instance of such struggle. 
In this way, capitalism as Real is neither an untouchable ideological background, nor an 
embodiment of an eternal principle.  However, it is still not clear why we should try to resolve the 
antagonisms in capitalism, if all societies are inevitably antagonistic.  Thus, Butler wonders 
whether anything really new could be ‘produced from an analysis of the social field that remains 
restricted to inversions, aporias and reversals that work regardless of time and place’, and 
whether ‘these reversals produce something other than their own structurally identical 
repetitions’.
18
  Meanwhile, Sharpe criticises Žižek for focusing on ‘antinomy’, or irresolvable 
antagonism, rather than particular ‘contradictions’, because it facilitates an escape from empirical 
political analysis,
19
 and normative values that tell us ‘whether our future acts will bring about a 
“better” or “worse” Other’.
20
  But, for Žižek, radical oppositional politics revolves around the actual 
needs of subjects excluded from rights and opportunities in society.  As such, empirical examples 
are the way in which ‘antinomy’ is recognised and opposed, and Žižek does not suggest that the 
failure of representation makes it irrelevant which symbolic order is dominant.  Rather, the 
subjects who embody contradiction make change necessary, and while there is a sense of 
structural repetition, as Butler says, because contradictions always emerge, it does not render all 
forms of exclusion equal. 
The concept of the symbolic Real and its association with capitalism therefore remains 
valid in our understanding, and suggests a radically oppositional form of ideology defined around 
it.  This association is itself an ideological construct, because, even if market fluctuations really 
affect people’s lives, to define them as an ‘underlying matrix’ is to symbolise them, and 
subjectively project a structure or narrative.  As in Jameson’s concept of history, it is only an 
alternative to ideologies that posit a different organising logic, or treat fields such as the cultural 
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and the economic as distinct entities.  But consequently, as with Jameson, there are important 
political ramifications, because the symbolic Real allows us not only to understand that the 
Symbolic is contingent, but also to see what this contingency excludes.  Laclau makes the point 
that capitalism cannot be the Real, since ‘capitalism as such is dislocated by the Real, and it is 
open to contingent hegemonic retotalizations’.
21
  But, Žižek is effectively ‘re-totalising’ capitalism 
as the (symbolic) Real, so as to represent the hidden split in the Symbolic that causes social 
exclusion.  Although the forces are never transparent, capitalism can act as a point of contention 
within the Symbolic, to reveal socially excluded subjects. 
 
ii) Subjectivity 
One implication of the gap within the Symbolic is that of an inherent potential in subjectivity to 
transcend its own ideological boundaries, if the subject can recognise the contingency of the 
Master-Signifier.  In our theory of ideology, this potential seems to represent precisely the 
possibility of alternative thinking confronting the limits of belief that each individual holds.  
However, in other aspects of Žižek’s Lacanian theory, any subjective recognition of this gap 
becomes problematic.  Specifically, despite a constant drive to exceed symbolic boundaries, 
desire, fantasy and superego function to block recognition of contingency, and maintain subjective 
identity.  As Žižek presents it, the subject’s irrational ‘enjoyment’ of its basic symbolic attachment 
renders the fantasy’s actual content superfluous, and political change does not appear plausible 
as a result of counter-ideological claims, or contradictory knowledge and experience.  Conversely, 
we argue, it is important to recognise a mutual dependency and influence between base 
attachment and coherent rationalisation, to establish grounds for change through consciousness. 
As we have seen, the symbolic or conscious subject is necessarily incomplete due to the 
failure of representation, and imagines an external reason for its particular attachment to hide its 
fundamental contingency.  The circuit of subjectivity has further complications, however, 
described by Žižek as ‘the square of desire, fantasy, lack in the Other and drive pulsating around 
some unbearable surplus-enjoyment’.
22
  The first point here is that drive is not a biological instinct, 
but a raw sense of lack, or incompleteness, emerging from symbolic subjectivity.  As Žižek puts it, 
‘drive is quite literally the very “drive” to break the All of continuity in which we are embedded, to 
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introduce a radical imbalance into it’.
23
  To pursue this negative excess of subjectivity would then 
involve exiting the symbolic order altogether, so within subjectivity drive is sublimated into desire 
through the fantasy.  In this process, ‘lack’ is represented as the apparent ‘loss’ of some object 
(objet petit a), which is then paradoxically ‘the object causing our desire and at the same time [...] 
posed retroactively by this desire’.
24
  That is, the desire seems always-already present, but is the 
result of sublimating the drive created by symbolic subjectivity.  Drive is therefore focused on an 
object it can never reach, because doing so would reveal that the object is not the lost ‘Thing’ 
after all.  But even so, the consequent repetition of circling the object partially satisfies drive, and 
to that extent its ‘aim is realized in its very repeated failure to realize its goal’.
25
 
In this schema, the fantasy’s role is to bestow fetishistic value on objet petit a, and protect 
it from contradiction by ensuring it is never attained or fulfilled.  It also presents desire as the 
desire of some Other, to ground it in an absolute external source.  From our perspective, the task 
is then to seek the limits of the fantasy and its ability to enable the subject to represent itself to 
itself coherently according to a specific desire, against potentially contradictory experiences.  
However, in Žižek’s terms, the particular content of the fantasy is less relevant, because it is not 
really susceptible to such contradiction.  First, he explains, where social antagonisms cannot be 
denied, the fantasy must posit some other external agent as cause of these problems.  In other 
words, the ‘fantasy is a means for an ideology to take its own failure into account in advance’.
26
  
For example, Žižek says, in fascism the Jews are held responsible for all social antagonisms, and 
are the way the fantasy displaces the intrinsic impossibility of its utopian vision.  Moreover, since 
symbolic attachment precedes the fantasy, it is ultimately held firm by the partial jouissance or 
enjoyment the subject receives from being within its circuit, so symbolic law is primarily obeyed 
not through justification based on the Other’s desire, but due to this basic unconscious 
acceptance.  It does not then seem that the fantasy has to be clear or consistent.  Rather, it 
merely has to keep deflecting or distorting information and experiences that might otherwise point 
to its contingency, and the irrationality of the core obedience. 
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In fact, Žižek states, the ‘stain’ of irrationality, or surplus over the symbolic identification, 
‘far from hindering the full submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very 
condition of it’.
27
  Specifically, as drive fulfils its aim, and the subject obeys attachment, the 
‘superego’ emerges as ‘an unethical moral Law […] in which an obscene enjoyment sticks to 
obedience to the moral norms’.
28
  This superego commands subjects to obey ideology purely for 
the enjoyment, rather than their fantasy ‘rationalisation’.  For example, Žižek explains how Nazi 
soldiers and officers in the Holocaust had an ‘imaginary screen of satisfactions, myths, and so 
on’, that allowed them to maintain a ‘human’ distance from their actions, or claim they were 
merely doing a job.  But, because this job permitted sadism, in that duty itself involved inflicting 
suffering, the participants would also have experienced ‘the real of the perverse (sadistic) 
jouissance in what they were doing’.
29
  The subject denies responsibility for the sadistic action, 
because it is duty or ‘objective necessity’, but is in fact still ‘deriving enjoyment from what is 
imposed on him’.
30
  Indeed, the superego actually inflicts guilt on the subject because of symbolic 
rationality.  For Žižek, ‘the true superego injunction’ is a general prohibitive ‘You shall not!’, 
without particular content, which explains that, ‘you yourself should know or guess what you 
should not do, so that you are put in an impossible position of always and a priori being under 
suspicion of violating some (unknown) prohibition’.
31
  Guilt comes from symbolic subjectivity itself, 
because the superego is a reminder that symbolically mediated action marks a ‘loss’ of subjective 
wholeness, or pure enjoyment.  The superego command to simply enjoy is the obverse of the 
attempt to justify behaviour through the fantasy of the Other, and marks the strength of the 
subject’s libidinal attachment.
32
 
Our issue with this structure of fantasy, enjoyment and superego is that it appears to 
block any way for the subject to recognise its own lack, and symbolic contingency.  In Žižek’s 
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terms, the fantasy is flexible enough to cover flaws in rationalisations to the point that, when ‘an 
ideology is really “holding us” […] we do not feel any opposition between it and reality’, even when 
an apparent contradiction is encountered, so ‘the ideology succeeds in determining the mode of 
our everyday experience of reality itself’.
33
  Also, the subject is hooked onto the Symbolic through 
an irrational enjoyment of interpellation as such, or the drive’s partial satisfaction according to a 
certain Master-Signifier.  It therefore seems that the subject can easily change symbolic identity 
within the scope of this Master-Signifier, by interpreting it in different ways, but is unable to go 
beyond it, because what remains is ‘the “irrational” fixation on some symbolic Cause’, to which 
‘we stick regardless of the consequences’.
34
  In such notions, there is no potential for dissonance 
between fantasy and experience, and a line is drawn between experience and knowledge 
changing how the subject affirms the Master-Signifier, and the impossibility of changing the 
Master-Signifier itself. 
As we see it, this concept of subjectivity in Žižek’s theory, whether relating to the 
definition of ideology or questions of political agency, disconnects rationalisation from ideological 
commitment, and denies any mutual influence between belief and attachment.  Yet, in our 
understanding, if the fantasy has to adapt as the subject experiences social antagonism and the 
contradiction of its rationalised values, then experience affects the subject, and it is not obvious 
that the Master-Signifier represents the limit of such effect.  In other words, if the fantasy must 
emerge ‘after’ attachment as a way of structuring it, that structure may subsequently influence the 
conditions of attachment themselves, and adaptations of the fantasy may require a different 
Master-Signifier.  There are circumstances in which the fantasy can no longer deflect the 
contradictions, and, while at the core of the subject there is always that libidinal attachment and 
partial enjoyment, the forms of that attachment in terms of the behaviour it engenders can change 
at such points.  Here, we can follow Butler’s description of the ‘interrelation’ between interpellation 
and fantasy, which means they are not separate levels but fully intertwined.  As she explains, 
social norms are ‘incorporated and interpreted features of existence that are sustained by the 
idealizations furnished by fantasy’.
35
  If we equate symbolic attachment to social norms here, the 
point is that fantasy itself conditions whether the same norms can still be accepted. 
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iii) Traversing the Fantasy 
Žižek’s approach to ideological change is thus different from our own, in that it focuses on 
negation, or attempting to reveal the irrationality of fantasy as such, rather than irrationalities in 
the content of the fantasy.  In Žižek’s Lacanian terms, subjects must ‘traverse the fantasy’ and 
recognise that there is no big Other, or external symbolic mandate.  At this point, subjects 
become conscious of the contingency of the Symbolic, and this recognition changes their 
attachment to it.  In our view, while recognising contingency is important to radical ideological 
change, the only plausible route to this recognition is still that of challenging the particular content 
of the fantasy through contradictory knowledge and experience.  Without this understanding, 
traversal becomes either a matter of seemingly random voluntarism, or of subjective 
disintegration.  We argue that, while Žižek does not ultimately view traversing the fantasy in such 
terms, he maintains a concept of negation that does not always indicate how alternative positive 
beliefs are the necessary catalyst for change.  In particular, with political change, as opposed to 
psychoanalytic treatment, traversing the fantasy implies ideological guidance through specific 
political values, and the impossibility of a total break, as the new ideology (which recognises the 
general contingency of ideology) develops within the old. 
Žižek explains, via Lacan, that ‘traversing the fantasy’ is the way the subject recognises 
that there is no ‘big Other’, and that all beliefs are contingent.  In the fantasy, the big Other is ‘the 
subject presumed to know’ how things really are, whose desire creates a sense of an external 
mandate.  Lacanian psychoanalysis then aims at getting the analsyand to stop positing what the 
big Other wants, and accept the lack of any absolute reason for subjectivity.  As Žižek says, ‘the 
“dissolution of transference” takes place when the analysand renounces filling out the void, the 
lack in the Other’.
36
  At this point, there is no guarantee of meaning from the Symbolic, and all that 
remains is the terrifying realisation for the subject that it is solely responsible for its next move.  
This position is that of ‘absolute knowledge’ in Hegelian dialectics, for Žižek, which recognises 
that meaning always falls short and totalisations consistently fail, and thus implies a ‘system’ of 
failures in which ‘the breakdown of a totalization itself begets another totalization’.
37
  Absolute 
knowledge is a subjective understanding that contradiction is at the heart of identity, or the idea 
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that symbolic suturing is contingent, and that the contingency of a particular symbolic order is only 
grasped from the position of another.  It is therefore a kind of truth, in the sense that it recognises 
the distortion of perspective as such, meaning that ‘what appears to us as our inability to know the 
thing indicates a crack in the thing itself, so that our very failure to reach the full truth is the 
indicator of truth’.
38
 
In terms of how to traverse the fantasy, Žižek states that subjects must first identify with it, 
or act fully in accordance with its dictates, rather than employing cynical or politically correct 
criticism.  In other words, it is necessary to make the fantasy appear in all its absurdity and 
incoherence by following it literally, against the unwritten rules (enjoyment) that support it, instead 
of allowing it to adapt in accordance with the basic symbolic attachment.  For example, he 
describes a satirical TV show broadcast in Sarajevo during the Bosnian War that, ‘instead of 
bemoaning the tragic fate of the Bosnians, […] daringly mobilised all the clichés about the “stupid 
Bosnians” which were a commonplace in Yugoslavia’, indicating that ‘true solidarity leads through 
direct confrontation with the obscene racist fantasies […] through the playful identification with 
them’.
39
  Elsewhere, he defines identification as a matter of insisting on an option that is formally 
given, but not really meant to be chosen.  So, if two friends are competing over a job promotion 
and the one who is offered it politely offers to step aside so the other can take it, the other would 
shatter the social rules by really following the fantasy and accepting it.
40
  This acting in 
accordance with the letter of the law undermines the subject’s enjoyment of obedience, and 
reveals its arbitrary nature. 
The main issue here is that of identifying the status of the subject at the point of 
recognising that the big Other and fantasy are subjective suppositions.  Specifically, this 
conscious recognition emerges within language, and the meaning of language is only stable if 
guaranteed by some Master-Signifier.  As such, the subject can only recognise the contingency of 
the fantasy, and the libidinal attachment to its Master-Signifier, if the authority of that Master-
Signifier is first undermined by another that contradicts it.  Therefore, when the subject identifies 
with its attachment as a matter of (partial) enjoyment, and embraces the fundamental lack within 
itself, as opposed to the loss of something, there is already an ideological motivation behind that 
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identification that implies certain responses.  Žižek is not always clear on this point, as he 
maintains notions of traversal as a negative step into the unknown, or suggests a temporal 
process that first dissolves the Symbolic itself, and only subsequently reconstructs a new 
symbolic identity and Master-Signifier.  On one hand, this temporality is a purely analytical way of 
showing how the Symbolic ‘posits its own presupposition’, or makes itself appear universal after 
the fact.  For example, Žižek considers via Schelling how the symbolic subject begins, and 
theorises that symbolic subjectivity cannot be accounted for, unless there is already some subject 
that brings itself into symbolic consciousness.  Here, he explains that there is no actual state of 
pre-symbolic subjectivity, and that the concept comes from ‘the need for the form of mythical 
narrative’, which ‘arises when one endeavours to break the circle of the symbolic order and to 
give an account of its genesis (“origins”)’.
41
  But, on the other hand, he also states that drive 
should be considered as pre-symbolic, in that, ‘The “subject before subjectivization” is a positive 
force in itself, the infinite force of negativity called by Freud the “death drive”.’
42
  This idea 
changes the meaning of drive and the Real, as it implies ‘an a priori structural emptiness 
preexisting the sequences of subjectifying identifications’, rather than a gap ‘hollowed out through 
the increasingly apparent contingency of all operators of subjectification’,
43
 and because it ‘re-
naturalises the drives, returning them […] to biological instincts’.
44
  Also, through this idea, Žižek 
presents traversing the fantasy as repeating some founding moment of symbolic attachment after 
consciousness, in that ‘the death-drive does the negative work of destruction, of suspending the 
existing order of Law, thereby, as it were, clearing the table, opening up the space for sublimation, 
which can (re)start the work of creation’.
45
  Thus, drive somehow restarts the subjective circuit 
from within the symbolic order, and this ‘wiping the slate clean’ necessarily ‘precedes any positive 
gesture of enthusiastic identification with a Cause’.
46
  In discussing the film Fight Club, Žižek then 
emphasises a scene in which the main character literally beats himself up, and explains that ‘the 
pure subject emerges only through this experience of radical self-degradation’, emptying it ‘of all 
                                                             
41 Žižek, Indivisible Remainder, p. 9. 
42 IDLC, p. 344. 
43 Adrian Johnston, Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2008), p. 231.  On this point, see also: Rex Butler, Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory 
(London: Continuum, 2005), p. 96. 
44 Boucher, The Charmed Circle of Ideology: A Critique of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler and Žižek (Melbourne: 
Re.press, 2008), p. 219. 
45
 FTKN, p. lxxxiii. 
46 TS, p. 179. 
Slavoj Žižek 
211 
 
symbolic support which could confer a modicum of dignity’.
47
  That is, first, annihilation of 
subjective identity destroys the attachment to the Master (or big Other), and then the subject can 
take the next (revolutionary) step. 
In our understanding, the notion of a ‘pure subject’ is problematic even as a concept, 
because it obscures how subjectivity is the compromise of symbolic identity, which has 
repercussions for considering political change.  If the subject is the cause of subjective 
identification, there is no point at which this empty subject exists, and no way of returning to it.  
Rather, the subject is always in the circuit of subjectivity, and the empty subject is nothing but a 
concept posited retrospectively from within subjective identification.  The idea of a subject 
emptying itself of all symbolic support prior to assuming a new symbolic attachment then detracts 
from focus on the kinds of political ideas that may allow subjects to understand the lack of the big 
Other, and influence their response to that idea.  This issue becomes more apparent where Žižek 
correlates the Lacanian psychoanalytic process to shifts in political ideas.  In traversing the 
fantasy in psychoanalysis, the analyst assumes an effective ‘empty’ mediating presence, or a 
subject presumed to know all the answers, for the analysand.  Thus, Žižek explains, ‘there is a 
desire that remains even after we have traversed our fundamental fantasy, a desire not sustained 
by a fantasy, [...] the desire of the analyst’.
48
  Similarly, Žižek claims that in politics, because 
change must occur through a transferential relationship, ‘a leader is necessary to trigger the 
enthusiasm for a Cause, to bring about the radical change in the subjective position of his 
followers, to “transubstantiate” their identity’.
49
  The difference here, we contend, is that political 
leaders do not hold the supposed place of knowledge ‘empty’, because they attempt to trigger 
enthusiasm for a particular cause.  They can bring subjects to perceive potentials for change only 
by convincing them through alternative universalised ideas that a certain kind of change is 
needed.  Conversely, as Bryant says, it seems impossible ‘to get a politics out of the discourse of 
the analyst’, because it ‘does not aim at collective engagement or the common’.
50
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We can thus only embrace the ‘always-already’ paradox of subjectivity, in which the effect 
posits its own cause, and therefore alternative ideology is the prerequisite for negation.
51
  In these 
terms, it is not so much a case of repeating the gesture that set the circuit in motion; rather, 
certain types of ideological influence allow the subject to recognise symbolic contingency as such, 
and that recognition is part of the ideological shift.  As Žižek says, the big Other cannot pre-exist 
and determine subjective identity, because it is only imagined as such by the subject.  Yet, the 
subject does not construct a big Other from nothing, but is guided by established discourses 
embedded in language.  In this way, recognising the inexistence of the big Other grants the 
subject a relatively self-reflexive position from which to question dominant principles.  The point is 
to enable a more open politics that challenges existing power relations because it understands 
contingency, against the alternative of positing ‘perfect self-identity in some form of otherness’, 
which ‘will always function as a barrier to our political acts’.
52
  Often, Žižek implies just that, 
especially when traversing the fantasy is interpreted as absolute knowledge, which recognises its 
own inevitable inclusion in the contingent symbolic series.  It also seems to be the necessary 
conclusion when Žižek formulates a politics of negation through socially excluded subjects, who 
embody ‘truth’ because their exclusion reveals contradictions in the social whole.
53
  Here, 
recognising contingency and negating the existing order appear to involve an already-formulated 
ideological position which identifies with the needs of the excluded.  However, Žižek generally 
does not explicitly acknowledge the need for a clear positive ideology (with particular beliefs, 
assumptions and values) to facilitate negation.  For instance, where he discusses traversing the 
fantasy through over-identification, he does not examine the kind of consciousness required to 
make such gestures.  In his examples (the Bosnian TV show, the insincere job offer), identifying 
with the fantasy does not appear to mean actually affirming it, but pretending to take it seriously, 
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to consciously enact its contradictions from an already-formulated counter-hegemonic position.  It 
therefore depends on the prior recognition of flaws from an oppositional perspective. 
Our approach also indicates that only certain forms of negation imply an oppositional 
political response, or reveal symbolic contingency in a way that points towards radical freedom 
and agency.  In other words, there may be various ways of reacting to the idea that reality is 
ideology, and not all imply a radical Left position.
54
  Without emphasising this point it is, as Glynos 
says, not clear ‘precisely what the difference is between crossing any one of a whole array of 
social fantasies (in the plural) and crossing the fundamental social fantasy (in the singular)’, and 
‘too easy to abstain from offering any response, even if we accept the necessarily negative 
gesture that this ethical move entails’.
55
  In this respect, we maintain that the difference between 
traversing particular fantasies and the universal fantasy is located in certain ideologies which 
identify with subordinate positions in existing power relations.  With Žižek’s theory, however, and 
even his politics, pure negation often appears to be a prerequisite of change (see Sections V and 
VI).  For this reason, there is some validity in criticisms that he uses ideas such as contingency 
and absolute knowledge ‘to promote blind Faith at the expense of rational belief or unconditional 
Fidelity at the expense of critical theory’.
56
  From our perspective, it is because Žižek connects 
ideology primarily to enjoyment, with rationalisation through fantasy its mere effect, that he does 
not consistently affirm the inseparability of negation and particular oppositional beliefs, which 
already fill in the fantasy as they empty out the previous content.  
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III. Internalisation 
i) Ideology as Fetish 
According to our position, it should be possible to disrupt ideologies in the sense that the 
relationship between conscious belief (knowing) and unconscious belief (obeying) is one of 
mutual influence, and under certain conditions the fantasy may struggle to ‘rationalise’ behaviour, 
or support the existing attachment to a particular Master-Signifier.  To establish the plausibility of 
this notion further, we must then also confront Žižek’s concept of ideological ‘displacement’, which 
disconnects knowledge from obedience by understanding that subjects are often aware of social 
problems and oppose them in theory, while justifying behaviour that reproduces those problems 
through a ‘fetish’.  For Žižek, this mode of ideology renders traditional ideology critique less 
useful, as it is no longer a matter of revealing contradictions through ‘symptoms’, but of showing 
how conscious awareness denies a deeper attachment to obedience and enjoyment.  Against this 
idea, we argue that there is no clear distinction between ‘fetishistic’ and ‘symptomal’ ideology, 
because fetishes still rely on conscious belief, and symptomal analysis remains the crucial factor 
in uncovering them. 
Displacement, for Žižek, means that ideological statements are less matters of error and 
ignorance than ways of justifying behaviour that contrasts with consciously held values.  Such 
statements take the form of ‘I know, but nevertheless’, such as, ‘I know God does not exist, but 
nevertheless I participate in religious activities out of respect for others, and because they have 
communal benefits’.  This ‘lying by way of the truth’ is honest in terms of conscious belief, but 
represses unconscious belief (obedience to religion).
57
  In politics, it may involve legitimising a 
pragmatic political measure that violates theoretical principles, on the basis that extraordinary 
circumstances make it necessary.  The fetish of necessity allows the politician to avoid 
acknowledging actual belief (and enjoyment) in the measure.  Alternatively, for Žižek, the subject 
might recognise that an action will have disastrous consequences but must do it for a higher 
reason, or that there is a ‘split between the moral norms I usually follow and the unconditional 
injunction I feel obliged to obey’.
58
  Žižek’s example here is Abraham, willing to break moral law 
and kill his own son to obey God, even though his obedience overrides morality.   
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According to Žižek, this mode of ideology is different from traditional Marxian concepts, in 
which illusion is at the level of awareness, because distortion is in social reality itself, at the level 
of action that maintains the existing order.  Everyday activities such as using money thus become 
ideological, in that people know money does not have value as such, but act as though it 
embodies wealth, which reproduces capitalist relations.  In Žižek’s terms, these people ‘are 
fetishists in practice, not in theory’, and misrecognise that, in the social reality of commodity 
exchange, ‘they are guided by the fetishistic illusion’.
59
  In displacement, subjects thus project 
their unconscious belief onto an external fetish object, which protects them from the 
inconsistencies of that belief, because they do not experience it as their own.  The fetish can be 
an object (money), concept (God, political circumstances), or even another person, such as in 
cynical ideology which projects a subject supposed to believe in the morality of norms that the 
cynic knows are corrupt and unjust.  Whether or not such believers really exist, the cynic uses the 
concept to justify acting in accordance with these norms on the grounds that everyone else does.  
As Žižek says, ‘in a definite, closed multitude of subjects, each person can play this role for all the 
others’, with each acting based on their belief that the others believe.
60
  In effect, cynics do not 
‘believe in’ the authority of the Symbolic order but still ‘believe it’, and ‘feel bound by some 
symbolic commitment’.
61
 
The first question which arises is whether all ideology involves displacement, or whether it 
relates to a particular (contemporary) form.  Žižek in fact distinguishes between ‘symptomal’ 
ideology, in which ‘the ideological lie which structures our perception of reality is threatened by 
[...] cracks in the fabric of the ideological lie’, and the ‘fetishistic’ mode, in which ‘the embodiment 
of the Lie [...] enables us to sustain the unbearable truth’.
62
  He states that in today’s supposedly 
‘post-ideological’ era ideology functions ‘more and more’ in its fetishistic mode, which implies that 
fetishism is currently dominant but historically variable.  He also defines a semiotic square, in 
which ‘symptomal’ and ‘fetishistic’ positions are placed in opposition, with cynicism and 
fundamentalist on the side of fetish, and liberalism and ideologico-criticism being symptomal.
63
  In 
this understanding, symptomal cases do not mask some actual reality, because it is always a 
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matter of fantasy covering the irrationality of attachment, but indicate instances in which subjects 
rationalise their behaviour directly, and consciously believe in what they do. 
Conversely, Žižek suggests at other points that disavowal is central to ideology as such.  
For example, he says, ‘displacement is original and constitutive’, that the ‘most fundamental’ 
beliefs ‘are from the very outset “decentred” beliefs of the Other’, and that ‘the phenomenon of the 
“subject supposed to believe” is thus universal and structurally necessary’.
64
  The idea here is that 
subjects do not believe first and then displace their belief, but that the symbolic attachment is 
immediately and necessarily displaced into the desire of the Other.  In this sense, however, 
fetishistic displacement does not represent an opposition with symptomal forms, and we in fact 
infer from this idea that the two modes of ideology are intrinsically connected, or that symptomal 
ideology emerges from displacement and fetishist disavowal still relies on beliefs with identifiable 
symptoms.  As such, while Žižek’s concept of fetishism is crucial to understanding ideology, in 
that rationalisation is not always direct, and different rationalisations may maintain the same 
underlying belief, ideology critique is still a matter of examining how conscious beliefs support 
behaviour.  For Žižek, increased ideological fetishism makes ideology critique a matter of getting 
subjects to realise that they really believe in and enjoy their actions.  For us, the route to this 
realisation remains symptomal analysis, since all affirmative ideology still justifies behaviour by 
repressing alternative possibilities. 
To demonstrate the interconnection between the two modes, we can first show that 
symptomal ideologies are also fetishistic.  For example, in Žižek’s semiotic square, liberalism is a 
symptomal ideology which allows for ‘interpretive demystification’, according to which ‘an “honest” 
liberal democrat will have to admit that the content of his ideological premise belies its form, and 
thus will radicalize the form (the egalitarian axiom) by way of implementing the content more 
thoroughly’.
65
  According to this idea, when confronted with the lack of freedoms in liberal 
societies, liberals should insist on their values, and radically reimagine society to implement them, 
else they would submit to fetishistic cynicism that claims such ideals are impossible to realise.  
However, if, as Žižek says, the fantasy accounts for its own failures by blaming particular 
circumstances, the symptomal and fetishistic modes may be combined in a statement such as, ‘I 
know current liberal societies do not embody liberal values, but nevertheless we should maintain 
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existing institutions because reforms could bring us closer to the ideal.’  This statement 
constitutes a non-cynical, fetishistic liberalism.  Furthermore, Žižek defines fetish as something 
which, ‘far from obfuscating “realistic” knowledge of how things are, […] enables the subject to 
accept this knowledge without paying the full price for it’.
66
  He explains that everyone has 
fetishes which allow them to tolerate hardship, from spiritual experiences ‘which tell us that our 
social reality is mere appearance which does not really matter’, to our children ‘for whose good 
we do all the humiliating things in our jobs’.
67
  Yet in this sense, even traditional or religious 
ideological mystification is fetishistic, because it provides ways to accept the realities of social 
disparity and injustice.  For instance, belief in an afterlife, or belief that aristocrats are inherently 
superior to peasants, are fetishistic coping mechanisms (I know that society is unfair, but 
nevertheless I tolerate it because we will be rewarded in the afterlife) based in ignorance. 
At the same time, we can see in such examples that ‘error’ reappears in the fetish itself, 
which implies that fetishistic positions have analysable symptoms.  Specifically, the fetishistic 
statement ‘I know, but nevertheless…’ also includes a ‘because…’ which contains contestable 
reasoning.  While this ‘because’ involves more obviously fragile assumptions in traditional 
mystified forms of ideology (for instance, any evidence that religion is a human creation 
undermines notions of the afterlife), the principle can also be applied more generally.  The 
reformist position of the liberal fetishist, for example, is susceptible to symptomal analysis which 
indicates a more fundamental disconnect between liberal values and the social structure.  With 
fetishistic cynicism, meanwhile, the statement ‘I know social relations are unjust, but nevertheless 
I act in accordance with them’, is completed with ‘because’ clauses such as ‘they are too powerful 
to resist’, ‘everyone else believes’, or ‘human nature is intrinsically selfish’, just as a traditional 
ideological statement reasons its acceptance.  The cynic’s position therefore still relies on 
excluding certain notions — that altruistic behaviour is as natural as self-interested behaviour, that 
many people do not believe in official ideology, or that resistance often improves people’s lives. 
In Žižek’s theory, however, the fetishistic element of cynicism dominates, and becomes 
the archetypal form of postmodern ideology.  He accepts that society appears ‘post-ideological’ 
(in the symptomal sense, which understands that illusion is located in knowledge), because in the 
prevailing cynicism ‘people no longer believe in ideological truth; they do not take ideological 
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propositions seriously’.
68
  Rather, subjects are already aware that official ideological norms are 
bogus, and accept them nonetheless, so challenging this awareness appears largely irrelevant.  
In this view, cynics are fully aware of everything except their own ideological displacement.  From 
our perspective, in contrast, while cynics may be more generally aware of social relations, it is 
problematic to assume they have such a complete understanding of social issues.  According to 
Žižek, ‘the basic lesson of the failure of traditional Ideologie-Kritik’ is that ‘knowing is not enough, 
one can know what one is doing and still go ahead and do it’.
69
  But our point is that even when 
subjects ‘know’ in this sense, there is always some contradiction in this knowledge that means 
ideology critique remains useful. 
At times, Žižek links cynicism to specific  ideological propositions, but he still does not 
present these concepts as symptomal contradictions, or conclude that fetishistic disavowals 
revolve around conscious beliefs.  First, the need for the image of a subject presumed to believe, 
means that cynicism ‘can function only if this system is “out there”, publicly recognized’.
70
  That is, 
the whole theatre of elections, political posturing, scandal, and earnest discussion must continue 
for the image to remain credible, so there is no ‘pure post-politics’, in which parties simply 
promote their ability for competent administration, because ‘any political regime needs a 
supplementary “populist” level of self-legitimization’.
71
  Also, Žižek says, ‘enemy propaganda 
against radical emancipatory politics is by definition cynical’, but ‘precisely insofar as it does 
believe its own words, since its message is a resigned conviction [...] that any radical change will 
only make things worse’.
72
  As with Jameson’s market ideology, there appears to be real belief 
that forces of change must be stopped because qualitative improvement is impossible.  In our 
understanding, such cynical convictions about the other, either as dupe or enemy, represent 
symptomal elements that may be challenged.  Indeed, if cynicism relies on a subject supposed to 
believe, then either cynics are right and most people still believe, in which case propagandistic 
manipulation remains socially dominant (and should be the focus of ideology critique), or the cynic 
is wrong and few people really believe, in which case the cynic’s false assumptions are dominant 
(and should be the focus of ideology critique). 
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Žižek’s focus on ideology is thus a critique of form, or how ideologies relate to power, 
rather than content or beliefs.  He explains that dominant ideologies can be ‘true’ in terms of 
content, and the important point is ‘the way this content is related to the subjective position 
implied by its own process of enunciation’.
73
  For example, he says, when western military 
intervention is claimed to be motivated by human rights, even though it is ideological (because it 
also consolidates western dominance), it is true if intervention really improves human rights in the 
target country.  Or, in East Germany after the fall of socialism, it was true that those who saw an 
opportunity for a properly socialist third way (such as the political group Neues Forum), ‘were 
nothing but a bunch of heroic daydreamers’, because the powerful forces surrounding capitalism 
were already in motion.  But that criticism was still ideological, because it ‘implied an ideological 
belief in the unproblematic, non-antagonistic functioning of the late capitalist “social state”’.
74
  In 
our view, these truths are at best partial, and still obscure blank spots, inaccuracies, and hidden 
suppositions.  With western military intervention, the truth of humanitarian efforts is 
simultaneously the lie that covers for the other reasons.  With Neues Forum, the pro-capitalist 
belief in the non-antagonistic functioning of the capitalist state is factually problematic.  Yet Žižek 
does not recognise this flaw as a symptom to be exposed, and concentrates instead on the value 
of the impossible utopian narrative in Neues Forum to reveal systemic antagonism.  For him, this 
example illustrates the Lacanian point that truth has the structure of a fiction, but in the dominant, 
cynically ‘realistic’ ideology that opposes it we can also see that fiction has the structure of a truth.  
In other words, ideology critique should analyse both how Neues Forum reveals the alternative 
potential beyond the apparent necessity of capitalism, and the possibility of developing that 
potential by criticising contradictions in the capitalist view directly.   
 
ii) Forms of Internalisation 
As we have seen from Žižek’s semiotic square of ideologies, he does not only examine cynical 
forms, although he views them as particularly dominant.  As such, further analysis of other 
ideologies that Žižek describes can help us develop the ideology map we have defined in the 
previous chapters.  The three forms of affirmative ideologies in the semiotic square (cynicism, 
liberalism and fundamentalism), provide a framework of main positions, but some ideologies also 
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imply overlaps between these points and variations within them.  The aim here is to consider 
these positions in a way that relates them back to those in the map and identifies possible 
symptoms within them.  Žižek’s formulations are useful in that they often reveal connections 
between ideologies, and demonstrate how apparently opposed positions effectively act together 
as mutual supports for the social whole.  However, we are also interested in how different 
rationalisations represent different levels of commitment to the social order, and seek indications 
of this variation in the details Žižek provides.  In this way, it can be understood how these 
positions relate to the whole as indirect forms of support that it must maintain. 
Having already begun to consider cynicism, we can continue by exploring different 
variations that Žižek introduces alongside cynicism ‘proper’ (the idea that subjects are aware of 
social problems and official hypocrisy, but believe that change would make things worse).  First, 
Žižek redefines ‘Kynicism’ (from Sloterdijk) as a cynical distance which impotently complains and 
mocks official dictates, or a defeatism in which the subject is fulfilled by complaint itself.  Through 
Hegel’s concept of the ‘Beautiful Soul’, which laments its victimisation by the social conditions, 
Žižek shows that cynical defeatists identify with the status quo, because only while things remain 
the same can they maintain their identity and be proven correct about their treatment.
75
  Thus, by 
complaining about the existing authority, the Beautiful Soul demands something from it, rather 
than challenging it.  He also mentions a similar defeatism that comes from an apparent desire for 
change, embodied by ‘progressive liberals’ who ‘often complain that they would like to join a 
“revolution” […], but no matter how desperately they search for it, they just “do not see it”’.
76
  He 
perceives that, despite the element of truth (there is no revolution on the horizon), this attitude of 
waiting to see a revolution before getting involved demonstrates a lack of genuine desire.  
Elsewhere, elements of defeatism or resignation are notable in a ‘Buddhist’ response, which for 
Žižek stresses that, rather than struggle either for tradition or progress, we should ‘drift along, 
while retaining an inner distance and indifference’, because ‘social and technological upheaval 
[…] do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being’.
77
  This position retreats from politics 
by prioritising spiritual concerns, but since subjects are always within power relations, equates to 
tacit acceptance of dominant forces. 
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These positions allow us to build on the notions of cynicism and defeatism we have 
already introduced.  On one hand, they reveal variations in defeatism, or different fantasies that 
justify feelings of impotence.  It is not only that people want change but cannot envisage it, but 
that they ‘enjoy’ playing the victim, or place themselves above political involvement.  On the other, 
this variation also suggests that these positions may not be equally cynical, or as equally 
committed to the status quo.  The ‘Buddhist’ stance seems particularly cynical, because, like the 
concept of human nature in cynicism proper, it elevates non-interference in existing conditions to 
an ahistorical principle.  Conversely, the ‘progressive liberal’ stance may represent a more 
complex mixture of the ‘Beautiful Soul’ and some residual desire for change that remains genuine 
on some level.  As such, while these positions are disavowals that displace their support for the 
existing order, the different claims may represent conditional disconnects between behaviour and 
belief, with support more fragile in some cases than others. 
Many other positions Žižek identifies relate to the categories of liberalism and 
fundamentalism, which he sees as connected, as two sides of the same (postmodern) coin.  He 
often defines liberalism in terms of ‘pluralist’ or ‘multiculturalist’ attitudes, and sees (similar to 
Jameson) that fundamentalist beliefs are reactions to such ‘post-ideology’ thinking, rather than 
remnants of the past.  The repression of antagonisms into pragmatic measures and identity 
issues returns in the guise of supposedly defunct political categories, such as racism and 
fascism,
78
 but because these ideas are widely deemed unacceptable, they assume a postmodern 
form in which they are merely implied.  As Žižek says, neo-fascism is ‘more and more 
“postmodern”, civilized, playful, involving ironic self-distance… yet no less Fascist for all that’.
79
  
Populist fundamentalism even uses the ‘strategies of identity politics, presenting itself as one of 
the threatened minorities, simply striving to maintain its specific way of life and cultural identity’,
80
 
but the racism remains behind this pluralist argument.  Also, for Žižek, fundamentalism and 
pluralism share a common basis in their fascination with the Other.  On one hand, many 
fundamentalisms are ‘perverted’, because rather than focusing on their own world, they are 
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obsessed with others’ sin and decadence, and lack conviction of their own superiority.
81
  On the 
other hand, western multiculturalists are fascinated by distant cultures as representations of both 
mystical liberation and filthy primitiveness.  These fixations on the jouissance of the Other are 
comparable, except that while fundamentalist fixation causes jealousy and resentment, the 
multiculturalist maintains an essential image of the Other at a distance (and the Other remains 
fascinating and acceptable as long as it conforms to this image).  In this sense, Žižek describes 
‘multiculturalism’ as ‘a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism’, which respects the 
Other as an object viewed from a supposedly empty universal position.
82
  It is not explicit racism 
that asserts superiority, but multiculturalists view their own position as a neutral point from which 
to evaluate other cultures, which involves an assumption of superiority over the specificity of the 
Other.
83
 
In both these ideological forms, the concept of the Other is therefore central, and should 
represent the point at which they may be challenged.  Yet, Žižek maintains, the fundamentalist is 
impervious to ideological challenge as he clings to his ideas and ‘(not so much believes as) 
directly “knows” the truth embodied in his fetish’.
84
  To a great extent we agree here, in that, 
although there must still be some challengeable narrative that supports belief, as opposed to pure 
blind adherence, the strength of commitment to racist ideas makes them especially difficult to 
penetrate.  With multiculturalism, however, the politics of tolerance suggests a particular avenue 
of belief that may be challenged.  According to Žižek, pluralist tolerance naturalises and 
neutralises political difference into issues of cultural identity or personal opinion, and as such 
cannot tolerate it if the Other actually insists on being Other, or that its cultural ‘choices’ are 
crucial to its identity.
85
  Or, while great sympathy is reserved for the Other as passive victim of 
oppression, who cannot assert its cultural choices, the moment it ‘wants to strike back on its own’, 
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it ‘magically turns into a terrorist, fundamentalist, drug-trafficking Other’.
86
  In our understanding, 
these limits of tolerance embody ideological symptoms, or the conditions behind the fetish, of 
which the multiculturalist seems unaware.  It is thus important to challenge these contradictions in 
multiculturalist tolerance, and understand more clearly why some people are deemed ‘worthy 
victims’,
87
 who deserve protection, while others are left to their fates.  Specifically, it seems a 
matter of the symbolic Real split itself, or the way in which affirmative pluralist ideology obscures 
that it operates within the boundaries of consumer capitalism. 
The triad of liberalism, fundamentalism and cynicism may be expanded further if we also 
consider the dualism Žižek identifies between Cultural Studies and the ‘Third Culture’ ideology of 
scientific progress.  As Žižek explains it, Third Culture ideology imagines a new epoch of 
humanity in which ‘egotistical individualism will be replaced by a transindividual cosmic 
Awareness’, and the naturalisation of the social, such as cyberspace becoming ‘a self-evolving 
“natural” organism’, will be coupled with the socialisation of nature.
88
  For Žižek, these ideas do 
not consider power relations, so although Third Culture asks questions about humanity itself, it is 
not anchored in social analysis (such as how cyberspace relies on political and economic 
institutions), or understanding of how science functions within hegemony.  He then sees Cultural 
Studies as the opposite, in that it represents a relativist-pluralist ideology (whether or not the 
actual academic field fits Žižek’s description) that confronts everyday power struggles, but does 
not examine the general workings of the universe or the human psyche.  According to Žižek, the 
aims of Cultural Studies predominantly ‘involve a kind of cognitive suspension […] characteristic 
of historicist relativism’, and ‘rely on a set of silent (non-thematized) ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions about the nature of human knowledge and reality’.
89
  In effect, 
Cultural Studies assumes certain notions of social hierarchy and identity struggle, and ignores 
considerations about humanity overall.  This focus on power relations then reveals the theoretical 
deficiencies in the utopian humanism of Third Culture, while the wider view of Third Culture 
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indicates the gaps in Cultural Studies.  What both miss, for Žižek, is the possibility of combining 
their positions to think the social order as a historical totality. 
In our theory, the dualism Žižek presents here also highlights how different affirmative 
ideologies may be both unified at a higher (systemic) level and contradictory.  In particular, this 
contrast between Third Culture and Cultural Studies (or intellectualised pluralism) appears to split 
liberalism into postmodern multiculturalist and more traditional or humanist forms.  That is, 
pluralism retains liberal concepts such as human rights and freedom of opinion, while Third 
Culture is a liberalism that contrasts identity politics with concepts of scientific progress and 
enlightenment values.  As we saw with Jameson, there remains a common liberal ground in their 
emphasis on the individual as conscious agent, but there are also major differences.  The other 
important factor here is that the way Žižek describes these positions suggests opposing 
affirmative ideologies may contain the elements necessary to challenge each other and develop a 
dialectical perspective.  Third Culture and Cultural Studies at once operate within apparently 
incompatible circles and are potentially able to transform one another into something more 
radical, via mediation.  In this sense, what keeps them apart is their common ground, because it 
lacks perception of struggle as a collective endeavour within specific circumstances. 
A final position to note here is Žižek’s notion of economic realism, or the neoliberal idea 
that we must simply accept (as mature adults) that utopian ideals cannot be realised, so it is best 
to rely on the ‘neutral’ mechanism of the market.  As Žižek explains, with such thinking, economic 
dictates regarding lower costs, higher efficiency, increased competition, and constant growth 
become ideals, and the necessity of the market ‘is itself to be inserted into the series of great 
modern utopian projects’.
90
  Thus, while economic realism has no illusions about the essential 
goodness of human nature, it believes a global mechanism can create progress and balance, and 
denies the social split caused by the mechanism itself.  In other words, this ideology claims that 
there can be no major economic or political changes, ‘to render invisible the impossible-real of the 
antagonism that cuts across capitalist societies’.
91
  In the terms we have developed so far, 
economic realism is less cynical than Jameson’s ‘market ideology’, and again takes a more liberal 
stance based around scientific advancement and individual endeavour.  Moreover, it is a useful 
illustration of the fundamentalist core within apparently pragmatic ideas.  For Žižek, 
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fundamentalist ideologies that revolve around absolute principles can justifying anything, which is 
why religious terrorists blow up civilians in the name of God’s will, and Stalinists killed millions by 
claiming to represent historical necessity.
92
  We would argue that this same idea applies to 
principles of market stability and expansion, which justify wars, forced regime changes, and mass 
impoverishment. 
Taking all these points into account, along with the positions we have identified in 
previous chapters, our map of ideologies can develop further.  With the help of the relationships 
Žižek explores, the positions diversify, and a wider variety of overlaps and contrasts become 
visible.  Broadly defined, the ideologies now included are: neoconservative/fundamentalist 
moralism, neoliberal moralism, liberal/scientific moralism, liberal pluralism, hedonism,
93
 
neoliberal/self-interested cynicism, cynical resignation, and conditional cynical defeatism.  In our 
view, all these positions comprise an ideological totality in late capitalism, each with symptoms 
that can be questioned, which may be more susceptible to alternative thinking in some cases than 
others.  In Žižek’s work, this overall picture is less clear, despite the range of positions he 
describes, as he tends to reduce the ideological totality to two or three terms.  For example, he 
says that ‘today's ideological constellation is determined by the opposition between 
neoconservative fundamentalist populism and liberal multiculturalism’.
94
  Or, he links specific 
positions to class groups — the ‘symbolic’ or professional class to politically correct liberalism; the 
‘middle class’ of traditional workers to populist fundamentalism; and the ‘excluded’ class of 
unemployed and underprivileged minorities to either hedonistic nihilism or radical 
fundamentalism.
95
  Yet, while these ideas are relevant, they lack the complex variation of 
ideological positions implied by Žižek’s overall theory.  Most significantly, there is no cynicism 
distinguished from the official liberalism and conservatism in the first example, or from the values 
attached to the middle and symbolic classes in the second.  These ideas contrast with Žižek’s 
emphasis on cynicism elsewhere, in which ‘today's typical subject’ cynically distrusts all public 
ideology, and fills in the gaps with ‘paranoiac fantasies’.
96
  In our understanding, it is important to 
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view cynicism as one part of the ideological composition, which itself involves universalised 
assumptions, and contrasts with other ideologies with non-cynical values.  For example, as Dean 
explains, the dominance of neoliberal economics in the US has relied on connections with religion 
and anti-government rhetoric, so ‘the category of fantasy alone cannot explain the hold of 
neoliberalism’.
97
  Affirmative ideologies are not only ways of organising a fundamental 
attachment, but must be maintained through particular structures of belief.  
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IV. The Commodity Form 
i) Commodity as Symptom 
These definitions of ideologies represent a specific view of consciousness in consumer 
capitalism, and our next step is then to examine some of the ways the capitalist order structures 
the ideological field and problematizes change.  In this respect, Žižek identifies many obstacles to 
oppositional politics presented by commodification and consumer culture, but, similar to Marcuse 
and Jameson, his theory in this area places too much emphasis on these obstacles, which 
narrows channels for critique.  First, we consider how, despite some potentials in Žižek’s theory 
for symptomal analysis, other elements of his work still render ideological content insignificant.  
On one hand, Žižek shows how contradictions in the commodity form embody the symptomal 
point of capitalism, and implies that economic social hierarchies still rely on certain beliefs.  On 
the other, the potentials of a critique based on these ideas are overridden by the everyday 
fetishistic practices of work and consumerism, and the cycle of capitalist reinvention that Žižek 
describes.  To demonstrate that a symptomal analysis may be more effective, therefore, we 
emphasise gaps between ideological behaviour and ideological commitment, so consumerist 
behaviour does not necessarily indicate disavowed support for capitalism, and also dispute 
Žižek’s correlation between capitalism and the inescapable circuit of subjectivity. 
Žižek’s theory shows that the commodity in capitalism is a fetish in practice and 
symptomatic of systemic contradictions.  That is, although subjects know the commodity form is 
merely symbolic, exchange and value become natural in daily transactions, so that commodities 
are endowed with ‘special powers’ through participation.  However, for Žižek, we can expose this 
naturalness through the logic of the Freudian dream work, in which the essential aspect is not 
what objects symbolise, but why particular symbols represent particular things.  In other words, it 
is important not only to recognise the equivalence between work and value, ‘but to explain why 
work assumed the form of the value of a commodity’,
98
 and ask how value naturalises its 
relationship to labour, or why labour power must be expressed as value.  According to Žižek, 
every universal has a point of false unity, in which the particular form undermines the general 
concept.  With the idea of equivalent commodity exchange, the exchange of labour power for 
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wages, ‘precisely as an equivalent, functions as the very form of exploitation’.
99
  Or, if the 
capitalist notion of freedom revolves around individuals being free to sell their labour, by 
accepting this freedom workers become enslaved to capital.  The result is that while relations 
between people are no longer fetishised in capitalism (so that certain people are seen as 
intrinsically superior), the fetish remains in relations between things.  But then, Žižek says, ‘the 
repressed truth — that of the persistence of domination and servitude — emerges in a symptom 
which subverts the ideological appearance’.
100
  It therefore seems that identifying this symptom, 
or recognising that labour is a commodity only by convention, reveals the contingency of 
exchange relations. 
The inequalities of commodity exchange relations thus reinforce hierarchy, despite formal 
equality between individuals.  There is a double standard in daily life, in which, for example, ‘a 
“postmodern” boss insists that he is not the master but just a coordinator of our joint creative 
efforts’, and yet ‘remains our master’.
101
  The commodity relationship means that the boss 
remains superior, regardless of appearance, and cannot really be treated as another co-worker.  
Similarly, with celebrity culture, it could be said that individuals know celebrities are just normal 
people, but their success is a sign that they should be treated as special.  In our understanding, 
these inequalities caused by the commodity form return to ideology, because they must be 
rationalised in some way.  This idea is supported by an observation Žižek makes that fetishistic 
relations are again reversed, so that relations between things now assume the appearance of 
relations between people.  He states that, ‘the book market is overflowing with psychological 
manuals advising us on how to succeed’, and ‘making our success dependent on our proper 
“attitude”’,
102
 rather than complex market forces.  Or, he notes that discussions of figures such as 
Bill Gates are dominated by consideration of his personal qualities, ignoring how the systemic 
structure enables one individual to accumulate so much wealth.  Put another way, such business 
entrepreneurs really become superior, following a Calvinist logic of pre-ordained selection, in 
which those who ‘make it’ prove they were always special.  However, inequality then requires 
conscious ideological support, beyond the structures produced by the commodity form.  In this 
way, Žižek’s observations about Bill Gates can be read as an indication that certain narratives 
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have to be sustained for the hierarchy of commodity to be widely accepted, and provide points of 
ideological contention. 
If Žižek’s theory hints at such possibilities, he does not develop them as such alongside 
his notions of the festishistic practices and the self-reproductive power of contradictions in 
capitalism.  First, as mentioned previously, Žižek identifies the everyday act of using money as 
fetishistic illusion, because people know money has no intrinsic value, but behave as though it 
does.  For Žižek’s theory, this participation indicates subjects’ symbolic attachment to capitalist 
Master-Signifiers, to the extent that, as he says via Hegel, ‘it does not matter what individuals’ 
minds are preoccupied with while they are participating in a ceremony; the truth resides in the 
ceremony itself’.
103
  Understood in this way, and because today almost nobody can avoid 
participating in commodified exchange relations, conscious ideological supports appear largely 
insignificant.  Second, Žižek explains that, while non-capitalist economies have historically 
followed a cycle in which contradictions finally erupt after a period of stability, the capitalist 
contradiction is ever present, causing continuous self-transformation, and increased resilience.
104
  
The secret to capitalism’s endurance is a kind of internal dialectical motor — because its 
contradictions are ‘crippling’, it evolves constantly, becoming a cycle in which increasingly large 
contradictions are followed by greater development and invention.  Žižek describes this cycle in 
Lacanian terms, according to which the ideal of non-contradictory capitalism functions as an 
object of desire, and contradiction maintains the drive to fill the gap.  He draws a homology 
between surplus-value and surplus-enjoyment, as two constitutive driving forces, and explains 
that Marx failed to grasp capitalism’s ability to continually create and resolve its contradictions.
105
  
In these terms, it does not seem that symptomal analysis would be able to disrupt this circuit. 
In the first case, the focus on fetishistic behaviour means it is not clear in Žižek’s theory 
how we can evaluate ideology where individuals act in contrasting ways, such as buying 
consumer goods while also working towards political change.  As we see it, this possibility 
indicates that behaviour is only partly representative of belief or obedience, and that conscious 
beliefs and values are also a measure of ideological commitment.  As such, if exposing the 
realities of continued social hierarchy and marking the difference between formal freedom and 
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actual experience can affect conscious beliefs, those effects may cause changes in behaviour.  In 
fact, as Žižek notes (drawing on Marcuse), the formal notion of freedom necessary to late 
capitalism provides a certain potential, because people have to understand the notion of their 
freedom before they can experience an antagonism between it and their actual servitude.
106
  Even 
so, we cannot ignore the links between consumer behaviour and affirmative ideology, and the 
need for reduced consumption.  Žižek imagines a scenario in which mass refusal to participate 
economically ‘in the financial virtual game’, could be today’s ‘ultimate political act’,
107
 since virtual 
money only functions as long as people believe in it by participating in its circulation.  While Žižek 
does not see such full refusal as an actual proposition, it suggests the possibility of a connection 
between market growth and consumerist belief.  Specifically, capitalism needs people to 
overconsume, and this need is supported by major ideological forces, so reduced consumption 
(rather than ethical consumption, which does not necessarily delink from excess) is a way of 
challenging both consciousness and practice. 
In the second case, the association between capitalist contradictions and the circuit of 
desire, or surplus value and surplus enjoyment, conflates capitalism’s historical ability to evolve 
through crisis with constitutive elements of subjectivity.  Thus, if Marx wrongly assumed that 
capitalist antagonisms would be resolved in an inevitable transcendence to communism, Žižek’s 
comparison between capitalist dynamism and the unending effects of interpellation, does not 
consider that capitalism has limits.  That is, this circuit does not include social relations outside 
the capitalist mode of reinvention, or the internal excess (the excluded) which Žižek elsewhere 
presents as the force capable of disrupting capitalism.  This excess effectively changes the 
relationship between surplus-value and surplus-enjoyment, and emphasises the symbolic aspect 
of capitalism, or that its constant change more resembles the fantasy adapting to retain 
coherence in the face of contradictions.  There is then theoretically a point at which the fantasy 
cannot maintain a narrative without changing its overall direction. 
 
ii) Enjoyment and Consumerism 
Late capitalism’s requirement for overconsumption appears ideologically as a general notion of 
fulfilment through consumerism that all affirmative positions internalise in some way.  In Žižek’s 
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theory, this aspect of consumer capitalism distinguishes it from other social forms in that the 
superego demand to enjoy becomes the law itself, collapsing the two together.  He then 
demonstrates that permissiveness destabilises subjectivity, because there is no specific 
embodiment of the big Other, which enables the dominant logic of capitalist demands to hide 
behind a lack of absolute authority.  In our terms, however, the demand to enjoy is still regulated 
by an overall logic that creates general social expectations of both pleasure and productivity, and 
this logic is in some way embodied in various authority figures.  The question then is how different 
ideologies internalise the general demand by prioritising certain elements according to certain 
authorities, which contrasts with the notion that they experience sheer lack of direction.  By 
identifying the particular ways in which different ideologies hook onto consumer capitalism, it 
becomes easier to identify how they may be challenged. 
In consumer capitalism, Žižek explains, the call to submit to a prohibitive paternal 
authority through ideas such as nation, God, or race, in which enjoyment is a hidden underside, 
gives way to a direct injunction to ‘enjoy’.  Subjects are guided by imaginary ideals (of social 
success), and the ferocious ascendance of this demand, which turns their ‘perverse’ enjoyment 
into law, and removes the tension between their ‘innermost idiosyncratic creative impulses and 
the Institution that does not appreciate them or wants to crush them’.
108
  In particular, this 
injunction points to consumerist pleasures that encourage experimentation and free choice.  But, 
by following the demand to enjoy and its accompanying micro-choices, the consumer forfeits a 
deeper freedom to choose whether to participate at all.  As Žižek puts it, what is excluded in 
consumer societies, ‘in which even such “natural” features as sexual orientation and ethnic 
identification are experienced as a matter of choice, is the basic, authentic, choice itself’.
109
 
Furthermore, the demand to continually choose and maximise pleasure confuses the 
subject’s desire.  The individual is treated as a ‘subject supposed to know what he really wants’, 
but because there is no external guarantee for that knowledge, the burden of choice and 
responsibility leaves subjects needing guidance more than ever, and they must be told what they 
want.
110
  The lack of predetermined patterns in social life is then presented as opportunity for self-
reinvention.  As Žižek says, ‘if this predicament causes you anxiety, the postmodern [...] ideologist 
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will immediately accuse you of being unable to assume full freedom’,
111
 and (as with one-
dimensionality) instability is reduced to individual personality defects.  In effect, the subject comes 
to resemble the near-schizophrenic form that Jameson formulates, as the lack of clear authority 
sets meaning adrift.  In fact, Žižek describes the consumer capitalist situation as one in which 
there is no big Other, in the sense that no specific individual or institution in society embodies that 
role.  Thus, he says, ‘there is no “Invisible Hand” whose mechanism […] somehow re-establishes 
the balance; no Other Scene in which the accounts are properly kept’, and ‘no global mechanism 
regulating our interactions’,
112
 which can ensure the meaning of choices. 
The lack of absolute authority, for Žižek, does not mean that there is no social structure, 
or that society is in some sense ‘post-Oedipal’, because subjectivity still requires subjection 
through continuing forms of domination.  At the very least, he claims, there is a big Other that the 
subject ‘blames [...] for its failure and/or impotence, as if the Other is guilty of the fact that it 
doesn’t exist’.
113
  Here, the lack of clear authority leads subjects to direct their ire at some invisible 
Other, but this blind blaming misses that capitalism itself frames social demands.  As Žižek says, 
‘the spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative 
when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly 
causes this disintegration’.
114
  In IDLC, Žižek clarifies this point further by explaining that what is 
lacking today is not a big Other to tie the social order together, but ‘a small other’ that can ‘stand 
in for, the big Other’, or someone ‘who directly embodies authority’.
115
  Similar to postmodernism 
for Jameson, this lack of a proper authority creates the impression of an ‘atonal’ range of 
multiplicities that obscure their structuring logic.  Thus, Žižek explains, the usual aim of radical 
politics to undermine an authoritative feature cannot work, and (as with Jameson) he seeks 
instead to reveal the tone behind the atonality, or the capitalist big Other that still unites the 
various imaginary ideals.  As such, the point is not, as Sharpe and Boucher argue, that Žižek 
seeks a new prohibitive authority to replace multiplicity, because he believes that any political 
pluralism is undesirable and ‘supporting multiple struggles for cultural recognition and different 
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sorts of political demands […] actually makes things worse’.
116
  Nor is it that, as Boucher says 
elsewhere, ‘Žižek’s position implies that political revolution is fundamentally a restoration of 
Oedipal subjectivity and a redemption of the “big Other”, redolent of a religious “cure” for 
postlapsarian wickedness.’
117
  Rather, the issue for Žižek is the existence of the big Other in its 
current form as an inaccessible pseudo-natural force, and the way in which pluralism can become 
an expression of its logic.
118
  As he explains, the problem is not ‘the inadequacy of every small 
other to stand in for the big Other’, but that the big Other hides behind them, and the appearance 
of unfettered multiplicity.
119
 
These aspects of Žižek’s work reaffirm the emphasis on individual responsibility in 
Marcuse’s one-dimensionality, and that on the structuring of difference in Jameson’s 
postmodernism.  Yet, as with those theories, some of the implications are overly extreme.  First, 
the superego cannot simply be integrated into dominant social demands in a way that eliminates 
the tension between them, because even if enjoyment becomes a symbolic duty, the superego 
still demands pure, non-symbolised enjoyment.  As Žižek says, superego guilt is that ‘of accepting 
the ego ideal (the socially determined symbolic role) as the ideal to be followed in the first place, 
and thus of betraying one’s more fundamental desire’.
120
  Moreover, the superego injunction to 
enjoy cannot be the only symbolic mandate, because the superego is indifferent to the 
preservation of the organism, while late capitalist societies expect a kind of responsibility from 
individuals to their consumer power.  Therefore, although advertising encourages excess in all 
areas, other social norms temper these demands and retain a sense of paternal prohibition.  This 
incorporation of certain aspects of enjoyment recalls Marcuse’s ‘repressive desublimation’, or an 
allowance of indulgence that serves the purposes of a ‘performance principle’.  We can also here 
follow Vighi’s distinction between jouissance and the valorised enjoyment of consumerism, or an 
imitation enjoyment that is regulated ‘as “enjoy responsibly” and “enjoy wellbeing”, i.e. “enjoy 
without enjoyment”’.
121
  For Vighi, the ‘potentially (self-)destructive injunction to embrace 
excessive enjoyment’ is ‘constantly balanced out and domesticated by opposite discourses’.
122
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This distinction is politically important because if this core aspect of subjectivity were fully 
incorporated into the existing order, it would be impossible to reorganise jouissance for non-
capitalist ends. 
The further repercussion of this patriarchal demand is that there may be more of a 
unifying sense of authority than Žižek suggests.  In other words, there is an ‘invisible hand’ 
regulating interactions, or some ‘Other scene’ which judges and guides performance, and if 
subjects are sometimes bewildered by the choices on offer, they are not necessarily desperate for 
new authoritarian masters.  Žižek claims that because freedom is fully part of the law, no 
enjoyment is now really transgressive except submission or domination, so some ‘extreme form of 
strictly regulated domination and submission becomes the secret transgressive source of libidinal 
satisfaction’, and ‘the Unconscious is not secret resistance against the Law; the Unconscious is 
the prohibitive Law itself’.
123
  Defined in this way, it is as if society is totally permissive and lacking 
authority, so that only dominance and subordination can be excessive.  In our view, however, 
some forms of submission and domination remain socially acceptable, while other kinds of 
libidinal satisfaction do not, based on forces of social guidance that emphasise not only 
enjoyment and consumption, but also productivity and self-maintenance.  This force is difficult to 
obey, as it is dispersed throughout various contrasting institutions, but still creates general rules 
and expectations. 
In this way, ideological rationalisations represent different modes of internalising the 
overall demand by emphasising the authority of certain institutions or leader figures (who partially 
embody the background capitalist logic) over others.  Contradictions in particular ideologies then 
reflect attempts to resolve the paradoxical demand to ‘enjoy responsibly’.  For Žižek, various local 
and temporary authorities, such as ethics committees, decide on particular issues because there 
are no established moral norms in various social domains,
124
 and any small others are finite and 
fallible, rather than constant and stable.  As such, ideological fantasies react to the lack of 
embodiment of the big Other by constructing an idea of the big Other behind the scenes, or an 
‘Other of the Other’, through paranoid conspiracy theories.
125
  Or, fundamentalisms lead to ‘the re-
emergence of the different facets of a big Other which exists effectively, in the Real, and not 
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merely as symbolic fiction’.
126
  Yet, most of the ideological positions we have identified (including 
fundamentalisms) involve a ‘knowing’ subject embodied in a specific authority figure that anchors 
the Symbolic, rather than some unknown force.  They do not then seem ephemeral, or lacking 
guidance, and phenomena such as ethics committees may be less a matter of creating individual 
moral positions and more a way for officials to mediate between varied convictions. 
From this perspective, we can suggest connections between particular ideologies and 
authorities, which condition their attachment to the capitalist background.  For example, neoliberal 
narratives emphasise productivity, and give the market a moral justification through a fetish of 
capital producing more capital, which is strongly supported by mainstream economics.  Or, liberal 
positions involve moral principles of individual responsibility, representative democracy and so on, 
and even if liberal freedom means subjects freely choose to do exactly as they are told,
127
 they 
are directed by (enlightenment or multiculturalist) values, embodied in branches of media, politics 
and academia.  Alternatively, positions may relate more to the scientific establishment (cynicism, 
liberal humanism), the government (cynical defeatism), or to religious leaders and populist 
politicians (fundamentalism).  These ideologies all internalise, to some extent, demands for both 
consumerist consumption and productivity, often prioritising one over the other.  They thus range 
from the extremes of economic commitment to the opposite extreme of ‘hedonism’, which accepts 
the injunction to enjoy and actively focuses on consuming.  Žižek describes this position as one in 
which consumer goods are never truly fulfilling, but ‘are nonetheless experienced as excessive, 
as the surplus-enjoyment’, so ‘the “not enough”, the falling short, coincides with the excess’.
128
  
This falling short turns consumption into a burden for the hedonist, because maximising pleasure 
requires so much preparation, that the initial attraction is lost.
129
  That said, hedonists are less 
concerned with the bigger responsibilities of late capitalist life, such as the future of the 
environment, because they reduce their needs to popular or fashionable choices. 
 
iii) Cultural Politics 
Our final area of concern at this point is how, for Žižek, commodification effectively blocks or 
diffuses radical cultural expression.  As may be expected, cultural content is a less prominent 
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consideration in Žižek’s work than unconscious belief and participation in consumer practices, 
and overall he does not prioritise political aesthetics as much as either Marcuse or Jameson.  In 
fact, he is critical of cultural Marxism, arguing that even its most sophisticated proponents, 
including Jameson, see ‘that the workers’ consciousness is obfuscated by the seductions of 
consumerist society and/or manipulation by the ideological forces of cultural hegemony’, and 
mistakenly conclude that ‘the focus of critical work should shift to “cultural criticism”’.
130
  While 
Žižek analyses various cultural forms, then, it is less to identify their potential (or lack of) to act as 
catalyst for radical politics, than to illustrate their repressed ideological meanings and 
contradictions.  Yet, we maintain, if challenging ideological content is important to political 
change, it must somehow function even within commodified communications, so we must 
continue to theorise how radical culture may make such an impact. 
Where Žižek examines aspects of culture in terms of political potentials, he generally 
emphasises their de-politicisation.  For example, he notes the abstract potential of art, but does 
not see it as an important source of change in current social circumstances.  He describes artists 
as those who do not ‘reconcile the opposites and tensions in the aesthetic Totality of a 
harmonious Whole’, but ‘construct a place in which people can ecstatically perceive the traumatic 
excess around which their life turns’.
131
  In other words, as for Marcuse, art points negatively 
beyond dominant narratives, or indicates a real excess.  However, Žižek explains, this dimension 
is missing in postmodern ‘transgressive’ art, in which artists display their inner fantasies on stage, 
because it ‘confronts us directly with jouissance at its most solipsistic’, and ‘precisely 
characterizes individuals insofar as they are caught up in a “crowd”’.
132
  He later adds that there is 
nothing ‘more dull, opportunistic, and sterile’ than constantly trying ‘to invent new artistic 
transgressions and provocations’, or ‘to engage in more and more “daring” forms of sexuality’.
133
  
This critique of the impotence of shock in permissive society also echoes Marcuse, but Žižek 
does not then continue to imagine how ‘authentic’ art may re-emerge in the current order. 
A similar concept of narcissistic individualism is apparent where Žižek examines the 
supposedly progressive qualities of new media and technology.  For example, he describes how, 
for its advocates, cyberspace is effectively a postmodern Utopia made real, in which subjects 
                                                             
130 PV, p. 50. 
131 OB, p. 96. 
132
 PV, p. 311. 
133 Ibid., p. 358. 
Slavoj Žižek 
237 
 
embrace their de-centred disintegration and become plural selves, seamlessly adopting different 
masks in different situations.  The problem is that ‘depriving the Self of any substantial content 
ends in radical subjectivization, in the loss of the firm objective reality itself’.
134
  Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the subject becomes an enclosed monad, communicating only with other masks, and 
if there is no Master and anything is instantly available, the desire of the Other is experienced as 
intrusion, because it compromises the illusion of limitlessness and points to the Real.  
Furthermore, cyberspace remains rooted in an economic system of exploitation and exclusion, 
but distances itself from that reality.  As such, rather than representing the ‘unending possibilities 
of limitless change’, it hides ‘an unheard-of imposition of radical closure’.
135
  In other words, the 
concept of frictionless capitalism, or capitalism without antagonism, that emerges with cyberspace 
relies on its material existence within unequal social relations. 
At the same time, the point for Žižek is not to oppose such technology, or argue that 
technological progress threatens to erase some essential notion of being.  He explains that, while 
utopian theorisation of technological development is problematic, ‘negative descriptions of the 
“meaningless” universe of technological self-manipulation’ involve the same ‘perspective fallacy’, 
because ‘they also measure the future according to inadequate present standards’.
136
  The 
utopian free floating subjectivity, and the dystopian loss of meaning are then two sides of the 
same fantasy, because each considers humanity as a fixed entity to be lost or sustained, rather 
than a changing condition.  In both cases, transcendental ideas are foreclosed, and together they 
constitute a cultural field which cuts off consideration of how capitalism structures conceptions of 
humanity.  Against such ideas, for Žižek, the important factor is how technology is implemented, 
in terms of the natural and human resources required, and its impact on social antagonisms.  It is 
therefore problematic when discussion around these issues is purely cultural, because it largely 
reduces politics to administrative matters, and difference to individual idiosyncrasies or ethno-
religious disagreement.
137
  Rather than merely participating in this cultural debate, Žižek explains 
it is necessary to confront the politics of these issues, by linking culture to the economic. 
To a great extent, this concept of linking culture to the economic accords with the aims of 
Marcuse and Jameson we have already discussed.  The important point to consider again is then 
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how cultural criticism may connect to the economic, and whether it can utilise commodified 
channels.  For Žižek, it is not a matter of directly opposing capitalism, and although ‘the economy 
is the key domain’, where ‘the battle will be decided’, any ‘intervention should be properly political, 
not economic’.
138
  The reason, he explains, is that anti-capitalist sentiment is non-subversive, as it 
has become part of mainstream culture, such as in Hollywood movies that demonise big 
corporations.  As Žižek puts it, ‘there is no lack of anti-capitalists today’, and ‘we are even 
witnessing an overload of critiques of capitalism’s horrors’.
139
  Conversely, he sees that the main 
sacred concept in society today, untouched by cultural criticism, is not capitalism but political 
belief in democracy, or control over capitalism through mass participation.  According to this 
thinking, only by questioning democracy itself, does the contingency of the whole system come 
into view, including the capitalist structure. 
For our purposes, the issue here is that, since anti-capitalist ideas can be so comfortably 
incorporated into mass cultural spheres, it is not clear how the critique of democracy could avoid 
a similar fate.  That is, if concepts as radical as anti-capitalism can be rendered non-subversive, it 
seems that the commodity form can co-opt any message.  So, for any criticism to appear 
worthwhile it is necessary to counter this idea and understand that economic criticisms may still 
have some impact.  In short, either the political approach meets a similar de-politicised fate, or 
there is room for various forms of radical content to show through their commodification.  In 
particular, in terms of Žižek’s work, we can contest the theory that mainstream culture, such as 
conspiracy films, has harmlessly incorporated anti-capitalist ideas.  As already mentioned, Žižek 
sees conspiracy theory as a way subjects imagine the ‘Other of the Other’, or a secret force 
behind the scenes.  This idea then recalls Jameson’s theory that conspiracy films are failed 
cognitive maps that do not recognise the centrality of capitalism itself.  In that sense, the 
ideological point in films such as Enemy of the State, which is among Žižek’s examples, is that 
rogue individuals or groups stand in for the capitalist system.  There may be anti-corporate or 
anti-neoliberal sentiments at work here, but they do not question capitalism itself.  In fact, as we 
have also seen, even when actual financial crisis occurred in 2007, opposition to capitalism 
overall was limited, and narratives focused on inevitable systemic fluctuation or greed and 
incompetence.  Žižek appears to make precisely this distinction elsewhere when he criticises the 
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anti-globalisation movement because, ‘instead of the critique of capitalism as such, […] we have 
the critique of the imperialist “excess”, with the (tacit) idea of mobilizing capitalist mechanisms 
within another, more “progressive”, framework’.
140
  Seen in this way, the problem for anti-
capitalism is that it still does not have a substantial cultural presence, and the goal remains that of 
creating and maintaining cultural space for any radical criticism, whether political or economic.    
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V. Agency 
i) The Act 
In Žižek’s terms, the possibility of mass radical politics revolves around some major traversal of 
fantasy, and it is a question of how subjects make such a shift psychologically and what factors 
may cause it.  First, it seems that, for any political tactic to be meaningful, subjects must have 
some internal motivating factor that allows them to take unsanctioned steps beyond their own 
fantasies.  To this end, while, for Žižek, the fantasy envelops rationalisation, speech and action, in 
a way that seems to render an ideological shift impossible, he defines the possibility of an ‘act’, in 
which subjects become agents by taking responsibility for their symbolic attachment.  Subjects act 
when they realise that the Symbolic does not provide an answer for how to proceed in a given 
situation, so they must take a decision to engage in action which takes them outside social norms.  
For us, this capacity for subjects to react differently by recognising their subjective determination 
implies that consciousness can effectively alter its symbolic attachment.  But, the political act 
often appears in Žižek’s work as a formal decision that happens to negate the Symbolic, creating 
an openness that allows for alternative ideas.  In our view, here, it is important to emphasise that 
the possible outcomes of an act reflect the politics behind it that caused the disruption to begin 
with.  As such, the prerequisite for a radical progressive politics is not merely an act, but one that 
represents an explicit attempt to achieve such ends, based from the start on oppositional 
ideology. 
Žižek perceives that subjects have a freedom beyond the basic illusion that they have 
chosen their own interpellation.  Specifically, while subjects ‘are passively affected by pathological 
objects and motivations’, they ‘have a minimal reflexive power to accept (or reject) being affected 
in this way’.
141
  This freedom remains a retroactive endorsement of causal influences, but allows 
subjects to decide which ‘sequence of necessities’ determines them.  That is, if subjects take 
responsibility for their interpellation and enjoyment, they react differently when confronted with 
their overdetermination by external forces.  As Žižek explains, if it is an illusion that subjects 
decide their own fate, then ‘simply to endorse and assume this predicament is also an illusion, an 
escapist avoidance of the burden of responsibility’.
142
  Subjects who simply accept 
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overdetermination as an absence of meaningful agency, lack a capability for self-reinvention 
gained by those who experience overdetermination as liberating.  In this way, ‘we are thoroughly 
passive, determined by and dependent on the past, but we have the freedom to define the scope 
of this determination’.
143
  This freedom accepts that the Other is unknowable and takes 
responsibility for desire, and is a form of agency because it produces different behaviour, 
including that towards social change.
144
 
Žižek calls this moment of agency an ‘act’, which he develops from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis into a radical political gesture.  The main criterion for an act is that it cannot be 
accounted for within the Symbolic, but changes symbolic horizons and is symbolised 
retrospectively under the new conditions.  As Žižek says, ‘an authentic act momentarily suspends 
the big Other, but it is simultaneously the “vanishing mediator” which grounds, brings into 
existence, the big Other’.
145
  Because it goes beyond existing symbolisation, it first appears as an 
aberration, crime, or form of madness.  Yet the act is ‘ethical’ precisely in this respect, not 
because it embodies a particular notion of good or frees subjects from pathological motivation, but 
because it reveals the contingent imposition of the existing law, and law in general.  The authentic 
act thus involves risk, because it confronts a fundamental social antagonism whose resolution 
must cause momentous transformation, and the subject should even accept that ‘it will acquire a 
meaning different from or even totally opposed to what [the subject] intended to accomplish’.
146
  In 
this way, according to Žižek, political movements such as fascism are not acts, because they are 
still guaranteed by the big Other, and because they do not go beyond ‘the key feature of their 
society, the capitalist relations of production’.
147
  He even explains that, for the acting subject, ‘its 
final outcome is ultimately even insignificant, strictly secondary in relation to the NO! of the pure 
act’.
148
  But, as such, acts always ultimately ‘fail’, in that they always inaugurate a new Symbolic, 
or another ‘unethical’ imposition of law.  The only truly successful act in this sense would be one 
that permanently dissolved symbolic subjectivity altogether. 
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An act is then only recognised as an act when it fails and creates a new Master-Signifier, 
which re-signifies history.  In this way, history is not only what happened and retrospectively 
appears as necessity, but a whole range of possible alternatives that may be redeemed 
depending on how it is signified.  The act banishes certain historical ghosts by changing historical 
perspective, and then turns that perspective into necessity, with the act itself becoming the 
‘missing link’ in the process.  At this point, the act ‘succeeds’ (in its aim, not its goal) by re-
suturing the Symbolic and erasing ‘the radically contingent, “scandalous”, abyssal character of the 
new Master-Signifier’.
149
  For this reason, although acts are rooted in material conditions (if the 
conditions are not right, nothing can change), they ‘are possible on account of the ontological 
non-closure, inconsistency, gaps, in a situation’.
150
  Therefore, change occurs only when the 
subject marks it by shifting the co-ordinates of what can be recognised.  It is not that the act can 
simply happen, without being ‘the outcome of intentionally guided forms of praxis’,
151
 because the 
Symbolic does not collapse until subjects posit a new order. 
As with traversing the fantasy, the question is how, precisely, a subject acts against 
symbolic meaning, and how acts are politically motivated.  It seems that, because the subject acts 
outside the bounds of accepted symbolic codes, the ‘actor’ cannot be the symbolic subject.  In 
fact, Žižek explains, ‘if there is a subject to the act’, it is ‘an uncanny “acephalous” subject through 
which the act takes place as that which is “in him more than himself”’.
152
  He also describes the 
act as a choice that simply must be taken, or a ‘purely formal’ decision ‘without a clear awareness 
of what the subject decides about’, which is ‘non-psychological’, has ‘no motives, desires or 
fears’, and is ‘not the outcome of strategic argumentation’.
153
  The cause of the act is then some 
excess ‘Thing’ in the subject that experiences the pure ethical imperative.  However, Marchart 
suggests, it then appears that acts ‘occur in a vacuum where all strategic considerations are 
suspended’.
154
  Against Žižek’s reading of Lenin, he states that, ‘when Lenin in 1917 came to a 
different conclusion to that of his fellow-revolutionaries, this was not because he was prepared, 
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existentially, to “take a leap”, but because he arrived at a different strategic assessment of the 
situation’.
155
  Similarly, for Sharpe, Žižek regards all strategy and consequence as being relegated 
beneath the ‘ethical’ negation,
156
 which ignores that actors are always motivated, even if not 
according to social norms.
157
  Žižek counters such points by explaining that his concept of the act 
does not disqualify political decision-making.  Rather, he says, it ‘is neither a strategic intervention 
into the existing order, nor its “crazy” destructive negation; an act is an “excessive”, trans-
strategic, intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’.
158
  In other 
words, it is a strategically motivated need to do the impossible by exceeding accepted strategies, 
and Lenin’s unprecedented action was based on assessment that the strategies on offer were 
insufficient.  In this sense, the need to act is strategic, but the act itself is not, according to the 
existing Symbolic. 
In this way, revolutionary subjects do not exit symbolic subjectivity in the act, because it is 
justified by their politics.  For example, Žižek states, although ‘psychoanalysis confronts us with 
the zero-level of politics’, or a gap which the political act can exploit, their relationship is always ‘a 
missed encounter’, in that ‘psychoanalysis opens up the gap before the act, while politics already 
sutures the gap’.
159
  The implication here is that the political act represents a certain interpretation 
of contingency, from a certain political stance, which has already filled in the negative space.  The 
complexities of Žižek’s position are clarified somewhat where he explains that the gap between 
negation and sublimation, ‘is not just a theoretical distinction between the two aspects, which are 
inseparable in our actual experience’, and the (Lacanian) point is to focus ‘on those limit-
experiences in which the subject finds himself confronted with the death drive at its purest, prior to 
its reversal into sublimation’.
160
  Here, the gap is neither purely theoretical nor actually 
experienced, but the subject can be confronted with the death drive, prior to sublimation.  In 
effect, the subject who traverses the fantasy is confronted with the truth of drive, that there is no 
big Other, but from within the Symbolic, so the free choice of symbolic identity at that point can 
retrospectively be seen to have already been decided. 
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The problem, we assert, is that if the political act is understood in this way, it cannot be a 
‘purely formal’ decision for the actor, as in psychoanalysis.  Specifically, the analysand in 
psychoanalysis acts against their unconscious attachment for reasons that are only symbolised 
subsequently, whereas the contingency of the existing Symbolic in politics is recognised due to 
conscious, oppositional goals.  In other words, the risk in the political act is that of trying to realise 
new social goals according to an already-functioning oppositional ideology that contrasts with 
dominant beliefs, and recognises there is no absolute guarantee for its own beliefs.  However, 
Žižek tends to disconnect the initial political aims of the act from the new Symbolic it creates, as if 
the act merely negates, with no bearing on the subsequent outcome.  For example, he explains 
that radical political change cannot be measured by how much life would improve for the majority 
afterwards, because it ‘changes the very standards of what “good life” is, and a different (higher, 
eventually) standard of living is a by-product of a revolutionary process, not its goal’.
161
  Yet, while 
the new meaning of the good cannot be explained according to existing dominant standards, 
revolutionaries (such as Lenin) must already have an alternative notion of the good life, which 
motivate them to act.  This alternative is necessary because we ‘have to be in a position to 
prepare for, if not completely recognize, a kind of portent or sign of how freedom might unfold, in 
time’.
162
  It then influences the kind of thinking that follows the political act, which, unlike the act in 
psychoanalysis, is not only signified in retrospect. 
To illustrate the point further, we can examine Žižek’s analysis (following Lacan) of 
Antigone, and her insistence on the proper burial of her brother in defiance of King Creon, which 
leads to her execution.  For Žižek, Lacan’s main focus regarding Antigone is ‘on the moment 
when she finds herself in the state “in between the two deaths”, reduced to a living death, 
excluded from the symbolic domain’.
163
  That is, before her actual death, Antigone’s insistence 
takes her beyond the symbolic law and big Other embodied by Creon.  Žižek also explains that 
the concept of the Other denotes both the authority figure guaranteeing the rules of language, and 
the ‘Thing’, or direct injunction without reason.  He adds that, in contradicting the symbolic big 
Other through her pure injunction, ‘Antigone does not merely relate to the Other-Thing, she — for 
a brief, passing moment of, precisely, decision — directly is the Thing’, and is excluded from the 
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community regulated by symbolic relations.
164
  Elsewhere, however, Žižek says Antigone 
embodies both the desire of the big Other, ‘which demands that the (brother's) body be integrated 
into the symbolic tradition’, and ‘a willing self-exclusion from the big Other, a suspension of the 
Other’s existence’.
165
  In this sense, she exceeds the dominant symbolic norm in accordance with 
another symbolic mandate.  But then, as Grigg says, Antigone ‘refuses to comply with a 
command she thinks is wrong […] in the name of a higher law’.
166
  She does not simply refuse in 
a way that eradicates the big Other for her, and her act ‘makes freedom […] relative to a particular 
form, or determination, of the Other’.
167
 
The point is that, since Antigone insists on established customs, her act does not 
recognise overall contingency.  On the one hand, she realises and accepts the likely 
consequences of her actions, and feels she cannot do otherwise.  For Žižek, this gesture is 
political ‘in a negative way’, in that ‘such “apolitical” defiance on behalf of “decency” or “old 
customs” [can be] the very model of heroic political resistance’.
168
  On the other, Antigone does 
not take full responsibility for her defiance, because for her the external Other demands the burial, 
and this appeal to ‘decency’ or ‘old customs’ replaces social norms with another absolute.  Thus, 
while Antigone’s refusal does the impossible by defying the king, it does not render the existing 
order contingent, so much as simply wrong, in a way that does not recognise the general non-
existence of a big Other.  Antigone’s act is thus not negative enough, and there is no reason to 
assume that such an act is relevant to progressive social change.
169
  In Žižek’s terms, even with 
such content, there can still be a general negating effect.  He describes Antigone’s act as 
symbolic, rather than a confrontation with the Real, and says that ‘Antigone insists up to her death 
on performing a precise symbolic gesture’, and she ‘does not stand for some extra-symbolic real, 
but for the pure signifier’.
170
  We argue that there is no pure symbolic insistence, because the act 
does not simply negate the previous Symbolic to allow for new meaning, but already suggests its 
                                                             
164 Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism, p. 163. 
165 Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative, p. 60. 
166 Russell Grigg, ‘Absolute Freedom and Major Structural Change’, Paragraph, 24 (2001), 111-124 (p. 116). 
167 Ibid., p. 123. 
168 Žižek, ‘Žižek Live’, p. 146.  
169 Yannis Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007), p. 135. 
170 IDLC, p. 305. 
Consciousness and the Limits of Social Conformity 
246 
 
own meaning.
171
  The level of openness to restructure the Symbolic after negation is dependent 
on the ideology that negates it, and Antigone’s act is relatively closed in that sense. 
In our understanding, therefore, a progressive political act must be more like a counter 
hegemonic movement that explicitly focuses on social division.  Here, Vighi and Feldner explain 
that, ‘the conscious definition of a subversive political strategy already necessarily includes drive 
and the dimension of the act’, which ‘can be conceived as synchronous with the attempt to disturb 
the core of the hegemonic ideological constellation’.
172
  This ‘conscious’ aspect is crucial, along 
with pointing to a general contingency, and only in this way does the act become a radical political 
move.  For Žižek, ‘what makes a certain move an act proper are not its inherent qualities but its 
structural place within a given symbolic network’, so it is not ‘a mere whimsicality’, and ‘the 
externality of the act is absolutely internal to the symbolic order’.
173
  In contrast, we contend it is 
not only the structural place that is important, but also whether an oppositional ideology can 
formulate its aims against this structure.  To an extent it may be that Žižek is ‘simply pointing to 
the unavoidability of the moment of negativity in any theorisation’, to set up ‘not simply an abstract 
“violent” negation of modern liberal-democratic institutions but rather a determinate negation of 
the normative consensus […] that sustains them’.
174
  However, some of Žižek’s examples imply a 
far more indeterminate negation. 
This point can also be applied to some of Žižek’s empirical examples of acts, which either 
seem to merely force dominant discourses to adjust, rather than collapse, or more fully negate 
dominance in ways that do not imply potential for progressive alternatives.  In the first case, Žižek 
views the arrest of Augusto Pinochet in the UK as an act that ‘changes the very parameters of the 
possible’, because, in Chile, ‘the fear of Pinochet dissipated, the spell was broken, the taboo 
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subjects of torture and disappearances became the daily grist of the news media’.
175
  The arrest 
was an insistence on international law that inadvertently allowed history to be re-signified and 
subordinate voices to be heard.  Yet this event does not alter class disparity itself, and represents 
more of a shift within the existing (capitalist) Master-Signifier rather than the introduction of a new 
one, because it is not explicitly signified in terms of class struggle.  In the second case, Žižek 
discusses the Canudos, a 19
th
 century movement in Brazil in which the poor and social outcasts 
created an autonomous community under the leadership of an apocalyptic prophet.  He also 
describes an instance in the Vietnam War in which the Viet Cong discovered that the US army 
had vaccinated the children in a village, and cut off the arms of the children into which the 
vaccines had been injected.  Here, Žižek endorses the complete negation of the Other, whether 
via religious fanaticism, or by rejecting even its ‘good’ qualities, because ‘If one adopts the 
attitude of “let us take from the enemy what is good and reject or even fight against what is bad”, 
one is already caught in the liberal trap of “humanitarian help”.’
176
  But, with the Canudos, the 
negation of one big Other leads to its replacement by another that is equally dogmatic.  
Meanwhile, with the Viet Cong, the logic of simply negating the Other results in an absurd, 
directionless ‘ethics’ condemned to mindlessly react.  In these examples, ‘What seems to count 
for Žižek is not the content of an emancipatory project, but the purely formal fact that a radical 
break is established vis-à-vis the existing order.’
177
  It suggests that only the symbolic effect of the 
act is important, not the type of politics that causes it. 
 
ii) Class Struggle 
In our view, the act must then connect more explicitly with class struggle and the symbolic Real, 
which Žižek sees as the anchoring points of radical political agency.  As already mentioned, class 
struggle is effectively the Real of the social, glimpsed through its effects, or excluded groups that 
experience need for change.  Žižek describes it as ‘the name for the unfathomable limit that 
cannot be objectivized, located within the social totality, since it is itself that limit which prevents 
us from conceiving society as a closed totality’.
178
  We argue in support of Žižek’s concept of class 
struggle here, because it represents a way to challenge affirmative ideological assumptions based 
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on the realities of deprivation, and to construct a political act that points towards a progressive 
result.  Nevertheless, as Žižek recognises, it remains difficult to imagine how class conscious 
agents can emerge in existing conditions, which still resemble those Marcuse theorised when he 
noted the fragmentation of revolutionary elements.  As with Marcuse, Žižek also considers some 
potentials for class consciousness to develop that appear unlikely, but he also sees class politics 
as a matter of connecting different movements and ideas under a larger goal.  This latter 
approach then implies the possibility of creating gradual ideological change through a variety of 
political and cultural channels. 
Žižek explains that the importance of class struggle is not that it overrides other struggles, 
but that it redefines their relationship.  As he puts it, class struggle is not ‘the ultimate referent and 
horizon of meaning’, but ‘the structuring principle which allows us to account for the very 
“inconsistent” plurality of ways in which other antagonisms can be articulated’.
179
  Class struggle 
signifies a symbolic and political move which reveals the politics and relationship to power of 
other symbolisations, because it shows that any concept of society involves ‘a partial position of 
enunciation’.
180
  Even relativism that considers particular antagonisms as equal and separate 
affirms the social order by failing to recognise its underlying antagonism.  Furthermore, this 
concept of class struggle goes beyond particular, historical groups, such as the industrial 
proletariat, to a general social antagonism.  Laclau in fact criticises Žižek because his notion of 
classes is too empty, and their only feature is that they, ‘in some way, are constituted and struggle 
at the level of the “system”, while all other struggles and identities would be intra-systemic’.
181
  But 
the primary point of class struggle is this dichotomy, which exposes the difference between 
making changes within a system, and transcending it. 
If class struggle has no stable content, it must still be established why only certain groups 
symbolise it, and why it privileges economic exclusion.  That is, class is not merely a negative 
category, since the very designation ‘smuggles a positive content into the “Real” of antagonism’, 
because it already implies a particular way of considering the social split.
182
  In Žižek’s view, the 
economic antagonism, specifically, enables us to understand the constitutive lack of totality.  It 
shows that pluralist identity struggles which supposedly replace class as the central social 
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antagonism are cultural expressions of late capitalism.  As such, where class struggle appears 
irrelevant, and economic relations are widely accepted, that does not indicate its lack but ‘the 
index of the victory of one side in the struggle’.
183
  In this sense, ‘the multitude of particular 
struggles with their continuously shifting displacements and condensations is sustained by the 
“repression” of the key role of economic struggle’.
184
  Focusing on the economic then reveals this 
general context, while taking a non-economic perspective means accepting certain basic 
assumptions of the existing order.  Class struggle is thus still a representation of the social Real, 
or what the political field represses, and there is no absolute line dividing subjects that are socially 
‘excluded’ from those who are ‘included’.  For Devenney, there is a clear contradiction here, 
because, based on notions of contingency, ‘the determining role of class cannot even be viewed.  
Yet this is precisely what is required if the act is to traverse the fundamental fantasy’.
185
  In other 
words, to know how to transcend class antagonism, we need to know what it is in some concrete 
form.  Similarly, Sharpe argues that understanding class divide as antinomy, or an always present 
split in the social, regardless of its content, allows Žižek to avoid examining specific social 
antagonisms, and to attribute the concept of class struggle to political groups almost at will.
186
  
Either class struggle is this Real, or it is particular political struggles, but it cannot be both.  
However, we can support Žižek’s point here that, while no specific subject is class struggle, 
because that is the antagonism in every social, there is a part of each social order that represents 
class struggle.  As such, class struggle can be derived from the groups who are most displaced 
and impoverished in society, and it is always a question of which groups fulfil that role in each 
situation. 
Radical change therefore revolves around society’s ‘part of no part’, or a common need 
for change represented by groups such as the unemployed, imprisoned, or displaced.  In Žižek’s 
terms, these groups are the ‘empty set’, which are represented only as transgressions in the 
dominant view of society, but could also represent society’s failure on its own terms.
187
  What 
Žižek calls ‘politicization proper’ is then a process in which ‘the logic of excluding a particular 
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group is shown to be part of a wider problem’, providing ‘a kind of distilled version of what is 
wrong with society as such’.
188
  This group represents the truth of a situation, and re-signifies 
other oppositions to social contradictions in more radical terms.  In IDLC, Žižek defines four 
possibly destabilising antagonisms in today’s societies: the ecological imbalance of global 
warming and resource shortages; the incompatibility between notions of private property and 
‘intellectual property’; the consequences of technological advances in areas such as biogenetics; 
and new forms of ‘apartheid’ in major cities between middle classes and slum-dwellers.  He 
explains that it is the last of these issues that represents class struggle, as humans are almost 
literally discarded as surplus to requirements, and that the other three only become revolutionary 
through the lens of the fourth.  Critics of ecological waste, biogenetic practices, and intellectual 
property can be progressive or conservative, but ‘the antagonism between the Excluded and the 
Included’ overdetermines ‘the entire terrain of struggle’.
189
 
In our theory of ideology, this notion of class struggle represents an oppositional point 
that counters many of the assumptions of affirmative ideologies.  The issue then is how it may be 
employed to this end.  First, it appears necessary to unite the singular issues and group interests 
of many postmodern political movements, which implicitly highlight contradictions in capitalism 
without actually defining them as such.  Žižek explains for example that workers’ rights campaigns 
should recognise that ‘there is no worker without a capitalist organizing the production process’, 
and that to overcome oppression ‘one has substantially to transform the content of one’s own 
position’,
190
 that is, view it universally or remain a worker.  For Žižek, class opposition must 
reinvigorate the concept of generalised Left movements, which means rejecting Beautiful Souls 
who ‘want a true revolution [but] shirk the actual price to be paid for it’.
191
  He explains that such 
Left liberalism claims to support collective social change, but always postpones considering it due 
to specific humanitarian emergencies, or the threat of ‘totalitarianism’ that ‘relieves us of the duty 
to think, or even actively prevents us from thinking’.
192
  In this view, the eternal delay reflects that 
the liberal Left is comfortable with the current system, and we must choose between accepting its 
struggle within capitalism, or rejecting it and actually confronting class antagonism.  The latter 
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involves recalling that many modern social rights emerged from Left victories, and showing that 
concepts of collectivity and labour struggle need not be replaced by single group issues.  As Žižek 
says, we must decide how ‘to remain faithful to the Old in the new conditions’, because ‘only in 
this way can we generate something effectively New’.
193
  An oppositional ideology is not a matter 
of repeating the past, but of retaining the memory of collective politics and rethinking it for the 
current situation. 
Despite the potential of such an approach, a problem remains that the excluded are often 
not politically active, or in a position to articulate their universality.  Also, as class struggle in 
capitalism has disconnected from the Marxist proletariat, the excluded is a more fragmented 
force, detached from any clear political movement.  As Laclau explains, the unity of class as a 
concept is lost when classes have no concrete identity, and although today ‘there are still 
remainders of full class identities in our world […] the main line of development works in the 
opposite direction’.
194
  Or, as Marcuse effectively observed, the excluded is not equivalent to the 
exploited working class, with its combination of material deprivation, central role in production, 
and potential collective consciousness.  Žižek also describes ‘three fractions of the working class’ 
today as ‘intellectual labourers, the old manual working class, and the outcasts’, all of which 
replace the universal class, and are currently antagonistic to each other.
195
  He notes that even 
the slum-dwellers are not a revolutionary class, because while ‘the classic Marxist working class 
[…] is defined in the precise terms of economic “exploitation” […], the defining feature of the slum-
dwellers is socio-political’.
196
  The difficulty is then how to include the excluded in an oppositional 
political project at all, or create class consciousness where it really matters. 
At certain points, Žižek formulates a potential ‘proletariat’, but these attempts remain 
unconvincing as the three required elements of revolution never intersect.  For example, he states 
that ‘to be a “proletarian” involves assuming a certain subjective stance’, because ‘the line that 
separates the two opposing sides in the class struggle [...] is not the line separating two positive 
social groups, but ultimately radically subjective’.
197
  Elsewhere, he explains that ‘today’s 
proletarians’ are found ‘where there are subjects reduced to a rootless existence, deprived of all 
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substantial links’.
198
  The first of these definitions is advantageous in that it creates a more 
inclusive concept, and implies that individuals from all classes could begin a class movement.  
However, there is no obvious need linking these conscious individuals to those who are materially 
deprived.  Žižek tries to define common ground by explaining that, due to technological and 
environmental issues, we are all proletarians, ‘dispossessed of our symbolic substance, our 
genetic base heavily manipulated, vegetating in an unlivable environment’.
199
  But lacking here is 
any immediate deprivation as experienced by the impoverished slum dwellers, just as this latter 
group has less notion of class consciousness.  Žižek says that, since deprivation is experienced 
in the global slums, ‘we should be looking for signs of the new forms of social awareness that will 
emerge from the slum collectives’.
200
  It seems, however, that such awareness can only emerge 
through mediation between different class representatives of the ‘proletariat’.  Marginality in itself 
is not sufficient for a radical politics,
201
 and the issue remains how to connect the subordinated 
potentials in all classes. 
At the same time, Žižek presumably realises that these attempts to define a proletariat 
demonstrate an incredibly slight potential, as he is aware that no major anti-capitalist politics is 
currently plausible.  He explains that, ‘calls for a radical overthrow of capitalism and its democratic 
political form, […] although necessary in the long run, are meaningless today’.  But, he continues, 
it is not then a matter of turning to local forms of resistance instead, because ‘it is more crucial 
than ever to continue to question the very foundations of capitalism’.
202
  Importantly, for our aims, 
this position Žižek takes is not merely a ‘vain hope of the implosion of capital’, which 
demonstrates ‘profound ignorance of the more complex mechanisms whereby contemporary 
forms of capitalisation function’.
203
  Rather, because the part of no part still represents a need to 
overthrow capitalism, and also the current impossibility of succeeding, anti-capitalism must begin 
through continuous production of alliances between groups and individuals, based on an 
economic logic.  For Žižek, it is still necessary to create a global anti-capitalist project, to avoid 
capitulating to capitalism, but class struggle means opposing ‘concrete political agents and their 
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actions’, while anti-capitalism remains ‘the horizon of all its activity’.
204
  In this sense, Žižek’s 
project is not hugely different from, for example, Laclau and Mouffe’s radical democracy, which 
also attempts to dissolve ideological boundaries, and find common points of articulation, to 
subvert hegemony.
205
  The difference is that it constructs a politics in opposition to capitalism 
specifically, which considers the human excess of capitalist production, for whom change within 
capitalism is inadequate.  Despite the difficulties (which face any unifying political movement 
today), it is a necessary position from our perspective in that it goes beyond interactions between 
contrasting affirmative ideologies, and may therefore create a more radical sense of contingency, 
and the most liberated agent.  
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VI. Political Action 
i) Democracy 
What remains is to consider the actual political moves that may develop into acts, or begin to 
create a class consciousness.  According to our theory of ideology, the aim is to gradually 
increase the presence of alternative thinking by challenging affirmative ideological content.  It is 
therefore necessary to negate dominant ideas with a positive opposition, which has certain radical 
beliefs and assumptions but also understands the contingency of all belief.  Our argument in this 
section is that Žižek provides us with a form of politics that is sufficiently radical, and implies the 
possibility of slowly building an opposition, but is in some ways still too focused on negation.  That 
is, in line with his concept of the act, Žižek promotes concepts of withdrawal and rejection of 
sacred ideas to create space for alternative thinking, and these concepts can appear to lack 
political direction, or obscure the ideology that motivates them.  To begin with, we analyse Žižek’s 
theory of democracy, and the shift he makes in his work from supporting radical democracy to 
rejecting democracy altogether.  At this stage, we are mainly concerned with defending Žižek’s 
position, because it represents an anti-capitalist politics that specifically aims to place control in 
the hands of the excluded.  The important point here is that Žižek does not actually discard 
democracy, but reformulates it around the excluded, in line with the goals of class politics.  The 
problem is where such a democracy may come from, as there is currently no clear path for it to 
emerge within existing social structures. 
Throughout Žižek’s work on democracy he retains the idea of the irrational Master-
Signifier, which fills the locus of power with some unquestionable notion.  For instance, he 
explains, where the Jacobins attempted to keep the centre of power empty, to protect it from all 
pathological motivation, they effectively took power themselves in ‘the most cunning and at the 
same time the most brutal, unconditional way’.
206
  Following this idea, any democracy also 
necessarily involves some irrational occupant of power, as well as an excluded social element.  In 
his earlier work, Žižek reads the implications of these excesses as a need for radical democracy, 
because of the contradiction it implies.  He accepts that democracy is manipulated and corrupted, 
and it cannot eradicate those factors, but that the abstract notion of democracy acts as ‘a 
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symbolic fact in the absence of which effective democracy […] could not reproduce itself’.
207
  In 
other words, democracy is both a particular realisation revolving around some contingent point, 
and the process of its own evolution, based on the impossibility of realising its universal idea.  For 
Žižek, ‘this split is the very source of the strength of democracy’, if it can ‘take cognizance of the 
fact that its limit lies in itself, in its internal “antagonism”’.
208
  Here, it is not that Žižek distances 
himself from democracy, because it necessarily contains ‘particularistic ideological fantasies’,
209
 
or its hidden excess has ‘sinister connotations’, aligned ‘with bureaucratic idiocy, illegal 
transgressions, racist jouissance, patriarchal sexism, and so forth’.
210
  Rather, it is precisely 
recognition of the ideological fantasy, corruption and irrational excess in democracy that gives the 
concept its dialectical momentum. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, Žižek changes his position as he identifies democracy as 
the major obstacle to social change, in the sense that people trust in the existing democratic 
process.  He states that, ‘What, today, prevents the radical questioning of capitalism itself is 
precisely the belief in the democratic form of the struggle against capitalism.’
211
  Democracy 
cannot fulfil the role of addressing deep antagonisms constitutive of capitalist society, so he 
considers whether it is ‘so discredited by its predominant use that, perhaps, one should take the 
risk of abandoning it to the enemy’.
212
  In such comments, Žižek in fact points to a particular 
understanding of democracy, in which voting and other formal aspects of liberal democracy 
become a kind of panacea.  Yet, because in today’s society there is an almost immediate 
association between liberal democracy and democracy as such, it may seem that anti-capitalist 
politics has to counter democracy itself to undermine its liberal form. 
In taking this step, Žižek also distances himself from radical democracy, on the basis that 
its appeal to the empty universal of democracy is filled by a hidden supplement.  For Žižek, 
theories of radical democracy are problematic when they equate recognising the universality of 
social antagonism with an ability to keep democracy open, or function without fantasy.  For 
example, Laclau speaks of maintaining a gap ‘between the particularity of the normative order 
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and the universality of the ethical moment’, and states that ‘the only democratic society is one 
which permanently shows the contingency of its own foundations’.
213
  Meanwhile, Stavrakakis 
argues against Žižek that ‘democratic lack can acquire a non-essentialist positive existence’, and 
that we can sacrifice ‘our libidinal, fantasmatic/symptomatic attachment to symbolic authority’, to 
‘really enjoy the signifier of the lack in the Other’.
214
  Such ideas, we assert, either imply that 
social stability is problematic because the law is always undermined by admission of its own 
contingency,
215
 or that hegemony shifts to a higher level, in which insistence on the ‘emptiness’ of 
power gives power to those who define emptiness.  Žižek focuses on this second point, and 
states that ‘the democratic empty place and the discourse of totalitarian fullness are strictly 
correlative’, because ‘it is meaningless to […] advocate a “radical” democracy which would avoid 
this unpleasant supplement’.
216
  Concepts such as the empty place do not acknowledge their own 
positive ideology, which, as Daly puts it, ‘reproduces the fantasy that it can submit everything 
(including global economic activity) to conscious political control and that we could change if we 
really wanted to’.
217
  Even a self-reflexive democracy must have an excess that is naturalised via 
fantasy, so ‘enjoying the lack’ ensures these norms remain authoritative. 
What is missing specifically in radical democracy, for Žižek, is a notion of class struggle, 
as the antagonism that remains repressed by the constitution of any form of law.  Žižek illustrates 
this point in a critique of Mouffe’s pluralist ‘agonistic’ democracy, in which different discourses 
meet as adversaries rather than enemies, to enable a variety of political positions to each propose 
‘its own interpretation of the “common good”, and [try] to implement a different form of 
hegemony’.
218
  For Mouffe, this democracy is not a matter of rational consensus, or agreement 
without exclusion, but the principle of democratic contestation should remain regardless of the 
hegemony established.  Žižek here points to a ‘key political struggle’ besides ‘the agonistic 
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competition within the field of the admissible’, which is ‘the struggle for the delimitation of this 
field, for the definition of the line which will separate the legitimate adversary from the illegitimate 
enemy’.
219
  That is, some position is already excluded to establish the agonistic system in the first 
place.  Mouffe explains that the beginning point is ‘a certain amount of consensus’ around ‘ethico-
political principles’, and confrontation should be between different interpretations of these 
principles, which include ‘liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, 
and so on’.
220
  Absent from this list is any clearly anti-capitalist position, which would require a 
different institutional system from some of the other discourses to be able to effectively compete.  
As Žižek says, this limit point represents the undemocratic assumption behind democratic 
inclusion, and is ‘overdetermined by the fundamental social antagonism (“class struggle”)’, that 
‘cannot ever be adequately translated into the form of democratic competition’.
221
 
Žižek’s approach to democracy thus centres on the inclusion of class struggle, and his 
opposition to established forms of democratic participation is defined against a democratic 
explosion of popular will.  This effective ‘act’ of democracy, for Žižek, appears anti-democratic in 
the sense that it represents what is repressed by existing democracy.  Its success involves re-
signifying the symbolic order, by exceeding normal procedure and becoming institutionalised ‘in 
the guise of its opposite, as revolutionary-democratic terror’.
222
  Consequently, this counter 
democracy is not a dictatorship that replaces democracy, but a subversion of the limits of existing 
democracy into a new form.  Žižek explains via Lenin that liberal democracy should be seen in 
this way as bourgeois dictatorship, because ‘the very form of the bourgeois-democratic state, the 
sovereignty of its power in its ideologico-political presuppositions, embodies a “bourgeois” 
logic’.
223
  Liberal democracy is democracy within capitalism, and therefore reveals its ‘dictatorial 
dimension’ if the overall background that sustains it is questioned.  In these terms, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat is a democracy formulated around the excluded in society, which negates the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.  It also has limits, but the important factor is who controls state 
power, and what the effects of that control are.  Žižek says, ‘if the price of being freed from the 
invisible hand of the market is to be controlled by the visible hand of new rulers’, it is worth it ‘if the 
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visible hand is visible to and controlled by the “part of no part”’.
224
  The important question is 
whether decisions are ‘made in the public space, through the engaged participation of the 
majority’, and if not, ‘it is of secondary importance if we have parliamentary democracy and 
freedom of individual choices’.
225
 
This concept of democracy marks a clear distinction between existing institutions and a 
potential beyond them.  It therefore represents an ‘oppositional’ ideology in the sense of seeking 
change based on the contingency of the economic and political logics in the social order.  Also, 
while it is unclear whether Žižek’s abandoning of the term ‘democracy’, rather than attempting to 
re-signify it, constitutes the most effective approach, it remains a commitment to a mass 
movement.  However, although Žižek’s proposal is more inclusive than Marcuse’s consideration 
of ‘dictatorship’, it shares the problem that there is no large-scale, anti-establishment political 
explosion on the horizon.  In other words, it does not take us beyond Marcuse’s political impasse, 
in that self-determination means first escaping established democratic procedure, which requires 
a self-determined subject to change social relations in advance.  In fact, Žižek observes that 
citizens in constitutional democracies resemble the (Hegelian) formal monarch, who merely ‘signs 
off’ on administrative measures decided elsewhere, and it is a question of ‘how to maintain the 
appearance that the king effectively makes decisions, when we all know this not to be true’.
226
  It 
then remains to be considered how a large-scale rejection of established democracy can 
gradually come to fruition, in ways that may even involve forms of democratic participation. 
 
ii) Refusal 
At this point, we examine whether the political tactics Žižek suggests are compatible with this 
gradual development.  Žižek places a strong emphasis on a politics of refusal, because a great 
deal of political activity is ‘pseudo-activity’ that merely appears to be doing something, based on 
an ‘urge to […] “participate”, to mask the Nothingness of what goes on’.
227
  We understand here 
that Žižek does not literally recommend that people do nothing, but instead choose behaviour that 
exceeds accepted forms of participation.  However, we question whether refusal has sufficient 
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political direction, and whether its goals can really be separated from established politics.  As with 
traversing the fantasy and the act, Žižek sometimes focuses exclusively on the negating power of 
refusal, which ‘clears the table’ of positive ideas before introducing specific political ideas.  Yet, in 
other cases, he implies a need to maintain certain forms of ordinary political participation to reach 
particular ends.  We therefore maintain that it is necessary to be more specific about how refusal 
and participation function together, and the ideological assumptions motivating the movement. 
Žižek defines three kinds of act that contrast with the act proper, because they only add to 
existing debates or cause momentary disruption: the hysterical act that ‘stages’ its complaint for 
the ruling order; the passage à l’acte that merely strikes out blindly (and violently) in impotence; 
and a symbolic act that stands in for a political programme, such as a cultural statement.
228
  The 
hysterical act forms demands and claims for rights that, as such, continue to recognise the 
existing authority.  The act of striking out (such as riots), meanwhile, disturbs the social structure 
momentarily, but does not restructure its symbolic coordinates.  As Žižek says, ‘an authentic 
political gesture […] enforces a vision, while outbursts of impotent violence are fundamentally […] 
a reaction to some disturbing intruder’.
229
  Finally, the cultural act is similar, for Žižek, in that, 
although aesthetic spectacle is clearly very different from spontaneous violence, ‘there is a 
deeper “identity of the opposites” at work’, in that both are performative representations of 
frustrations that cannot name them and do not touch on the political real.
230
  These three acts are 
thus incorporated within the establishment, in constitutional democracy, the legal system, and 
commodified culture respectively. 
The radical alternative, according to Žižek, is a symbolic violence that disturbs society’s 
apparent balance and introduces a point of separation.  Rather than the violence of the passage à 
l’acte, or a fascist spectacle that stands in for real change, revolution requires the violence of 
refusal.  The gesture is encapsulated, for Žižek, in the phrase ‘I would prefer not to’, spoken by 
Herman Melville’s character, Bartleby the scrivener.  It is passive refusal that causes the wheels 
of procedure to grind to a halt, and as such is a non-violence that is extremely violent in its 
effects.  Žižek explains that such refusal allows us to pass from a politics ‘which parasitizes upon 
what it negates, to a politics which opens up a new space outside the hegemonic position and its 
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negation’.
231
  In effect, maintaining the system as it is requires more effort than changing it, ‘so 
that the first gesture to provoke a change in the system is to withdraw activity, to do nothing’.
232
  
Even certain forms of apparently subversive activity contribute to the energy needed to sustain 
the system, and simply stopping would be more productive for political change. 
It should be noted, however, that this ‘doing nothing’ is not exactly the complete 
withdrawal that Žižek’s reference to Bartleby implies.  That is, it is not that he ‘affirms only 
something like […] individual subjective withdrawal from the concrete options open in the 
present’.
233
  Instead, it represents a politics whose first move is to refuse the terms of the debate, 
or the totality represented through a limited choice, such as liberalism and conservatism, and 
choose its hidden excess.  The aim is effectively to make the impossibility of radical change 
possible by treating it as a genuine option, as ‘the greatest fear of the rulers is that these voices 
will start to reverberate and reinforce each other in solidarity’.
234
  As with Marcuse, revolution can 
become necessity only once it has become a possibility, and Žižek states that, whereas in the 
early 20
th
 century it was clear what the Left needed to do, but not when to do it, today ‘we do not 
know what we have to do, but we have to act now, because the consequence of non-action could 
be disastrous’.
235
  The necessary radical move is then this abyssal negation of existing 
domination, to make space for politics.  For example, with the environmental crisis, for Žižek, we 
must insist upon drastic, preventative action (and risk appearing absurd if there is no 
catastrophe), rather than choose between doing nothing or taking limited measures that do not 
disrupt the social order.
236
  In that sense, refusal is the most active approach. 
What is less clear here is whether Žižek sees Bartleby politics as any rejection of 
dominant terms, or one which has a clear political alternative in mind from the beginning.  In our 
understanding, refusal cannot connect with radical progressive politics unless it already 
challenges affirmative ideologies based on particular notions of revolutionary possibility.  But, in 
some cases, Žižek’s description of refusal presents it more as indeterminate negation, such as 
when he suggests that a ‘zero-level’ or ‘empty form of protest […] deprived of concrete content’, is 
needed to ‘open up the space into which concrete demands and projects of change can then 
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inscribe themselves’.
237
  Elsewhere, he also says ‘it is all too simple to oppose this passage à 
l’acte directly to the authentic political act’, and we ‘have to accept the risk that a blind violent 
outburst will be followed by its proper politicization’.
238
  Yet, as we have seen, this ‘zero-level’ 
describes a ‘missed encounter’ that has already been sutured by a politics, while a ‘blind violent 
outburst’ represents an expression of misdirected rage.  As such, all protest is determinate to 
some degree, and there is no likely correlation between blind outbursts and progressive 
alternatives.  At other points, Žižek implies that refusal is a more deliberate and directed political 
action.  For example, he states that Bartleby’s attitude remains the permanent foundation in a 
radical movement, so ‘the very frantic and engaged activity of constructing a new order is 
sustained by an underlying “I would prefer not to” which forever reverberates in it’.
239
  Here, 
Bartleby signifies a sentiment or principle that runs throughout a specific politics, whose agents 
presumably also have in mind what they would prefer. 
In more practical terms, it is also not clear whether refusal is to be applied at all times, or 
whether negation is best achieved through forms of sanctioned participation in some situations.  
For instance, Žižek suggests that individuals could subtract themselves from politics by making a 
conscious decision to not vote, which may eventually undermine the government’s legitimacy.  
But, he adds, while in principle ‘one should be indifferent to the struggle between the liberal and 
conservative poles of today’s official politics’, in fact ‘one can only afford to be indifferent if the 
liberal option is in power’.
240
  With such an idea, it seems that radicals should only refuse if they 
are sure the liberals will win (and retain legitimacy), because a conservative win would further 
solidify dominant discourse.  On another occasion, Žižek criticises Critchley’s notion of making 
infinite, unfulfillable demands against the state, and argues that it is more subversive ‘to bombard 
those in power with strategically well-selected precise, finite demands’, which the government 
cannot simply dismiss.
241
  The implication here is that demands to the state as such are not 
problematic because they recognise the incumbent power, only certain kinds of demands.  Yet 
Žižek does not then specify which demands are compatible with refusal, or how to determine 
when they may be productive. 
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It is difficult to reconcile these notions with others in which Žižek encourages non-
participation at all costs.  At one point, he explains that ‘I would prefer not to’ means not only not 
participating ‘in capitalist competition and profiteering’, but refusing ‘to give to charity to support a 
Black orphan in Africa, engage in the struggle to prevent oil-drilling in a wildlife swamp, send 
books to educate our liberal-feminist-spirited women in Afghanistan’, and so on, because these 
actions contribute to maintaining the capitalist machinery.
242
  In this sense, refusal involves 
accepting disastrous short term consequences for various people, and, as Dean says of this 
comment, although it confronts the existing Left with its complicity in the current system, it 
appears as ‘the provocation of a catastrophe’, especially for those most vulnerable, ‘in the hope 
that an act will somehow occur’.
243
  Furthermore, such blanket withdrawal implies not only the risk 
of defying liberal fearmongering about totalitarianism, but that of leaving the political 
consequences to chance.  Overall, it thus seems necessary to balance concepts of withdrawal 
and participation, to create a mediation between the everyday and the radically different, as 
suggested by Jameson’s theory of Utopia.  Also, it may be fruitful to emphasise refusals that 
target capitalism and the affirmative aspects of political participation more specifically, such as 
simply buying less, as a means of rejecting individualist choice for more collective political 
involvement.  
 
iii) The Party 
Refusal is not merely a matter of individual decision, for Žižek, and he recognises that it must be 
organised into a movement which can influence individuals to take responsibility for their symbolic 
attachments.  He thus constructs a concept of ‘the Party’, as a force of leadership that 
demonstrates the possibilities of negation.  As he describes it, the Party and its leaders develop 
reciprocally with a movement, in that the Party’s universal structure is filled by people’s particular 
grievances.  It therefore represents a form of political opposition that mediates between abstract 
ideals and everyday concerns, and is self-reflexive and open to different content.  However, 
despite the importance of these qualities (which can combine with Jameson’s theory of Utopia 
and Marcuse’s concept of radical educators), Žižek emphasises the Party’s negating effects over 
any positive beliefs that define the leadership’s initial framework.  In our understanding, the Party 
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inevitably privileges a certain perception of social issues, and it must be clear about the limits that 
structure its opposition to remain open.  This notion is important if the Party is to become the 
unifying point of a political movement, because it involves challenging conscious rationalisations 
of affirmative ideologies, and its ideological content overdetermines these challenges, as well as 
the alternative direction desired. 
Žižek explains that radical politics requires a certain organisation and conceptualisation, 
in what he describes as ‘the tetrad of people-movement-party-leader’.
244
  The idea is to maintain a 
relationship of mutual influence between these terms, with none assuming the position of absolute 
control or knowledge.  Thus, he says, ‘the authority of the Party is not that of determinate positive 
knowledge, but that of the form of knowledge, of a new type of knowledge linked to a collective 
political subject’.
245
  In this way, the Party introduces and maintains class consciousness, and 
turns resistance into a revolutionary project by emphasising class struggle in terms of the 
excluded, and the lack of the big Other.  Meanwhile, the content of the movement is produced by 
people within it, under this anti-big Other framework.  As such, for Žižek, ‘there is no “true” party 
line waiting to be discovered’, as it ‘emerges out of the zigzag of oscillations’, or ‘through the 
mutual interaction of subjective decisions’.
246
  The leader is then the element that unifies Party 
and people by literally taking the lead, rather than being a Master who objectifies the subject-
supposed-to-know, or claims to speak for the will of the people.  As Žižek puts it, the ‘authentic 
Master’ frees people from fear of acting by saying ‘something like: “Don’t be afraid, look, I’ll do it, 
this thing you’re so afraid of, and I’ll do it for free — not because I have to, but out of my love for 
you; I’m not afraid”’.
247
  The Master is a vanishing mediator who embodies a freedom beyond 
symbolic horizons, and demonstrates that it is realisable. 
As with the intellectual leadership discussed by Marcuse, the largely negative role Žižek 
gives to the Party means it does not prescribe what a specific movement should involve.  Yet, 
also as with Marcuse, Žižek is then criticised for a merely formal commitment to revolution.  
According to Laclau, Žižek demands that we replace liberal democracies with ‘a thoroughly 
different regime which he does not have the courtesy of letting us know anything about’.
248
  That 
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is, Žižek simply dismisses existing political efforts, without theorising any concrete alternatives.  
Similarly, Samuels argues that, since Žižek merely criticises actual (non-revolutionary) politics, he 
‘denies the real effects the women’s rights, worker’s rights, civil rights, and gay rights movements 
have had on changing our political and social systems’.
249
  For us, however, Žižek does not 
dismiss all existing politics, or claim that past left-wing gains have been worthless, and often 
positively registers unexpected political ruptures symbolised by even moderate left-wing victories 
(Obama in the US, Syriza in Greece).  If Žižek does not fully endorse specific movements, it is 
more ‘because they will inevitably be caught up in the logic of capital, a logic which has 
hegemonised hegemony’.
250
  In other words, particular progressive moments in recent history 
demonstrate the possibility of acts, but cannot themselves resist dominant forces because they 
are not explicitly opposed to capitalism.  Moreover, the main reasons for not formulating clear 
political content are to avoid constructing a rigid party line, and to reveal an excess in the norms 
of discourse.  As Glynos explains, the ‘attempt to predict outcomes can only rely on current 
standards and ideals’, which calculate radical proposals based on ‘foundational guarantees 
rooted in our current ethico-political horizon’.
251
  In this way, if Žižek sometimes overemphasises 
the ‘abyssal’ quality of radical politics, he also effectively occupies the position of the analyst,
252
 
which provides a framework for a conversation between transcendental ideals and practical 
measures. 
The issue we have with Žižek’s concept of the Party is again similar to that of Marcuse’s 
radical education, that is, not emphasising enough how certain political solutions are inevitably 
already implied by the leadership.  First, the individuals who form the Party have motivations for 
doing so, and their already formed ideas become part of the Party’s foundations.  Second, the 
leadership cannot avoid being the figure of transference, or a knowing subject, in demonstrating 
what is possible rather than simply announcing the contingency of the social order.  Here, the 
leader is analogous to the analyst, in that, as ‘the lure of the analyst’s knowledge makes the 
analysand create knowledge for him or herself’, it is ‘through the emancipatory activities of the 
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leader or leaders’ that ‘individuals realize that they themselves are the final repositories of 
power’.
253
  However, in transference onto the leader the subject experiences negation by following 
the leader’s specific actions and aims, and, if we do not acknowledge this political content, the 
Party may be more dogmatic and less open to content from the movement that might redefine 
revolutionary goals.  For example, in describing revolutionary-egalitarian justice, Žižek defines 
‘trust in the people’ as ‘the wager that a large majority of the people supports […] severe 
measures, sees them as its own, and is ready to participate in their enforcement’.
254
  Here, the 
Party makes an assumption about what people need and will support, using ‘the logic of the future 
anterior’, or an ‘idea of the people as if a future construction of the people was already in place’.
255
  
While this assumption is a way of resisting populism, it must also involve a prescription of political 
content based on the knowledge of the Party, rather than the movement.  Without engagement 
between populist demand and the Party’s concept of needs, the Party acts for ‘the people’ as an 
abstract concept, which resembles an ideological statement Žižek associates with totalitarianism.  
Here, Sharpe and Boucher are justified to ask ‘whether the Leader could express the political will 
of the revolutionary vanguard in any other way than by messianically imposing it upon the 
lumpenproletariat, who would in turn impose it on society’.
256
  To avoid this possibility, in our view, 
the Party needs to acknowledge the content of its position from the beginning, so it may be 
developed through the composition of the movement. 
As with Marcuse, Žižek thus effectively presents leaders (educators) as a group that 
understands social problems, and the movement (students) as a group that experiences them.  
For example, in his analysis of Occupy Wall Street, Žižek argues that the protests successfully 
created an opening for rethinking politics, especially by rejecting ordinary political debate (a 
statement of ‘I would prefer not to’).  Yet, he explains, once this step has been taken, such a 
movement should also discuss what it does want, and create debate around new Master-
Signifiers that suggest practical political measures.
257
  In a sense, for Žižek, these protests call for 
a new Master, but it is not that there is some leader figure who simply knows the answers.  
Rather, the people and potential leaders have different gaps in their knowledge, or, ‘it is the 
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people who have the answers, they just do not know the questions to which they have (or, rather, 
are) the answer’.
258
  But, from our perspective, the unity is important in that both sides can 
contribute something to form and content.  Not only does the leader bring some content with their 
structuring role, but the people and movement can contribute ideas about the overall meaning 
and goal of their refusal. 
Finally, we may ask why subjects might decide to follow the Party (or the ideas of 
individuals who may retrospectively be identified as the Party), if their aims are not already 
revolutionary.  In analysis, only once subjects recognise a need to submit themselves to the 
process does transference occur, and in the sense that the leader equates to the analyst, the 
subject must experience social symptoms and view the Party as the best option to address them.  
But, if fantasies allow subjects to redirect blame for social symptoms onto others, it is not clear 
why anyone who is not already a revolutionary should look to the Party.  Seen in this way, the 
Party can only increase its influence if, in line with our concept of ideology, symbolic attachments 
are susceptible to change due to the fantasy being affected by contradictory experience and 
knowledge.  In particular, the kind of knowledge that may challenge affirmative ideological beliefs 
is that within the oppositional ideology of the Party itself.  As such, if the growth of the Party 
depends partly on external circumstances weakening affirmative rationalisations, it also depends 
on the extent to which the beliefs represented by the Party gain an alternative presence.  The 
particular assumptions that contribute to the Party’s constitution are then the prerequisite for its 
power to negate, and for the gradual growth of a radical movement.   
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VII. Conclusion 
Our first aim in this chapter has been to affirm the idea of the Symbolic-Real split, in the contexts 
of both ideology theory and social change.  The Real indicates that there is no external reason for 
interpellation into the Symbolic, which then forms the basis of ideology, because this lack must be 
hidden by a fantasy that structures rationalisation or conscious belief.  Žižek also allows us to 
understand a split in symbolic attachments at the level of the symbolic Real, or around an empty 
Master Signifier, which includes and excludes certain content.  Where he, like Jameson, presents 
this split as a question of class struggle, this view of social relations assumes a universal aspect, 
which implies the possibility of re-signification beyond the current Master-Signifier.  Our 
understanding of ideology effectively follows these structures, and Žižek’s analysis of ideological 
positions also enables us to develop our ideology map, by introducing detailed consideration of 
the different psychological reactions involved. 
At the same time, Žižek’s understanding of ideology contrasts with our own, particularly in 
the way he prioritises unconscious belief over conscious rationalisation.  In Žižek’s notion of the 
subject, the fantasy covers inconsistencies to maintain the basic attachment to the Master-
Signifier, regardless of their content, and ideology is sustained primarily through the enjoyment of 
simply obeying.  Furthermore, the dominant fetishistic mode of ideology makes conscious ideas 
even less susceptible to contradiction, as they already distance themselves from behaviour.  
Against this idea, we have shown throughout the chapter that thoughts and actions remain 
connected, so that a conditional justification supports fetishistic disavowal, and different forms of 
justification demonstrate a more or less direct commitment to systemic goals.  In this way, fantasy 
and enjoyment have a reciprocal relationship, in that ideological attachment both produces the 
fantasy and relies on the fantasy retaining certain kinds of coherence for its stability. 
These arguments have then framed our analysis of potentials for change, both in terms of 
how subjects may become politically active and the kinds of activity that may be productive.  In 
many ways, Žižek’s theory points towards the type of gradual development of alternative ideas, 
and the need to mediate between radical ideals and everyday political language, that we have 
promoted in previous chapters.  The possibility of an agent that can make a move beyond 
dominant symbolic norms, and the way Žižek defines an anti-democracy politics that rejects these 
norms and organises itself in the Party, suggest steps towards a dialectical negation of the 
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existing whole.  From our perspective, however, it is necessary to focus on the role of oppositional 
ideology in creating the conditions for this negation by challenging the content of existing 
affirmative fantasies.  Žižek, conversely, tends to prioritise negation over its cause, or valorise the 
opening up of alternative horizons in itself (especially as he believes that ideology critique is 
ineffective).  Our insistence on formulating a particular oppositional ideology to cause negation, 
that will also affect what comes after, then becomes part of political strategy.  We thus conclude 
that the politics of refusal and the act, as well as the role of the Party, should be focused on 
creating breaks with political norms through specific challenges to affirmative rationalisations of 
those norms.  This approach entails the possibility of subjects shifting their ideological 
attachments based on new knowledge or experience. 
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Chapter 5 
 Conclusion 
The preceding chapters have reiterated a number of key points regarding the theorisation of 
ideology and how such theory affects approaches to political change.  We have constructed these 
ideas both on foundations provided by Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, and against aspects of their 
theory.  Most fundamentally, these three theorists demonstrate the value of a dialectical view of 
society, which compares existing social relations to unrealised potentials implied by their 
developments and contradictions.  In this way, there is an effective division between ideologies, 
based on whether individuals view society in terms of this excess, or what could be, rather than 
only consider what is.  In terms of radical politics, the question of ideology then becomes that of 
how mass consciousness might shift from a one-dimensional or fragmented mentality to two-
dimensional, historicised thinking.  In particular, this shift appears to rest on the possibility of 
individuals recognising a constitutive antagonism in the socio-economic structure, in the sense 
that the very form of existing social relations creates a certain excluded or outside part, which 
embodies contradictions in proclaimed social values.  As such, these excluded groups represent 
a necessity for change, which in turn suggests a need to reconsider dominant social priorities.  
This class antagonism is a unifying factor between the works of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, as 
well as our own theory. 
The ideological split between ‘affirmative’ and ‘oppositional’ ideology then forms one part 
of a ‘two-tiered’ concept, whose other element is rationalisation.  Here, Žižek’s theory offers a 
basis for the relationship between the two-levels, in the way that a gap in subjective interpellation 
is repressed by imagined external justifications for the subject’s position.  Žižek also shows that 
this sheer negative excess is not some utopian impulse towards greater collectivity (as Marcuse 
and Jameson suggest), because drive is merely that which remains partially unfulfilled by 
sublimation.  There is simply something in the subject not identical with its symbolic self, which 
implies potential for some form of radical break.  However, in our understanding, Žižek still does 
not view the content of rationalisation as central to sustaining ideological commitment, so its role 
remains limited as in Marcuse and Jameson’s work.  In effect, unconscious belief and automatic 
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acceptance predominate these theories, whereas we have argued for the equal importance of 
basic ideological attachment (affirmation or opposition) and its rationalisation.  Thus, although 
subjects must be interpellated into language and culture to formulate reasons for that 
interpellation, the reasons themselves may affect the subject’s ideological orientation in turn, even 
leading to significant behavioural change. 
We have then considered how this concept of ideology applies to particular social 
circumstances, and specifically the forms of late, advanced or consumer capitalism described by 
Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek.  The main point that has emerged in this respect is that of an 
overall background of social demands, which is not directly experienced, but to which all 
ideologies are responses of some kind.  For Jameson and Žižek, this guiding force makes itself 
invisible through a logic of difference and a lack of clear authority.  It appears that there is an 
endless range of demands on subjects to consume and recognise others that has a bewildering 
or fragmenting effect on the psyche, so the task is to somehow show that a structure still exists.  
Conversely, through Marcuse’s concepts of the performance principle and repressive 
desublimation, there is a clearer sense of direction and limitation in these demands, which neither 
undermines the superego nor turns it fully into an injunction for consumerist enjoyment.  
Therefore, while the consumer-producer balance is no longer represented by a clear separation 
between work and leisure, as in Marcuse’s time, affirmative rationalisations are clear belief 
systems that obey an overall demand by investing in certain institutional authorities over others. 
Having theorised this structure behind the complex demands of consumer capitalist 
society, it becomes possible to imagine alternatives, based on the contradictions and exclusions it 
creates.  Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek all note in different ways how the primacy in capitalism of 
economic growth and profitmaking leads to massive waste, environmental destruction, 
impoverishment and imperialist expansion.  To challenge these problems on a sufficiently large 
scale therefore means confronting dominant ideas regarding social needs, and fundamental 
features of the capitalist mode of production.  More specifically, it is a task that requires a mass 
political movement centred on class, or constitutive forms of economic and political exclusion in 
existing social relations.  One of the main questions in this regard has been that of who could be 
the agents to start or join such a revolutionary movement.  Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek all 
emphasise that there is no singular revolutionary class in consumer capitalism that replaces the 
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industrial proletariat, and it is clear that any such potential is now split and spread among different 
classes.  Furthermore, as Jameson demonstrates in particular, it is difficult to identify a logic that 
can connect the issues faced by one class to those faced by another.  We have thus maintained 
that the important point is to focus on pockets of ‘class consciousness’ present in elements within 
each class, which may represent a beginning point for connectivity. 
The other main question is how a radical political movement may develop, not only as a 
result of worsening material circumstances, but through deliberate attempts to change dominant 
perceptions.  In this respect, it is clear that there is no current likelihood of sudden change, or of a 
mass class movement, and any attempt to force such a theory (as in Marcuse’s minority 
dictatorship) seems implausible.  Consequently, we have highlighted ideas in each chapter that 
suggest a gradual development of political change, in which utopian ideals must mediate with 
everyday problems, and disruptive protest must combine with established political participation.  
Here, Marcuse’s ‘step by step’ approach and concept of negative education, as well as Žižek’s 
concept of the Party, imagine dialogue between leaders and activists.  Meanwhile, Jameson’s 
theory of Utopia demonstrates a means of bridging a gap between otherwise mutually exclusive 
discourses.  However, these theories either assume that the subjects with whom it is possible to 
communicate are already involved in protest politics (Marcuse, Žižek), or that the aim is merely to 
reintroduce the possibility of historicising thought, rather than to actually create a specific political 
movement (Jameson).  Conversely, we have suggested that such an approach could have an 
impact on affirmative forms of ideology, if oppositional political ideals can gain sufficient social 
presence.  
This notion of presence leads to another consideration, which is the extent to which 
radical political ideas can be effectively expressed through commodified cultural channels.  As we 
have seen, Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek emphasise the de-historicisation and de-
contextualisation of culture by media structures, and how market demands marginalise 
oppositional ideas.  While we see these analyses as largely realistic, we have also argued that 
there remains space for alternative ideas to be produced and received, and perhaps even to 
become sufficiently prominent that they begin to cause doubt and uncertainty in affirmative 
ideologies.  Without ignoring the cultural dominance of certain narratives, this understanding 
focuses on gaps in the dominant structure of cultural production and distribution, such as the way 
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it does not explicitly censor content, or control how content is received.  Furthermore, the 
emphasis here is not only on Marcuse’s notion of ‘high art’, whose utopian form would not be 
widely comprehensible until a shift in political sensibilities had already occurred.  Rather, while we 
affirm Marcuse’s criticism of anti-intellectual protest, it seems that a mass movement must utilise 
more direct political communication and popular cultural forms. 
With each of these issues surrounding radical change, our overarching point has been 
the need for a modified approach to ideology that gives more attention to the conscious 
dimension, and shifts the scope of political possibility.  In our view, attempts to emphasise the 
potential to increase oppositional sensibility in existing social conditions rest on the notion that 
affirmative ideologies can be challenged through their conscious rationalisations.  As such, 
ideology cannot be understood fully through formulations of ego weakness (Marcuse) or psychic 
fragmentation (Jameson), according to which subjects simply assimilate dominant demands, and 
behaviour is not always a clear measure of ideological commitment (Žižek).  Rather, there is a 
certain agency even in affirmative ideology, in that subjects accept their social positions 
conditionally and are capable of moving beyond those positions if they perceive that those 
conditions are not met.  Ideology involves beliefs and assumptions based on values that are 
susceptible to challenge in some way, and the social structure depends on the support of these 
ideologies.  Our analysis of political change proceeds from this notion. 
Having understood ideology in this way, it has then been important to examine what kind 
of beliefs and conditions different ideologies have, if they are to be challenged.  We have 
therefore identified various ideological positions, which enables us to see how certain ideologies 
may be more susceptible to opposition than others, as they involve more indirect commitment to 
the status quo.  These positions have been drawn from the work of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, 
where they describe different forms of ideological internalisation, but our approach also considers 
the contrast between these positions as much as their overall unity of affirmation, and does not 
assume that certain positions are especially representative of current social circumstances.  In 
particular, the focus on cynicism in Jameson and Žižek’s theories suggests that individuals 
understand social problems but support the system regardless, which indicates that belief in 
absolutes is no longer a major component of ideology.  Against this point, we have argued that 
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such ideologies still involve fundamental assumptions, and that non-cynical ideologies also retain 
a significant presence. 
These ideological positions can then be arranged in what we have called an ideology 
map, outlining their various features.  The content of this map, as developed through our analyses 
of Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek, consists of the eight positions defined below, and provides 
summaries in terms of beliefs, justificatory arguments and awareness of social issues.  This 
individual analysis of ideologies identifies many of the deep assumptions relating to affirmative 
ideologies in consumer capitalist societies.  Most significantly, it also allows us to ascertain which 
positions are more susceptible to oppositional challenges, what kinds of information or radical 
ideas may be most effective against particular assumptions, and how oppositional politics might 
communicate with everyday political thinking.  In this sense, some essential aspects of such 
ideological challenge are already apparent.  For example, it appears necessary to revive a notion 
of progress through mass participation both inside and outside established democratic channels; 
cultivate narratives that counter demands for excessive labour and excessive consumerism, 
based on alternative conceptions of individual and social needs; retain a commitment to pluralist 
participation, or inclusion of the marginalised parts within society, in opposition to cultural 
fundamentalisms.  As we have seen, current social conditions mean that the expansion of such 
ideas will be a gradual process, but, as Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek all show, taking an 
oppositional stance that commits to the possibility and necessity of radical change is the first step. 
 
Ideology Map 
Throughout the thesis, the process of constructing a theoretical basis for the study of ideology has 
also involved identifying ideological positions and their content.  We have thus outlined certain 
features that either distinguish affirmative ideologies from one another, or connect them in some 
way.  At this point, we can summarise those preliminary findings to establish a starting point for 
further research.  The idea is that we may analyse various facets of culture to further understand 
the conscious supports for affirmative ideology that exist today, and the prevalence of particular 
beliefs and assumptions.  To fulfil this proposal, it is useful to have a basic framework of 
ideological positions already defined, so that we have some concept of the patterns of 
rationalisation to be examined and challenged.  This analysis may be centred on investigations of 
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particular themes, such as those mentioned above (attitudes to work, consumerism, democracy), 
represented in political and media texts, as well as individuals’ own accounts, to consider how 
different rationalisations relate to dominant (late capitalist) social demands. 
As previously mentioned, the positions we have developed to this point merely represent 
a preliminary sketch, and are not meant to represent an exhaustive catalogue of affirmative 
ideologies.  They do, however, cover a wide range of beliefs that include a variety of cynical ideas 
as well as more direct forms of attachment to aspects of late capitalist society.  Also, they are not 
to be seen as rigid designations that individuals adhere to exclusively, as certain beliefs may 
overlap into others.  For example, concepts of individualism or freedom of choice may be relevant 
to different positions in different guises, creating links between them.  Conversely, other positions 
are less compatible, and this incompatibility may be considered to highlight that certain beliefs 
suggest a deeper commitment to existing social relations than others.  In this way, we do not view 
them merely in terms of their higher level unity, or the similar kinds of behaviour they may 
engender, as Marcuse, Jameson and Žižek often do. 
At this stage, we thus end with the following definitions, which should provide the basis to 
further understand how affirmative ideologies connect and contrast with each other, and the 
conditions that maintain them: 
 
Cultural Fundamentalism 
For cultural fundamentalists, social problems such as unemployment and crime result from the 
corruption of traditional (religious or nationalist) structures that are considered timeless and 
unquestionable.  This corruption is then blamed on groups at both ends of the social spectrum — 
permissive liberal elites on one hand, and traditionally oppressed minorities on the other.  Cultural 
fundamentalism implies an awareness of social problems, but little awareness of their economic 
causes, or that apparently ‘universal principles’ are contingent and historically variable. 
 
Economic Fundamentalism 
Economic fundamentalism describes a commitment to neoliberal capitalism based on belief that 
market deregulation, reduction of government and entrepreneurialism are the keys to general 
prosperity.  As such, social problems are caused by government interference in market freedom, 
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which must be resisted at all costs, and individuals contribute to social good through hard work.  
This ideology maintains a utopian optimism that recognises economic inequalities, but believes 
they can be overcome by the market and individual effort, and thus fails to recognise connections 
between market demands and increased poverty. 
 
Humanist Liberalism 
This position involves a belief that scientific rationality can shape society in progressive ways if it 
can resist more irrational forms of thought (such as religious faith).  It tends to understand political 
and economic problems as specific issues that can be countered with reforms to existing 
structures, by utilising enlightenment values, empirical analysis and advanced technology.  Such 
solutions, therefore, do not consider that contradictions may be more systemic, and do not 
distance themselves from existing power relations.  
 
Pluralist Liberalism 
The pluralist liberal affirms existing social relations on the basis that they are inclusive of different 
cultural identities, and believes in tolerance.  As such, any explicit ideological commitment (at 
least if it opposes culturally permissive capitalism) appears totalitarian, and effectively makes 
itself an intolerable enemy whose totalising visions are intrinsically oppressive.  Politically, the 
focus of pluralism is on acceptance of different identities within existing social structures, which 
does not then consider the limits of acceptance due to the class disparities intrinsic to capitalism.  
 
Consumerist Hedonism 
Hedonism in its affirmative form is the idea that self-fulfilment results from maximising pleasure.  
Specifically, this position focuses on a need to live life to the full by seeking enjoyment in terms 
prescribed by consumer advertising and current fashions, which then ties the hedonist into the 
labour necessary to afford and maintain the desired lifestyle.  More than the other positions, 
hedonism implies low awareness of social problems and their causes, or the ability to 
disassociate social degradation from the reproduction of the consumer society.   
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Cynical Self-interest 
This form of cynicism sees that society is heavily flawed and corrupt, but understands that such 
flaws are inevitable in any system due to human nature.  Any kind of political change that might 
disrupt the cynic’s (relatively privileged) social position is thus deemed too risky, and the cynic 
employs various affirmative economic and cultural arguments to maintain this position.  Social 
relations are then fiercely defended, despite high awareness of problems and entrenched power 
structures.  However, cynics are less aware of how human behaviour is socially structured, or 
how social improvements can be achieved through collective effort.    
 
Cynical Resignation 
Cynical resignation involves a more spiritual perception of social issues that distances itself from 
political concerns and makes its peace with existing circumstances.  It re-contextualises political 
participation as insignificant in relation to higher universal powers, and is thus concerned with 
achieving forms of harmony in everyday life.  Any awareness of social problems can thus be 
rationalised away, but in doing so individuals fail to acknowledge their own tacit complicity in 
social inequality and injustice by refusing to confront it.  
 
Cynical Defeatism 
The cynical defeatist is heavily critical of the social system, but either understands that there is no 
way to resist it or that resistance may be even more destructive.  The result is a focus on 
complaint and mockery, aimed at the establishment, with little commitment to actual political 
action, and even a tendency to retreat into escapist consumerism (in part to repress guilt).  This 
ideology represents the highest awareness among those we have described of the deep 
structural contradictions behind social ills, but capitulates in its inability to define weak points in 
the system, and therefore continues to contribute to it.  
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